The Challenge of Right-wing Nationalist Populism for Social Work

A Human Rights Approach

Carolyn Noble, Goetz Ottmann, Carolyn Noble, Goetz Ottmann

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780429509414
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Nationalism & Patriotism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Right-wing nationalist populism poses direct attacks on social tolerance, human rights discourse, political debates, the survival of the welfare state and its universal services, impacting on the roles of social work. This book demonstrates how right-wing nationalist populism can and must be countered.

Using case studies from around the world, this book shows how a revitalised radical social work where community organisation, building alliances, trade union commitment and social action can be used as political forces to speak up against discrimination and hate in accordance with human rights, social justice, and social work values. The rise of national populism signals that now is the time for social work to forge and reforge such networks and create links with civil society and challenge right-wing populist policies wherever they manifest themselves.

It will be of interest to all social work students, practitioners and academics, particularly those working on critical and radical social work, green social work, anti-oppressive practice and community development.

1 Right-wing nationalist populism and social work

Some definitions and features

Carolyn Noble and Goetz Ottmann

Introduction

The rise of nationalist right-wing populism is intertwined with a neo-conservative reconstruction of citizenship in racial, ethnic and moralistic terms. This, in turn, redefines who has access to social services and under what conditions. For social workers, this generates a massive challenge. If access to social services is no longer guided by needs, rights and social justice and, instead, by ethnicity, social status and economic virtue, social work no longer exists – at least not as a social critical, human rights-based profession. Thus, if neo-conservative forces in politics and society have their way, social work will be reshaped by its wider context, transforming social workers into agents of the state, social controllers, and supervisors of thresholds that demark the limits of compliance with rules devised by an increasingly authoritarian politics. Human rights-based social workers will be forced into the margins, where they might take on the roles of lobbyists, advocates, and activists of a fragmented civil society.

Nationalist right-wing populism embodies the next step in the culture wars and the neo-conservative reactions that followed the hegemony of social-democratic welfare after World War II and its liberalisation after 1968. It is the neo-conservatives’ response to the political failure of globalised neo-liberalism and technocratic statism and its short-term ‘solutions’ that barely survive a political cycle (de Sousa Santos, 2014) that translated into the current political crisis of neo-liberal social democracy (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Voss, Daugherty Bailey, Ife, & Kötting, 2018). It is fuelled by a fragmented, yet polarised electorate whose unmet demands are amplified by social media and widespread frustration in the face of cultural change and downward social mobility in the post-industrial economies of the Global North (Touraine, 1997). To be sure, the current culture wars are central to social work as their outcomes will define the profession. The aim of this volume is to bring to light the impact of right-wing, nationalist populist politics on social work and to reflect on possible responses to the corrosive forces that transform rights-based social services and, by extension, the foundation of modern social work.

What is populism?

Populism and democratic politics are intimately intertwined (see also Fitzi, 2019). Rhetoric and strategies devised to generate mass support often contain populist elements (Weyland, 2001). Because politics occurs in different socio-historical and cultural contexts, populism can take many guises and it is difficult to settle on one specific definition. Some popular definitions focus on political style (e.g. rhetoric) (Laclau, 2005), some on political strategy (e.g. policy choices, forms of mobilisation) (Weyland, 2001), and others on political ideology (a tapestry of ideas about the nature of society and politics) (Mudde, 2016). Among the currently more popular authors on right-wing populism, Mudde (2004; 2007) argues that populism is a ‘thin’ ideology that merely sets up a binary framework, e.g. ‘pure’ versus ‘corrupt’ to which one can attach all sorts of ‘thick’ ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, imperialism, anti-imperialism, feminism, fascism and all sorts of individuals, organisations and transactions to explain the world and justify specific agendas. Linked to a charismatic leadership, populism can accommodate a broad range of actors and groups, often referred to as ‘followers’ or ‘support base’, sometimes linking previously opposed groups in a common cause, aggregating their different demands and concerns into one rallying cry, e.g. ‘stop the boats’, or ‘build a wall’ (Noble & Ottmann, 2018). These leaders build popular support by spinning false explanations and symbolic solutions that fail to address genuine social ills (Roth, 2016). Peoples’ hopes and expectations for betterment, for dignity and a better future are stirred by the sheer ‘will to power’ and the rhetoric of nationalist leaders and the governments they form. In essence, populism operationalises a divisive and polarising strategy that pits us (the morally superior people) versus them (the corrupt elites and non-people) and claims that the interests of the people are un- or under-represented and that a strong leader is required to liberate ‘the people’ from the throngs of corrupt and thus illegitimate elites (see, for example, Fitzi, 2019; Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

Right-wing nationalist populism is an authoritarian, anti-pluralist form of populism that uses a rhetoric featuring women and ethnic and cultural minorities as scapegoats for a plethora of social issues amid promises invoking a cultural and economic golden age (i.e. ‘make America great again’, ‘return to traditional family values’) (Abromeit, 2018; Gandesha, 2018; Rensman, 2018). Ife (Chapter 2) argues that right-wing nationalist populism is a retreat from Modernity as well as a paradoxical attempt to take refuge in Modernity. On the one hand it is a rejection of modern truth claims in search for a pre-modern ‘oracle’ easily manipulated by powerful leaders (see also Frost, Gonzalez-Pons & Gren, Chapter 9). On the other, it is a search for security and continuity in white, patriarchal Modernity’s discourses of colonial dominance (see Noble, Chapter 6, and Waters, Chapter 16). It is the search for pre-modern leaders/heroes to deliver us from an increasingly chaotic, capitalist world-order. Contributors to this volume use the term populism in this sense.

Historical background

During a moment of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it looked as if nothing could stop the spread of pluralist, liberal democracy. The disintegration of the old Soviet Union symbolically affirmed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the rise of the Arab Spring led some to proclaim the ‘end of history’ as humankind had reached its evolutionary potential (Fukuyama, 1992). A decade later, the modernist idea of a teleological conclusion began to unravel in the face of the rise of reactionary, right-wing populist leaders and totalitarian regimes thinly disguised as democracies. The election of Trump (USA), Johnson (UK), Bolsonaro (Brazil), Modi (India), Erdogan (Turkey), Duterte (Philippines), Netanyahu (Israel), Salvini (Italy), Kurz (Austria), and Orbán (Hungary), among others, sent shockwaves through the liberal democratic political establishment. Indeed, contributions to this volume leave no doubt that the rise of illiberal, anti-pluralist, anti-democratic forces is not limited to the fringes of the political spectrum but has also captured the centre (Fitzi, 2019; Wodak, 2019).

The chapters included in this volume demonstrate how right-wing governments in Germany, Finland, the United Kingdom, France, Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia win votes on racist, anti-women, anti-terrorist, anti-immigration, anti-welfare, ugly intolerance of difference and diversity, anti-corruption and pro-capitalist, but anti-globalisation platforms. Contributors to this volume argue that, to varying degrees, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, misogyny, Islamophobia, white supremacism, and anti-establishment positions have well and truly entered conventional political discourses. A few decades ago, these sentiments populated the extremes when multiculturalism, feminism, tolerance, inclusiveness, human rights and social distributive justice campaigns were part of the liberal values of previous more left-leaning governments. By becoming mainstream these increasingly authoritarian and illiberal governments have begun a gradual attack on civil liberties, muzzling or demonising any media or legal challenge or accountability, chipping away at barriers between church and state, politics and the rule of law. By spewing hateful invectives against the working class, women, migrants, asylum seekers, Indigenous peoples and communities and less powerful peoples, and by cracking down on any oppositional voices, whistle blowers and progressive journalism, they have successfully marginalised and in some cases discredited liberal or leftist alternatives.

Why did we see a rise in nationalist right-wing populism?

Populist challengers tend to emerge during periods of crisis (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). While the socio-historical events that facilitated the rise of right-wing nationalist populism are different across countries, contributors to this volume agree that the influx into Western countries of immigrants/refugees from Asia, the Middle East and Africa and the perceived threat to an imagined cultural fabric, in combination with the impact of neo-liberal globalisation, the relocation of manufacturing jobs and the privatisation of core services (i.e. protective services) played an important role (see Baines & Mapedzahama, Chapter 3). Indeed, the deteriorating economic circumstances of most citizens (and particularly of the lower middle class) are key factors that right-wing populists claim to address (Mudde, 2007). In particular, the rise of China and its growing geo-political and economic influence on the world stage raises widespread fears in formerly hegemonic countries that the colonial dominance of white modernity and, associated with it, political and economic power is coming to an end (see, for example Ferguson and Woodward, 2009). In cultural terms this translated into a sense of ‘White fragility’ (see Ife, Chapter 2 and Baines and Mapedzahama, chapter 3) and ‘crisis of masculinity’ (see Pease, Chapter 5). These insecurities are used by right-wing populist leaders/politicians to generate mass support with the help of political agitators (Bourdieu, 1998) and compliant and complacent social media. The expansion of far-right movements around the world and their inclusion into the formal political realm have in their wake created a globally permissive environment for authoritarian politics, and intolerant extremist ideologies which pose dilemmas for those supporting a pluralist democratic project (Clements, 2018).

Furthermore, contributors to this volume argue that the rise of right-wing nationalist populism has been aided by terrorist attacks, economic stagnation, rapid technological change, the greed and corruption of capitalist barons and corporations, growing inequality, the rise of cosmopolitan elites (the ‘winners’ of neo-liberal globalisation), the crushing defeat of trade unionism, the unevenness of ‘free’ trade, and a general decline in and regard for democratic institutions (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Ironically, the rising discontent is also aimed at supporters of the rights of LGBTI+ communities, refugees and asylum seekers and women (c.f. reproductive rights, wage equality, gender justice) (see Noble, Chapter 6), fearing that this support is at expense of the politically ‘neglected’ groups such as white working-class men (also see Pease, Chapter 5), the religious, ethnic majorities and the older generation and less educated (Mudde, 2007; Younge, 2017). Furthermore, the discontent is also directed towards artists, intellectuals, journalists, academics, and social workers – that is, those accused of living in an ‘ivory tower’ and who are also seen to be in cahoots with the political elite. This unease is further fuelled by the rapid changes in population demographics as previously homogeneous communities become more ethnically, religiously and racially diverse. Kaufman (2018) argues that, while there are some common economic threads to understanding the rise of populism in the West, the disruptions and growing disquiet currently evident in the political landscape has its roots firmly in the unrest over ethnic change. He argues that rapid population change increases discontent among those who value existential security and stability.

The support for the left’s multicultural narrative, affirmative action, bilingualism, and celebration of difference and diversity made it taboo to express any concerns about loss of ethnic and cultural ground, and the trinity of sacred values around race, gender and sexual orientation kept the conservative politicians and their simmering discontent with demographic and cultural changes quiet. That is, until now. The populist surge seems to have captured this discontent with its anti-immigration, pro-‘golden past’ rhetoric as an effective means of expressing anxieties of the ‘other’ and the weakening commitment to the nation state (Kaufmann, 2018), and has thus captured the imagination of the common people, who subsequently voted in large numbers for these right-wing governments. Public figures such as Trump (USA), Bannon (USA), Farage (UK and EU), Le Pen (France), Hofer (Austria), Petry (Germany) and Hanson (Australia) among others have gained prominence by appealing to the common imagination in talking up (and in some instances fabricating) their countries’ ‘glorious’ past to capture the disenfranchised public’s dreams for a better life. In sum, their calls to save the West ‘from the clutches of immigrants and multiculturalists’ continue to find widespread support.

Much of populist leaders’ formal and informal power is sustained by scapegoating refugees, immigrant communities, women and minorities for the rising discontent of modern, capitalist societies, using emotions such as fear, hatred and indifference to advance their cause. Contributors to this volume illustrate that truth is a frequent casuality, as are handy scapegoats (e.g. Muslims, refugees, Indigenous people, the alt-left, feminists, socialists), as fears of war or terrorist catastrophes are exploited. As a result, misogyny, nativism, xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia are on the rise (Roth, 2016, p. 2; also see Latham/Briskman, Chapter 14). All these events have left in their wake a cradle of discontent not only with politics but with social life in general.

There is also the small capitalist class, who would prefer that the rest of society be excluded from this club and remain clueless and unorganised. To be successful this discourse needs the support of a complacent or compliant press to fuel crises and create scandals and conflicts as an effective way of attracting readers and capturing the populist discontent. For populist parties to succeed, their platform and rhetoric needs to resonate with sentiments and views already held by a significant part of the population (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Real participatory democracy engages with people directly, in conversation. The rising discontent and polarisation indicate that there is a lack of faith in the way modern democracy responds to and reflects the popular will. Painter (2013) argues that mainstream parties have become centralised, nepotistic, self-interested, arrogant and aloof, concerned more about their ‘bottom line’, and resist calls for transparency and accountability. Many have been found to have instigated fake news and stories that conceal their interests and those of the power elites, and have therefore contributed to the increasing distrust people have in the state and the fourth estate. These parties, he argues, must take stock and look at their role in not only drifting away from their historical electorates but in creating the distrust, disillusionment, fear and unease endemic in society. As many industrialised and developing societies become more individualised and voters more independent, it has become harder for tradit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Right-wing nationalist populism and social work: Some definitions and features
• 2. Social work, modernity and right-wing nationalist populism
• 3. White fragility, populism, xenophobia and late neoliberalism
• 4. A radical tradition of community development responses to right-wing populism
• 5. The rise of angry white men: Resisting populist masculinity and the backlash against gender equality
• 6. Right-wing populism and a feminist social work response
• 7. The multifaceted challenges of new right-wing populism to social work: The profession’s swansong or the rebirth of activism?
• 8. ‘A roar of defiance against the elites’: Brexit, populism and social work
• 9. Integration in the age of populism: Highlighting key terms in the context of refugee resettlement in the United States
• 10. Citizenship, populism and social work in the Finnish welfare state
• 11. Surveillance, sanctions, and behaviour modification in the name of far-right nationalism: The rise of authoritarian ‘welfare’ in Australia
• 12. Is welfare chauvinism evident in Australia?: Examining right-wing populist views towards Muslim refugees and Indigenous Australians
• 13. Resisting the rise of right-wing populism: European social work examples
• 14. Social workers partnering with populism
• 15. ‘They live like animals’: Migrants, Roma and nationalist populism
• 16. Ga ngaandu gimubi-li yalagiirrma: (To whom it may concern)
• Index