The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader:

Presidential Speeches with Commentary

John W. Dietrich

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317456643
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Negocios y empresa
• Subtopic: Publicidad

India has become one of the hottest business stories in the news. Covering the fast-growing economy, the twists and turns of domestic politics, labor in the large informal sector, the cultural roots of Hindu nationalism, the foreign relations roller coaster, the business of Bollywood, and a special chapter covering the range of new resources about India available on the web, this unique book highlights and illuminates India's vastly changing fortunes.

Chapter 1

Bush and the World of 2000

For many generations of Americans, there has been one major event that has served as a defining moment in national or world affairs. The attack on Pearl Harbor turned December 7 into a date that would “live in infamy.” The assassination of President John F. Kennedy riveted the country. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) are this generation’s defining event. The images and emotions of that day are seared into the memories of hundreds of millions of people around the world. Since then, Americans have seen dramatic changes in their daily lives, political views, and perceptions of personal and national security.

The events of 9/11 had a particularly powerful effect on the foreign policy of President George W. Bush and his administration. September 11 forced Bush to turn more attention to foreign policy, reinforced his conviction that the country needed strong presidential leadership, and gave him a sense of mission. The attacks also changed Bush’s policy priorities. New challenges, such as building an antiterrorism coalition and overthrowing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq came to the fore, while other issues were lowered on the agenda. In addition, the war on terrorism has redefined who is a U.S. ally and who is an enemy. On a deeper level, 9/11 challenged the continued relevance of the long-standing strategic doctrines of containment and deterrence. Domestically, influence shifted away from Congress toward the executive branch. And among the President’s advisers, power shifted toward those favoring strong responses.

Bush’s foreign policy, therefore, can be divided into two periods. The first period began when presidential candidate Bush laid out his vision of the world and it continued through his first eight months in office. The second period began with the events of 9/11 and continued through the rest of the first Bush administration. Although useful, this division should not be over-read as implying that Bush was completely reborn on 9/11, with no preexisting policy challenges or personal views. Focusing only on the second period would leave the observer with little sense of what Bush’s policies might have been in the absence of 9/11. Bush’s specific actions in response to the attacks would also be harder to understand. Most important, ignoring the first period would make it impossible to judge whether Bush’s longer-term bold, and by some accounts revolutionary, post-9/11 policies are entirely a function of 9/11, or whether those events simply reinforced and refocused his preexisting views on America’s national security and world role. Some background knowledge about Bush’s personal foreign policy experience, his decision-making style, the major policies he planned for his administration, his overall foreign policy vision, and the people he appointed as key advisers is, therefore, crucial to understanding Bush’s foreign policy both before and after 9/11.

Campaign 2000 and the Education of George W. Bush

During the long presidential campaign, foreign policy received little attention in comparison to issues such as taxes, education, and personal character. Traditionally, bold foreign policy debates are rare during campaigns for two key reasons. First, few voters focus great attention on foreign policy except at times of crisis. In 2000, the world seemed relatively safe and calm, and the United States enjoyed vastly superior military, economic, and political power over any potential rising foe. Some policy challenges remained, but the United States mostly enjoyed the rare luxury of choosing when and where it wanted to be engaged. Unsurprisingly, polls during the 2000 campaign showed that only four percent of voters chose an international issue as the most important problem facing the country. Second, candidates prefer to maintain policy flexibility should they be elected, so they rarely go on record with policy specifics.

Some observers speculated, though, that Bush’s lack of foreign policy focus resulted not from a quiet world or campaign strategy, but rather from his inexperience and disinterest in the area. Since his previous top political post had been Governor of Texas, Bush could not match the foreign policy credentials of his Democratic rival A1 Gore, who had served in Vietnam before becoming a U.S. Senator and then a Vice President, known for his role in crafting administration foreign policy. For Bush, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that, for much of his life, he had adopted what one observer called “a principled provincialism,” an active avoidance of foreign policy.¹

Although he went to school during the Vietnam War, Bush was not an activist in favor or against the war. Rather than serving in Vietnam, he joined the Texas Air National Guard. His father had held several key governmental positions. Despite that influence and opportunity, Bush rarely had traveled internationally or met with foreign leaders. Furthermore, Bush showed little interest in academic or think tank-sponsored discussions of foreign policy. Most of his political career centered on Texas state politics and a limited number of domestic issues. Bush supporters tried to downplay the importance of past experience and stress Bush’s intellectual curiosity about foreign policy. Still, critics questioned whether he had the necessary background to lead the world’s only superpower.

Bush’s poor showing on specific foreign policy facts reinforced these questions. An incident in November 1999 highlighted the problem. During a general interview, a Boston TV reporter challenged Bush to name the leaders of four global hotspots: Chechnya, Taiwan, Pakistan, and India. Of the four, Bush correctly identified only the surname of Taiwan’s leader, Lee Teng-hui. Many commentators noted that the test had been unfair, since Bush had no advance warning and the questions were considered extremely difficult. For weeks, though, press reports of Bush’s campaign referred back to the encounter.

Some also questioned Bush’s overall intelligence because of his poor grades in school and lack of focus in his early adult life. He also was hurt by his tendency to misspeak and mispronounce words. He referred to Greeks as “Grecians,” confused the countries of Slovakia and Slovenia, and made bold pronouncements such as, “If the terriers and bariffs are tom down, this economy will grow.”² Under pressure and constant scrutiny, all speakers make errors, but “Bushspeak” and “Bushisms” became the butt of jokes on late night TV and Internet sites.

The combination of Bush’s lack of experience and perceived lack of intelligence took a major toll. In one poll, only 10 percent of respondents chose Bush when asked whether Bush or Gore would be the better foreign policy leader. The impact low foreign policy numbers would have on election results was unclear, but most observers agreed it was a major political weakness. Therefore, making specific foreign policy pronouncements became less important than Bush making clear and cogent statements demonstrating his overall mastery of the issues. He also needed to build a strong team of advisers that would help offset his weaknesses.

In early 1999, Bush consulted with many foreign policy specialists. He then assembled a group of eight to be his tutors on world affairs. The group was co-chaired by Condoleezza Rice, a former provost at Stanford, who had served for two years as an expert on Russia in Bush’s father’s National Security Council (NSC). Bush described Rice as the person who “can explain to me foreign policy matters in a way I can understand.”³ She became Bush’s alter ego on foreign policy, to the point that her writings and comments on policy were considered a direct reflection of Bush’s views. The other co-chair was Paul Wolfowitz, Dean at Johns Hopkins University, who had served in several previous administrations and was known for his strong vision of how to use American power.

The group came to be known as the Vulcans, named after the ancient god of the forge. One notable characteristic of the group was that none of them had held a major position in Bush senior’s administration. In fact, many of the advisers were more in tune with the views of President Ronald Reagan than the elder Bush. Second, as Rice acknowledged, “If there is a weakness in the team, it’s that it’s heavy on security issues.”⁴ Only one of the eight had extensive experience in international economics. These characteristics likely reflected, but also reinforced Bush’s underlying policy preferences.

The Vulcans met repeatedly with Bush, often engaging in three-hour long sessions at his Crawford, Texas Ranch. They also prepared regular briefings for Bush on recent world events. It was, perhaps, the most intense tutorial in which a candidate has ever engaged. Some critics questioned whether Bush would become a puppet of his advisers. However, members of the group always stressed that Bush was not just a blank slate waiting to be filled with information, but rather had underlying views and asked probing questions.

The Vulcans’ tutorial never completely dispelled concerns about Bush’s foreign policy qualifications. Overall, though, the Vulcans succeeded in two major goals: worry about Bush’s credentials lessened once he surrounded himself with a team of topflight advisers and Bush show a marked improvement in his knowledge base and confidence on foreign policy issues as the campaign went on. After Bush’s debates with Gore, most commentary stressed that, while Gore still had the upper hand factually, Bush had proven that he could hold his own on foreign policy.

Bush’s Decision-Making Style

Bush’s experiences in business and Texas politics, his interactions with the Vulcans, and his comments during the 2000 campaign give some preliminary insight into his decision-making style. Overall, Bush believed that a leader should establish a broad vision for policy, solicit information from a strong and loyal team of advisers, and then make decisive and firm decisions. This style would affect how he interacted with his advisers, Congress, and the broader policy-making system.

One root of Bush’s decision-making style has been his underlying personality. Bush is known for his ability to use humor to put people at ease, but he can be serious on issues about which he cares deeply and take them on as missions. He has charisma and can convince an audience that they should support his vision. He believes strongly in balancing work time with recreation, which leads him to favor efficient meetings, short policy memos, and quick decisions. He becomes impatient if the decision process does not match his timetable. He prefers facts and real life experience to deep philosophies.⁵

Bush’s style was also affected by his experiences. Three aspects of his life stand out. First, Bush’s management background, since he is the first U.S. president to have an MBA. At Harvard business school, executives are trained to be team leaders. The executive should take advantage of his team to delegate work and get expertise in particular areas, but should guide the team through the decision process and make final decisions. Second, Bush had a ringside seat to watch the workings of Reagan’s and his father’s White House. Both of those administrations were known for conflicts among advisers that often spilled out in leaked information and tell-all books. The Bush administration was also known for poor coordination of information flow under chief of staff John Sununu, in whose firing George W. played a part. Finally, while in his forties, Bush turned to an evangelical faith to help him quit alcohol and reprioritize his life. Bush’s new faith allowed little ambiguity, reinforced his tendency to see issues in terms of good and evil, and reinforced the idea that he should not question previously reached conclusions.⁶

Bush’s preferred style was evident with the Vulcans. Bush came to discussions with some preliminary vision on the given topic. This vision was not the deeply thought out, intellectual framework of some politicians. Instead, it was what Bush often describes as a “gut” feeling.⁷ Bush then gathered his advisers, much as a CEO might gather his company vice presidents, so that they could report on their particular areas of expertise. He liked to learn through a process of specific questions and answers. He accepted disagreement among his advisers, but expected them to not carry grudges against each other, to never go outside the circle to complain, and to fall in line behind his final decision. Once Bush reached a conclusion, it rarely varied subsequently.

Bush believed that the president should be the dominant player not only within the executive branch, but in the overall policy-making system. During the 2000 campaign, he spoke strongly of the need to grant presidents “fast-track” trade negotiation authority, which limits congressional amendments or reservations to presidentially negotiated trade agreements. Bush also supported presidential control of military missions. In May 2000, the Senate considered an amendment that would have cut off funds for U.S. forces in Kosovo unless Congress authorized an extension. The idea had support from many Republicans who saw it as a way of limiting President Bill Clinton’s flexibility. In an unusual move for a presidential candidate, Bush termed the proposal “legislative overreach”⁸ and lobbied against it. The proposal was defeated by a coalition of Democrats and a few Republicans who supported Bush’s view.

Cast in a positive light, Bush’s style has seemed to enjoy many of the virtues of recent presidents without suffering from some of their weaknesses. Reagan was known for his big policy visions, but also for his lack of interest in policy details and implementation. Richard Perle, a Vulcan who served under Reagan commented about Bush: “Like Reagan, he’s got a predisposition for certain broad ideas,” but “I think he’s intellectually more curious than Reagan was.”⁹ On the other hand, Bush’s father was known for his policy expertise, but had trouble with “the vision thing.” Clinton was extremely interested in policy detail and had some broader vision, but was also determined to hear all sides and consider all angles that he was often vacillating and inconsistent. Bush arguably had vision, took some interest in detail, and made firm decisions.

Cast in a more negative light, Bush’s style has had its own weaknesses. First, he tended to base his vision on gut feeling rather than extensive knowledge. Critics have questioned the origins of those gut feelings and worried that Bush subsequently interpreted facts to match his intuition. In this regard, Bush’s response when asked in April 1999 if Clinton was doing enough to stop Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction is very revealing: “My gut tells me no, but I do not have enough facts to be able to back that up with a statement.”¹⁰ Second, Bush’s leadership style encouraged conformity, leading him to gather together a group of homogenous advisers. He thus risked becoming a victim of “groupthink,” where group members repress conflicting opinions in the interest of social cohesion and tailor their advice to reinforce the leader’s views. Third, Bush tended to put people and issues into neat black and white categories and to reach conclusions that were not easily altered by later realities. In a complicated world with shades of gray, he risked being trapped by his own rigid categories and decision making. Finally, his desire to center so much policy control in the hands of the president and a small group of advisers risked minimizing congressional input and reestablishing the “imperial” presidencies of the Cold War era with little outside control of executive power.

Bush’s Foreign Policy Priorities

In the course of the 2000 campaign, Bush gave four main foreign policy speeches that laid out his views and priorities. In a September 23, 1999 speech, he addressed a number of defense and security issues (Speech 1.1). He noted that America now had unrivaled power and had benefited from the recent spread of freedom throughout the world. These conditions presented the challenge of turning American influence into peace. Bush also cautioned that important threats remained, so the country had to be ready to defend itself a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Chapter One Bush and the World of 2000
• Chapter Two The War on Terrorism
• Chapter Three Iraq
• Chapter Four Security Issues
• Chapter Five Global Issues
• Chapter Six Europe and Russia
• Chapter Seven Relations with Asian Powers
• Chapter Eight Middle East Peace and Reform
• Chapter Nine Latin America and Africa
• Notes
• Index