The Dark Side of the Crescent Moon

The Islamization of Europe and its Impact on American/Russian Relations

Georgy Gounev

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351484084
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Ciencias sociales
• Subtopic: Estudios islámicos

The Dark Side of the Crescent Moon constitutes a historical and political analysis of the growth of radical Islam throughout the world. It shows how the spread of radical Islam in Europe drove the United States and Russia to become allies of necessity, in order to confront a shared danger. Georgy Gounev provides readers with a detailed assessment of the people, countries, and global movements that factor into Islam's mounting threat.

From the evolution and history of radical Islam to the role of the United States and Russia in the rise of Islam, the author lays out the factors contributing to this global phenomenon. Taking the reader from Chechnya and Kosovo, to Sudan and Somalia, to Afghanistan and Iraq, Gounev explores the motivations that lurk beneath the surface of active conflict, and extend the threat to the shores of Britain, Russia, and even the United States. He illuminates the vast network that is actively transmitting the political and religious dogma of radical Islam. Casting a cold eye on the theocratic fundamentalism emanating from Iran and Saudi Arabia, Gounev sounds an alarm about a growing threat both outside and inside our borders.

1
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim World during World War II

Let’s make this abundantly clear from the very beginning: the impression created by many American books and movies that World War II was fought and won mainly on the battlefields of Normandy and the Pacific is wrong. It was the Soviet Army that played the decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany during the war and made an important contribution to the Allied victory over Japan. At the same time, according to the most accomplished Soviet military leader, Marshall Zhukov, without American assistance within the framework of the Lend-Lease program, the victory of the Soviet Army would have been impossible.¹

Unlike the situation in Russia, where the memories of the war still touch some raw nerves even after sixty-five years, except for the thinning group of veterans who fought the common enemy in the Pacific and Europe and professional historians, very few people in the United States care about the legacy of WWII. As far as the young generation of America is concerned, the history of the dramatic global conflict is as unknown to them as the historical background of the Greco-Persian Wars fought millenniums ago.

The answer to the question why the legacy of WWII is such an emotional issue in Russia and such a nonissue in the United States is simple: the Soviet Union lost 27 million people during the war, while the American losses were in the neighborhood of 300,000. There is something else though; ever since the times of Joseph Stalin, the official Soviet policy with regard to the legacy of the war has always been to keep the deep wound open. This practice was temporarily abandoned in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, but it was recently renewed.

The celebration of every anniversary of WWII in Russia has two dimensions. The first one is the formal celebration of the Soviet victory that runs with the smoothness of a huge and carefully prepared military operation. It manifests itself in military parades proudly shown to the entire world and endless, repetitive articles, speeches, radio and TV broadcasts, and a lot of ceremonies around the monuments of the fallen defenders of the country.

Besides the official celebrations marked by the inevitable bureaucratic deadness, the anniversaries also have a deeply touching human dimension. Victory Day, May 9, is when the few remaining veterans get together to pay tribute to the countless multitudes of their fallen fellow warriors. At the end of those reunions, without paying any attention to the respectful looks of passersby, the veterans trade powerful hugs, knowing that this meeting could well be their last.

As for the locations of the veterans’ meetings, they range from the foggy and often snow-covered northern port of Murmansk all the way to the balmy Mediterranean at Tel-Aviv. The people of Israel look with bewilderment at the small groups of white-haired people who proudly display the Soviet-era decorations earned on the deadly Eastern Front. These are the Jewish veterans of the Soviet Army who found their home in Israel and for whom May 9 is precisely as meaningful as it is for the participants in the reunions on Russian soil.

Remembering one of the best examples of ancient Rome’s wisdom, stipulating that “to understand doesn’t mean to justify,” let’s try to understand the attitude of the Russian leadership toward the history of WWII. There is absolutely no way to reconcile the artificially created positive image of the totalitarian Soviet Union with the historical truth.² There are Russian politicians who are not able to acknowledge that for thirty endless years their country was ruled by an individual who happened to be a fellow dictator and a former partner of Adolph Hitler. As if this part of the truth is not enough, another aspect of their dilemma is that Joseph Stalin managed to murder a much larger number of human beings than the Nazi Führer. A very important fact that is not well known is the Stalinist attempt to conceal the truth about Soviet politics before the Nazi aggression.

August 23, 1939—The History of an Extremely Dangerous Flirt

Maybe the most damaging piece of information for the contemporary Russian admirers of Joseph Stalin was provided by Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi minister of foreign affairs, who in 1939 was twice honored as a guest of the Soviet dictator. Living in the shadow of the Nuremberg gallows, Ribbentrop made Stalin’s expectations abundantly clear: “When I came to Moscow in 1939, Marshall Stalin didn’t discuss with me the opportunities for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish conflict. . . . He was eager to make sure that if he doesn’t get half of Poland and the Baltic countries. . . . I should immediately fly back to Germany.”³ The Soviet connection to the outbreak of WWII, however, has a long and complex history that climaxed in the successful Nazi-Soviet negotiations during the night of August 23–24, 1939.⁴

Before addressing the consequences of those negotiations, however, it would be quite interesting to briefly explore an alternative behavior of Joseph Stalin during that memorable August night in 1939. The question is what would have been the correct Soviet strategy during the negotiations with the Nazi foreign minister if, indeed, Joseph Stalin’s goal had been the prevention of Nazi aggression, as some contemporary Russian politicians and historians are claiming.

The examination of this issue would lead the potential researcher to only two possibilities open to the Soviet dictator. The first one would have involved an outright rejection of the “peace initiative” of Adolph Hitler. The Soviet leader could have told the Nazi Führer’s envoy, “Look, Mr. Ribbentrop, my government has only one purpose at this moment, and it is to prevent war. The way we see the situation is that Poland is not about to attack you, but rather Germany is preparing to attack Poland. Such action could provoke a British and French reaction that will transform your invasion of Poland into a global war threatening my country as well. We are in no position to tell you what to do, but if you attack Poland, you are on your own. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will drastically escalate its preparation for every eventuality.”

Had Joseph Stalin said those words to the Nazi foreign minister, at least as far as the fall of 1939 was concerned, the outbreak of WWII could have been prevented. Even an adventurer such as Adolph Hitler would have thought twice before attacking Poland with the probable involvement of Great Britain and France in the conflict while also facing an unpredictable Joseph Stalin in the east, who had just rejected his offer.

The second option the Soviet dictator had at his disposal would have required a combination of two important considerations. Under this scenario, besides preventing German aggression, it would have been possible for the Soviet Union to take advantage of the German invasion of Poland to occupy the eastern part of the country. Then Germany would have taken from Poland an area only large enough to provide a solid territorial continuity between Germany proper and the city of Danzig (the formal reason for Hitler’s aggression), while the Soviet Union would incorporate the eastern areas of the country. As a result of such an arrangement, Poland would have suffered a serious loss of both sovereignty and territory, but although substantially weakened, the country would have continued its uncertain existence by separating totalitarian giants full of mistrust for each other.

Such strategy would have provided bloodless gains for the Soviet Union, while at the same time it would have denied the dictators of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union the opportunity to jump at each other’s throats by not offering a common border between their countries. Those were the only two options open to Joseph Stalin that could have enabled him to effectively block the road for future Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union.

It is time to move from the area of what could have happened to the field of what actually happened. To put it bluntly, Hitler needed the war to achieve his dream of world domination. Joseph Stalin also needed that war. He was planning to sit on the fence while Nazi Germany and the Western democracies entered the war after the German attack on Poland. Then, remembering what happened at the end of WWI, the Soviet dictator hoped that “a revolutionary situation” would emerge that offered limitless opportunities for Soviet intervention at the most appropriate moment. In other words, what happened in Moscow in August of 1939 was nothing less than an act of coordination of a joint Nazi-Soviet strategy designed to kindle a fire that would burn the world for the next six, seemingly endless, years under the name of WWII.

However, what Joseph Stalin was unable to grasp was that by establishing a common border with Nazi Germany he had created a deadly danger for his own country. The most carefully hidden piece of truth about the Nazi-Soviet deal reached during the night of August 23–24, 1939, was that with the signing of the nefarious document, Joseph Stalin bears precisely the same amount of responsibility for the outbreak of WWII as his new friend, Adolph Hitler.⁵

One of the most important historical facts with regard to the early stages of the Nazi-Soviet relations was the Soviet contribution to the German military effort. The main components of this contribution manifested in the transformation of the northern Soviet ports (primarily Murmansk) into bases that catered to the needs of the German sea operations against Great Britain, the endless supply of raw materials that enabled the German conquest of Western Europe, and the placing of the huge Soviet propaganda machine at the service of the Nazi partners.⁶

One particularly odd event from the point of view of Stalinist historians is that the fuel for the German bombers that devastated London and wiped out Coventry was produced from Soviet oil. There was also an array of shocking joint activities conducted in Poland by them People’s Commissariat of Internal affairs (NKVD) and the Gestapo. A rather obnoxious Nazi-Soviet mini-deal took place when Joseph Stalin handed a large group of German communists (political refugees in the Soviet Union) to the Gestapo. An even uglier adventure had been the shameful (and unsuccessful) Soviet aggression against tiny Finland, “given” to Joseph Stalin by his generous new ally, Adolph Hitler.

Meanwhile the clock of history mercilessly counted down each hour Joseph Stalin allegedly needed “to buy” from Adolph Hitler to prepare the defense of his country. When the Nazi Führer made his decision to invade the Soviet Union, the country was still completely unprepared for the incredible might and intensity of the upcoming assault. It was Joseph Stalin who bore the crushing burden of responsibility for the complete strategic surprise achieved by the enemy. The dictator had been completely deaf and blind to every sign of the approaching avalanche. His confusion reached its climax on the eve of the German invasion. Tempted to strike first, but not daring to assume the risk of such an attack, Joseph Stalin postponed the choice between offense and defense and failed to prepare his army for either of those strategies.

President Roosevelt’s War

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Adolph Hitler came to power in the same year, 1933—Hitler in January and Roosevelt in March. It was as early as April of that same year when, during a conversation with the ambassador of France, FDR quietly and in a matter-of-fact statement called Adolph Hitler “a mad man.”⁷ This episode never received proper attention and provides every reason for the conclusion that President Roosevelt was among a very limited number of politicians who grasped the very nature and magnitude of the threat created by Adolph Hitler. Six and a half years later, when the Nazi assault on Poland marked the beginning of WWII, CommentPresident Roosevelt saw with absolute clarity the danger emanating from the Nazi quest for global domination. At the same time however in the eyes of the public opinion of the country, it was just a distant conflict from the flames of which USA should be kept away.

Unlike the case of Joseph Stalin, the German invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the best bits of news President Roosevelt received for the duration of the war. He understood that the fate of the conflict would be determined on the Eastern Front, and with this consideration in mind, FDR decided to organize an unprecedented flow of material and military assistance to the Soviet Union. A month after the start of the German-Soviet War, Harry Hopkins, who was possibly the only individual who had the unconditional trust of the president, was negotiating in the Kremlin with Joseph Stalin.⁸

Because of his acting talents, Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from his erstwhile guest the calamity that had befallen the Soviet Union and to convince him of his best feelings with regard to President Roosevelt. Hopkins’s report prompted the long string of telegrams FDR kept sending for years in which he begged the dictator to agree to a personal meeting.⁹ There can be little doubt that the president had other important considerations involving the highly desirable Soviet participation in the war against Japan once the battle for Europe was over. To achieve this goal, Roosevelt was ready to grant American recognition of the “Soviet right” to dominate Eastern Europe.

Throughout the war years, the Roosevelt administration committed military and strategic gaffes that had far-reaching consequences. There can be little doubt that executing a large-scale landing operation on the French coastline was impossible in 1942. However, according to exhaustive British research, it would have been absolutely possible for an American and British landing force to launch the Normandy invasion a year earlier.¹⁰ There would have been very important positive consequences from the earlier conduct of such an operation. It would have shortened the war and saved a great many human lives, including many thousands of Jewish lives because one of the conveniently forgotten facts of WWII history is that 1944 was the bloodiest year of the Holocaust. An earlier launch of the cross-channel invasion would have prevented the spread of bitterness among the Soviet population, who grew to share the opinion of their rulers that the Western Allies were dragging their feet while the Soviet Union was bleeding white.

The Mufti’s War

As far as the Muslim world was concerned, WWII had a different impact on various regions and countries, and both the challenge and response were delivered along secular lines. The attitude of the residents of this world toward the belligerents also differed in many important ways. If we start with the easternmost extensions of the Muslim world, Dutch East Indies, (present-day Indonesia) and the Muslim part of the Philippines, the reaction to the Japanese occupation and the resistance against it was delivered entirely along secular and nationalistic lines.

The situation in Northern Africa and the Middle East, however, was completely different. Given that in the aftermath of the WWI the Arab world and Iran were divided into French and British zones of influence and domination, the precipitous rise of Nazi Germany from the ruins of defeat, humiliation, and crisis caused a c...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: The Sunset of the Cold War and the Dawn of Radical Islam
• 1 The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim World during World War II
• 2 The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim World during the Cold War
• 3 On the Road to Al-Qaeda
• 4 The Beginning of the Islamization of Europe
• 5 The Jihadist Assault on Europe
• 6 The Islamo-Totalitarian Challenge to Russia
• 7 Iran: The Emergence of the Shia Branch of Theocratic Totalitarianism
• 8 America and the Jihadist Axis of Evil
• 9 The Jihadist Penetration of America
• 10 The American-Russian Divide after the Breakup of the Soviet Union
• Epilogue
• Index