Positive Ethics in Economics

Volume 14, Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology

Damien Bazin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351497794
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Theory
• Index: Economics

Economics is often accused of being "a-ethical" - lacking a moral perspective - if not altogether immoral. Its detractors criticize economic models of pure and perfect competition, and claim that economics should be concerned with social effects and strive to be equitable. Yet, these critics fail to understand that the discipline has many dimensions. Economics has also developed a group of concerns directly related to ethics. The presence of practical ethics is evident in the economic analysis of behaviour that incorporates ethical preference, altruism, and a responsible calculation based on norms. It is fair today that economics differentiates ethics from purely financial matters, and the discipline can be associated with morality in man's daily life. Volume 14 of the distinguished "Praxiology" series, examine the concept of positive ethics in economics. While normative ethics moralizes economics, trying to render it more "just, " positive ethics is first and foremost a model for the construction of theoretical economic reasoning: it reflects on ethical practices within economics, and introduces a model of reasoning that takes individual ethical behaviour and its after-effects into account. The book is divided into three parts. In "Altruism, " the contributors discuss the notion of unselfish concern for the welfare of others, and its place in economic practice. In "Commitment, " the authors discuss reason as being central to economic theory, as well as the position of ethical behaviour. In "Responsibility, " the idea that man is not an island unto himself, but a being involved in a set of relationships, is examined. If a person is simultaneously responsible for himself and others, then how far does his responsibility extend? "Essays on Positive Ethics in Economics" is thought-provoking volume that will be of interest to economists, policymakers, philosophers, and students of ethics and morality.

Part One
Altruism

On the Concept of Altruism¹

Jérôme Ballet
Augendra Bhukuth

The term “altruism” is attributed to either Andrieux (professor of Auguste Comte at the Ecole Polytechnique) or to Auguste Comte himself in his “Positive Catechism”. Nonetheless, the latter systemized the term in his writings. From now on, the term is defined in economic theory notably since Kolm (1966), Hochman and Rodgers (1969), as the positive integration in the utility function of an individual ‘i’ of an argument representing the consumption or the well-being of other individuals ‘j’, with j≠i. In other words, altruism is defined by the positive internalisation of the well-being of others in the utility function.

This definition is actually common in economic theory. However, it deviates totally from the original concept meaning as it was proposed by Auguste Comte. In this paper, we shall propose to go back to the origin of the term throughout the controversy, which happened between Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. We extract some elements of thoughts towards the actual definition. The assumption that we uphold is as follows: the concept of altruism, as it is seen originally, implies a social dimension in accordance with the actual notion of social preference. Hence, it moves from the actual definition based on an individual dimension and personal preferences. We understand that the word altruism in its origin implies an account on society and it cannot be reduced to a simple inter-individual theory, which refers to the notion of benevolence.

We support this assumption by three stages. In the first stage, the point of view of Auguste Comte will be exposed and the critical reaction of two of his contemporaries: John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. In a second stage, the point of view of Mill and Spencer on altruism will be briefly developed. In a third stage, we shall characterize the difference between altruism and benevolence by different authors. Finally, we will conclude on the abusive interpretation of the contemporary concept of altruism.

1. Altruism by Auguste Comte and its Critics

Auguste Comte develops the term altruism with reference to the law of solidarity, a central law in his work. This law is connected to the notion of humanity and links individuals to the past. Humanity is the whole human-being past, future and present submitted to an interdependence formulated by solidarity. According to Comte, living-beings are necessarily more and more governed by the dead. Each person belonging to humanity knows two successive lives. A first temporary life, which constitutes the actual life, is qualified as objective life. A second life, a subjective one beginning only after death, is formed by the imprint left by everyone. The proportion of dead over livings is always increasing in a way to prevail the first over the followers.

The law of solidarity was developed in reality before Comte. Laurent (1991) makes us go back to the solidarity tradition of the beginning of the XIX century. The change over of the semantic meaning of the adjective “solidary” from its legal origin towards the qualifying utilisation of the interdependence relation of human-being, was the act of Mirabeau since 1789 and Châteaubriand in 1802. Yet it occupied an entire place in the social philosophy from the writings of Pierre Leroux (1840). The contribution of Comte consisted in giving it a real ethical dimension through the association of duties and altruism.

The argument that Comte used in other respects was directed at economic elements such as the division of labour. The law of solidarity, which unites members of humanity, takes on an economic form under the division of labour. As this division increases, cooperation becomes increasingly necessary. But intensification of this division of labour favours personal instincts over social moral. To avoid all forms of halt or even regression in social progress, which are due to the dissolution of solidarity, the social moral must be imposed to all individuality. It becomes a superior reference to individual moral. The true social moral implies that everyone is born with obligations towards their predecessors, their contemporary and their followers. Comte insists on “the irrevocable substitution of duties to rights” (Cingolani 1992). He withdraws the idea of right with its individual reference to substitute it with the notion of duty, which translates concrete solidarities of work in society: “positivism never admit rights by everyone to others. Because his point of view, which is always social, cannot include any notion of right based constantly on individuality” (Comte 1852, p.297)².

Altruism takes an extreme form under the formula “live for others”, which reflects genuine compatible feelings with duties towards others. In this framework, the artificial order instituted by the government consists to improve the natural order formed by the spontaneous participation of individuals to the law of solidarity. Freedom consists, as a matter of fact, in the subordination of personal feelings to altruistic feelings. Individual freedom, which is used to devote absolute individualism, is only “a result of modern anarchy”, which will disappear with individual subordination to social order. Each individual is seen constrained to sacrifice his personal interests to duties resulting from social solidarity.

Beneficence is linked to selfishness and solidarity to altruism. Meanwhile this altruism is extreme in its benevolent form since a precept as “treat others as you would like to be treated” according to Comte (1852) is merely reduced to a personal calculation. It corresponds to an indirect form of stimulation of selfishness. Pure altruism is translated by personal sacrifice for the gain of others.

This notion of solidarity will experience a great success with Bourgeois (1896, 1902), who ensures the link between the social ethic of solidarity and the principles of political action. To this solidarity, in term of duties, opposes a concept (Nozick 1974, Rothbard 1982) founded on individual right to ownership and in the first instance, the right to ownership of oneself. This libertarianism leans on the virtue of selfishness (Rand 1964). Altruist-collectivist thought, to use the word of Rand, is based on the fact that humans are responsible of each other and that the misfortunate of them is a “mortgage” on the others. In this sense, the notion of duty is a priority. The notion of right is excluded from the argument. The foundations of thought are to overthrow according to libertarianism. Only rights have a moral value.

The same argument was used by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer to oppose the cardinal rule of moral as they perceived it in Comte’s work, since this one is “live for others”. Comte not only considers that individuals must give priority to requirements of general wealth over their selfish tendency, but also states that each of them should search for the slightest defect he could bring to their personal interests. The argument of Mill and Spencer on “rights” is opposed to that of Comte, based on “duties”. This notion of right is closely linked to that of Justice. Yet, the aim of Justice, and by consequence of rights, is to assure the highest possible amount of happiness. Thus, the law of solidarity is rejected since Humanity can probably obtain the highest amount of happiness when each individual pursues his own interest, under the condition of submitting himself to the rules established to respect others’ goods. The rules to respect by each other towards everyone concern equality and the inviolability of rights. Beneficence, as opposed to Justice, creates no rights. It can be that an individual does not need the kindness of others, but the rights that he possesses are, on the other hand, always necessary.

Without directly quoting Comte, Mill (1861) too forwards a criticism. He reproaches him for not distinguishing generosity from Justice, by making entire humanity a holder of rights, and making present individuals debtors towards the former: “He (the moralist, and by implication Comte) is well obliged to say that our efforts, to all possible extent, are due to our fellow creatures assimilating our efforts to a debt (Mill 1861/1988, p.133). Yet for Mill, there is a type of altruism up to which we all must be required to rise and beyond which there is no obligation but shall be considered as meritorious (Mill 1865/1890, p.144).

The personal sacrifice imposed by duties, is moreover for Mill (1861), only a virtue in a “very imperfect state of social arrangements” and probably unnecessary in a perfect state of society. In November 1829, in a letter addressed to Gustave d’Eichthal, he was praising, just as enlightened interest or caution, certain categories of impulsion that were non representative of principles of morality. Justice is the moral principle by excellence. It is based upon the notion of individual rights. Having a right implies possessing an element guaranteed by society, because of its indispensable nature that helps reach the highest general utility as possible.

The analysis of Mill and Spencer in terms of rights joined in the criticism of Comte. This is quite distinct regarding women’s rights. When Comte supported the subordination of women to men in a compatible way with the notion of social duty, Spencer in Justice and Mill in Subjection of Women voiced their favour towards t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Acknowledgement
• Contents
• Editorial
• Introduction
• PART ONE: Altruism
• PART TWO: Commitment
• PART THREE: Responsibility
• Notes about the Authors