Introduction
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has essentially faced, and suffered from, three interrelated challenges of governance: that revolve around (1) the perennial problem of unbalanced civilâmilitary relations; (2) lack of socio-economic development; and (3) the environment, that largely have remained neglected in the public policy domain. As the first chapter in this volume, this study thus deals with the lingering crisis of governance and development in Pakistan through studying the case of the (former) Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA),1 which, in recent years, has witnessed various military operations, legal and institutional arrangements and, above all, (extra-)regional attention with respect to cross-border insurgency. Bearing in mind the aforesaid challenges along with the sub-regional significance of the FATA in terms of governability and federalism, this study aims to emphasise the conceptual, empirical and thematic value of the case in hand for other studies in this book, which are conducted on similar themes, though in different parts of Pakistan. Moreover, this initial chapter will also serve as a point of reference for Chapter 2 that explains the FATAâs merger with KhyberâPakhtunkhwa.
In order to fully comprehend the said merger, it is pertinent to highlight and analyse the processes, the policy and the actors that shaped the political, demographic and institutional dynamics of the (former) FATA which comprises 27,200 sq km and has a population of approximately five million. A British-era legal framework, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), provided the basis for local governance through the collective responsibility of tribes. The tribal people were allowed to retain their semi-autonomous status in exchange for loyalty to Pakistan. The FATA lagged far behind, compared to the other parts of the country, in terms of socio-economic and political development, primarily because of this minimal state presence. In addition, as a result of the lack of a proper governmental set-up and the weak authority of the Pakistani state, the FATA emerged as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban militants who fled the US attacks in Afghanistan. Under the terms of its alliance with the US in the War on Terrorism, Pakistan attempted to exert control over the FATA, hitherto a semi-autonomous territory, around 2004 that backfired and insurgency began there.
Since then. the Pakistani military has carried out various military operations in different parts of the FATA to suppress the rising Pakistani Taliban insurgency, also known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Pakistani governmentâs initial counterinsurgency campaign from 2004 to 2008, that relied on conventional forces and used force indiscriminately, did not succeed in curbing the insurgency. Instead, the insurgency in the FATA became powerful and brought significant territory under its control. However, Pakistan improved its counterinsurgency strategy around 2009 and started retaking areas under the control of the TTP.
Consistent military assaults in different agencies or areas of the FATA, including Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan area, launched in June 2014, forced the TTP to relinquish its control of the region completely in 2016â17. Hundreds of the TPPâs militants were killed and most of the leadership fled across the border to Afghanistanâs eastern provinces where the Afghan government has little or no control. Following the defeat at the hands of the Pakistani military, the TTP splintered into many small groups, operating independently. The destruction of the powerful Pakistani Taliban insurgency raises a few important empirical questions. Why did the FATA insurgency disintegrate? How important was the role of the United States, particularly of the Obama Administration, in shaping Pakistanâs changed counterinsurgency approach? What changed in the Pakistani governmentâs counterinsurgency approach that led to the defeat of the TTP? How much has the Pakistani government changed its governance mechanism in the region to stop the resurgence of insurgency? This chapter focuses on addressing these questions.
I argue in this chapter that a robust counterinsurgency strategy by the Pakistani government, characterised by adapting conventional forces into a counterinsurgency force, a more judicious use of force targeting insurgents and securing the civilian population, and following a clear and hold strategy, led to the defeat of the TTP insurgency. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section begins with an analysis of how the TTP insurgency escalated and posed a serious threat to Pakistanâs security. This also discusses how the initial growing strength of the insurgents created an alarming situation that forced the government officials to take the threat seriously. The chapter also discusses how the changed American approach towards the PakistanâAfghanistan region under President Obama pushed Pakistan to adopt a hard line towards militants operating in the FATA region. The chapter then moves on to explain the elements of the Pakistani government counterinsurgency strategy that led to the defeat of the FATA insurgency.
Pakistanâs responses to the growing power of the TTP
The US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks toppled the Afghan Taliban regime. Many Al-Qaeda militants and Afghan Taliban members sought refuge in the FATA due to the geographical proximity, shared ethnicity and Islamic brotherhood. The FATA had long enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and the Pakistani government exercised only limited authority there. The FATA comprises around 27,200 sq km of territory, roughly the size of Maryland in the United States. In addition, the FATA tribes did not follow any formal laws (i.e. the laws of a modern state to govern society) but their own tribal system based on the centuries-old code, Pashtunwali, that provided the basis to govern their daily lives. This tribal system is sometimes misunderstood as lawlessness in the absence of a formal governance system, which is not true. Johnson saw Pashtunwali âas an alternative form of social organisation which advances conflict resolution mechanismâ.2
The US pressurised the Pakistani government in 2002â03 to take military action against the foreign militants hiding in the FATA to deny them space and to stop them from attacking American-led international forces across the border in Afghanistan. Pakistan initially resisted American pressure to undertake a military operation because of the semi-autonomous status of the FATA region and the fierce independence of the tribesmen. The Pakistani government exercised limited control of the area through a patronage network that was established during British colonial times. Local tribal leaders, also known as Maliks, were given a share of power by the government in administering the tribal areas in addition to disbursement of allowances and subsidies in return for their loyalty to the Pakistani state. This modus vivendi of maintaining the status quo helped the Pakistani state avoid rebellion from the FATA tribes for a long time before 2004.
However, in 2004, the Musharraf government finally gave in to American pressure and became willing to use military force against the tribesmen in the FATA. The US also incentivised Pakistan with economic and military assistance along with designating the country a major non-NATO ally. Pakistan finally launched military operations in the FATA against the local tribal groups who were alleged to be providing support to the foreign militants. The militaryâs use of force against the locals not only broke the long tradition of not interfering in the semi-autonomous region of the FATA but it also wildly disrupted the patronage network that had played a key role in keeping the tribes under control. The disruption of the long-held status quo marked the onset of insurgency in the FATA. In the following years, the FATA insurgency became very powerful.
Pakistanâs poor counterinsurgency strategy from 2004 to 2008 provided space and strength to the FATA insurgency. The Pakistani government lacked commitment to fighting the insurgency and employed an ad hoc strategy that involved excessive use of force, on the one hand, and offering peace negotiations to the insurgen...