Managing Critical Incidents and Large-Scale Event Security

Eloy Nuñez, Ernest G. Vendrell

• Publisher: CRC Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781315352992
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Global Development Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

2017 Award Winner of the ASIS Security Book of the Year

Nuñez and Vendrell aim to provide the most current and effective resources for managing special events and critical incidents. Their book relies heavily on case studies and after action reports that examine the lessons learned from a multitude of previous events and incidents. In addition, the text identifies and examines best practices and recommended approaches, providing the reader with a variety of checklists and planning tools.

1

Introduction to Critical Incident Management

The Complex Nature of Critical Incidents and Large-Scale Special Events

In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile critical incidents and large-scale special events that have challenged public safety organizations across the country. Complex events such as incidents of widespread civil unrest or venues drawing national and global attention often present a myriad of challenges and potential problems for organizations and communities. Far too often, communities are caught off guard, finding that their response plans and resources are less than adequate. When this occurs, the results can lead to a number of negative consequences, including potential loss of life and property as well as a general lack of confidence in government. As an example, the recent civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, had a devastating impact on the local community and law enforcement, and it will take some time to establish requisite levels of trust and rebuild impacted areas.

Clearly, high-profile critical incidents, such as the civil unrest that has recently occurred across the country, serve to illustrate the profound impact that complex events can have on unprepared organizations and the communities that they serve. The initial impact is compounded by the vivid imagery that is continuously broadcast by television and various social and electronic media, which often results in further uncertainty and complexity.

Managing Chaos, Uncertainty, and Complexity

Critical incident management is a complex endeavor. There are many moving parts at many different levels, and at times it can be overwhelming to even the most experienced practitioner. The purpose of this book is to simplify a very complex set of factors so that current practitioners, and students aspiring to be future critical incident managers, can understand and deal with the complexities that are likely to confront them. Indeed, this book follows the same fundamental rules that are endemic to critical incident management. As in the management of critical incidents, this book strives to simplify complexity, to make order out of chaos, and to reduce uncertainty. Figure 1.1 illustrates the fundamental objective of critical incident management, and what this book strives to achieve.

Chaos

All critical incidents are chaotic. It is the job of the critical incident manager to restore order as soon as possible.

Figure 1.1 The Objective of Critical Incident Management

VIGNETTE 1.1 Stampede at the County Fair

It was one of those crazy Saturday nights for the officers working off duty at the County Fair. It was much busier than the typical night of lost children, people getting sick on rides, and an occasional obnoxious drunk individual having to be escorted out of the fairgrounds. This night, the midways were packed with attendees … mostly teenagers celebrating the last day of school. Through the late afternoon, and into the early evening, the 25 off-duty officers working the late shift had to deal with several turnstile jumpers who were trying to get into the fair without paying. Reports over the police radio were received about possible gang members … recognizable by the colors of their clothing … coming into the fair. Along with the gang members were six undercover Gang Unit detectives keeping an eye on things.

Things started to go bad once the sun went down. First, two Gang Unit detectives arrested a white male juvenile who they believed to be a member of the Latin Kings gang. While effecting the arrest of the white male juvenile, two other female juvenile gang members interfered by coming up from behind and grabbing the detectives’ arms. The two females had to be restrained by other uniformed officers who had arrived at the scene, and along with the male gang member were handcuffed and transported to the police office. Subsequent to the arrests, the officers discovered a loaded semiautomatic pistol in one of the females’ purses.

Meanwhile, other reports were coming in over the radio about individuals inside the fairgrounds wearing the colors of the Folk Nation and Imperial Gangsters street gangs. There was tension in the air that was felt by all. Sporadic fights were breaking out at different locations in the fairgrounds. There were rumors about individuals who had been observed carrying guns, and that a possible gang fight was brewing. Things were getting so tense that the on-scene commander was discussing with the County Fair manager about closing down the fair early that night. It was only 9:05 PM, and the fair usually closed at 11 PM on weekend nights. An early closing would cost the fair a considerable amount of revenue, but the County Fair manager agreed to the commander’s recommendation. By the turnstile count, there were over 20,000 people in attendance that night, and they would have to be herded out of the fairgrounds much earlier than expected. This would not be an easy thing to do.

Before the commander could announce the early closing to the officers via the police radio, three shots rang out around the west side entrance to the fair. As a result, many people panicked and a crowd of several dozen people ran in an easterly direction through the crowd to the midway section of the fair. Several uniformed officers ran in the direction of the gunfire, as did a couple of plainclothes undercover Gang Unit detectives. Some of the fairgoers saw the detectives running with guns at their sides, which further panicked the crowd. The more people panicked, the worse it got, and what was first a crowd of several dozen people morphed into a stampede of several thousand, all along the entire length of the midway. Along the way, several elderly people were knocked out of their wheelchairs, and parents were seen pulling their children into protective cubbyholes between the various exhibits and rides. Just then, two more shots rang out on the east side of the midway, and now some in the crowd that had been stampeding in an easterly direction, turned and ran against the flow in a westerly direction.

The scene was chaotic, and many people were trampled and injured as a result. What had started out as a bad night, was turning really bad. The onscene commander’s job was to get control of the situation and restore order to this chaotic situation. One of the first things he needed to do was gain control of the Gang Unit detectives so that they would not further add to the chaos and panic.

Uncertainty

All critical incidents are uncertain. Amid the chaos in the County Fair stampede vignette, there was also a great deal of uncertainty. The undercover detectives running in the direction of the shots fired only made things worse, as people in the crowd could not discern between the good guys with guns, and the bad guys with guns. Moreover, the uniformed officers responding to the scene of the shots fired may not recognize the undercover detectives, which adds to the uncertainty.

Chaos creates uncertainty, and uncertainty leads to more chaos. It is a cycle that needs to be managed and reversed. It is the job of the critical incident manager to minimize uncertainty at critical incidents. Critical incident managers can minimize uncertainty during the actual incident, but most of the mitigation of uncertainty can be done prior to the incident, and even after the incident occurs. In other words, with proper planning and visioning, critical incident managers can minimize the uncertainty that they are likely to face during spontaneous critical incidents, or at least mitigate its effects. Uncertainty can be reduced considerably with proper planning before the incident occurs and by learning from the experience after the incident occurs.

Mitigation of the effects created by uncertainty can also be done ahead of time. This will be discussed in greater detail later, but briefly stated, the underlying premise of mitigating the effects of uncertainty has to do with preparing critical incident managers and first responders ahead of time to accept the likelihood that they will face uncertainty and chaos at these incidents. Much like residents of coastal areas weatherproof their homes in anticipation of hurricane season, first responders can “weatherproof” their mind-sets in anticipation of the chaos and uncertainty that are likely to occur during a critical incident.

Vignette 1.2 is an excerpt from the 9/11 Commission Report.¹ This vignette provides a good example of how uncertainty leads to chaos, and how chaos leads to uncertainty. As you read the vignette, consider the uncertainty that the initial “first responders” (the air traffic controllers) were faced with, and the immediate steps that were taken to make sense of the situation.

VIGNETTE 1.2 Excerpt from the 9/11 Commission Report

The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Control Centers often receive information and make operational decisions independently of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system. What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or by FAA headquarters in Washington.

Controllers track airliners such as the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primarily by watching the data from a signal emitted by each aircraft’s transponder equipment. Those four planes, like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, were required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight.

On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft. With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficult to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder data, primary radar returns do not show the aircraft’s identity and altitude. Controllers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. But they can change the configuration of their scopes so they can see primary radar returns. They did this on 9/11 when the transponder signals for three of the aircraft disappeared.

Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft’s transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts—which could take 5 minutes or more—were tried and failed.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11

FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane’s failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14 AM, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft.

At 8:21 AM, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a “no radio” aircraft.

The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector’s airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11.

At 8:24:38 AM, the following transmission came from American 11.

American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are returning to the airport.

The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words “we have some planes.” The next transmission came seconds later.

American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.

The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight’s altitude. Because the controller didn’t understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the radio transmission, listen to it closely, and report back.

Between 8:25 and 8:32 AM, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American11 had been hijacked. At 8:28 AM, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center’s airspace.

By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32 AM, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC (National Military Command Center) to request a fighter escort.

The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the other...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Authors
• 1. Introduction to Critical Incident Management
• 2. Risk Analysis
• 3. Planning and Organizing at the Operational Level
• 4. Planning and Organizing for Tactical Response
• 5. Strategic Planning—A Systems Approach
• 6. Organizing and Planning Training Exercises
• 7. Learning and Innovation
• 8. Planning for Large-Scale Special Events—Putting It All Together
• Glossary
• Appendix I: Steps for Planning a Special Event
• Appendix II: Typical Field Force Lineup
• Appendix III: Enhanced Mobile Field Force Lineup
• Appendix IV: Multiagency Team Assignments
• Appendix V: FTAA-Related Training
• Appendix VI: Example of a Training Schedule
• Appendix VII: Example of a Training Timeline (2003 FTAA)
• Index