Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Shahram Akbarzadeh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351859523
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This handbook examines the regional and international dynamics of the Middle East. It challenges the state society dichotomy to make sense of decision-making and behavior by ruling regimes. The 33 chapter authors include the world's leading scholars of the Middle East and International Relations (IR) in order to make sense of the region. This synthesis of area studies expertise and IR theory provides a unique and rigorous account of the region's current dynamics, which have reached a crisis point since the beginning of the Arab Spring.

The Middle East has been characterized by volatility for more than a century. Although the region attracts significant scholarly interest, IR theory has rarely been used as a tool to understand events. The constructivist approach in IR highlights the significance of state identity, shaped by history and culture, in making sense of international relations. The authors of this volume consider how IR theory can elucidate the patterns and principles that shape the region, in order to provide a rigorous account of the contemporary challenges of the Middle East.

The Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East provides comprehensive coverage of International Relations issues in the region. Thus, it offers key resources for researchers and students interested in International Relations and the Middle East.

1
The blurred line between state identity and realpolitik

Shahram Akbarzadeh

The Middle East has been making news for decades – mostly bad news. From Arab-Israeli wars, hostage taking, Islamic revolutionary upheavals, jihad against the Soviet Union, more wars, to the scourge of sectarian warfare, the region appears to be in ongoing turmoil. Yet the level of scholarship on the Middle East and the underlying currents that lead to explosive eruptions on a regular basis remains limited. Popular revolts in Arab states in 2010–11, dubbed the Arab Spring (because it held the promise of opening up the political landscape), caught region experts by surprise. For all the ink that had been spilt on the Middle East, the scale and intensity of the popular revolt was unexpected. The community of scholars on the region were caught even more off-guard with the rise of sectarian conflicts that have become a prominent feature of politics in the region, threatening to shatter the idea of the nation-state.

Studies of politics and its subfield of international relations in the Middle East had adopted the conventional scholarly approach that placed the state front and center. Studies of politics and international relations in the Middle East have examined a range of topics including wars, political systems, revolutions, and regional dynamics, almost exclusively from a state-centric perspective. Taking the state for granted has been the overarching feature of scholarship, even when studying social movements and state weakness. This field of study has produced insightful analysis on the nature of the state, strengths and weaknesses of political systems, and challenges to the ruling order, albeit “overstating the state”. In his seminal work, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, Nazih Ayubi examined the range of social, political, and economic pressures facing modern states in the region, concluding that the Arab states tend to shift further towards authoritarianism to compensate for their weakness.¹ In exploring questions of stability, political legitimacy, and cultural/traditional liabilities that challenge the state, Ayubi pointed to the inherent weakness of the state, but this did not prompt a recalibration of the analysis. The Arab state remained the primary unit of analysis, bent on self-preservation in a system of states. This pattern has remained the dominant feature of scholarship on the international relations of the Middle East.

The state-centric approach is consistent with various re-incarnations of the realist school of thought in international relations. To be sure, the modern experience of the Middle East – especially in the second half of the twentieth century – provides ample evidence on the significance of the state. The Arab-Israeli wars presented a case of emerging states, seeking to prove their worth in a hostile environment: the Israeli state fighting for survival, and Arab states to enhance political legitimacy. The short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR, 1958–1961) confirmed this pattern as two post-colonial Arab states experimented with the formation of a super Arab power under the charismatic leadership of President Gamal Abdul Naser. The convergence of Egypt and Syria under the UAR flag and their subsequent divorce has given further evidence of the centrality of the state in the political imagination of the elite in the Middle East. A similar pattern may be observed in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Iran’s southern territories in 1980 sought two distinct objectives: giving Iraq greater access to waterways to the Persian Gulf, and weakening Iran’s hostile new regime. Baghdad’s concern with Iran’s message of revolution was shared by other regional powers. The young Arab sheikhdoms to the south of the Persian Gulf felt vulnerable to calls from Tehran for Arab Muslims to follow the Iranian example and overthrow their ruling regimes. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1982 that brought together Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates was aimed at countering Iran.

The concern with state self-preservation meant that GCC members saw Iraq as a bulwark against Iran’s message of revolution. This concern, however, revealed a prevailing feature of political thinking: confusing ruling regimes with the state. Iran’s call for revolution was aimed at incumbent regimes and the emulation of the Islamic model of government that had emerged in Iran following the 1979 revolution. This was a call for the Islamization of the state, not its abolition. GCC members’ concern with self-preservation therefore was effectively about the future of the ruling regimes. Protecting incumbent regimes in the Middle East has emerged as the key driver of state policies, domestic and foreign. This is doubly true in the authoritarian context of the region, where incumbent regimes are not subject to popular wishes, except in exceptional cases such as the 2011 popular revolt. Placating the ruling regime against internal and external threats is the primary driver for decision-making.

This feature highlights a challenge to the abstract view of the state as a rational actor. Ruling regimes exercise power with a view to their past and their future. They carry an identity informed by religion, culture, and history. This is an important aspect that constructivism and to some extent neoclassical realism have sought to incorporate in the analysis of international relations. Taking note of regime identity as a unit of analysis adds a key dimension to our understanding of the way states behave and relate to each other, and how ruling regimes respond to domestic/societal incentives and threats. It allows for changes in the priorities of the ruling regimes to reflect evolution and identity shifts. Far from being static, ruling regimes evolve to accommodate change inside and outside their domain while seeking to maintain continuity. Keeping this balance is challenging. Cultural changes in the Middle East commensurate with the rise of the educated middle class have generated significant pressure for cultural and political change, but this remains an uneven experience. The growing educated middle class in the region has been a force for modernization. In contrast, the more traditional sections of the society are suspicious of this push for change and view it as a threat to their identity and value system. The latter phenomenon is captured in the term ‘westoxification’, to depict the erosion of traditional values by encroaching Westernization. This process is seen as a threat to the authentic way of life and values. The ruling regimes are forced to navigate these counter-pressures, some more successfully than others, always with an eye toward their legitimacy and continuity.

Saudi Arabia and Iran present two archtypes of the merger between the state and the ruling regimes and how the concern with regime legitimacy and priorities colore the behavior of the state. Following the ascendancy of King Salman bin Abdulaziz in Saudi Arabia in 2015, the ruling family experienced a generational shift with far-reaching implications for state behavior internally and externally. Soon after assuming the throne, King Salman appointed his son Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) as defense minister and deputy Crown Prince ( January 2015). Taking this key role at 30 years of age meant that MBS was in a position to act on the sentiments and aspirations of his generation, who were well-educated, internationally well-connected, and aware of Saudi Arabia’s external image. For the new generation of Saudi elite, the problem with Saudi Arabia’s image was closely tied to the way it had handled regional challenges and Iran. Under King Faisal and his successor King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia was inclined to shy away from provoking Iran and worked behind the scenes to support its allies. A long-term perspective on regional issues and avoiding major foreign policy shifts typified the Saudi approach. In short, the Saudi approach to foreign policy was risk averse. This was clearly unsatisfactory to the new generation of Saudi elite, who saw the quiet diplomacy approach as a sign of weakness. For MBS and his ilk, Saudi Arabia’s risk aversion had left Iran unchallenged, allowing it to spread its influence across the Middle East and make inroads into Saudi Arabia’s backyard. MBS broke with Saudi Arabia’s cautious security and foreign policy-making by launching Operation Decisive Storm, a bold move that brought Saudi armed forces in combat in Yemen.

In Riyadh’s perspective, the Yemen war was justified in terms of the need to roll back Iran, which was accused of sponsoring Houthi rebels. The Yemen war signaled a change of tenor in the way Saudi leaders responded to threats. They sought to take the lead in initiating a direct response to Iran, rather than lobby the US for action. This new approach led to the formation of a military coalition of forces with the United Arab Emirates and token representation from a number of other Arab states. While the war has dragged on, and the Saudis have not been able to achieve their objective of suppressing the Houthi rebellion, this assertive response has helped send a strong message to Iran and the Muslim world: Saudi Arabia is reclaiming the mantle of Muslim leadership and will not tolerate Iranian expansionism. This newfound assertiveness was on display again in 2016 when Saudi Arabia encouraged Muslim states to break diplomatic relations with Iran in response to mob attacks on the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, and even more forcefully the following year at the Istanbul summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. In 2017 the Saudi leadership used the OIC summit to chastise and isolate Iran for what the Saudis called aggressive and destabilizing interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states in the region. This was a symbolic show of force, signaling to Iran that the Saudi leadership was prepared to challenge Iran publically. The new Saudi leadership does not appear to be constrained by the modicum of behavior that governed its predecessors.

The generational shift in Saudi Arabia and the new assertiveness against Iran has had implications for Saudi foreign relations, most significantly with the US and Israel. The Obama administration’s pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran, signed in July 2015, only months after MBS assumed this post as defense minister, provided an opportunity for him (and his allies in the royal family) to stamp his mark on Saudi national security and foreign relations. Under MBS’ leadership, Saudi Arabia openly challenged the US decision to sign the nuclear deal with Iran. In this period, the Saudi view of the US dimmed significantly. Washington was seen to be betraying Riyadh and putting Saudi security and interests at risk by moving to free Iran from sanctions. The sense of betrayal was palpable and enhanced the desire in the new leadership for self-reliance in Saudi’s national security. After months of negotiations, Saudi Arabia signed a multi-million-dollar arms deal with the US: an agreement worth a staggering US$350 billion over 10 years.² The change of administration in the US, especially the overtly anti-Iran agenda of President Donald Trump, has repaired some of the damage in Saudi-US relations. According to Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Ambassador to the US, ‘there is a huge improvement in the Saudi-US relationship under this administration. I think that President Trump is determined to work with his allies in the region to counter Iranian expansionism and terrorism’.³ But by this time, the new foreign policy thinking has been solidified. The new US administration has not changed the new leadership’s assertive (critics might say adventurist) foreign policy in the region.

The Saudis’ greater assertiveness in relation to Iran and efforts to challenge the Obama administration’s pursuit of the nuclear deal presented a unique point of confluence with the Israeli position on Iran. Tel Aviv had been publicly lobbying the US to take action against Iran and warned against the nuclear deal. Israel shared the Saudi point of view that freeing Iran from international sanctions would embolden Tehran and offer it a free hand to meddle in the region even more forcefully. This convergence of views facilitated a series of meetings between the Saudi and Israeli leaders to coordinate their position and lobby the Obama administration. These efforts were initially made behind closed doors, but they soon came to light and paved the way for a public rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is a remarkable policy shift, as Saudi Arabia does not have official diplomatic relations with Israel and needs to manage widely held public opinion that continues to see Israel as an occupying power of Islam’s third holiest site. In this respect the Saudi leadership is taking a risk by deviating from the consensus view and flirting with a taboo subject. Engaging in talks with Israel, with the long-term prospects of establishing full diplomatic relations, has the potential to seriously undermine the political legitimacy of the Saudi leadership, and appears to be at odds with its assertion of global Muslim leadership. Yet, the new leadership appears ready to take this risk in order to challenge the threat that Iran is seen to be presenting. In other words, the regional threat from Iran is seen as near and present, overshadowing the protracted dispute with Israel over its occupation of Muslim lands. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has already made a number of attempts to find a negotiated deal with Israel to address the matter, including Palestinian grievances, showing interest in moving away from the deadlock with Israel. The urgency of what is seen as a real threat has given the Saudi leaders the justification to take the opportunity to open a new chapter in Saudi-Israel relations, effectively prioritizing hard geostrategic considerations over religious and ideological agenda. The Saudi leadership is clearly hoping that it can maintain popular loyalty by depicting the Iranian threat not purely in security terms, but through a sectarian lens, blurring the line between hard-power considerations and ideological concerns.

The blurred line between hard-power calculations and ideological concerns raises questions about the most appropriate conceptual framework to make sense of the Saudi behavior. On the one hand, the realist approach appears to have some explanatory merits as hard-power considerations are gaining prominence over Islamic affiliations and the self-proclaimed notion of Saudi leadership in the Muslim world. The rather contentious rapprochement with Israel is a stark example of hard-power foreign policy thinking at work. On the other hand, this shift is predicated on the assertive style of the new Saudi leadership. The MBS agenda, internal and external policies, reflect growing domestic pressure for change, especially amongst middle-class Saudis who seek more entrepreneurial and social opportunities. MBS reform agenda pays homage to this growing domestic push and suggests that domestic considerations need to be incorporated into the conceptual approach. Neoclassical realism purports such a conceptual framework and could shed light on shifts and re-orientations at the top. However, neoclassical realism is less interested in the power of ideas and identity politics, major factors in a state that is deliberately ideological and justifies its policies in relation to religion and its religious standing. The constructivist approach in international relations appears to be more adept at capturing the force of ideational factors in shaping Saudi behavior. However, as has been discussed previously and throughout this book, a mix of factors affect policy change. Adopting a conceptual framework to capture this mix is a challenge that has occupied scholars of the region.

The Iranian case presents a similar dynamic at work. The Islamic Republic of Iran was founded on the premise of advocating for Muslim interests globally. The post-1979 Iranian Constitution makes it incumbent on the government of the day to advance the interests of the ‘down-trodden’ anywhere they may be. This constitutional mandate was based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary ideas, which expected the Iranian revolution to serve as a beacon for other popular uprisings throughout the region. Iran’s message of revolution and political change along Islamic lines proved to be a source of anxiety among ruling regimes in the neighborhood, resulting in the ostracization of Iran. Khomeini’s venomous attacks on Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the Saudi dynasty set the tone of the relationship between Iran and its neighbors and served to isolate Iran. In response, the Iranian leadership made a virtue of its pariah status primarily for domestic propaganda, but also for its revolutionary projection to the region as it hoped to galvanize public opinion in the Arab world. Here the Iranian regime was conscious of the gap between ruling regimes in the region and their population, and sought to invest in it to undermine potential threats and ultimately remake the region in its own image. While this mix of ideological zeal and hard-power considerations gave way to a more measured foreign policy over time, especially under President Khatami, the Arab Spring and the subsequent descent of the region into sectarian conflict revived Iran’s revolutionary agenda. The firebrand President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad thrived in the context of political upheaval and explicitly pushed for the revival of Khomeini’s revolutionary message for the region. In Ahmadinejad’s view, the Arab world was just catching up with the lessons of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under his leadership, Iran hosted a major conference in Tehran to celebrate the “Islamic Awakening” of the Arab world, and feted the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in an obvious attempt to forge a new partnership with far-reaching implications for the regional balance of power. Unfortunately for Ahmadinejad, the military coup in Egypt (2013) removed the prospects of that partnership. Iran’s ambitions of expanding its links in the region were further challenged with the deteriorating situation in Syria. President Bashar al-Assad had been a loyal ally of Iran, now under threat by a host of armed groups, including the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, known by its Arabic acronym as Daesh.

The arrival of the softly spoken Hassan Rouhani to the office of the presidency in 2013 did not change this dynamic. While Rouhani toned down the fiery rhetoric of his predecessor, and secured a nuclear deal with P5 + 1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), Iran under his leadership remained committed to supporting Assad’s war efforts to crush the rebels. In this respect, Rouhani’s approach was consistent with that of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who traditionally takes a more ideologically driven stance on policy matters. Protecting Assad and maintaining Syria as an ally are integral to Iran on two important grounds. Ideologically, Syria is a key player in Iran’s anti-US and anti-Israel narrative. Syria’s history of antagonism with Israel and support for Iran, especially during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), made it a natural partner for Iran’s notion of an “axis of resistance”. Such a partnership served Iran to project an image of pursuing a revolutionary agenda in the region and standing up to Israel, seen as the occupying power of Muslim lands. The Iranian regime puts significant stock in the propaganda value of this alliance – externally and internally. Anti-Americanism and challenging Israel have been key pillars of Iran’s Islamist ideology and central to state identity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Anti-Americanism is an almost immutable aspect of the ruling regime’s identity that sets the parameters of inclusion and exclusion for foreign policy choices. This explains why Mohamad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, the two Iranian presidents credited with pursuing a reformist and pragmatic agenda, found it impossible to cross the redline and explore normalization of relations with Washington. Rouhani’s aversion to even meeting with President Obama in the wake of the 2015 nuclear agreement was highly noteworthy. For many observers, this would have been the best time for dire...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• 1 The blurred line between state identity and realpolitik
• 2 Neoclassical realism: domestic politics, systemic pressures, and the impact on foreign policy since the Arab Spring
• 3 What constructivism?
• 4 Historical sociology and Middle East international relations
• 5 Subaltern realism meets the Arab world
• 6 Islam, political Islam, and the state system
• 7 Don’t shoot the elephant: Middle East stability after the Iranian nuclear deal
• 8 The revolutionary guard in Iranian domestic and foreign power politics
• 9 The Arab uprising and regional power struggle
• 10 US–Israel relations during the Obama administration: fundamental shift, or adaptation to new realities?
• 11 Saudi Arabia and Iran: Islam and foreign policy in the Middle East
• 12 The Arab Spring and Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East
• 13 China’s foray into the Middle East: from ambivalence to ambition?
• 14 Oil production, innovation, and politics in the Middle East
• 15 Qatar: an ambitious small state
• 16 GCC foreign policy: the struggle for consensus
• 17 EU policy in the Middle East: unfulfilled aspirations
• 18 Old and new challenges for ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East
• 19 UN Security Council Resolution 1325: a framework for women’s peace activism in the Middle East?
• 20 The demise of the Arab strongman? Authoritarianism and the future of the Middle East
• 21 Armed non-state actors and strategic decision-making
• 22 Islamic State: aberration, or accelerant of system-wide changes to come?
• 23 Proxy relations: Iran and Hezbollah
• 24 The Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda after the Arab Spring: a failed project
• 25 Transition and the Arab Spring
• 26 Shock absorption: Palestinian–Israel status quo 2009–17
• 27 The rise and fall of Turkey in the Arab Spring
• Bibliography
• Index