Social influence is a fundamental aspect of life in organizations. Indeed, it is unlikely that organizations could function at all without it. Almost all organizational members engage in influencing othersâor at least they attempt to do soâand, in turn, virtually everyone in any organization is subject to the social influence of others. Moreover, this assertion holds true for every type of organization, whether large or small, public sector or private sector. Engineers, social workers, salespeople, union members, and, of course, managers and supervisors all attempt to get others to engage in behaviors that meet the objectives of the influence agent. This is not meant to imply, however, that all influence processes are overt and intentional. It is important to recognize that it is possible to influence others unintentionally, and it is possible to be influenced without conscious awareness of having been influenced.
Part 1 begins with a review of such topics as power, influence, and organizational politics, and it provides an overview of the study of these constructs, as that study has evolved. The readings in this section cite much of the most important literature on power and influence that has appeared over the past few decades and thus provide the interested reader with many worthwhile leads for further study. In these readings, there is a focus on factors that affect peopleâs choice of influence strategies. Also emphasized is the rather difficult cognitive challenge faced by someone who must analyze a situation in order to choose an appropriate influence strategy.
Because Part 1 will provide a theoretical and historical basis for better understanding the material which will comprise the subject matter of Parts 2 through 4, we recommend that Part 1 be read before any of those sections. Before discussing the readings in any more detail, we offer some background on the study of power and influence in organizations.
POWER AND INFLUENCE
Power and influence are closely related concepts, but they are by no means synonymous. Power can be portrayed as a resourceâa sort of reservoir of forceâthat can be used by an agent to change the behavior of another. The actual application of that force is what we mean by âinfluence.â Through the application of power, A has the capacity to influence B to behave in ways that s/he would otherwise not behave. As Hardy (1995, p. xiii) has pointed out, this rather simple notion has been âchallenged, amended, critiqued, extended and rebuffed over the years, but nevertheless remains the starting point for a remarkably diverse body of literature.â
The diversity in the literature to which Hardy refers extends well beyond the field of organization and management into sociology, political science, and the like. For our present purposes, however, we shall limit our treatment of power and organizational influence processes to literature sources that have been directed at an audience of managers and management scholars. Thus, the readings in this book have all been taken from journals and books that are primarily intended for a management audience.
Even though power is a well-known reality in organizational lifeâfor instance, Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) observed that managers asked to describe power distribution in organizations seem to have little trouble doing soâit tends to be a âmessyâ and elusive concept. While many aspects of power seem rational and public, there are also aspects that are more-or-less hidden beneath the visible surface. That is, along with the overt aspects of power and power relationships, there are some rather covert or symbolic aspects that do not, at first, meet the eye (Frost 1987).
Early work in management literature tended to distinguish power from authority. The latter was âlegitimateâ power bestowed by the hierarchy and embedded in the formal system; the former was considered âillegitimateâ and tended to be excluded from organizational research. Hardy (1995) argues that this dualistic perspective continues to characterize management literature on power and that the management approach to the topic pursues a functionalist perspective in which power and politics are viewed as illegitimate activities that are contrary to the established order. We believe, however, that the readings in this book paint a somewhat different pictureâone in which power and legitimate authority are treated as inseparable facets of the same underlying construct.
POWER AND DEPENDENCE
Key to the idea of power, is the notion of dependence. The more B is dependent on A, the greater the power that A exerts over B. In order to exert power over B, A must control resources:
(1) that are important to B,
(2) that are relatively scarce, and
(3) that B cannot obtain without A (or that B cannot easily replace by substitute resources).
This set of criteria is consistent with the basic framework for the strategic contingencies theory of power, suggested by the Aston Group around thirty years ago (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings 1971), and elaborated by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) in their resource dependence model. This general way of thinking about power relationships recurs throughout the literature on power and influence. In the most general sense, dependence is a function of three, somewhat overlapping, elements: importance, scarcity and nonsubstitutability.
Importance
Individuals (and organizations) must cope with many uncertainties or problems, and they must be able to obtain scarce and needed resources that they do not possess. Some, of course, are deemed more essential than others (hence the Aston Groupâs use of the term strategic contingencies). If A controls resources or the solution to problems that B needs, A has power over B. The amount of that power is proportional to the relative importance that B places on the missing resources or solutionsâthat is, the extent of the need. These are what Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) refer to as the âcritical contingencies.â As they noted, the idea of importance may be obvious but that does not diminish its significance.
Scarcity
It has been said that the term âscarce resourcesâ is a tautology. It is difficult to conceive of any resource that is limitless. Still, some resources are clearly in shorter supply than others. Following the example above, As power over B is proportional to the scarcity of the resources that B needs and that A controls.
Nonsubstitutability
Here, we mean that neither the source for obtaining the resource nor the resource, per se, is subject to substitution. In the former context, even if a needed resource is both important and scarce, As power over B would be reduced or even nullified if B were able to go to C or D to obtain it. The more alternative sources that exist, the lower that power of any individual provider. In the latter context, the same dilution effect would exist if the resource, itself, could be substituted for by alternative resources that would solve the critical problem facing B. Thus, either substitution of supplier or substitution of resource would have an equivalent suppressing effect on As power over B.
It should also be readily apparent that the dependence of B on A would be considerably attenuated if A were also dependent on B for some (presumably other) important, scarce, and nonsubstitutable resource. In such a case, dependence becomes interdependence and each party is in a position to âmake a dealâ for the needed resources, rather than simply having to yield to influence.
POWER BASES
As we know, not every influence attempt is successful. The efficacy of any influence attempt depends upon the influence agentâs ability to apply one or more effective bases of power, as well as to utilize appropriate influence tactics. Regarding bases of power, we who study organizations probably owe our earliest conception of power bases to the work of French and Raven (1959) whose original framework consisted of five categories: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power.
In the years that followed, French and Ravenâs original five-category framework has been criticized for being too simplistic and for missing some important bases of power in addition to those suggested. Sources of power that are difficult to categorize under the French and Raven framework (e.g., persuasion, advice, attractiveness) are noted by Bell, Walker, and Wilier (2000). Raven (1999) added a sixth category, information (both direct and indirect), to French and Ravenâs original five, and he also increased the explanatory power of the original power bases by dividing each of them into more definitive subcategories. Kotterâs classic article âPower, Dependence, and Effective Managementâ (1977), which is included as a reading in Part 2, noted that it is possible to exert influence over another by capitalizing on the otherâs perceived sense of obligation, and that many influence tactics are not nearly as direct as implied by the French and Raven framework. Rather, there are several indirect methods availableâin general, by manipulating the environment of the target person, rather than by exerting direct influence. Clegg and Hardy (1996) went so far as to assert that one can never achieve closure on what the bases of power areâthey might be anything under the appropriate circumstances.
Despite its rudimentary nature, French and Ravenâs framework provides an appropriately straightforward beginning for our understanding of the variety of power sources that may be available for exerting influence. As a sort of bonus contribution, their framework also emphasizes an aspect of power that is crucially important to our understanding of power and influenceâpower tends to be a relative concept. It is the relationship between the parties (influence agent and target) that determines the power that one party has over the other.
Let us, then, consider each of French and Ravenâs original categories as background material for newer and more elaborate schemes that will appear in this book. As a convenience, we subdivide their five bases of power into two subsets: position power and personal power.
Position Power
Position power includes those bases of power that accrue to an individual whose position in an organization or network provides access to, or control over, resources that can be used for rewards or punishments. It also includes power that results from legitimation, by the system, of the right to direct the behavior of others on the basis of position, per se. What these sources of power have in common is their relative impersonalityânone depend to any great extent on characteristics of the individual. Instead, as role incumbents are replaced by their successors, most of the position power tends to be transferred to the replacement. First, let us consider the two position-power bases that Kelman (1958) referred to as âmeans controlââthat is, reward power and coercive power.
Reward Power
Reward power is the ability to offer tangible rewards in exchange for a target personâs compliance (for example, the offer of an increase in pay, or a promotion). As with other power bases, this ability to reward is largely a matter of the target personâs perceptions. In other words, in order to have force, reward power must be credible.
Coercive Power
Coercive power is the power to punish. The effectiveness of this base of power depends on credible threatâthat is, the target person believes that the influence agent possesses the means and will employ them to punish him or her, if s/he does not comply.
At first blush, reward power and coercive power might appear to be functionally redundant, i.e., extremes on a continuum. In fact, some scholars have lumped the two together under the general term, âsanctionsâ (that is, rewards as positive sanctions and punishments as negative sanctions). Clearly, they do have much in commonâboth depend on credibility of the threats or promises, and on the fit between what is offered (or threatened) and the specific targetâs needs (or vulnerabilities). Both are based on a quid pro quo exchange, of the if-then or either-or form. Neither is self-sustaining without surveillance; that is, the influence agent must monitor the targetâs compliance or noncompliance in order to administer outcomes (this is probably relatively more important for coercive power than for reward power). Nevertheless, there is at least one important difference that justifies treating them as separate power basesâthey tend to affect the future relationship between the parties differently. Repeated use of punishment is apt to decrease the attractiveness of the influence agent in the eyes of the target, whereas repeated rewards may have the opposite effect. In general, the potentially negative side effects that may accompany punishment seem to have few if any parallels for the use of rewards.
The remaining type of position power to be considered is legi...