Aviation Terrorism and Security

Paul Wilkinson, Brian Jenkins

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135231217
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

First Published in 1999. The recent conviction of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef for plotting what prosecutors called '48 hours of terror in the sky' by conspiring to bomb a dozen US airliners, the increasing number of man portable SAM attacks on aircraft, and the recent crash of a hijacked Ethiopian airliner off the Comoro Islands causing 127 deaths, show that aviation confronts a wide range of security threats. The aim of this volume, published ten years after Lockerbie, is to assess the changing threats to aviation security. It is a sad fact that despite major efforts by certain states to enhance security, much more needs to be done to remedy weaknesses in international aviation security if further Lockerbies are to be prevented. The contributors examine threats and vulnerabilities in the light of recent developments in aviation security and consider the prospects for strengthening the response at national and international levels. The study is of obvious relevance not only to security and academic specialists but also to the international civil aviation community and national policy makers.

1

Introduction

PAUL WILKINSON and BRIAN M. JENKINS

The aims of this volume are: first, to assess the changing terrorist threat to the security of civil aviation, including newly emerging threats; second, to review the effectiveness of some of the major policies and measures introduced at national and international levels to protect civil aviation; and third, to consider the merits of new or hitherto neglected approaches to preventing and combatting aviation terrorism.

A key advantage shared by our contributors is that in addition to their expertise in aviation terrorism and security they have a wide knowledge and understanding of the post-Cold War strategic environment and patterns of conflict. This provides the essential context for analysing not only the ever-changing phenomena of international and domestic terrorism worldwide, but also for interpreting the significant developments in aviation terrorism that are in large part shaped by these factors. If we fail to adequately understand the dynamics of the relationship between patterns of violence and conflict generally, and aviation terrorism in particular, how can we hope accurately to identify new threats and develop more effective means to counter them?

Ariel Merari’s opening essay provides a fascinating statistical analysis of aviation terrorism trends since the upsurge of modern international terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many non-specialists may be surprised at his depressing conclusion that, in spite of the significant improvements in aviation security achieved by certain countries and the efforts of international organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO):

In the recent decade, the average hijacker had an 81 per cent chance of actually seizing control of the airliner. The terrorist hijacker had an even higher chance of success – 85 per cent. The rate of success in bombing attacks against airlines, the principal cause of death in attacks on commercial aviation, has also been appallingly high – 76 per cent.

A great strength of Professor Merari’s analysis is that it is both historically comprehensive and encompasses all the major forms of aviation terrorism – attacks on airlines, airports and airline offices.

Ariel Merari observes that ‘even in the recent decade, the rate of attacks is still quite high’. Hence, despite the decline in the overall numbers of attacks on airliners during the 30 year period, ‘the rate of attacks is still quite high. The magnitude of the threat is still a reason for worry’. Complacent assumptions that the threat from aviation terrorism faded away after Lockerbie should be discarded. In 1996, the last year of Professor Merari’s analysis, just over 10 per cent of all recorded acts of international terrorism were directed at aviation targets. They included a dozen hijackings, two attempted hijackings, half a dozen attacks on airline officers and an airport bombing; the year culminated in the crash of the hijacked Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 767 off the Comoro Islands with the loss of 127 lives. We need to add to this picture events such as the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for conspiring to create what US prosecutors called ‘48 hours of terror in the sky’ by plotting to bomb a dozen US airliners in mid-air in the Pacific region, the growing number of man-portable SAM attacks on aircraft, and the ominous possibility of terrorists emulating the Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, possibly by attacking a civil aviation target such as an airliner cabin or an airport lounge or terminal building.

Of course it is important to see the statistics on aviation terrorism in their proper context. In reality airlines are an extremely safe means of transport. In each decade since the mid-1940s, there has been a 40 per cent fall in the fatal accident rate for international scheduled flights. Indeed it is the incredibly good safety record of the world’s airlines that has helped to make air travel such a phenomenally successful mode of transport and one of the fastest growing industries in the world.

There is a compelling case to be made for an effective security system on grounds of the commercial interests of the civil aviation industry. The second Gulf War showed that if the public develop a real fear of flying and no longer trust the will and capability of governments and aviation authorities to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, they will desert the airways in droves. In the first week of the war, The Association of European Airlines claimed that its members had lost 25 per cent of their traffic. Airline Business estimated that the industry as a whole was losing approximately $1.5 billion per month in the immediate aftermath of the war. The industry has every reason to be apprehensive about the effects of any future major conflict in the Middle East, and the concomitant threat of increased terrorism. What counts is the public’s perception of the risks involved.

Yet despite the strong desire of both passengers and crew for effective security against terrorism, and despite the real improvements in aviation security made by certain states following the Lockerbie bombing, many major security weaknesses and vulnerable points remain. Moreover, as Ariel Merari reminds us, these gaps are by no means confined to the poorer countries in the developing world:

... in North America the rate of thwarting of hijackings over the recent two decades has been 43 per cent and in Western Europe 24 per cent (still, a better than two-to-one and three-to-one chance for the average hijacker, respectively). Yet in the most recent decade the thwarting rate in North America had dropped to 23 per cent and in Western Europe to merely eight per cent. The rate of foiling of bombing of airliners also leaves much to be desired. In North America it was 22 per cent over the most recent two decades ... and in Western Europe, 60 per cent.

Ariel Merari’s explanation for this sorry situation is twofold: the security authorities have almost invariably failed to foresee the terrorist’s adoption of fresh methods of attacking aviation, and there is a basic lack of expert knowledge and professionalism on the part of the airline companies’ security systems.

The essays by Peter St John and Brian Jenkins provide ample evidence on the lack of foresight displayed by the security authorities when they were faced by the first wave of hijacks for political extortion and the first sabotage bombings of airliners respectively. It is true that aviation security systems did adapt quite rapidly to the threat from the wave of hijackings in the early 1970s, but they have been much slower in their response to the threat of sabotage bombing. Far too many airports still lack the enhanced x-ray machines capable of reliably detecting explosives, and many are still failing to operate an effective and comprehensive system of positive baggage reconciliation, the linchpin of good security against the sabotage bomb.

In his examination of the development of the hijacking tactic by terrorists, Peter St John concentrates on the political motivation of perpetrators of aviation terrorism as his prime causal factor of hijackings, attacks on airports and sabotage of civil aircraft, while fully accepting that this was the politicisation of an essentially criminal phenomenon. He argues that the ‘seminal causes’ of each new phase of hijacking have been unsolved political problems, which the contemporary great powers either ignored or failed to address properly. This analysis leads him to conclude that solving the root problems of the Palestianians and improving US relations with Iran may go some way towards eradicating the scourge of aviation terrorism. Hence Peter St John’s discussion, like Ariel Merari’s, seeks to offer practical recommendations for the policy-maker in the light of his assessment of the threat.

In his review of aircraft sabotage, Brian Jenkins reminds us that the sabotage of passenger aircraft is one of the deadliest threats posed by contemporary terrorists. He records that since 1969 there have been more than 70 known attempts to plant bombs on board airliners, and these have caused 15 crashes in which 1,732 people have died. He points out that the terrorists’ shift of emphasis from hijacking to sabotage bombing of airliners reflects a well-established terrorist trend ‘toward large-scale indiscriminate violence’, also mirrored, for example, in the tactic of using huge truck bombs in city centres.

In the introduction to his article on Aircraft Sabotage Brian Jenkins also explains some of the key factors which continue to make civil aviation such an attractive target for terrorists. It ‘offers terrorists concentrations of people – mostly strangers – in enclosed environments, generally poses little security challenge and allows easy escape’. He also comments (see abstracts) that:

commercial aviation historically has been a favourite target of terrorists who have viewed airliners as nationally-labelled containers of hostages in the case of hijackings, or victims in the case of sabotage.

One attraction of attacking civil aviation that seems to be missing from this list is the gaining of dramatic world-wide publicity. This was certainly important to groups such as the PFLP in their efforts to use hijackings in the early 1970s as a method of political extortion. However, as Brian Jenkins explains, few sabotage bombings of airliners:

are credibly claimed by any terrorist group... the lack of claims may reflect the changing motives and organisational patterns of terrorism ... . Terrorists working on behalf of state sponsors, determined solely to punish their perceived enemies, or inspired by religious fanaticism with God or His self-appointed spokesperson as their sole constituent have no need to claim responsibility.

Newer and emerging threats to aviation security are not overlooked in this volume. Bruce Hoffman analyses the potential threat to air cargo integrators and concludes that while it cannot be entirely discounted:

Terrorists have not attacked air cargo integrators because they lack ... identification or associational value, are considerably less well-known than commercial air passenger carriers, and since they do not carry passengers whose death and injury is grist for the media, do not have the same ‘sensationalism’, and publicity value as established passenger carriers.

In his review of the missile threat to civil aircraft Marvin B. Schaffer provides a balanced assessment of the threat, drawing attention to the proliferation of man-portable missiles and the increasing probability of terrorist groups not only acquiring some of these weapons but most probably also using them against civilian aircraft. He therefore argues that it is now in the public interest to develop a program to develop equipment to negate the threat of man-portable missiles and to stockpile it without waiting for a new catastrophic event to occur.

In his concluding essay, in addition to arguing the case for substantially strengthening the international civil aviation system against terrorism, Paul Wilkinson also briefly considers some of the ominous possibilities of terrorists using chemical, biological or radiological weapons or cyberwar against civil aviation. A key lesson that governments and the aviation security industry should have learned from Lockerbie is that we must never again allow our security to lag behind the tactics and weapons of the terrorists. His observation leads logically to the second part of this volume, which is concerned

primarily with problems of international and national responses to the challenges of aviation terrorism.

* * *

Rodney Wallis contributes an illuminating and thought-provoking review of the role of the international organisations – ICAO, IATA, ECAC and ACI – in enhancing aviation security. Drawing upon his wealth of experience as director of security of IATA, he soon dispels the notion that their contribution is only of marginal value. He shows how all the major international aviation organizations ‘working in partnership’ have developed international conventions, standards, procedures and practices which all play a vital part in the strengthening of the global aviation security regime, despite the formidable obstacles inherent in the nature of modern international relations.

Brian Jenkins’ second essay casts a critical though constructive eye over aviation security in the United States. As a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security chaired by Vice President Gore, he is also able to provide an insight into how the Commission carried out its work, and assesses its impact on US aviation security policy and measures. Among the key policy issues he raises are unavoidable and crucial questions: who should pay for improvements in aviation security?; how can US aviation security be more effectively regulated and monitored to ensure that aviation security policy and the Gore Commission’s key recommendations are properly implemented?

Omar Malik’s parallel study of British aviation security against terrorism is equally critical and constructive, drawing valuably on the author’s professional experience as a Captain in British Airways, as convener of the British Airline Pilots’ Association security committee, and as a member of the National Aviation Security Committee, in addition to his academic knowledge. He concludes with a favourable overall assessment of Britain’s track record, especially since Lockerbie, in pursuing higher aviation standards. However, he is highly critical of what he describes as ‘Government unwillingness to contribute to the industry’s costs ...’ and .... ‘its failure to develop a constructive partnership with industry’.

* * *

As the publication of this study of aviation terrorism and security has been timed to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, it is particularly appropriate that the volume contains an article by Dr Jim Swire on behalf of UK Families Flight 103. Dr Swire has been the tireless leader of the UK families group. Perhaps understandably, Jim Swire’s article reflects the group’s preoccupation with the effort to secure a trial of the two Libyan suspects indicted by the Scottish and American authorities in 1991 for their alleged role in the bombing. As the Libyan leader has steadfastly refused to hand them over to the US or British authorities, despite the UN sanctions aimed at forcing him to do so, Jim Swire (with the help of Professor Robert Black of Edinburgh University’s law faculty and other indefatigable supporters, such as Tarn Dalyell MP) has campaigned hard to get the British and American governments to allow a trial of the Lockerbie suspects in a neutral country under Scottish law. By mid-summer 1998 the British and American authorities had agreed to a proposal on these lines, and the Dutch government had given its approval to the idea of holding the trial in The Hague. In late August, Colonel Gadaffi appeared to agree in principle to such a trial, but a week later he made an announcement that seemed to reject the US-British proposal. At the time of going to press, it is difficult to tell whether Colonel Gadaffi’s statement is simply a ploy to secure guarantees from Washington, London and The Hague that the two Libyan suspects will under no circumstances be extradited from Holland to the US or the UK, or is a complete reversal of his previous position. If the latter, Gadaffi’s action is likely to deepen suspicion that the Libyan regime is afraid of a trial because it believes it has much to hide. If Colonel Gadaffi does finally reject the offer of a trial in the Netherlands, the US and UK governments will seek stronger UN sanctions against Libya for its refusal to hand over the Lockerbie suspects for trial, probably including an oil embargo. If, on the other hand, a trial does go ahead it will be an unique judicial process, conducted according to Scottish law but without a jury, and taking place in a foreign country.

It must be emphasised, however, that it is not the aim of the present volume to add to the mountain of theories and speculation about the criminal investigation into Lockerbie, though some of the major theories concerning the authorship of the crime are usefully surveyed by Peter St. John. In his concluding essay on enhancing global aviation security, Paul Wilkinson stresses the importance of judicial co-operation to bring those guilty of crimes of aviation terrorism to justice.

The editors share the view that everything must be done to secure a proper trial of the two Libyan suspects indicted for the Lockerbie bombing. A fair and thorough trial offers the only real prospect of discovering those responsible for authorizing, planning and carrying out this atrocity and ensuring that they are brought to justice. The fact that a decade has elapsed since Lockerbie makes the pursuit of the criminal investigation more difficult but by no means impossible. A success in bringing at least some of the individuals responsible for the Lockerbie bombing to justice would be a great victory for the international rule of law and might help to deter at least some of those who may be planning further atrocities.

However, the major emphasis of the contributors to Aviation Terrorism and Security is on reassessing the terrorist threat to civil aviation and reviewing the implications for aviation security policy, measures and procedures. If aviation security measures and procedures had been thoroughly implemented in the case of Pan Am 103, the perpetrators would never have succeeded in planting their bomb on board. Every time aviation security thwarts a sabotage bombing of a jumbo jet it saves hundreds of lives. The challenge discussed in this volume is how to improve not only our national airport and airline security systems, but how to ensure that all airline passengers and crew, regardless of their countries of origin and their destination, can enjoy the highest standards of international aviation security, matching the best practise in the major aviation countries.

The battle to protect civil aviation passengers and crew can only be won if the law-abiding members of the international community combine their efforts to tackle the scourge of international terrorism in all its forms. Our freedom of the airways is ultimately dependent on our ability to preserve the freedom of society as a whole. Dedicating ourselves to the vigorous pursuit of these goals would be the best memorial to the passengers and crew of Pan Am 103 and the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons
• 3. The Politics of Aviation Terrorism
• 4. Aircraft Sabotage
• 5. Aviation Security and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Potential Threat to Air Cargo Integrators
• 6. The Missile Threat to Civil Aviation
• 7. The Role of International Aviation Organisations in Enhancing Security
• 8. Aviation Security in the United States
• 9. Aviation Security Before and After Lockerbie
• 10. A Statement on Behalf of the UK Families Group–Flight 103
• 11. Enhancing Global Aviation Security
• Bibliography
• Abstracts of Articles
• Notes on Contributors
• Index