5 John Hildrop, in Free Thoughts upon the Brute Creation (1742â43), also argued for animal souls and kindness to animals. In contrast, Humphrey Primatt contended that animals had a right to just treatment on earth because they were barred from the justice of the afterlife: âas we have no authority to declare, and no testimony from heaven to assure us, that there is a state of recompence for suffering Brutality, we will suppose there is none; and from this very supposition, we rationally infer that cruelty to a brute is an injury irreparableâ (42â43). Harriet Ritvo reminds us that âWherever we look in nineteenth-century British culture ⊠the role of animals appears not only multiple but contested. ⊠the search for a single generalization or a single unfolding narrative may be intrinsically misguidedâ (âAnimals in Nineteenth-Century Britainâ 122). It is beyond the scope of this study to do justice to the complex history of the humanâanimal relationship. My aim here is to pursue two interrelated strands in this historyâsentience as the basis for direct ethical obligation to animals and the connections drawn between cruelty to animals and cruelty to humansâand to read Jane Austen within this context. Markman Ellis writes, âJust as abolitionists sought to reposition Africans as thinking and feeling people, the animal-cruelty campaigners sought to refigure the cultural construction of brute creation, showing them to be not things but animals possessed with feeling and thus endowed with certain rightsâ (107). I argue that Austenâs novels resonate with late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century discourses about animals as thinking, feeling beings and with discourses which connect the animal question to abolitionism and feminism. Fanny Price in Mansfield Park is neglected and abused, treated without feeling by her family. All of Austenâs heroines, even those whose immediate contexts are more loving, find themselves perilously close to the status of animals in a culture which denied women citizenship, and the novels explore the pain of their subordination and vindicate their feeling, thinking natures. Focusing on discourses about animals, I seek to contribute to the discussion of Austen as engaged with the revolutionary politics of her time. Christine Kenyon-Jones argues that at the end of the eighteenth century, âthe issue of animal cruelty became associated with questions of rights and citizenshipâ: âSince animals could be seen to be metonymically or synecdochically linked to ⊠oppressed human groups, they were drawn into the debate, and the continuum of better treatment and rights was also, to some extent, applied to themâ (40).
Eighteenth-century discourses of animal welfare and rights emphasized animal sentience. We see this clearly in Humphrey Primatt, one of the first to present an âalternative to the concept of a merely indirect obligation towards animalsâ (Maehle 94). In A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals (first published in 1776 and reprinted in the 1820s), he argues that âa man can have no natural right to abuse and torment a beast, merely because a beast has not the mental powers of a manâ (12). He dethrones reason as the central determinant of humanâanimal relations, and, instead, emphasizes the commonality of sentience: âPain is pain, whether it be inflicted on man or on beastâ (7). The ability to feel pain entitles animals to âFOOD, REST, and TENDER USAGEâ (147), but ânot only their necessary Wants, and what is absolutely their Demand on the principles of strict Justice, but also their Ease and Comfort, and what they have a reasonable and equitable Claim to, on the principles of Mercy and Compassionâ (202). Animals, according to Primatt, have a right to âHappinessâ (202).6 Similarly, Thomas Youngâs An Essay on Humanity to Animals (1798) emphasizes that âanimals are endued with a capability of perceiving pleasure and painâ (8). The most frequently invoked challenge to the Cartesian mind-body and humanâanimal duality is that of Jeremy Bentham in his 1789 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: âa full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?â (283). Some eighteenth-century writers on the ethical treatment of animals extend their arguments to vegetarianism. Joseph Ritson, in An Essay on Abstinence from Animal Food as a Moral Duty (1802), links the cruelty of rural sport to meat consumption: the prior is a prejudice and a âcustomâ (97, 220), just as âanimal food [is] not natural to manâ (41). John Oswaldâs The Cry of Nature; Or, An Appeal to Mercy and to Justice, on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals (1791) also includes a case for vegetarianism alongside a denunciation of rural sport. These texts âprovided ways of showing how human behaviour could be mediated through temperance and nonviolenceâ (Morton, Shelley and the Revolution in Taste 41).
6 Primattâs text contravenes the claim that all anti-cruelty discourses are more about social regulation and âeffective labour disciplineâ (Malcolmson 89). Primatt explicitly draws attention to cruelty âof every class and denominationâ (77): his examples include sport associated with the lower classes (cockfighting and bullbaiting) as well as the sport of the upper classes (âto chace a Stag, to hunt a Fox, or course a Hareâ), the mistreatment of horses, and upper-class culinary privileges (âto roast a Lobster, or to crimp a Fishâ) (75). See footnote 1. In these texts, animal suffering matters in and of itself, but is also seen as intersecting with other forms of oppression. Primatt protests human slavery alongside animal suffering: âthe white man (notwithstanding the barbarity of custom and prejudice) can have no right ⊠to enslave and tyrannize over a black manâ (11). Slavery is also included by George Nicholson (On the Primeval Diet 223) and John Lawrence in A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on Horses and on the Moral Duties of Men towards the Brute Creation (127). The title page of The Cry of Nature announces its author, John Oswald, as a âMember of the Club des Jacobines,â aligning the animal cause with other revolutionary causes. And Ritson links cruelty to animals to social hierarchies:
Man, who is every-where a tyrant or a slave, delights to inflict on each sensible being within his power the treatment he receives from his own superiors: as the negro revenges the cruelty of his owner upon the innocent dog. Every animal, wild or tame, of which he becomes the possessor, is his property, his prisoner, his slave; to be treated with caprice and cruelty, and put to death at his pleasure. (100)
Thomas Young, in An Essay on Humanity to Animals (1798), writes that âcruelty to animals ⊠tends to render those who practise it, cruel towards their own speciesâ: âhumanity towards animalsâ has âan ...