On June 29, 1974, security forces escorted a 94-year-old leftist dissident back to his hometown after he criticized the government at a rally in Dhaka (Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.121). The dissident, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, was a veteran politician, popularly known as the âRed Maulanaâ due to his socialist orientation and religious educational background. Decades later, on May 6, 2013, state security officers dispatched yet another nonagenarian dissident Maulana back to his hometown after his movement, Hefazat-e-Islam, challenged the governmentâs legitimacy at a rally in the capital. This dissident, Shah Ahmad Shafi, had recently ventured into politics to demand that the government align the country with his movementâs socially conservative interpretation of Islam. Between the two rallies, the world stage had witnessed massive changes: the systematic weakening of leftists and increased visibility of Islamists, the end of the Cold War and the onset of the War on Terror, and the complex consequences of neoliberalism. The two rallies not only reflect interconnections between domestic dynamics and the global context, but also underline the diverse challenges the Bangladeshi state has faced.
Bangladesh is one of the few Muslim-majority countries to have sustained procedural democracy for a significant period of time and has been upheld as a model for other developing countries due to its gains in human development, but has also drawn attention because of the intensity of its conflictual politics. In 2013, 507 people died as a result of political violence, while 22,407 were injured (Ain o Salish Kendra, 2014). Much of the political violence occurred during hartals or general strikes called by opposition parties to put pressure on the government to meet various demands. The Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry has estimated that each hartal day costs the economy over US$200 million (Wall Street Journal, 2013). During hartals, opposition party cadres clash, sometimes fatally, with ruling party cadres and the police. Opposition party cadres violently enforce strikes whenever possible, by threatening or attacking vehicles and citizens who defy the hartal.
The persistence of political institutions that do not effectively distribute power and economic resources makes instability a recurring feature of politics in Bangladesh. This chapter traces how Bangladeshâs inheritance of weak institutions at the time of independence has fueled the expansion of patronage networks, manipulation of institutions for political gain, and intense competition over economic and political resources. Bangladeshâs first-past-the-post electoral system tends to exacerbate these problems: it deprives the opposition of parliamentary authority and reduces checks on the ruling partyâs power, multiplies opportunities for corruption, facilitates the use of state resources to marginalize opponents, and pushes opponents toward extra-parliamentary measures, such as insurgency, assassinations, coups, street protests, and hartals (Siddiqi, 2011, p.7). After introducing four political parties that have influenced Bangladeshâs political development, this chapter traces the impact of institutional weakness on democratic commitment and political instability during different episodes of Bangladeshâs history: Bangladeshâs first democratic experiment from 1972 to 1975; military rule from 1975 to 1990, and civilian rule from 1991 to the present.
Major political parties
Bangladesh has a first-past-the-post parliamentary electoral system with single member districts. Such systems tend to be dominated by two large parties. The center-left Awami League (AL) and the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) currently dominate the political stage. Other political parties have had difficulty competing with these two parties at the national level. As citizens can elect only one representative for their constituency, they are less likely to vote for candidates from smaller parties that do not have the reach and resources necessary to win at the national level and thereby influence the allocation of resources. Two other parties, the centrist Jatiya Party (JP) and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), have also played important roles in national politics in spite of their relatively smaller vote shares.
Awami League (AL): Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Sheikh Mujib), the AL won the national parliamentary elections of Pakistan in 1970, but President Yahya Khan annulled the results, cracked down on Bengalis in East Pakistan, and arrested Sheikh Mujib in March 1971. After a nine-month-long Liberation War, during which AL leaders formed a provisional government-in-exile, Bangladesh emerged as an independent country on December 16, 1971. Sheikh Mujib, celebrated as Bangabandhu (literally âFriend of Bengalâ) and the Founder of the Nation, ruled Bangladesh from 1972 until his assassination by army officers in 1975. In 1981, his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, was elected leader of the AL. Sheikh Hasina served two terms as prime minister from 1996 to 2000 and 2008 to 2013. In January 2014, after the AL claimed victory in elections boycotted by the major opposition party, Sheikh Hasina continued serving as prime minister. A center-left party, the AL initially articulated a platform based on socialism, secularism (non-communalism), Bengali nationalism, and close relations with India and the Soviet Union, but over time, it has embraced economic liberalization, emphasized its commitment to Islam, and strengthened relations with the United States.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP): In 1978, the then president, General Ziaur Rahman, founded the center-right BNP. Ziaur Rahman was the army officer who had declared Bangladeshâs independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujib in March 1971 and taken power after Sheikh Mujibâs assassination in 1975. As a response to the ALâs emphasis on Bengali nationalism, the BNP sought to develop a âBangladeshi nationalismâ that would distinguish Bangladeshi Bengalis from Indian Bengalis and emphasize the Muslim identity of the majority of Bangladeshâs citizens. It also sought to establish stronger relations with the United States and Muslim-majority countries, particularly oil-rich ones, and adopted economic liberalization programs. An umbrella party, the BNP attracted people with grievances against the AL, including military personnel, business people, pro-China leftists, and Islamists. The BNP ruled the country from 1979 to 1981 under Ziaur Rahman and then from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006 under the leadership of his widow, Khaleda Zia.
Jatiya Party (JP): In 1986, Hussain Mohammad Ershad, the former army chief who had taken power in 1982, shortly after Ziaur Rahmanâs assassination, founded the JP. Similar to the BNP, the JP advocated economic liberalization and close ties with Muslim countries and the United States. The JP won parliamentary elections in 1986 and 1988 and dominated the parliament under Ershadâs leadership until he resigned in 1990.
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JI): The JI is Bangladeshâs main Islamist party. During the Liberation War, the JI refused to support freedom fighters and several members collaborated with the Pakistani Army. The 1972 constitution banned religion-based political parties, but Ziaur Rahman allowed the JI to resume political activities. The JIâs vote share in elections has been small, but the BNP has sought (and received) its support to compete against the AL and enabled it to play a disproportionately important role in politics. The JI has made some doctrinal compromises, such as accepting a womanâs political leadership and supporting womenâs political participation (Shehabuddin, 2008; interviews, JI members, Dhaka, 2010). It has, however, advocated various restrictions on civil and political liberties. For example, it demanded an anti-blasphemy law in the early 1990s and the declaration of Ahmadiyyas, who self-identify as Muslim, as non-Muslims. The JIâs student wing, the Islami Chhatro Shibir, maintains an active presence on several university campuses. In 2009, the AL-led government set up an International Crimes Tribunal, which convicted several JI leaders for war crimes, amidst accusations from the BNP and JI that the trials sought to incapacitate the opposition rather than serve justice.
Bangladeshâs first democratic experiment: 1972â1975
An inheritance of institutional weakness: the roots of conflictual politics
Kiren Chaudhry (1993) has argued that post-colonial states often struggle to build responsive political institutions, because these would threaten entrenched interests and require financial and administrative resources that such states usually lack. In order to consolidate power, many leaders preferred to assume direct control over institutions, national resources, and industries in order to build patronage networks, expand their own base of support, and weaken opponents. After the Liberation War in 1971, Bangladesh dove into the challenges of reconstruction and state building with a weakened civil bureaucracy, a factionalized military, and a depleted economy, amidst concerns about Indian hegemony and uncertainty about international recognition and financial support. Such factors made it difficult for leaders to focus on building responsive institutions that could effectively distribute power and economic resources and address citizensâ needs and grievances. Leaders therefore often relied on centralized decision making and patronage to consolidate power and address pressing problems.
Upon his return to Bangladesh from Pakistan in January 10, 1972, Sheikh Mujib embarked on the ambitious task of creating a secular, democratic, and socialist state, while trying to restore order and coordinate reconstruction. The AL won a landslide victory in the 1973 parliamentary elections, but the Mujib regime faced multiple challenges to its authority due to the divergent ideological and material expectations Bangladeshâs liberation had generated. Major leftist opposition groups including the Jatiyo Samajtrantrik Dol (JSD â National Socialist Party) and Maulana Bhashaniâs National Awami Party (NAP) accused Sheikh Mujib of failing to meet the needs of citizens, especially workers and peasants. The state also struggled to control insurgents such as radical leftists who sought a âSecond Revolutionâ that would overthrow Sheikh Mujibâs âpetty bourgeoisâ rule (Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.121). Other domestic and international actors found Sheikh Mujibâs professed support for socialism and state-led economic planning objectionable and wanted Bangladesh to adopt a less pro-Soviet and more pro-US stance. Sheikh Mujibâs emphasis on Bengali nationalism also generated grievances among non-Bengali communities. Manabendra Narayan Larma, an MP from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, criticized Sheikh Mujibâs call for indigenous communities to embrace Bengali culture. Amidst multiple challenges to his authority, as well as devastating floods and famine, Sheikh Mujib gave paramount importance to the assertion of political stability in Bangladesh.
Restoring order proved to be a difficult task, as two of the most important state institutions for stability, the civil bureaucracy and military, were weak and fragmented. According to Jahan (1974), tensions and competition arose between bureaucrats who had worked with the government-in-exile during the Liberation War and those who had not. The fragmentation of the bureaucracy complicated the task of reconstruction and restoration of order. A 1972 Presidential Order that permitted the non-appealable dismissal of civil servants fueled concerns about job security, while parliamentary supervision constrained the autonomy of the bureaucracy (Jahan, 1974, pp.129â130; Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.125).
The military was also factionalized and some personnel developed strong grievances toward the AL government. By rewarding officers who had fought for Bangladeshâs liberation with early promotions, AL leaders generated resentment among officers who had been stranded in West Pakistan and repatriated after the war. The Mujib governmentâs close relations with India, which the Pakistani Army had trained both Bengali and non-Bengali officers to consider the enemy, also irked some army officers (Khan, 1982, p.169; Maniruzzaman, 1975, p.123). Furthermore, certain army personnel complained that most of the annual defense budget went toward supporting the Rakkhi Bahini, a paramilitary force formed by the Mujib government in March 1972 to fight armed insurgents (Jahan, 1973, p.206; Maniruzzaman, 1976, p.122). The fragmentation and perceived marginalization of the army in independent Bangladesh therefore deprived the AL government of a crucial source of political stability.
The demise of Bangladeshâs first democratic experiment
The majoritarian parliamentary system gave Sheikh Mujib yet another means by which to concentrate power in his own hands amidst intensifying challenges to his government. In January 1975, Sheikh Mujib used the ALâs parliamentary dominance to pass a constitutional amendment that established a presidential system, banned existing political parties, and invited citizens to join a single national party, BAKSAL (the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League). He argued that a one-party presidential system would bolster national unity and reduce political strife, but this move aggravated grievances and heralded the end of Bangladeshâs first democratic experiment.
In the context of the Cold War, Sheikh Mujibâs adoption of a one-party model deepened anxiety among domestic and international anti-socialist forces. Eight months later, disgruntled army officers assassinated Sheikh Mujib and all but two members of his family on August 15, 1975. As a result of this coup, an anti-socialist faction took power and imprisoned four high-profile AL leaders. This faction also promoted Ziaur Rahman from deputy chief of army to chief of army. A complicated power struggle ensued among various factions. On November 3, a pro-Mujib faction moved to regain power from the anti-socialist faction, which, fearing the return of the AL, ordered the murder of the four jailed AL leaders, including Tajuddin Ahmed, Bangladeshâs wartime prime minister. Bangladesh thus lost two of its most iconic civilian politicians, Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed, within three months. For the next 15 years, the political stage would be dominated by the military.
The restorationist pro-Mujib faction had placed the army chief, Ziaur Rahman, under house arrest, but a soldiersâ revolt freed him on November 7 in a coup led by Colonel Abu Taher, a leftist freedom fighter who wanted to eliminate differences between soldiers and officers in the army. In his drive to consolidate power, Ziaur Rahman eventually ordered the arrest of Colonel Taher, who was convicted of treason by a military tribunal and hanged on July 21, 1976. Ziaur Rahman would continue to purge the army of revolutionary leftist officers and eroded the strength of leftists in Bangladesh.
The military strikes back: 1975â1990
Rather than developing autonomous and responsive political institutions, Bangladeshâs leaders repeatedly used and reshaped political institutions to consolidate their own power. Mil...