The Routledge Research Companion to Security Outsourcing

Joakim Berndtsson, Christopher Kinsey

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317042211
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Freedom
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Conveniently structured into five sections, The Routledge Research Companion to Outsourcing Security offers an overview of the different ways in which states have come to rely on private contractors to support interventions.

Part One puts into context the evolution of outsourcing in Western states that are actively involved in expeditionary operations as well as the rise of the commercial security sector in Afghanistan. To explain the various theoretical frameworks that students can use to study security/military outsourcing, Part Two outlines the theories behind security outsourcing. Part Three examines the law and ethics surrounding the outsourcing of security by focusing on how states might monitor contractor behaviour, hold them to account and prosecute them where their behaviour warrants such action. The drivers, politics and consequences of outsourcing foreign policy are covered in Part Four, which is divided into two sections: section one is concerned with armed contractors (providing the provision of private security with the main driver being a capability gap on the part of the military/law enforcement agencies), and section two looks at military contractors (supporting military operations right back to antiquity, less controversial politically and often technologically driven). The final Part takes into consideration emerging perspectives, exploring areas such as gender, feminist methodology, maritime security and the impact of private security on the military profession.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and security studies, foreign policy and International Relations.

Part I THE OUTSOURCING CONTEXT

The Evolution of Security Outsourcing

DOI: 10.4324/9781315613376-2

1 Supporting the Troops

Military Contracting in the United States

Martha Lizabeth Phelps

DOI: 10.4324/9781315613376-2

Introduction

Historical accounts of the United States’ use of military contractors and private security companies (PSCs) often start at the end of the Cold War. An example of this trend can be seen in German activist and scholar Rolf Uesseler’s work, which explains how Western military contracting grew out of four main factors, each intrinsically linked to the end of the Cold War:

the worldwide reduction in national defense budgets; the expansion of national security policies beyond mere national defense; the sudden increase of international, national, and local areas of conflict; and the increasing reluctance, especially among industrialized nations, to take part in peacekeeping missions.

(Uesseler 2008, 113)

Narratives focusing on the Cold War have merit, but fail to account for the United States’ long history of supply and logistics contracting.

PSCs are corporate entities that undertake contracts in the operational sphere by providing support that may include the use of force. These contracts are awarded by reputable entities, such as state agencies or international governmental organizations, in exchange for monetary or resource compensation. Neither the hiring agency nor the company undertakes these contracts with the expectation that private employees will engage in combat. Even so, these individuals are armed and often placed in dangerous situations (Phelps 2014). Examples of these types of contracts involve protective services such as convoy, personnel, or site protection. Peter Singer’s (2003) “Tip of the Spear” typology simplifies definitions by imagining how likely a contractor is to fire a weapon while doing their job. Military service and support contractors,¹ on the other hand, do not normally carry weapons and avoid situations where they may have to use force. PSC employees are likely to carry weapons and knowingly place themselves in harm’s way as part of their job, even though they are expected to avoid such situations if possible. This is separate from the idea of a private military company (PMC), such as Executive Outcomes (EO) that, in the past, were contracted to provide operational support to state governments. The use of direct and intentional military action is different than the type of security performed by PSCs. It is the difference between offensive and defensive operational capacity. Or, to quote Christopher Kinsey: “Protective security … is not warfighting even when conducted in a war zone” (2009, 145).

PMCs, such as EO, no longer operate, whereas, since 9/11, PSCs have gained market share. Most contracts awarded in zones of conflict do not have an operational focus, but rather undertake supply and support services. These contracts are commonplace, and many companies are household names. For example, Fluor is the construction company that refurbished San Francisco’s Bay Bridge in 2014. However, Fluor also has constructed a base in Alaska to house an intercontinental missile defense systems; this base has the highest level of security, weapons systems, and anti-terrorist measures. ManTech, a Fairfax Virginia-based computer-consulting company, maintained a 44-person-strong telecommunications center for American troops in Baghdad. Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) employed over 50,000 people in Iraq to support the army’s largest logistical contract (LOGCAP). This is just a small roster of the service support and system support contracts hired by the United States.

American companies that provide supply and support services also undertake jobs that fall under the label of private security contracts. It is often difficult to trace what firm oversees which contract, as PSCs are often intertwined with supply and support contractors. An example: DynCorp, founded in 1946 as a logistical and construction company, was purchased by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in 2003 (Kinsey 2006, 23; DynCorp Intl.). CSC focuses on IT consulting and business solutions and services. However, DynCorp clearly acts as a PSC. During the War on Drugs, DynCorp dusted crops and maintained no-fly zones. In the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, DynCorp trained the domestic police.

The United States deployed more contractors during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars than allied forces deployed national troops (Kinsey 2009, 49, 57; Mandel 2012, 13). These private employees were a mix of logistics and supply contractors and PSCs. The point of this chapter is not to catalogue all of the United States’ contracting companies and their activities. That would take volumes. Rather, this chapter seeks to provide a preliminary understanding of military outsourcing in the United States. This history of outsourcing will provide the reader with a greater knowledge of the history of American military contracting, demonstrate the difference between military contracting and PSCs, and provide a launch pad for future research. In order to complete these objectives, this chapter will discuss the history of outsourcing in the United States and examine the two main periods of American military privatization.

Public Administration's Red Tape

PSC are a required part of any modern US military deployment. This dependence on private firms may bring to mind President Eisenhower’s caution regarding the growth of the military industrial complex. To clarify, Eisenhower feared military, and related industry, spending would dwarf domestic production. He warned against military spending overpowering the domestic economy, rather than opposing the outsourcing of government functions. During his administration, the Bureau of the Budget released Bulletin No. 55-04:

It is the general policy of the administration that the Federal Government will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels.

(Bureau of the Budget 1955)

This Bulletin began an intimate relationship between contracting and the executive branch of the government. In 1966, this relationship was augmented when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released Circular Number A-76:

In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and services the Government needs.

(Office of Management and Budget 1966)

The executive branch’s support of privatization did not outweigh the need for government oversight. There are limitations written into these two documents. Bulletin 55-04 states that “exceptions to this policy shall be made by the head of an agency only where it is clearly demonstrated in each case that it is not in the public interest to procure such product or service from private enterprise” (Bureau of the Budget 1955). The Bell Report, a 1962 report on contracting in the military prepared for President Kennedy, speaks directly to the idea that the core competency of government should stay in public hands:

there is one additional point we would stress. Activities closely related to governmental managerial decisions (such as those in support of contractor selection), or to activities inherently governmental (such as regulatory functions, or technical activities directly bound up with military operations), are likely to call for a direct federal capability and to be less successfully handled by contract.

(Bell 1962, 12)

The words “inherently governmental” indicate that it is impossible to outsource the core capacity of the government (Stanger 2009, 24). As demonstrated, the executive branch encouraged outsourcing for all governmental functions, excluding those that are inherently governmental.

As early as the 1960s, the inbred nature of contracting and government became apparent. In 1965, federal contractor Booz Allen won the contract to assess USAID. Unsurprisingly, the firm recommended the inclusion of more contract employees. Booz Allen argued that contract employees worked harder and more efficiently to maintain employment. Direct federal employees were viewed as unmotivated to perform at a high level due to the perception of guaranteed employment. The company’s other main finding provides ironic foreshadowing. Booz Allen recommended primary contracting authority and oversight should rest with managers in the field, rather than employees in Washington (Stanger 2009, 113).

The Bell Report codified the outsourcing of non-inherently governmental functions. Therefore, it is logical that non-combat support functions, like laundry or military construction, continued to privatize. Military support had been a quietly growing industry. In WWI, for the first time, the United States hired a PSC, Vinnell, to undertake support sector jobs inside zones of conflict (Jones 2010, 3). Early contracts focused primarily on military construction. The end of the twentieth century accelerated military outsourcing. When Ronald Reagan became president, he sought to improve and transform the United States’ military. This plan had three key points: force multipliers, cost control, and the concentration of combat power (Engbrecht 2010, 66). Using contractors helped achieve all three goals.

By the time the Berlin Wall fell, military contracting was a quiet, but substantial, part of American security culture (Corn 2012, 156, also see the chapter by Erbel in this volume). The end of the Cold War propelled contracting into the limelight. The United States reduced both its military personnel (by nearly one third!) and budget (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 47). Without an approaching enemy, high military expenditures were not justifiable. Consequently, worldwide defense cuts occurred. However, the underlying reasons for military conflicts did not disappear with the Cold War. Companies, moreover, maintained economic interests in areas that were now vulnerable to crisis. American enterprise needed the raw materials and cheap labor provided by developing countries.

Previously, when the federal government cut office positions, it hired contractors to supplement the remaining personnel. When troop levels were cut after the Cold War, government held to the same policies (Kinsey and Patterson 2012, 3). Military contractors took over running dining halls, laundry facilities, and the general infrastructure maintenance of United States military bases (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 47). This allowed the remaining national forces to focus on increasing the core competency of the military (Kinsey and Erbel 2011). The same need for contractor support occurred within the Department of State. The protection specialists that now support the diplomatic corps were once employed directly by the Department of State; now these positions are a mixture of public staff and PSC contractors.

President Clinton also relied on contractors; MPRI, DynCorp, and KBR were all active in the Yugoslav Wars. The Clinton Administration granted Blackwater² its first contract (Scahill 2007). By the time he left office, Washington spent $201.3 billion a year on contracts with private companies. President George W. Bush oversaw a 110 per cent increase in contracting, an amount equating to $238.2 billion. This level of outsourcing is impressive; it equates to the United States’ federal government spending “more than 40 cents of every discretionary dollar on contracts with private companies” (Stanger 2009, 12).

The Pentagon is not blind to the growth of outsourcing. In 2001, the Department of Defense promised to “assess all its functions to separate core and non-core functions. The test will be whether a function is directly necessary for warfighting” (Department of Defense 2001, 53).³ Even with that restriction, contracting continued to expand. The highest level of contracting took place in the military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan saw a ratio of three contractors for every two national troops (Schwartz and Swain 2011).

President Eisenhower’s warning against the military-industrial complex focused on the fear that a state-controlled industry, such as the military, would harm private business. This has not occurred. Stanger reports that “in 2002, the United States budgeted $344.9 billion for defense and the military, and the net income of all United States corporations that year came to $1.08 trillion” (Stanger 2009, 167). In 2013, companies that supported United States deployments abroad generated approximately $100 billion in revenue (Sethi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I The Outsourcing Context: The Evolution of Security Outsourcing
• Part II Theorising Security Outsourcing
• Part III The Law, Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility of Outsourcing Security
• Part IV Armed Security Contractors and Military Contractors: Drivers, Politics and Consequences
• Part V Emerging Perspectives: Issues of Gender, Military Professionals and Maritime Private Security
• Conclusion
• Index