1
The Problem
For about three quarters of a century, Western intellectuals have consumed an inordinate amount of time and energy in trying to âunderstand fascism.â1 It has never been quite clear what that understanding might entail. More often than not, what we have been given has left us with an abiding sense of dissatisfaction.
The interpretations have come in waves. At times, fascism has been characterized as the last defense of capitalism.2 At another time, we were told that fascism was the product of pandemic sexual disorder.3
More recently, the preoccupation seems to be with explaining the seeming popularity of fascismâits recent ârebirthâ and âriseâ in a variety of places both near and far.
In fact, a case can be made that there has been an unexpected reappearance of some kind of fascism in the last decade of the twentieth century. There are political movements of varying size and importance that seem to have found fascism cognitively and emotionally appealing. Our problem arises from the incongruity that results from the insistence, urged on us by a Western academic, that to âunderstandâ fascism, one must appreciate the âpathologyâ that lay âbehind the hatred and destructiveness [it] unleashes.â4 We are informed by yet another that âthe word fascism conjures up visions of nihilistic violence, war, and Goetterdaemmerung,â together with a âworld ofâŚuniforms and discipline, of bondage and sadomasochismâŚ.â
It seems counterintuitive to suggest that the explanation of the contemporary reappearance of fascism lies in the fact that people have suddenly come to find ânihilistic violenceâ and âpathological destructivenessâ attractive. As a consequence, we do not immediately know how to deal with the information that âfascismâ has a demonstrated âability to appeal to important intellectuals,â5 and those who follow them, when all the term conjures up for us is a vision of sadomasochism and unprecedented horrors. We are evidently left with a puzzle, âthe conundrum of fascismâs appealâŚ,â6
In post-Soviet Russia, there are major intellectuals, who are politically influential, who show interest in Mussolini and Mussoliniâs Fascism.7 In Moscow, Alexander Dugin, another of Russiaâs intelligentsia, reads, and translates for his audience, the literature of âneofascism.â In Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, and Lithuania, âfascistâ elements have resurfaced in a âbaroque, often unpredictable alchemyâ of âleftâ and âright.â8
What has become clear is that âfascism,â however the term is understood, has an appeal for many in the contemporary, post-Soviet world. That it should have any appeal at all is a riddle. If âfascismâ is typically ânarcissistic and megalomanie,âŚsadistic, necrophiliacâŚ[and] psycho-pathological,â remarkable for its âsheer scale of inhumanity,â9 it is difficult to understand its continued attractiveness to anyone, much less intellectuals, anywhere in civilized society.
All of which suggests that something is very wrong. Either Western academics have offered assessments of fascism that lack accuracy, dimension, and depth, or some portion of thinking humanity finds sadomasochism, narcissism, and necrophilism seductive. If that is the case, then the appeal of fascism is not to be explained by a scrutiny of fascismâs intellectual pretentions; it is the proper subject for a textbook in abnormal psychology. Those who find fascism appealing must be left to provide case studies for psychiatrists.
Before any plausible answers can be forthcoming, it seems necessary to attempt to identify the referents of the term âfascismââ-in the effort to ensure that everyone is talking about the same thing. That has been proven to be a difficult task indeed.
Fascism as a Fugitive Notion
Throughout the major part of the twentieth century, academics have sought some theoretical understanding of âfascism.â At first, the concern was with the political phenomenon as it manifested itself on the Italian peninsula at the conclusion of the First World Warâan effort that was not notable in its achievements.10 With the alliance of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany in the 1930s, the coupling resulted in the coalescence of both into what was conceived to be a generic phenomenon. By the advent of the Second World War, Francoâs Spain, Salazarâs Portugal, Austriaâs Heimwehr, the Swiss National Front, the Falanga in Poland, the revolutionaries led by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu in Romania, the Lapua movement in Finland, and that of the Arrow Cross in Hungaryâamong an indeterminate host of othersâ were all considered âfascist.â11
In the Far East, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Blue Shirt Society were understood to be equally âfascist.â12 In Japan, Ryu Shintaro and his New Order Movementâand sometimes the entire imperial governmentâwere considered âfascist.â13
In Latin America, âfascismâ was to be found almost everywhere. The Brazil of Getulio Vargas and the Argentina of Juan Peron were both conceived âfascist.â âFascismâ was a phenomenon that was just short of universal.
There were misgivings. At times, the âfascismâ of one or another group was characterized as âconservative,â or âclerical,â or âauthoritarianâ rather than fascist. And there were times when the âfascismâ of one or another movement or regime was dismissed as âfalseâânot a fascism at all.14
It was never quite clear what âfascismâ was, how it was to be characterized, and how it was to be identified. By the end of the Second World War, the issue seemingly had become moot. The âWar Against Fascismâ had been successful.
For academics, however, victory in the War Against Fascism notwithstanding, the issues became increasingly complicated and confused. By the mid-1960s, the term âfascismâ had passed into the lexicon of ordinary laymen. In general, the term had become nothing more than an expression of derogation. Not only had the terms âfascismâ and âfascistâ been reduced to invectives, but in 1975, Stanley Payne spoke of both as among the âvaguest of contemporary political terms.â15
The terms had inextricably mercurial and ambiguous reference. With the passage of time, there was scant improvement. In 1995, Payne could still report that âat the end of the twentieth century fascism remains probably the vaguest of the major political terms.â16
In the interim, unhappily, the issue of fascism in the modern world had taken on considerable urgency. Without any clear warning from our âSovietologists,â the Soviet Union had disappeared, and in its place more than one analyst reported the stirrings of what they could only identify as âfascism.â17 Vladimir Zhirinovsky had made his appearance and was identified as the leader of a âRussian fascism.â18 The issues had become so tendentious that when an English translation of Zhirinovskyâs book, The Final Dash South, appeared, it was given the title, My Struggle19âa gratuitous reminder of Adolf Hitlerâs Mein Kampf.
For many academics, everything seemed to have telescoped into Hitlerâs National Socialism. The world appeared to lay prostrate before the threat of its revival.20
That was not to be the worst. Soon authors were speaking of Zhirinovsky, Serbiaâs Radovan Karadzic, Romaniaâs Gheorghe Funar, and Hungaryâs Jozsef Torgyan as âStalino-fascists.â21 There was talk of âRed-Brown coalitions,â with former Marxist-Leninists joining forces with fascists to challenge the liberal, free market successors of a failed communism.22
It seemed as though everyone was testing the conceptual fungibility of language. What became eminently clear was the realization that any account of fascism, and its influence in the modem world, had become increasingly tortured and obscure. By the end of the twentieth century, scholarship gave every evidence of not understanding very much about one of the most important political phenomena of the contemporary world.
By the end of the century, it had become obvious to almost everyone charged with the responsibility of offering a comprehensive and intelligible interpretation of the political history of our time, that great confusion confounded the study of âfascism,â however âfascismâ was understood.
One only needed to consider the implications of the judgment of Walter Laqueur, who could argue that if fascism rather than Bolshevism had prevailed in Russia after the revolution of 1917, âit would have done what Stalin did in any case.â23 Stalinism and fascism were conceived, in some real operational sense, to be historically identical in outcome.
Had fascism prevailed in post-tzarist Russia, it would have marshalled everyone, labor and enterprise alike, to the task of making Russia a âgreat power.â Like Stalinism, fascism would have âmilitarized the economy and society in generalâ; it would have ânationalizedâ heavy industry âto a significant degree.â It would have persecuted âminoritiesâ and âintellectualsâ in very much the same manner as Stalin. In effect, and in substance, fascism was, for all intents and purposes, all but indistinguishable from Stalinism.
For at least half a century, we had been told that fascism was reactionary and congenitally anticommunist. Marxist-Leninists were revolutionary and intrinsically antifascist. We had been told that fascism was of the âextreme rightâ and Marxism-Leninism was of the left. Now we are told that âresurfacing communist leadersâŚâ have been gravitaiing toward fascism, and âquite often exhibit a degree of ultranationalist prejudice we would never have expected from such past paragons of communist internationalism.â24
Communists, in effect, have become increasingly like the fascists on the âradical rightââor perhaps they had always been of the âradical right.â In any event, it would seem that we are no longer certain of anything.
If all that is not confusing enough, other academics insist that âfascism,â as all âright-wing extremist groups,â25 include âantitax,â âfundamentalist religious,â and âanticommunistâ organizations.26 Thus, âfascismâ can be either anticommunist, or a form of Stalinism, a host for religious fanaticism, or a vehicle for tax protestors. It can be an expression of âclerical conservativismâ or Islamic fundamentalism.27 It can asso...