Drones

Safety Risk Management for the Next Evolution of Flight

Harrison G. Wolf

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781315471396
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Aviation
• Index: Technology & Engineering

This book is an everything-included approach to understanding drones, creating an organization around using unmanned aircraft, and outlining the process of safety to protect that program. It is the first-of-a-kind safety-focused text book for unmanned aircraft operations, providing the reader with a required understanding of hazard identification, risk analysis, mitigation, and promotion. It enables the reader to speak the same language as any civil aviation authority, and gives them the toolset to create a safety risk management program for unmanned aircraft.

The main items in this book break down into three categories. The first approach is understanding how the drone landscape has evolved over the last 40 years. From understanding the military components of UAS to the standards and regulations evolution, the reader garners a keen understanding of where we came from and why it matters for moving forward. The second approach is in understanding how safety risk management in aviation can be applied to drones, and how that fits into the regulatory and legislative environment internationally. Lastly, a brief synopsis of the community landscape for unmanned aircraft is outlined with interviews from important leaders and stakeholders in the marketplace.

Drones fills a gap in resources within the unmanned aircraft world. It provides a robust understanding of drones, while giving the tools necessary to apply for a certificate of authorization, enabling more advanced flight operations for any company, and developing safety risk management tools for students and career professionals. It will be a mainstay in all safety program courses and will be a required tool for any and all individuals looking to operate safely and successfully in the United States.

1 A quick history of drones

Unmanned aerial systems are new for civil aviation; however, they are nothing new to the military aficionado or warrior who in some form or another has been around drones for quite a while. While there has been a recent shift of support for unmanned aircraft in military organizations, the systems have been developing for over 60 years—some say over a century²—and gone through many mission profiles. Only recently has a focus on unmanned aircraft been an accepted part of the military culture, where pilots were pilots, not sitting in a chair thousands of miles from the action. Understanding where these systems came from and how they were integrated into the military ranks sheds light on both problems faced moving forward as well as possible solutions to problems encountered stateside. This history is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) history over the last century, but instead included to familiarize the reader with the progression of domestic UAVs. Every month, there is a Cold War era program introduced to me which I had not encountered previously.

The beginning of the modern UAV could be seen in a speech given in 1956 by Air Force Major General David Baker, addressing a meeting of industry and military leaders as, “We can readily see that except for certain types of missions, the manned combat aircraft will become technically obsolete in the future” (Erhard 2010: 4). While his comments addressed the new role of the intercontinental ballistic missile development and use, the backdrop included “sophisticated, jet-powered target drones … [and] … camera-carrying derivatives of jet drones operated by Air Force pilots …” that would soon be the first combat UAV in history (Erhard 2010: 5). While the development of UAVs started early, the systems did not become well supported in the Air Force as they faced “independent externalities” such as internal-political threat, cultural backlash, and basic technological hindrances in the form of location detection, targeting difficulties, and training. Simply put, the vision and foresight existed beyond the capability of the machine.

The greatest contributor in the United States, and perhaps the world, to the continued development of the UAV has been the US intelligence community—specifically the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Between 1960 and 2000 the “intelligence community budget funded roughly 40% of the total US UAV investment, double that of the next greater contributor.” Though funded by clandestine organizations, the Air Force was responsible for partial funding and complete operation of each UAV developed during this time. The first, large push for combat drones came from “off budget” projects picked up by the US Air Force originally solicited by the NRO for use with aerial surveillance over communist nations. These programs would be run throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s and they are often referred to as the original NRO “Program D” projects.

Figure 1.1 A BQM-34 Firebee II drone is carried aloft under the wing of NASA’s B-52 mothership during a 1977 research flight © NASA

In mid-April 1960, Ryan Aeronautical presented the Air Staff with a proposal for a strategic reconnaissance drone—the first of its kind as an alternative to risky U-2 over flights. The Soviet Union had recently developed the SA-2 surface-to-air missile capable of shooting down a U-2 spy plane. Two weeks after this meeting, on May Day, 1960, an American U-2 was shot down over Soviet territory—the plane and pilot were captured, and the pilot tried in an internationally publicized court trial. This was the catalyst that the UAV industry needed to cultivate demand for an unmanned spy plane variant. In response, a contract was signed for the development of “Red Wagon” Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle while a similar, if not bigger and more ambitious UAV, code named “Oxcart,” was also being developed by the CIA. Oxcart would eventually be dubbed the A-12 and finally renamed the SR-71 Blackbird. That’s right, the same SR-71 that has become ubiquitous with Cold War era technology development was initially intended to be a drone (McIninch 1994).

Though Red Wagon had the support of General Curtis LeMay and Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick, Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, vetoed the project; diverting all funds to project Oxcart in early 1960—$96 million in total. While the shooting down of this U-2 had the effect of increasing interest in UAV development, it also increased the drive for satellite imagery, communication, and surveillance. These would in the short-term limit mission roles and funding for UAVs, but in the long term enable new unmanned systems to thrive as they would become GPS guided, using satellite communications and imagery for all applications. It should also be noted that mission roles and responsibilities are still in changing balances between these three modes of strategic reconnaissance—drones, satellites, and manned aircraft. If we were to look at the current military roles of these three systems, we would see that they are, or in most cases intended to be, fully integrated components of one larger combat group. This was not the case until recently, and the roles remained unbalanced, and thought of as interchangeable.

The National Reconnaissance Offices’ public image for their office “Program D,” entitled Big Safari, continued throughout the 1960s to run “low-rate modifications” to manned aircraft. Among these programs the RB-50E/G Haystack, C-130 Rivet Victor, and Ryan Q-2C are the most significant; the Ryan Q-2C Firebee, Model 147A Firebee target drone, becoming the main targeting drone used by the Air Force during this time (Erhard 2010: 6). The Firebee is notable for its place in history as one of two explanations for the term “drone.” Some historians believe that the term drone came from reference to the “Fire Bee” specifically since the male workers of the bee hive are drones, while others believe that, like a drone, the unmanned aircraft system is controlled without a mind of its own.

The most notable use of the Firebee never took place. On October 14, 1962, U-2 spy planes tasked with maintaining visual surveillance of Cuba, passed over a lightly clouded coastline taking aerial images for later analysis and what they discovered were newly built nuclear missile installations in Cuba. The US reacted, going on 72-hour operational alert (Erhard 2010: 8). The United States Air Force was set into motion and a variety of missions were drawn to increase surveillance, protect American lives, and move towards nuclear targeting. The Firebee was set to be deployed over Cuba using state-of-the-art camera imaging, loaded on a GC-130 mother ship. At this time, the main configuration for any Firebee launch was by being loaded under the wings of a military cargo plane. When some distance from the target was reached, the Firebee would be dropped from the payload clip and initiate firing of its rocket engine. Over the next eight hours the GC-130 sat ready to take off on the runway. The Firebee had never been used up until this point as an offensive imaging solution to a need for unmanned surveillance. Understanding that this new technology would change how imagery was taken, and then again, countered by enemy forces, Secretary LeMay called to kill the flight, as he wanted to protect the technology’s secrecy for flights over mainland Soviet nations. Lloyd Ryan, then an Air Force colonel and drone proponent, recalled in a given interview in December 2008, “We only had two, and we had great visions of greater potential elsewhere [over the Soviet Union] … Le May flat out told the undersecretary, not only, ‘No,’ but ‘Hell, no’” (Erhard 2010: 8).

It would be quite some time before UAVs would have an opportunity to prove their use. The Firebee would soon be renamed Lightning Bug in March, 1963, as the top secret program name had been compromised.

Figure 1.2 F-15 remotely piloted aircraft research vehicle (RPRV) mounted under wing of NASA’s B-52 © NASA

The Lightning Bug would become the main platform adopted by the Air Force until 1972, adopting a great many varieties for operations in Vietnam. Most interesting and important of these variations was the 147TE Combat Dawn SIGINT version deployed to Osan Air Base, Korea, with a more powerful engine, real-time data link, and an NSA (National Security Agency) package. These UAVs collected radar data from targets in North Korea at very high altitude. The emergence of satellites for communications, reconnaissance, and data transfer led to the demise of most UAV development and operation as satellites could boast real-time digital image processing. In a “watershed decision,” the NRO transferred its entire SR-71, U-2, and drone inventory to the Air Force in 1974 as the NRO had become focused entirely on satellites by 1974; essentially outsourcing its airborne reconnaissance to the Air Force. It would not be until new dangers from the Soviet Union emerged that the reconnaissance UAV would find new life; dangers requiring a solution other than episodic satellite coverage. The mid-1970s provided for the advent of the microprocessor which led to a “meteoric rise” in sophisticated communications and sensor electronics allowing for new UAV technologies—stealth aircraft design, digital fly-by-wire autopilots, composite structures, and Global Positioning System satellites all contributed to innovation for UAV mission and design. With these advances, a newly refreshed perception of threat from the Soviet Union, and a new presidential administration friendly to arms budgeting all contributed to the creation of the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System (AARS).

As Ronald Reagan became President upon promises to restore military strength in 1980, the transition team for intelligence identified airborne surveillance as a “perceived shortfall.” Soon after, $1.5 billion per year was granted to the NRO budget for the development of “long-endurance (up to two days), high altitude reconnaissance aircraft … [with] … remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), possibly stealth technology …” and that they, “… should be reviewed for … strategic intelligence collection” (Erhard 2010: 14). The UAV industry received an influx in funding at this point as mission stratagem centered upon “commonality” vendoring originally developed for an ill-fated joint-strike fighter concept from the 1960s (Erhard 2010: 14). With a focus on “commonality,” a Joint UAV experiment under the leadership of the UAV Joint Program Office (JPO) began development between the Navy and Air Force; this experiment was tasked with developing a medium-range UAV (MR-UAV)—essentially a jet-powered, compact, alternative to the Lightning Bug useful in tactical reconnaissance support air operations with data-linkage. This aircraft—BQM-145A—received a new, unique mission profile in that it required a modular payload with “joint” tasks allocations to be placed alongside manned aircraft: F-16Rs (Erhard 2010: 15). This would be the first time that both manned and unmanned platforms were intended to be used in conjunction, taking advantage of benefits for both. The BQM-145A would eventually suffer from a “one size fits all” mentality in design in order to satisfy the misconception that jointness in operations and system design were necessary for success and continued use. However, a first step in the process of integrating UAVs with manned systems had been taken and would continue even after the project was cancelled.

The UAV Joint Program Office (JPO) had failed to live up to the role it was challenged with as MR-UAV BQM-145A—the joint, manned/unmanned interfacing system was underutilized and never saw meaningful operation with a blossoming budget increase of 300% from previous predictions ($3.5 billion). As the UAV JPO began to dwindle programs and shutter obsolete initiatives, a few programs moved to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) where, while no new UAV programs were fielded in its tenure, budgetary allotments were given to highly successful UAVs of Israeli-influenced design—Pioneer, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Predator, and Global Hawk. Short-range UAV Hunter and medium-range Pioneer and Predator were developed with relationships between TRW, General Atomics, DARO, and Defense Air-borne Reconnaissance Program (DARP). Funding for highly specialized micro-UAVs, medium-ranged UAVs, high-altitude UAVs, and special tactical UAVs is increasing dramatically and now the Air Force, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, National Guard deployed in Iraq, and Marines all incorporate a wide variety of unmanned aerial systems in their operations. This trend only continues to increase.

Case study: NASA’s unmanned organizational flaws

Unmanned aircraft capture our attention for reasons that go beyond technology. These amazing aircraft started as military machines; flying robots that soar thousands of feet above the ground delivering a bird’s eye account of all that lies below. Others are even more attention-grabbing with a capability to deliver the wrath of nations onto their enemies or provide vaccines for illness-stricken populations during the worst of climactic events. They stealthily hover over sold-out stadiums and international events to sense biological, radiological, or explosive residues to identify threats, prevent casualties, and ensure the public welfare beyond the warzone, and in the assumed sanctuary of urban life. This was not always the case. Unmanned aircraft have gone through near constant evolution over the last century as technological advances changed the very way systems communicate and processes are automated. Hard lessons had to be learned through crashes, and safety considerations developed along with these accidents and mishaps, just as they have with manned aviation. Unlike manned aviation, those crashes often did not take any lives and provided accessible narratives from their pilots.

Those in the aviation industry understand that a mishap or accident is a curse, just as it is a blessing. Lives lost are terrible and any accident in the UAS world that causes damage or the loss of life will set the industry back tremendously. However, if the important lessons of the accident are drawn out, in order to reduce the risk of future faults or mishaps, then that same accident may be a positive turning point for an organization or industry. Such was the case of the F-15 Remotely Piloted Vehicle Program conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA had already been using remotely piloted aircraft to test theory and analytics for design of aircraft, but the newest McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle in development required extensive modeling prior to full performance evaluation and production. As NASA had become known for their use of radio-controlled models for the aerodynamic testing of wingless space-reentry vehicles, they were asked to conduct Air Force modeling prior to final production.

In 1969, the Air Force had recognized the need for a Mach 2-capable jet-powered fighter plane utilizing air superiority and capability lessons learned over the sky of Vietnam. This prototype first flew in 1972, prior to which Major General Benjamin Belli—then Chief of the F-15 System Program Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio—requested NASA assistance in testing a three-eighths-scale model remotely piloted version (Merlin 2013). The goal of this testing was to identify, configure, and analyze the extremely dangerous maneuvers involving high-angle-of-attack flight and spins. The remotely piloted aspect to test this scale model allowed for limited testing without the use of a test pilot—significantly reducing the overall risk associated with flight testing stall and spin-recovery techniques. The overall contract awarded to McDonnell-Douglas required building three F-15 RPV models for $762,000—or roughly $250,000 per aircraft—a much smaller sum than the usual $6.8 million for a full-scale aircraft (Hallion and Gorn 2003). These models measured 23.5 feet long and consisted largely of fiberglass and wood while weighing roughly 2,500lb. The models had no internal propulsion system and had been designed for a recovery method consisting of a mid-air “catch” by helicopter after deploying a parachute.

This Remotely Piloted Vehicle was unique in that it was built to be dropped. Suspended under the wing of a modified B-52 Stratofortress (much like the Ryan AQM-34 Firebee targeting drone mentioned above), the miniaturized F-15 RPV would be carried to an altitude of 45,000 feet. It would then be released from its “launch pylon” as the aircraft reached 175 knots. On October 12, 1973, the first flight of the F-15 model took place as it was dropped from the B-52 over the Dryden Flight Research Center in Mojave, California. The pilot, Einar Enevoldson, glided the virgin craft for nine minutes without any problems and upon reaching 15,000 feet altitude, a 12-foot spin-recovery parachute deployed in order to stabilize the descent of the aircraft. After the final parachutes had also deployed following the stabilized descent, the aircraft was plucked from the air by a hook suspended by cable from a helicopter and ultimately released onto a cushioned bag on site. The first flight was a success (Reed 1980).

Though the first flight was a success, pilot Einar Enevoldson would go on to pilot many more flights using these models of the F-15 Eag...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Introduction
• 1 A quick history of drones
• 2 Technology adoption: A story of war and economics
• 3 International standards and regulations
• 4 Domestic regulations, standards and the FAA roadmap
• 5 Concept of Operations: One size does not fit all
• 6 How to be safe and legal: SMS for remotely piloted aircraft
• 7 The States Act and privacy implications for drones
• 8 Developing a community
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index