p.7
PART I
Straboâs point of view
p.9
1
STRABOâS PHILOSOPHY AND STOICISM
Myrto Hatzimichali
The presence of philosophy in Straboâs Geography is threefold: firstly, Strabo presents geography as a philosophical discipline, which endows it with prestige and a tradition of illustrious predecessors. Secondly, there are echoes of philosophical ideas in the Geography, which are not explicitly advertised as such, and yet frequently bear traces of Stoic influence. The third aspect of philosophyâs presence in the Geography is the historical one: Strabo is an invaluable source of information on the careers of philosophers in the first century BCE, including teacher-pupil relationships, professional rivalries and events of great cultural importance. An indicative example is provided by his remarks on philosophers from Tarsus:
The passage also demonstrates the importance Strabo placed on the Roman connections of these intellectuals and their political involvement. It also contains an example (âmy contemporaryâ) of his frequent first-person references that, along with the pronounced emphasis on intellectuals from his native Asia Minor, create a sense of personal involvement with the cultural tradition that he reports on.2
Geography as a philosophical discipline
These personal references and traces of self-identification are spread throughout the Geography but are significantly absent from its opening:
p.10
As Clarke has pointed out, the traditional self-introductory prologue giving the authorâs name and city of origin is replaced by what Strabo considered as most representative of himself, namely the programmatic description and definition of his geographical project in terms of philosophy.3 Instead of introducing himself, Strabo introduces his project, and opens by expressing a judgement about its nature.
The practice of enhancing oneâs own field of expertise by appeal to philosophy is paralleled in comparable strategies employed by other scientists. A striking text, which could be the proem of the second book of the Geographoumena of Artemidorus of Ephesus, is preserved in the âArtemidorus papyrusâ (dated by a number of scholars to the early first century CE). The author pursues an elaborate analogy whereby the philosopher operates in the manner of a geographer, âspreading his soulâ across all cognitive territory like the geographer surveys all known lands. Thus, geography can claim methodological affinity and comparable value with philosophy, which is called âmost divineâ in a Platonic echo (Phdr. 239b4).4 An alternative tactic is to treat philosophy as the necessary intellectual background to oneâs own science, by claiming that the latter can only be properly mastered by those with philosophical training. Such a tactic is exemplified, for instance, by Vitruvius with respect to architecture (De arch. 1.1.3; 1.1.7â10) and by Galen with respect to medicine, in his work entitled The Best Doctor Is Also a Philosopher (Med. Phil. I 60â3 KĂŒhn).5
Straboâs approach in his prologue contains elements from both of these tactics, but he seeks to present geography as a philosophical concern, presumably one of several, not as a separate field of analogous intellectual standing with philosophy, nor as a science for which philosophical training is a prerequisite. This amounts to a very broad conception of philosophy, indicated also by the first argument he offers in support of the view that geography should be treated as part of the philosopherâs business. This first argument is an appeal to tradition: earlier expounders of geographical themes, Strabo claims, are agreed to have been philosophers. They are divided into three groups: firstly, the ancient pioneers (Homer, Anaximander and Hecataeus) had been âphilosophers of a kindâ, and it was Eratosthenes who drew attention to this fact. Strabo is careful not to characterize outright the early predecessors as geographers either, but as men who âventured to touch uponâ geography. The second group, which includes representatives of a âmiddleâ period, is broader and Strabo does not offer a full list, finishing with âand many othersâ. The last group is fixed in number and contains Straboâs most respected forerunners, with the title âphilosophersâ closely attached to them. The more detailed elaboration6 of this first argument consists mainly of a lengthy vindication of Homerâs geographical expertise in order to justify his inclusion as the inventor of geography (1.1.2â10 cf. archĂȘgetĂȘs, âfounderâ, at 1.1.2).7
The appeal to philosophy as a very broad educational ideal, capturing the privileged wisdom of scientists, historians and poets alike,8 is in the background on many occasions where Strabo makes explicit use of the word philosophia and its cognates. This wisdom includes educational and consultative functions that go far beyond the mainstream tradition of Greek philosophy:9 the Druids in Gaul are practising moral philosophy (4.4.4); Egyptian priests and Chaldaean astronomers are also philosophers (16.1.6; 17.1.3; 17.1.46), while different types of philosophers may be found among Indian wise men (15.1.70; cf. 15.1.59). It is interesting that the views of these groups are often reported as responses to Greek concerns (see for example 4.4.4 for the Druidsâ opinion on the immortality of the soul).
p.11
These references can illuminate Straboâs programmatic claim about geographyâs status as a philosophical discipline, showing that it rests first and foremost upon a broad and inclusive conception of philosophy. This conception is fully compatible with his portrait of the geographer/philosopher as a âman who surveys the divine and the humanâ and âcares about the art of living and happinessâ. Occasionally, however, the range of pursuits that fit under its banner can be a source of tension that drives a wedge between the geographer and the philosopher. This occurs when the stress is placed on geographyâs requirement for political utility, while philosophical knowledge includes optional investigations that go beyond the geographerâs remit. For example, after listing certain types of detailed celestial observations he states:
This is followed by remarks on the basic astronomical knowledge that the reader does need to have (he must have observed a globe, the position of the tropics, etc.) in an attempt to strike a fine-tuned balance between practical and theoretical pursuits.
Strabo and Stoicism
We may now turn to examine in more detail the other two arguments through which Strabo introduces the common concerns of geography and philosophy, following the list of philosophical forerunners:
Strabo links geography and philosophy by virtue of the fact that they both involve wide learning, which characterizes those who display an active interest in all things divine and human. In this expression we may detect the first trace of Stoic influence in Straboâs work, because it is repeated in the proem of AĂ«tiusâ doxography10 (hence we can take the subject of âas they sayâ to be the Stoics):
p.12
Strabo ignored the distinction drawn by the Stoics between wisdom, which is a state of knowledge, and philosophy, which is an activity, the practice of a suitable/useful pursuit. He also introduce...