The Origins of the Second Arab-Israel War

Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-56

Michael B. Oren

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135189495
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire du Moyen-Orient

This book represents the first scholarly examination of the origins of the 1956 Sinai campaign between Egypt and Israel. Utilising a wide range of primary sources, the study analyses the reasons for the breakdown of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and the failure of efforts to mediate a peace accord.

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The Border

The Egypt-Israel border extended 250 kilometres from the tip of the Gaza Strip to the Gulf of Aqaba. It was the site of the most intensive interaction between the two countries and the primary source of the second Arab-Israel war. More than a mere line separating hostile armies, the border represented a tangle of legal and political issues which, when exposed to internal and external pressures, produced a steady escalation of tension. This, in turn, greatly influenced other areas of Egypt-Israel relations, resulting, ultimately, in their irreversible drift towards war.

For the most part, the border between Egypt and Israel was determined by ground forces in the 1948 war, with details worked out by Israeli and Egyptian delegates to the Rhodes armistice talks in February 1949. The Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement (EIAA) of that month, like those signed thereafter between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, identified an international boundary ‘beyond which the forces of the respective Parties shall not move’. Like the other Agreements, the EIAA established partial or complete demilitarized zones in contested limitrophe areas. It entrusted supervision of the armistice to UN Military Observers (UNMOs) of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UN-TSO), who monitored compliance with EIAA regulations. Reports of violations were reviewed by an Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), composed of three Egyptian and three Israeli officers and a UNMO, invested with the right to publicly condemn the offending party.

Unlike the other Agreements, however, EIAA provided for a Special Committee to facilitate the workings of the MAC. Comprising an Egyptian, an Israeli and a UN officer, the Committee was empowered to hear appeals on questions of principle. In contrast to its authors' intentions, however, the Committee more often obstructed the EIMAC, for, once an issue had been appealed, it remained sub judice until resolved. Thus, Egypt and Israel, if dissatisfied with an EIMAC ruling, could appeal it to the Committee where, by raising objections over procedure, they could delay its issuance indefinitely.¹

The EIAA, though initially successful in imposing a truce, soon proved incapable of sustaining it. Designed as an interim military agreement, the EIAA did not provide for changing conditions along the border, nor did it reconcile conflicting Egyptian and Israeli claims to sovereignty over various border areas. Such omissions would later serve as major sources of border friction.

According to all the Armistice Agreements, the State of Israel had no real borders but only Armistice Demarcation Lines (ADL). These, it was stressed, were ‘not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary’, though in fact the Egypt-Israel ADL conformed with the 1947 UN partition lines and, with the exception of Gaza, with the traditional border between Palestine and Egypt. Nor could Egypt and Israel be said to enjoy complete sovereign rights on either side of the ADL, as indicated by the EIAA's stipulations for force limitations and demilitarization. These restrictions did not, however, alter the fact that the ADL separated not only armies but independent states which, by nature, would seek to assert their sovereignty up to, and in some cases beyond, the ADL.

Throughout the period leading up to the 1956 war, Israel worked to erect settlements and barricades along the ADL. These were designed not only to provide security against attack but, insofar as the Armistice did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Negev, to bestow upon the ADL some semblance of permanence. Egypt was less concerned with proving its sovereignty over Sinai – such recognition was implicit in the EIAA – than with blocking Israel's attempts to establish the ADL as a legal border. Irredentist claims, Egypt's to the Negev and Israel's to Gaza, further exacerbated this tension, as did certain locations where the ADL had not been clearly delineated.²

The contest over sovereignty was particularly bitter in two areas, al-Aujah and the Gaza Strip. Al-Aujah al-Khafirah (Hebrew: Nitzana), a 125-square-mile rectangle situated 70 kilometres south of Beersheva, contained vital axes leading into Sinai and the Negev. In view of the area's strategic importance, the EIAA had designated al-Aujah a Demilitarized Zone (DZ), such as those which existed on the Syrian and Jordanian borders. By contrast, the status of Gaza, a 140-square-mile strip wedged between the Negev and Sinai deserts and the sea, was sui generis. Occupied by the Egyptian army in 1948 as a temporary measure pending its inclusion in a Palestinian state, Gaza remained under Egyptian trusteeship, a situation explicitly recognized by the EIAA. The Armistice did, however, establish strict limitations on troop and weapons strength inside the Strip, as well as on the Israeli side of the Gaza ADL.

Israel considered the DZ as part of its territory, a claim rejected by Egypt, which regarded it as a no-man's-land. Egypt disclaimed sovereignty over Gaza – a policy largely directed against Jordan's annexation of the West Bank – and made efforts, such as its support of a local All-Palestine government, to distinguish it from Egyptian territory. In practice, however, Egypt exercised full sovereign rights in Gaza; the All-Palestine government had only symbolic powers. In principle, Israel denied Egypt's right to occupy Gaza but, in signing the EIAA, implicitly recognized it, and held Egypt responsible for maintaining the Armistice along the Strip.

The EIAA also failed to account for demographic changes in key border areas. Again, these were most dramatic in the centres of greatest controversy, in Gaza and al-Aujah. Unlike the other DZs, al-Aujah was uninhabited at the time of the Armistice, with the result that no provision existed for a civilian presence there. This omission invited Egyptian and Israeli attempts to introduce their own personnel into the zone and thus establish control over it.

More destabilizing still were demographic changes in the Gaza Strip, where an estimated 210,000 Palestinian refugees – in addition to 100,000 indigenous inhabitants – were densely crowded.³ The desire of the Palestinian refugees to regain their former homes deepened with the deterioration of conditions in the Strip, and placed increasing pressure on Egypt to fulfil their aspirations. The situation presented Egypt with a dilemma, for it could maintain neither order in Gaza nor its image in the Arab world without responding to refugees' demands, yet to do so raised the risk of EIMAC censure and, more ominously, Israeli retaliation.

To reconcile these contradictions, Egypt adopted a two-pronged policy of publicly opposing infiltration while secretly harnessing a portion of it for the purposes of sabotage and intelligence-gathering. The policy had many advantages, for not only did it gain Egypt goodwill in Gaza and among the Arab states, but also provided it with information on Israeli forces and a means of retarding Israel's settlement of the border area. The policy also allowed Egypt to escape condemnation in the EIMAC, for though the EIAA proscribed both civilian crossings of the ADL and hostile actions by irregulars, the Commission could find no evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the infiltration.⁴

The Israelis, however, would not endure even limited infiltration, especially if it resulted in the loss of life and property. In response, they staged armed retaliations across the border, often depicting them as the work of vigilante settlers in an attempt, albeit rarely successful, to avoid the EIMAC's condemnation. The policy's main purpose was to punish the infiltrators, but it had other objectives as well. Insofar as the Israelis believed that the Arab states actively encouraged infiltration as a first step in their campaign to destroy the Jewish State, the retaliations were designed to have a deterrent effect. Hence, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) reserved the right to retaliate against any Arab target, not necessarily the origin of the infiltration. Retaliations also served to satisfy the demands of the Israeli public for revenge, and of the IDF for action.⁵

Israel's retaliations, even when directed at the West Bank, invariably caused unrest among the Gaza refugees and placed pressure on Cairo to respond in kind. As a result, Egypt had to both bolster its forces in Gaza and upgrade its sponsorship of infiltration. Israel interpreted these moves as further proof of Egypt's commitment to war, and, as such, resolved to launch even larger-scale retaliations. The result of this vicious cycle of provocations and reprisals was an almost continuous escalation of Egypt-Israel tensions along the border.

For all its volatility, however, the Egypt-Israel border remained relatively quiet for nearly two years after the signing of the EIAA. In contrast to their political disagreement over the meaning of that document, Egypt and Israel concurred in its practical provisions for the border. While major fighting erupted on the Syrian and Jordanian borders, violence between Egypt and Israel was limited to chance encounters between infiltrators and Israeli soldiers or settlers. In Gaza, the occupation authorities kept armed infiltration to a minimum, and in the DZ, Egypt sought a modus vivendi with Israel through the organization of joint patrols.

Their bellicose rhetoric notwithstanding, the Egyptians had no intention of waging war against Israel. Resistance to the idea was especially strong in the army, whose leaders feared risking another humiliating defeat. Even Faruq, Egypt's corrupt and corpulent monarch, who harboured an abiding ambition for a ‘second round’ with Israel, was too preoccupied with growing opposition to his rule to contemplate such action.⁶ A similar outlook prevailed in Israel. Though antagonized by Egyptian propaganda and infiltration from Gaza, Israeli leaders wanted to avoid the resumption of open hostilities with Egypt. Military commanders shared this opinion, particularly in light of the IDF's poor performance in clashes with the Jordanian and the Syrian armies. Thus, at this juncture, there existed a rare confluence of Israeli and Egyptian interests in maintaining the status quo. Such harmony was evident in the EIMAC which, in 1950, was rated by the UN as the most efficient of the Armistice Commissions.⁷

Beginning in late 1950, however, Egypt-Israel border relations began a process of steady deterioration. Egypt withdrew from the joint patrols in the DZ, while Israel evicted from the area Azazme bedouin allegedly sent by Egypt to establish a foothold in the Zone. Egypt protested the action in the Security Council, which condemned it, but failed to force Israel to reinstate the tribe. Armed infiltration meanwhile increased on the Gaza border and, for the first time since the Palestine war, appeared to be aimed at the IDF. On 21 October, following the shooting of two IDF officers by infiltrators, Israel launched its first reprisal into Gaza, killing an undisclosed number of refugees and causing extensive damage to property.⁸ In the EIMAC, co-operation between the delegations ceased as Israel appealed the MAC's ruling on the bedouin expulsions to the Special Committee, and Egypt responded by appealing an Israeli complaint on the Canal blockade (see Chapter 2). A stalemate ensued in which each delegation refused to discuss the other's appeal, resulting in the paralysis of the Special Committee and, to a great extent, of the EIMAC as well.

These tensions were chiefly the result of domestic instability within Egypt. Opposition to Britain's presence in Sudan and in the Suez Canal Zone led to confrontrations between Egyptians and British forces in Egypt. Tension reached a climax in January 1952, with the outbreak of anti-British riots in Cairo. These events sapped Egypt's military strength in Gaza and diminished its ability to control infiltration. Political upheaval further contributed to the escalation – three Egyptian governments fell in the spring of 1952 – as the beleaguered regime sought to rebut its detractors by demonstrating its steadfastness on Palestine. The marked increase in infiltration, accompanied by the intensification of hostile propaganda, deeply provoked the Israelis. In the first months of 1952, the IDF conducted 11 small-scale raids into Gaza and scheduled a major retaliation for July. The operation was postponed, however, with news of the Free Officers' revolution, as Israeli leaders paused to assess the new situation in Egypt.⁹

THE BORDER IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE JULY REVOLUTION

On 23 July 1952, King Faruq was ousted by a military coup conducted by a group calling itself the Free Officers. The event proved to be a turning point in Egypt-Israel relations. Initially, the Officers expressed their intention of concentrating on the country's internal problems and of distancing themselves from the policies of the previous regime. While still bitter over the Palestine defeat, the Officers tended to blame that humiliation on Britain, on other Arab armies and corrupt Egyptian politicians – in that order – and showed little interest in resuming an active role in the fight against Israel. Such a move, in addition to jeopardizing the new government, would serve only to distract the Officers from more pressing issues, such as the economy and relations with Britain, and remove the possibility of attaining US military and economic aid.¹⁰

The Egyptian coup became the focus of intense interest in Israel. While the Israeli press depicted the event as yet another example of instability and militarism in the Arab world, officials at the Israeli Foreign Ministry kept a close watch on the Officers for any indication of a willingness to negotiate. Though uncertain of the political ideas of General Muhammad Naguib, the regime's figurehead leader, and suspicious of those of other Officers – Anwar Sadat and the Salem brothers, Salah and Gamal – the Israelis were hopeful of a breakthrough. Much of their optimism centred on one man, Gamal Abdul Nasser, a dynamic and charismatic 34-year-old Lieutenant Colonel, whom Israeli intelligence had identified as the real power behind Naguib. Nasser was known to the Israelis; he had participated in ceasefire talks with the IDF in 1949 and had expressed a desire to resolve the conflict.¹¹ Aiming to appeal to Nasser, Israeli leaders conveyed to Cairo invitations to peace talks (see Chapter 5), and thereafter regarded the border as a barometer of the Officers' receptivity.

The signs were, at first, promising. Lieutenant Colonel Salah Gohar and Lieutenant Colonel Haim Gaon, the Egyptian and Israeli representatives to the EIMAC, agreed to break the deadlock in the Special Committee and to erase the long backlog of complaints. They further arranged a series of two-week periods during which all problems would be handled directly by the representatives outside the EIMAC framework. Gohar also made the extraordinary gesture of volunteering to join with Israel in marking the ADL. In Gaza, the Egyptian authorities curtailed the activities of Palestinian nationalists and reinforced efforts to restrict infiltration.¹²

The period of co-operation in the EIMAC proved, however, shortlived. By November, Gohar refused to renew the fortnightly agreements and retracted his offer to participate in the marking project. These decisions, he explained, were a response to Israel's attempts to exploit Egypt's goodwill gestures by using the EIMAC as a forum for political talks. While Gohar's claim was not without foundation (see Chapter 5), Egypt's altered stance towards the border came within the context of a general hardening of its position on Palestine.¹³

At base, the shift in the Officers' strategy represented the resumption of Egypt's traditional quest ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• List of Maps
• Chronology
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. THE BORDER
• 2. BOYCOTT AND BLOCKADE
• 3. THE STRUGGLE OVER REGIONAL DEFENCE
• 4. THE ARMS RACE
• 5. SECRET EFFORTS FOR PEACE
• 6. DESCENT TO WAR
• 7. CONCLUSION
• Notes
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index