The Idea of War and Peace

The Experience of Western Civilization

Irving Louis Horowitz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351481175
• Edition: 3
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Modern theorists and their ideas on war and peace are here presented, interpreted, and evaluated with scholarship and clarity of expression. In examining the main currents in modern social theory, the author has gone directly to the works of the leading philosophic figures. This book is a carefully documented analysis based on primary sources. Its republication in an expanded version after more than a half century since its initial appearance is a welcome addition to the literature on conflict and conflict resolution.

In this 2007 greatly expanded third edition of The Idea of War and Peace, Irving Louis Horowitz provides a sense of substance to the character of Western Civilization. The book permits the reader to better understand what the "clash of civilizations" is about. It provides a broad outline of both European and American twentieth century social philosophies as they relate to the issue of war and peace. It also offers a new concluding section that explores in depth this same theme in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Such major figures as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Jacques Maritain, Albert Einstein, and Vladimir Lenin, reviewed in earlier editions, are now joined by examinations of the work of Raymond Aron, Harold D. Lasswell, and other contemporaries. The Idea of War and Peace is not just one more manual of how to conduct or avoid conflict, and even less, a guideline to policy-making. Instead, the work offers a profound sense of the theories and values that underline manuals and guides.

This third edition is graced by a consideration of major figures in the second half of the twentieth century and a retrospective on the work of Niccolo Machiavelli on the nature of warfare. It also includes chapters on the relationship of war, peace, and the democratic order--and a postscript on new forms of state power and terrorism. This new edition links past and present and serves as an analytical bridge between cen

Part 1
Philosophical Idealism

1
Philosophic Dimensions of War and Peace

The quest for peace has been a central motive in the life of people from the first moment of their entrance on the worldly scene. And certain it is that the issue of harmony and conflict has mounted in intensity and urgency with the evolution of civilization. Philosophy, by its very nature as a discipline providing men with a general theory of reality, must continuously grapple with the most intimate problems of human existence. The traditional division of philosophy into categories such as metaphysics, logic, epistemology and aesthetics has only obfuscated the wider realms of social philosophy. The perpetuation of these divisions as hard and fast rules of thought tends to inhibit the exploratory role of political philosophy. Yet, despite the burdens of the system-builders and the sloth of tradition, the great thinkers in every age have devoted themselves to solving the riddle of the nature of peace and war. This attempt has been made not for its own sake, but as we see in Condorcet, in efforts to define the conditions for the further progress and enlightenment of mankind.

The fact that philosophy deals in generalizations is itself neither a criticism nor a uniquely beautiful quality. It is the content of any generalization that is significant. That the problem of war and peace as it is treated in the history of philosophy does not remain on the level of the factually apparent, is indicative of possible rewards in the philosophic method. Philosophy commences its treatment of the issue of peace and war, not by examining any specific treaty, holocaust or alliance, but by asking why such phenomena come into being and what intellectual forces they express. It is the search for general laws and characteristics of human behavior that provides philosophy with its distinctive dimension.

The starting point for a philosophic examination of war and peace is the person. The view of any thinker on this subject rests upon a broad theory of human nature, a social perspective on the nature of people in their manifold associations, institutions and attitudes. Beyond this philosophy treats the vast issues relating to social conflict and harmony and the conditions and value of each. It moves from the study of man as a knowing and doing individual to man as a member of a national, economic, religious and cultural group. As philosophy moves from a study of the individual to the social, it increasingly asserts the importance of relating the general laws it discovers to the practical life of mankind. Because of this, a philosophy of importance has generally moved from the study of human nature to an analysis of the social organism in its historical setting. What initially begins as an inductive sifting of facts describing the nature of man, culminates more often than not, in a conception of collective behavior, i.e., society.

Every theory of human nature and conduct generates attempts to implement its broad conclusions. The rationality of men cannot be expressed in words alone. The specific mechanisms, the forms evolved for coping with the threat of world conflagration, are themselves a distinct aspect of the uses of reason in philosophy as in politics. Philosophy, which by its nature serves to satisfy the requirements of reason and common sense alike, brings out the interdependence of men and their thought on action. As a result, philosophers have pioneered in attempts to bring about organizations that could establish the goals of civilization in fact. The great philosophers have been alert to the need for adequate mechanisms to express the basic wants of men, and aware of the dangers of goals that have no provisions for appropriate organizational roots.

It is the entire cycle, starting with the individual organism and his conscience and ending with the structure of society, that provides philosophy with its characteristic range and role. If it is to be realistically evaluated, philosophy should be considered in terms of the profound elements of a given socio-historical era, or segment of an era. Greek and Roman thinkers had to consider the nature of war in terms of the development of a slave economy. It is neither impossible nor insignificant to relate the clash of ideals to their social origins. Plato placed his hopes for a just order in intellectual gentry. By their contemplative nature and connection with the land of their birth, they could lead the Greek city-states out of the mire of conflict indulged in by the moneyed classes as a means of further enrichment and power. If Plato’s noble birth, training and outlook led him to offer a solution to the issue of war and peace in terms of a “plundered aristocracy,” the instinctive regard for the general welfare led Lucretius to encourage a solution based upon primitive economic equality. Lucretius was a unique combination of the retrogressive and revolutionary, as were visionaries and utopians after him. Only the equality of men characteristic of prehistory could, in his estimate, bring about the constructive rather than the destructive use of invention and industry, for only such a society had built-in provisions for social harmony. In Epictetus we have an expression of pessimism that often accompanies a civilization built on the endless suppression of human dignity and the constant plunder of land and culture. Although he desires a world community of peace, he resigns himself to the idea that strife is woven into the fabric of existence, and that men can do nothing but refuse to become disturbed by it. Thus he shifts the basis of tranquility from society to individual consciousness.

Although the ancient thinkers posed many of the problems and themes of social philosophy, contemporary philosophers cannot, in the light of broad historical requirements, offer the same resolutions. Slavery is no longer the basis of material wealth. Indeed, ours is a transitory period in which it is not even possible to speak of a unified economic system regulating the world. Because of the continually changing reference points in society and science it is necessary to examine contemporary philosophy as a specific and unique entity.

It is apparent, for example, that Jacques Maritain’s enlightened theocracy bears only a surface relation to the Augustinian City of God. The underlying reason Maritain’s position is well received is the political and ethical paralysis of a business civilization, its ability to generate friction rather than unity between men. He substantiates such a viewpoint in a remarkable statement: “We are looking on at the liquidation of the modern world . . . whose decline was precipitated by the advent of the bourgeois class, the capitalist profit system, the imperialistic conflicts and unbridled absolutism of the national States.”¹ It is the application of philosophy to the burning issues of our times and not any evangelical fervor that lends both credence and strength to a particular outlook. In considering the transient elements in social and scientific growth, philosophy does not lose sight of the need to place immediate circumstances in a wide genetic context. Such a context involves a general view on both the nature of man and his forms of social existence. As we shall see, this may not help philosophy avoid the relativity of knowledge, but it will help it escape relativism as a goal of philosophy instead of as a condition of our knowledge of the external world.

Given the same set of empirical circumstances but a varying set of theoretical assumptions, the conclusions philosophers arrive at may differ enormously. The relativity of knowledge accentuates the difficulty, but not the impossibility, in arriving at a solution to the issue of war and peace. The philosopher, no less than any well-informed person, knows that nuclear weapons can result in the decimation of humanity. But such an awareness may lead to opposite conclusions. For Reinhold Niebuhr, it may serve to demonstrate the threat of coexistence to the further growth of Protestant morality. To Paul Tillich, the identical awareness of the dangers of atomic warfare and the same requirements of Protestantism, may lead him to posit the necessity of cooperation and coexistence between different economies and ideologies. For every theorist who advocates a settlement of world problems in terms of a Baconian doctrine of Utility and Progress, there may be another who urges the accentuation of differences in terms of the same doctrine. This does not imply that every interpretation of traditional philosophies is equally valid. It does, however, indicate the need for securing an anchor-point from which to present a scientific evaluation of experience and ethics.

Everyone professes a desire for peace as an ultimate goal if for no other reason than self-preservation. Even fascist doctrine viewed its rejection of pacifism in the name of racial purity as a eugenic precondition for a thousand years of peace. A major concern therefore is the study of divergencies that arise in analysis of the question of war and peace, and the distinguishing of those views tending to promote harmony, and those leading down the corridors of conflict. And for such a distinction, the anchor of history alone seems adequate for the determination of the character of philosophies. For this reason, the interpretation offered herein will, as far as possible, rest upon the findings of economic and political history. For such an interpretation offers the most secure footing on the shifting sands of ideas. History alone explains why philosophy is a series of unresolved antinomies, and whether the future of philosophy has anything else in store for civilization.

War as an historical event produces attempts to explain its dynamics. Events precede explanations. But the explanation is often prompted by the desire soberly to explain why wars take place and equally significant, what are the causal relations necessary to insure a stable peace. One theorist holds that peace can only be brought about by a permanent destruction of socio-economic antagonisms. Another theorist may offer a quite different approach; insisting that warfare can be ended only through the constructive channelization of instinctually derived tendencies toward aggression. Such a difference is a clear indication that different types of causal moorings can be used. Since causal analysis has such profound consequences in a general description of war and peace, it is worthwhile distinguishing the nature and types of possible causal moorings.

A consistent dualism has persisted in the causal analysis of war. On one side is political idealism, which is identified by its placing of primary causation in subjective or introspective factors, such as innate propensities to violence, inherent human restlessness, or the spirit of adventurism and heroism realized fully only in combat. Standing in sharp contrast is political realism, which is characterized by its belief in the primacy of external, socially conditioned causes of aggression. For this outlook, economic schisms, political rivalries, the search for precious materials and the like are basic causes for physical strife. Throughout philosophic history these diverse tendencies have asserted themselves. Despite efforts at offering a relativistic compromise, this remains an essential division of modern political philosophy.

Modern civilization is indebted to antiquity for exploring many aspects of the causal basis of war and peace. In Greek philosophy we find the kernel of the modern division between objective and subjective theories of causation. If there is anything, which distinguishes the ancient theorists, it is their general fidelity to objective fact whether realist or idealist premises bound them. This contrasts with contemporary philosophy, which has tended to explain the causes of war on the basis of instincts and repressions insofar as it is idealist, or totally explain the cause of war on a pre-determined set of economic and political factors if it is realist in content. This type of reductionist tendency may account for the current influence of political pluralism.

It was Plato’s belief that the basic cause of war inheres in the corruption of souls. This internal corruption is expressed socially in the growth of luxury of a central economic category. In a community of scarcity the compulsions to survive, rather than any propensity to goodness, compels men to cooperate with each other. But when this primitive economy is transcended, when men become differentiated in their material functioning, luxury and ostentation become valuable, not intrinsically, but for the power they bring. The quest for luxury then, is on the material level a quest for power, while psychologically, it expresses the decadence of the soul. Plato held the love of honor and gain to be a symptom of decline in both the individual and society as a whole. In a sense, the ultimate justification for the philosopher-king is that only such a person can uproot the causes of war. For those coveting wealth as an end must by their very aims turn to militarism as a fulfillment of their ambitions. Only the philosopher, guided solely by the search for truth and wisdom, is capable of purging the soul of society, and rendering man peaceful. Plato’s influence pervades the history of philosophy. Expressions of his view on the relation of war to wealth can be found in modern thinkers like Whitehead and Santayana.

Although Lucretius shares Plato’s search for an objective theory of the causes of conflict, his position is the reverse. He held that war is an expression of economic and technological backwardness. The lack of technical developments fosters a ferocious individualism, untamed by the sociality and economic abundance Plato noted as causes of strife. To Lucretius, peace is an indication of the “taming” of men. Technological growth stimulates a need for reciprocity and cooperation. He believed that the success of such a community of human interests, despite the economic friction attending advances in technique, is attested to by the simple biological fact that man has survived and multiplied. Lucretius’ faith in science and in the worth of material progress goes far in explaining why his viewpoint has remained a cornerstone of materialist thought. Curiously enough, the difference between Plato and Lucretius is reproduced in the eighteenth century. Rousseau propounds the notion that material progress is an agent of moral corruption and Helvetius presents the idea that such progress is really a liberating agent. This is indicative of the degree to which the solution of the causal problem itself rests on the understanding and interpretation of history.

A third and even earlier theory of causation than those of Plato and Lucretius was enunciated by Heraclitus. It was his belief that war is neither caused nor prevented by progress or industry, but is basically a manifestation of nature at work. For Heraclitus, war is in the general nature of things. It is the peculiarly human expression of the strife prevalent throughout the universe. As it is put in one of the fragments: “Men should know that war is general and that justice is strife; all things arise and pass away through strife.”² As with Hegel, morality is neither a cause nor a condition of strife for Heraclitus. War is conceived of as an expression of the conflicts between men in the way that strife is a condition for the evolution of physical life. The passage of time has not lessened the importance of this position. It remains a primary tenet of many philosophies for the reason that the historical evolution of man has almost invariably been accompanied by warfare. The position of Heraclitus is more than an archaic theory. It remains a fundamental challenge to the modern world. He posed a basic issue: can the conflicts between nations and social groups be resolved in no other fashion than war? The opinions of Plato and Lucretius still carry weight because they appealed to the historical and psychological status of men. The views of Heraclitus carry even greater force because he appealed to the laws of physical and human change.

Epictetus made the most influential exposition of a subjective theory of causality in antiquity. He proceeded on the assumption that the cause of conflict is the native desire for sensuous pleasures; the inability of most men to understand that they are not the drama themselves but merely “actors in a drama of such as the author chooses.”³ The human failing is the constant turning to “externals”; driving men to seek what is not properly theirs, or at any rate, not what the superiors of society deem to be theirs by nature. Epictetus would say that it is the things outside man that cause war rather than what is inside him. The end of man is freedom, and freedom is an internal phenomenon. It cannot be achieved through victory in war or politics. True peace can be achieved by enduring even the horrors of physical conflicts. It was his belief that the road to freedom, that is, tranquility and peace, “is a disregard of things which lie not within our own power.”⁴ Such a philosophy, like a number of its more explicit counterparts today, insists not only upon locating the cause of war in the egoism of men, but by implication holds that peace can be defined in a way that avoids the multiple problems of the social world. The cause of war being a matter of the soul, there is neither reason to avoid nor engage in physical combat with others. Peace will be ours only if we achieve a sense of inner purity and self-abnegation. Epictetus in a sense raises masochism to a principle; relating peace not to life or abundance, but to an eternity of suffering and if need be to death itself. His solution to the problems of conflict is not an alternative to the actions of men, but an acceptance of them no matter what they may be.

The tendency of ancient political theory, with the important exception of Aristotle, was to focus attention upon a single, exclusive aspect of society and attribute all events to its working out. Much of the same took place in natural philosophy, where the search for laws of nature usually revolved about a primary element, such as water, fire, air, or a combination of these elements. For all the reductionism inherent in ancient philosophy, its efforts were not in vain. The thinking of Plato, Lucretius and Heraclitus has largely served to define the theoretical limits of contemporary analysis of the causes of conflict. For its part, political pluralism can trace its genealogy back to Aristotle. The Stagirite, in indicating the various types of sovereignty, the differences among constitutions, the complexity of the economic basis of life, indicated that a war could be traced to a single cause only in the rarest of cases. The psychological urge for metaphysical certainty has largely given way to a more broadly conceived approach to causation. The basic distinction between ancient and modern political philosophy on this score is that while the ancients generally held to a doctrine of exclusive singular causation, modern theory is content to establish a variety of causes, some empirically more central than others. The most ardent advocate of human depravity, as the basic cause of conflict would not, for example, rule out the existence of other causes. Similarly, few economic determinists would deny the role, however secondary, of psychological or religious factors in stimulating conflicts. It is this understanding of the complexity of the causal problem that characte...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface [2007]
• Preface [1973]
• Preface [1956]
• Introductory Essay Philosophical Orientation and Peace
• Part 1 Philosophical Idealism
• Part 2 Philosophical Realism
• Part 3 Beyond Idealism and Realism: 1956-2006
• Notes
• Index