Critical Issues in Contemporary China

Unity, Stability and Development

Czeslaw Tubilewicz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317422983
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Critical Issues in Contemporary China: Unity, Stability and Development comprehensively examines key problems crucial to understanding modern-day China.

Organized around three interrelated themes of unity, stability and development, each chapter explores distinct issues and debate their significance for China domestically and for Beijing's engagement with the wider world. While presenting contending explanatory approaches, contributors advance arguments to further critical discussion on selected topics.

Main issues analysed include:

• political change
• military transformation
• legal reforms
• economic development
• energy security
• environmental degradation
• food security and safety
• demographic trends
• migration and urbanization
• labour unrest
• health and education
• social inequalities
• ethnic conflicts
• Hong Kong's integration
• cross-Strait relations.

Given its thorough and up-to-date assessment of major political, social and economic challenges facing China, this fully revised and substantially expanded new edition is an essential read for any student of Chinese Studies.

1Muddling authoritarianism

Czeslaw Tubilewicz

This book comes out at – what might well be – a turning point in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China). Having presided over four decades of incremental political reforms and liberal economic restructuring, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Xi Jinping has allegedly entered – what some observers have called – its ‘final phase’, ‘endgame’ or the ‘twilight’ of its rule (Shambaugh 2015; Auslin 2015; Pei 2015). Politically, the CCP under Xi has reportedly moved away from its earlier efforts at modest political reforms (Shambaugh 2015; Youwei 2015). Instead, it has tightened censorship; suppressed the dissenting voices of ethnic minorities, democracy activists, human rights lawyers, labour non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious groups; and returned to anti-Western ideological orthodoxy (Shambaugh 2015; Economist 2015; Schell 2016). An anti-corruption campaign, more sustained and extensive than ever before, targets Xi’s political enemies, while destroying the very foundation of the CCP’s collective leadership – namely the tacit agreement that Party leaders and their families can profit with impunity from economic reforms. Having sidelined his premier, destroyed the unity of party-state elites and created a variety of small leading groups to govern China directly, Xi’s centralization of power appears superficially reminiscent of the cult of personality that Mao Zedong enjoyed decades earlier (Pei 2015; Ringen 2016; Schell 2016; Minzner 2016). The Economist (2016) has sarcastically called Xi Jinping ‘chairman of everything’, while the Taipei Times has referred to him as ‘child of the Cultural Revolution’ (Ma 2016).

Economically, the CCP’s earlier strategy of de-communizing agriculture, unleashing entrepreneurship, reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and facilitating China’s integration with the global economy has hit a wall of anti-reform opposition – composed of large SOEs and local party cadres – with vested interests in perpetuating crony capitalism (Youwei 2015; Shambaugh 2015; Pei 2015). In 2015 China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.9 per cent, its slowest rate in 25 years, while the strategy to transition from export-oriented investment-intensive development to a domestic-consumption-driven economy is proving difficult (Magnier 2016). According to David Shambaugh (2014), emigration and the large outflow of capital from China ‘speak volumes about [Chinese economic elites’] (lack of) confidence in their own domestic political and economic systems’. Thus, as another commentator suggests, ‘[a]‌fter 25 years of continual growth beginning in 1992, China’s period of economic prosperity has ended, and now the decline has begun. China will face a future downward trajectory that will have far reaching implications for its own political system, and for the economic and political configuration of the world’ (Wu 2015). In Wu’s view, China will soon fall into economic depression, featuring large-scale unemployment and mass protests. Shambaugh (2014), Pei (2015) and Schell (2016) paint an equally apocalyptic vision of a contemporary China. Ringen (2016) conveniently summarizes the argument by stating:

The two decades between Deng Xiaoping and Xi were the golden years for the People’s Republic. The economy grew ferociously. The country was at peace. There was hope of liberalisation. It was also a period of grey, technocratic, collective leadership that served China well. Now all is different. Economic growth has slowed to a trickle. China has turned to aggression in its neighbourhood. Rather than political liberalisation, there are ever tighter controls. Instead of collective leadership, there is one-person rule in the hands of the new leader.

Not everyone agrees with the thesis of the CCP’s twilight. Some implicitly dispute the extent of the Party’s current repression by evidencing the existence of ‘a resilient civil society’ (Gershman 2015) or the widespread popularity of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption crusade (Moses 2016). Others note Xi’s success with the sweeping restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Grossman and Chase 2016). The PRC media, predictably, consider apocalyptic predictions as ‘wrong and unhelpful’ (Peng 2016). Likewise, China’s government officials do not see any crackdown on liberties (Dodwell 2016).

In essence, the debate presented above centres on the question of whether the CCP’s strategy of economic liberalization and limited political opening – variably termed ‘authoritarian resilience’ (Nathan 2003) or ‘adaptation’ (Shambaugh 2009) – has exhausted its potential. This book enters this debate – so far featuring arguments painted with broad strokes – by focusing on several key political, economic and social challenges facing contemporary China. They loosely revolve around three interrelated themes, which former State Councillor Dai Bingguo (2010) identified as China’s core interests that ‘brook no violation’, namely:

•unity (‘China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity’);

•stability (‘China’s form of government and political system and stability, namely the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the socialist system and socialism with Chinese characteristics’); and

•development (‘the basic guarantee for sustainable economic and social development of China’).

More specifically, in terms of regime stability, the contributors to this volume examine the evolution of the CCP as China’s revolutionary and governing party; the role of the PLA in Chinese politics; and the reform of the Chinese legal system. In terms of sustainable economic development, the contributors debate the very existence of the ‘China model’, analyse the extent of environmental degradation and evaluate Beijing’s effectiveness at ensuring China’s energy and food security. In the context of social stability, this volume includes analyses of demographic trends, migration and urbanization, inequality of opportunities, labour unrest, broad social change and ethnic minorities. The chapter on ethnic minorities links the discussion of social stability in border areas with the issue of territorial unity, which also features Beijing’s integration with Hong Kong and its evolving strategies for unification with Taiwan. While these chapters are fairly distinct, are focused on separate issues and can be read discretely, they collectively raise broad questions regarding the CCP’s capacity to continue generating economic growth, to maintain regime and social stability and to restore and uphold the territorial integrity of China.

Stability in pre-reform China

In a country as populous as China, stability (whether political, social or economic) has often been a great concern. In the imperial period, population pressure (particularly when combined with a shortage of arable land and various ecological disasters) had serious consequences for society, sometimes leading to large-scale rebellions. Foreign demands made on Chinese sovereignty from the middle of the nineteenth century to early in the twentieth also exerted a destabilizing influence, triggering uprisings and social turbulence. With the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China experienced a protracted period of political chaos, marked by hundreds of military conflicts between local military strongmen (warlords) and frequent changes of government. The accession of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang: KMT) to power in 1928 failed to bring lasting political stability, as the KMT government continued to struggle with warlords and the communist challenge until the Japanese invasion in 1937. The war with Japan was hardly a period of stability for the Chinese state, while the final chapter of Republican China, the Chinese Civil War between the KMT and the CCP (from 1946 to 1949), resulted in massive population dislocations, economic destruction and yet more violent political struggles.

The CCP’s victory in 1949 brought an end to the incessant warfare that had engulfed China for a century, but, given the revolutionary ideology of the new ruling regime, it was not meant to bring social stability, at least not in the short term. Mass movements, including the Land Reform (1950), Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–8), Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and Cultural Revolution (1966–76), led to social upheavals, resulting in ever more human tragedy. Although the CCP had successfully restored economic growth to pre-war rates by the early 1950s, the Chinese economy experienced protracted turbulence from the launch of the Great Leap Forward until the late 1970s.

In contrast to the pre-revolutionary period, the social, economic and political instability in communist China – with the exception of ethnic conflicts in the border areas – was brought about by the party-state leadership, rather than by any enemies. Communist China’s leader, Mao Zedong, perceived society as characterized by numerous contradictions in which ceaseless change and social upheaval were not only normal but necessary, so that society could reach a higher level of proletarian consciousness. Furthermore, in Mao’s view, revolution could be sustained only if all bourgeois influences were eliminated. Since bourgeois tendencies could resurface within revolutionary institutions (such as the Party apparatus and state bureaucracy), however, and these in turn could carry out a counter-revolutionary restoration (Wang 1992: 54–5), continuous revolution appeared indispensable to guard against ideological revisionism. Hence Mao’s dictum ‘To rebel is justified’ – coined as early as 1939 (Schram 1989: 172) – encouraged the masses to rebel against the Party and state bureaucracy (and all forms of authority). Continuous revolution notwithstanding, Mao’s encouragement of rebellion at no point was meant to challenge his leadership within the Party or the ruling position of the CCP, however. The Chinese Communist Party weathered leadership succession struggles and socio-political upheavals by ensuring the loyalty of the Chinese military and extinguishing real or imagined opponents to its rule.

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 ended the Party’s concern with counter-revolutionary restoration but did not bring immediate socio-political stability, as the first post-Mao years featured continued intra-Party power struggles. The winner of the post-Mao succession process, Deng Xiaoping, feared the return of political and social instability à la Cultural Revolution, which had paralysed the party-state apparatus, inhibited economic development and polarized Chinese society. Therefore, Deng gave priority to political and social stability as the basis for creating a favourable environment for dynamic economic development. Stability and development became the Deng leadership’s main objectives.

Authoritarian resilience

In the name of preventing social upheaval, Deng suppressed expressions of mass dissatisfaction with the CCP, of which the Democracy Wall movement (1978–9) and the Beijing Spring (1989) are the best-known examples. His resolve to maintain stability – with tanks and bullets if necessary – carried the hidden cost of silencing dissenting voices and, consequently, seriously restricted the political evolution of his communist party-state. The public’s mourning for former CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang in April 1989, which turned into large-scale, nationwide demonstrations, exposed the fragility of stability in Dengist China. The collapse of communist regimes in Soviet Europe (1989–91) further underlined this fragility. Some analysts – notably Walder (1995) – predicted ‘quiet revolution from within’ in China, arguing that economic reforms would necessarily weaken the CCP’s organizational capacity, thus eventually ending the communist regime. Others also predicted the fall of the CCP, but focused on the political leadership: intense factional struggles and the absence of a charismatic leader to succeed Deng (Myers 1990: 462–4; Domes 1990: 469–70). Still others questioned the likelihood of stability surviving Deng’s death (Goldstone 1995; Waldron 1995) or did not rule out instability in post-Deng China as a likely – though not necessarily exclusive or most likely – scenario (Dittmer and Wu 1995: 494; Baum 1996; Fewsmith 1997: 527–8). In the event, though, Deng’s death in 1997 neither inspired any unrest nor, indeed, gave rise to any intra-Party factional struggles. The CCP weathered not only the Asian financial crisis (1997–9) but also the emergence of the Chinese Democratic Party in 1998 and the Falun Gong challenge in 1999. Under its leadership, China recovered Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999), lost to Britain and Portugal centuries earlier, which one analyst called ‘a rare victory of territorial consolidation in an era of other communist powers falling apart’ (Tang 2001: 891). Finally, in 2002–2004, the Party witnessed its first orderly leadership transition, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.

Some analysts did not find the CCP’s survival and achievements convincing and continued predicting the party-state’s demise. Chang (2001: 284–5) argued that the CCP regime – eroded by corruption and malfeasance – could no longer ‘provide the basic needs of its people’, who ‘are now in motion, and it is just a matter of time before they get what they want’. Similarly, Waldron (2003) noted China’s ‘serious problems’ (including environmental degradation), which the CCP regime could only exacerbate, rather than resolve. In Waldron’s view, the political change in China would come quietly, but in unpredictable ways. He (2003) wrote about a ‘volcanic stability’, namely the CCP’s increased repression of civil society suffering from corruption, ecological destruction and the near-total collapse of social morality. ‘Chinese society currently resembles a volcano on the verge of a major eruption,’ He (2003: 71–2) asserted, and continued: ‘The day will come when the CCP will not be able to tamp down these fires.’ In a similar manner, Li (2007: 29) – implicitly tapping into Lipset’s modernization theory (Lipset 1959) – concluded that, ‘[h]‌aving achieved an economic miracle, the Chinese people are unlikely to be satisfied with stopping short of the door of political democracy’. Rowen (2007) and Liu and Chen (2012) explicitly referred to Lipset when predicting Chinese democracy to emerge by 2020/2025. Pei (2006: 212), for his part, argued that the future of the CCP’s ‘predatory autocracy’ (or ‘trapped transition’) was prolonged stagnation.

Proponents of the China threat ‘theory’ placed themselves opposite to the doomsayers. According to these accounts, neither t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Muddling authoritarianism
• 2 The Chinese Communist Party’s evolution
• 3 Military transformation
• 4 Legal reforms
• 5 Economic development strategy
• 6 Energy security
• 7 Environmental degradation
• 8 Food security and safety
• 9 Demographic trends
• 10 Migration and urbanization
• 11 Inequality of opportunities
• 12 The new labour movement
• 13 Social change
• 14 Ethnic minorities
• 15 Hong Kong’s integration
• 16 Cross-Strait unification strategies
• Index