Chapter 1 | LAURA F. EDWARDS |
The Politics of Marriage and Households in North Carolina during Reconstruction
IN THE FALL of 1865,1 North Carolina lawmakers gathered at the statehouse in Raleigh to draw up a new constitution. The unenviable job of opening this difficult session fell to Edwin G. Reade, who tried to set a reassuring, positive tone. āFellow-citizens,ā he began, āwe are going home.ā Despite recent events, the Union still stood as an āold homestead . . . built upon a rock . . . [that] . . . weathered the storm.ā Defeated Confederates simply needed to āgrasp hard again the hand of friendship which stands at the door . . . [and] . . . enjoy together the long, bright future which awaits us.ā2 With this imagery of this Union as a domestic haven, Reade intended to blunt the conflicts that had torn the nation apart and divided the Confederacy. While Unionists and Confederates had faced off on battlefields and in statehouses, their old homesteads stood unchanged, waiting to enfold them in domestic tranquility when they returned. Now they just had to open the door and enter.
Readeās homecoming metaphor drew praise both within and outside the South. Not everyone, however, greeted his invitation with enthusiasm. At the very same time that North Carolinaās lawmakers were listening to Edwin Reade, a group of African American delegates gathered across town and called to order the first statewide Freedmenās Convention. Their final report also featured domestic issues and imagery. But their destination could not have been more different than Readeās. The delegates wanted āeducation for our children,ā protection for āour family relations,ā provision for āorphan children,ā and support for āthe re-union of families which have long been broken up by war or by the operations of slavery.ā Unlike Reade and other white lawmakers who longed to āgo homeā to the households they had left behind in 1860, black delegates had no intention of returning to their ex-mastersā āold homesteads.ā They and the African Americans they represented wanted households of their own.3
In the history of Reconstruction, Edwin Readeās domestic vision has taken precedence over the African American delegatesā claims. Even as historians of the period carefully questioned every other aspect of political and social conflict, they left this one, highly gendered image in place. Like Reade, they assumed a distinction between āprivateā and āpublicā: the public sphere, a dynamic and contentious place, was where history happened; it did not happen in the quiet isolation of āprivate,ā domestic space. Traditional political historians occasionally noted sentimental attachments to the āold homestead,ā but then passed it by to locate the dynamics of change in coalitions, elections, legislation, and organized acts of violence. Social historians extended the public realm to include fields, streets, and work places and to cover the battles waged by African Americans and poor whites over labor and race. Yet, for the most part, they too ignored the domestic sphere. The household may have provided support and motivation for political action, but it was not actually part of that arena. By either standard, Edwin Readeās metaphoric homestead seemed historically accurate and the domestic issues raised by the North Carolina Freedmenās Convention appeared politically inconsequential.
Recent work that uses gender, in combination with race and class, has challenged this view. Emphasizing the institutional connections between the āprivateā and āpublicā spheres, these studies have revealed the extent to which public power was deeply rooted in domestic relations and underscored the centrality of southern households to social and political change.4 As this new work has shown, the antebellum household was far more than a collection of people or a place of residence. It also defined private obligations and mediated the distribution of public power. Before emancipation, heads of household assumed economic, legal, and moral responsibility for a range of dependents, who included African American slaves as well as white women and children. Heads of household also shouldered the duty of representing their dependentsā interests in the public arena of politics. In this way, private authority translated directly into public rights and power.5
The exemplary household head was an adult, white, propertied male. To those who held the reins of power in the antebellum South, this was the only kind of person capable of the responsibilities of governance, whether in private households or public arenas. Because women, children, and African Americans were considered to lack both self-control and the capacity for reason, they were thought to require the protection and guidance of white men. But white men claimed power on their ability to fulfill the duties of household head, not on the basis of their race and sex alone. Not every man measured up. Dependency tainted all those who lacked sufficient property to control their own labor and maintain their own households. Nevertheless, all propertyless white men possessed the potential to head independent households. In this sense, their position was always different from that of white women and African Americans, who could step out of their proper place and even step into the role of household head, but could never fully embody the power of that role.6
War and emancipation shook the antebellum household to its foundations and shattered the configurations of power it supported. Freed from their dependent position as slaves, African American men could, theoretically, take on the role of household head with all its private and public privileges. Although African American women would find it difficult to claim the same rights as their menfolk, they might well demand privileges previously reserved for white women as dependent wives and daughters. At the same time, many white men faced the loss of their property and, in the case of slaveholders, most of their dependents as well. Not only did the borders of their households shrink but also the very basis of their mastery there was called into question, a situation that also undermined their exclusive claims to public power. The household thus became a highly contested political issue. After all, political and civil rights still hinged on how households were defined, who qualified as a household head, and what rights they and their dependents could exercise.7
Nowhere was the political content of the household more evident than in conflicts over marriage in the early years of Reconstruction. As the institution that created households, marriage lay at the very center of the postemancipation political structure.8 Perhaps more than any other issue in Reconstruction, the questions raised by the status of freedpeopleās marriages show how domestic relations structured civil status and political rights. Immediately following emancipation, conservative whites imposed legal marriage on freedpeople as a way to consolidate state power over them and compel them to support their families. African Americans, however, turned legal marriage to their advantage, using it to buttress their claims to civil and political rights while also trying to maintain their own vision of marital relations. But the laws governing marriage allowed them only so much room for maneuver. The rules of marriage formed the central support in a patriarchal legal framework that had subordinated poor white and African American men as well as women before the war and could still be mobilized to serve the same ends.
As conflicts over marriage are connected to traditional political issues through gender, the politics of Reconstruction begin to look different. New issues come into focus: Edwin Readeās homestead becomes far less tranquil, while the domestic claims of the first Freedmenās Convention begin to look far more significant. The actions of people excluded from formal political arenas take on new immediacy as well. Ultimately, their efforts to remake the domestic sphere meant that Edwin Reade and other elite white southerners could never āgo homeā to a place untouched by political conflict or historical change.
With the abolition of slavery, the legal burden of constituting households fell to marriage alone. As a Mississippi judge explained in 1873: āThe superstructure of society rests upon marriage and the family as its foundation. The social relations and rights of property spring out of it and attach to it.ā9 Without marriage, there were no legally recognized fathers, and without fathers, there were no legally recognized parents, since mothers had no formal rights to their children. In this situation, the transfer of property across generations became more complex. Inheritance laws, designed to keep property in the legitimate male line of the family, supplied little guidance in a world where fathers had no legally recognized male heirs. Marriage also framed the rules for the distribution of property and authority within households. In its absence, women no longer surrendered to their husbands their property, their wages, their children, and their ability to contract in their own name. Laws did exist to deal with children who were born out of wedlock and lived outside a legally recognized family; they became wards of the state and were apprenticed to a responsible master. But there were no comparable mechanisms to deal with unmarried women, whose number multiplied as a result of wartime casualties and emancipation. They were simply on their own, accountable for their own material needs, political interests, and moral destiny. The prospect of self-supporting women called the allocation of public power into question as well. Household heads represented the interests of their wives and children in the public sphere because they were legally liable for them. In the absence of this relationship, former dependents moved in the public world on their own. Within existing legal and political structures, of course, those people assumed to be dependents had few rights and little power. But without marriage, the rationale for this situation also dissolved.
Given the importance of marriage, it is not surprising that North Carolinaās Supreme Court buttressed the institution against change in the years directly following emancipation. The first effort to do so came in 1868 with State v. Rhodes, a case of wife beating. A lower court had found Benjamin Rhodes innocent, basing the ruling in generations of legal precedent that allowed a husband to whip his wife as long as the switch was no larger in diameter than his thumb. In a decision written by Justice Edwin Reade, the same man who offered the homecoming metaphor at the 1865 constitutional convention, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the verdict but questioned the reasoning. For Reade, the issues in Rhodes extended beyond wife beating or even the civil status of married women. At stake was the relationship between the household and the state, which emancipation had destabilized. The state, Reade flatly declared, did not ārecognize the right of the husband to whip his wife.ā Nonetheless, the sanctity of the private sphere shielded the husbandās actions from public scrutiny. However loath the court was to condone violence within the domestic sphere, Reade believed that far greater evils āwould result from raising the curtain and exposing to public curiosity and criticism the nursery and the bed chamber.ā āFamily government,ā Justice Reade declared, ābeing in its nature as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, the Courts will not attempt to control, or interfere with it, in favor of either party.ā In practice, this meant that the court assumed a household head innocent until proven guilty, since it was his governance that was in question. Given the courtās reluctance to interfere, guilt was nearly impossible to prove.10
Despite the rhetoric of domestic privacy, Rhodes also established the public dimension of the household. For the stateās conservative elite, marriage and the households it created were too important to their notions of social order to be left entirely to the discretion of the people, most of whom they neither respected nor trusted. Marriage, as Justice Reade later explained in defending the stateās right to prohibit interracial unions, āis more than a civil contract; it is a relation, an institution, affecting not merely the parties, like business contracts, but offspring particularly, and society generally.ā Because marriage contained such wide-ranging social and political implications, the state had a rightāindeed a dutyāto make sure the institution took forms that served the public interest. The same logic shaped Readeās decision in Rhodes. Even as he drew a veil around relations within the household, Reade planted that private sphere squarely in the public realm. Household heads derived their power from the state, and family government was ultimately subordinate to state government. Although the state would never meddle with ātrivial complaints arising out of the domestic relations,ā it would intervene if a husband, father, or master āgrossly abuse[d] his powers.ā The state reserved for itself the power to decide what constituted gross abuse.11
In Rhodes, Reade confronted a world without slavery by reaffirming the householdās boundaries and its connection to public power. Emancipation lurked, unstated, between the lines. Focusing on āfamily governmentā and ādomestic relations,ā Reade explicitly extended the logic of his decision to other domestic relationshipsānamely, those of parent/child and master/apprentice. If not for emancipation, the relationship of master and slave would have been included. The fact that it was not made the others unstable. After all, if one domestic relationship could be dissolved with the stroke of a pen, then what was so inviolable about the rest? At the very least, they might be subject to alteration. Rhodes, however, ruled out this possibility, establishing precedent that would shape subsequent cases for the remainder of the century.12
But Rhodes did not resolve all the questions posed by emancipation. It made no mention of ex-slavesā relation to legal marriage or whether legally married freedpeople acquired the same rights and duties that fell to legally married whites. Antebellum law had not recognized slave marriages, and emancipation did not make ex-slavesā marriages legal. During the war, some northern officials found the absence of legal marriage among slave couples troubling and promoted āthe sacred nature and binding obligations of marriage.ā In some cases, their efforts were well received by African Americans who had their own reasons for formalizing their domestic relations.13 As long as slavery was in force, white southerners did not share these concerns. After emancipation, many southern whites began to view freedpeopleās domestic relations with alarm. Marriage figured prominently in William W. Holdenās recommendations to freedpeople in his first address as North Carolinaās provisional governor on Ju...