What Did You Do During the War?

The Last Throes of the British Pro-Nazi Right, 1940-45

Richard Griffiths

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317495642
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Parties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is a sequel to Richard Griffiths's two highly successful previous books on the British pro-Nazi Right, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-39 and Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, the Right Club and British Anti-Semitism 1939-1940. It follows the fortunes of his protagonists after the arrests of May-June 1940, and charts their very varied reactions to the failure of their cause, while also looking at the possible reasons for the Government's failure to detain prominent pro-Nazis from the higher strata of society.

Some of the pro-Nazis continued with their original views, and even undertook politically subversive activity, here and in Germany. Others, finding that their pre-war balance between patriotism and pro-Nazism had now tipped firmly on the side of patriotism, fully supported the war effort, while still maintaining their old views privately. Other people found that events had made them change their views sincerely. And then there were those who, frightened by the prospect of detention or disgrace, tried to hide or even to deny their former views by a variety of subterfuges, including attacking former colleagues. This wide variety of reactions sheds new light on the equally wide range of reasons for their original admiration for Nazism, and also gives us some more general insight into what could be termed 'the psychology of failure'.

Part I

Puncturing myths about the ‘phoney war’ period

1

To fight or not to fight

The myth of Mosley’s patriotism

Some stories are so often repeated that they eventually become accepted as undisputed facts. Nowhere is this more true than in the literature dealing with Sir Oswald Mosley, much of which continues to rely heavily on, as Francis Beckett puts it, ‘Mosley’s own unsupported explanations of events’ (Beckett, 1999: 219). This is partly because of the way in which, after the event, he succeeded in using truncated or misdated quotations from his own writings in order to justify his actions. A typical example of the continuing acceptance of Mosley’s version of events by generations of commentators is the following statement, which makes the case that Mosley was wrongly arrested in May 1940:

He had campaigned for peace, but publicly urged his members to fight once war was declared. At the beginning of September [1939] he had instructed them ‘to do nothing to injure our country, or to help any other power, […] to obey [their] orders and in particular obey the rules of their service’.

(Dalley, 1999: 241)

The basis for these and similar assertions lies in a passage quoted by Mosley himself in his own memoirs. This was part of his ‘Message to the members of British Union’, which had been published in the movement’s newspaper Action on 16 September 1939, but dated 1 September 1939. Once we look at it more closely, however, and relate it to the actions of Mosley and British Union (BU) during the next eight months, we see that he did the opposite of ‘urging his members to fight once war was declared’, and that the quotation in question, through its truncated nature, hides the fact that he never claimed, at the time, to be doing so. As he was later to quote it in My Life and elsewhere, the 1939 passage runs:

To our members my message is plain and clear. Our country is involved in war. Therefore I ask you to do nothing to injure our country, or to help any other power. Our members should do what the law requires of them, and if they are members of any of the forces or services of the Crown, they should obey their orders, and, in particular, obey the rules of their service […] We have said a hundred times that if the life of Britain were threatened we would fight again.

(Mosley, 1968: 400)

This was to be repeated, in exactly the same form, by other apologists. Two questions need to be raised in relation to it. First, is this a correct account of Mosley’s Message of 1 September? Secondly, does it accurately depict Mosley’s wartime attitude, as shown by his and his movement’s activities, and the advice to their members?

Is it a correct version? Though Mosley’s version in his biography My Life does follow closely the text printed in the 16 September issue of Action (the BU newspaper), the first after the outbreak of war (the only change being that Mosley has inadvertently printed ‘in particular’ for ‘in every particular’), the quotation is in fact very misleading. Mosley’s Message had, by the time it appeared in Action, been so heavily censored that little of its original meaning remained, and it appeared as innocuous as Mosley was later to claim it to be. The full message had, however, been extensively distributed in its entirety to BU members, and to the movement’s usual publication outlets. Its contents were perceived to be so subversive that in a written question in the House of Commons Brigadier-General Edward Spears MP asked the Home Secretary to ‘consult the Director of Public Prosecutions as to the advisability of taking legal action against the author and publishers’. The DPP decided against prosecution not because he questioned the subversive nature of the content of the Message, but because it was dated (possibly pre-dated, for this reason) 1 September, which was before the outbreak of war, and could not therefore strictly be classed as seditious (TNA HO 144/21429).

What had aroused the ire of Spears? The full Message started with a depiction of the way in which the British public had been tricked into war by Jewish propaganda: ‘The dope machine of Jewish finance deceived the people until Britain was involved in war in the interest of the Money Power which rules Britain through its Press and Parties.’ More seriously, Mosley not only declared his own intention not to fight, but implicitly encouraged others to take the same attitude:

We have said a hundred times that if the life of Britain were threatened we would fight again. But I am not offering to fight in the quarrel of Jewish finance, in a war from which Britain could withdraw at any moment she likes with her Empire intact and her people safe.

And he concluded: ‘I am now concerned with only two simple facts. This war is no quarrel of the British people; this war is a quarrel of Jewish finance’ (TNA HO 144/21429).

Only when we place the apparently innocuous version published by Action in its original context does it become clear that the passage later quoted by Mosley was in fact addressed only to those already in the Services: ‘Our members should do what the law requires of them, and if they are members of any of the Forces or Services of the Crown …’ As the Home Secretary Sir John Anderson was later to put it, ‘Sir Oswald Mosley […] was too clever to put himself in the wrong by giving treasonable orders’ (TNA CAB 65/7). And Mosley needed to be doubly careful on this score, given an article by A.P. Laurie which had appeared in Action on 2 September, the day before the outbreak of war. This article, addressed directly to the troops, had specifically preached desertion:

Germany has committed the unforgivable sin of refusing to borrow money from the international financiers, and they must be punished. […] The lust of the international financier for gold dripping with blood is not yet satisfied. Fools, why do you submit? […] Why do you allow these fat bellied millionaires to send you out to kill and be killed by your brothers the Germans, who are good fellows? You must act quickly or you will be too late. Once war is declared, you are sheep in the pen, ready for the butcher’s knife. You will be gagged, and not even allowed to cry out in protest before you die.

Mosley, then, specifically called on those already in the Services to obey orders. What the Action version left out was his instructions, immediately after that call, to all other British Union members (instructions so important that they were underlined – the only underlined passage in the whole Message):

But I ask all members who are free to carry on our work to take every opportunity within your power to awaken our people and to demand peace.

(TNA HO 144/21429)

Furthermore, though those in the Armed Services were instructed to obey orders, the same was definitely not true, in practice, of the instructions given to those who joined civilian defence units. Indeed, from the first days of the war BU members were encouraged to join such bodies in order to spread propaganda within them. As Special Branch noted on 18 September:

Unofficially, members (both male and female) are being encouraged to join the civilian defence units – Air Raid Precautions, Special Constabulary, Nursing Reserve, etc. – and to carry on the propaganda of the movement within these organisations.

(TNA HO 144/21429)

Of course, opposing the war was in itself legitimate, if done within the law, in the same way as the actions of the other peace movements in Britain, such as the Peace Pledge Union, were legitimate in themselves. Where Mosley’s policy got onto more dangerous ground was in its strong support for Germany’s case, in its distorted message as to the causes of the war, but above all in its advocacy of the refusal, by people who would otherwise have no objection of conscience to war in itself, to fight in a war that had, they believed, been brought about by the interests of Jewish finance. Only if the safety of Britain were actually threatened ‘would we fight again’ (and as we shall see, when the crunch appeared to have come in May 1940, even this promise went out of the window).

Practical instructions in relation to this policy of refusal to fight were soon developed in the first weeks of the war. On 16 October a circular letter signed by Neil Francis-Hawkins, Director-General of British Union, was sent to all branches. It read:

Young men likely soon to be called up have addressed many questions to Headquarters upon their position. The position of the movement is as follows: We have always been willing to fight for our country if Britain or her Empire is threatened. In fact many of our members entered the Forces of the Crown before the War in case that ever threatened. Members who are in any of the Forces of the Crown have been advised to obey orders. All members have been asked to do nothing to injure the country and to obey the Law. Those of us who are now free under the Law to decide the matter for ourselves are not offering our services to fight in this War BECAUSE WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT BRITAIN OR HER EMPIRE IS THREATENED. It is a matter for the individual conscience of young men who are now to be called up whether or not they exercise the right which the Law gives them of appearing before the Tribunal.

(TNA HO 144/21429)

Accompanying this letter was a document of advice as to how to apply for the status of Conscientious Objector, while at the same time making it clear to the authorities that this did not mean that one would object to fighting in another kind of war, against another kind of enemy (the crucial passage was underlined):

Applicant would begin by proving his sincere adherence to the creed of British Union, which is based upon belief in the British people and their national destiny. He would express his detestation of all international creeds which involve the nation in foreign quarrels of no concern to the British people.

He would then express his willingness to serve his country in any ordinary war in defence of Britain or the British Empire, from whatsoever quarter attack might come. In this case, however, the Government has seen fit to publish as their war aims an ideological conflict to destroy the system of a foreign country. […]

Applicant should avoid long argument under what circumstances they would defend Britain from attack. […]

The Applicant should maintain throughout that the onus for the creation of his conscientious objection rests with the Government, which has deliberately raised the ideological issue by making one of its principal war aims the destruction of the political system of another great nation. […]

Religious grounds should be avoided, as they tend to confuse the main ideological contention. […]

(TNA HO 144/21429)

As Special Branch commented in the file containing this document, Francis-Hawkins’s letter was ‘so couched as to leave no doubt in the reader’s mind that the leaders desire those of their followers who are of conscription age to refuse to serve’. The party’s leaders were already ‘very anxious to induce some young man to appear before a Tribunal, and make a test case’. It can never have been true, therefore, that Mosley ‘publicly urged his members to fight once war was declared’. Indeed, as MI5 later stated:

The outbreak of war brought about no change in the policy or outlook of British Union […] For reasons which are obvious, Sir Oswald Mosley did not call upon his followers to perform illegal acts. He did not call upon members of the Armed Forces to refuse to obey orders. But, short of committing illegal acts, everything was done to ensure that ‘financial democracy dictated by Jewish interests’ was not victorious and that world Fascism remained undefeated.

(TNA KV 2/886)

One wonders how hopeful the leaders were that such applications might be successful. Their tactic was probably that of causing chaos in the system, while advertising publicly the refusal to fight, and the idea of this being a ‘Jewish War’. As a member of the Advisory Committee was later to state:

One knows that so many members of the British Union did register as Conscientious Objectors, and that their attitude was that they were registering as part of the policy to upset the Government. […] There is a good deal of evidence in support of the vie...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Endorsment
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Nomenclature
• Introduction
• Part I Puncturing myths about the ‘phoney war’ period
• Part II Peace and war, high-mindedness and low connections: the Duke of Bedford and the peace movement
• Part III Defence Regulation 18b and its after-effects
• Part IV Renegades
• Part V Pro-Nazism, patriotism, hatred, fear, remorse: the extraordinary variety of motives among former ‘fellow travellers’
• Part VI Aftermath
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Index