A Mind Of One's Own

Feminist Essays On Reason And Objectivity

Louise Antony, Charlotte Witt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429982316
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Gender Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

With philosophy so steeped in patriarchal tradition how is it possible for feminists to work within it? In this volume, 13 feminist theorists discuss whether traditional ideals of objectivity and rationality should be given a place within the committed feminist view of philosophy and the world.

Metaphysics

10
On Being Objective and Being Objectified

SALLY HASLANGER

1. Introduction

One of the common themes in feminist research over the past decade has been the claim that reason is "gendered": more specifically, that reason is "male" or "masculine." Although feminists have differed in their interpretations of this claim and the grounds they offer for it, the general conclusion has been that feminist theory should steer clear of investments in reason and rationality, at least as traditionally conceived. For example, we should avoid an epistemology that privileges reason or the standpoint of reason; we should avoid theories of the self that take rationality to be a defining trait; and we should avoid endorsing moral and political ideals that glorify reason and the reasonable "person" (read: man).

The feminist resistance to ideals of reason has at least two different strands. On one strand, giving reason prominence is problematic by virtue of what it leaves out; our views (and our lives) are distorted by a failure to recognize and properly value what has traditionally counted as "feminine." It is not that reason is inherently objectionable, but allowing ourselves to be preoccupied with the significance of reason reflects a bias toward men, or the "masculine," which feminism ought to challenge.¹ Thus we might aim in our theorizing to integrate "feminine" perspectives and attributes that have been contrasted with reason, or we might recognize an alternative "feminine" reason in addition to the more traditional "masculine" reason.²

On the other strand, reason itself is more deeply implicated in our oppression; the problem is not one that can be solved by a shift in emphasis—in short, by a new appreciation of the feminine. Offering a positive characterization of this second strand is tricky, for there are markedly different views about how reason is implicated and what we should do about it. But the core idea is that a rational stance is itself a stance of oppression or domination, and accepted ideals of reason both reflect and reinforce power relations that advantage white privileged men^.3 On this view, the point is not to balance the value of reason with feminine values, but to challenge our commitments to rational ideals.

On the face of it, it may seem misguided for feminists to pursue these challenges. It has long been a feminist project to resist the association between women and the "feminine," and even to question the very categories of "masculine" and "feminine." If feminists now take up the project of revaluing the feminine, aren't we reinforcing rather than combating traditional stereotypes? Should we not be wary of ideals of femininity that have been defined in the context of male dominance?⁴

Moreover, although it is clear that the rhetoric of reason is often used to marginalize and silence women, an appeal to the value of reasoned debate is also a way of opening up a discussion to criticism of standard assumptions. Because an important element in the traditional conception of reason is the value it accords to honest public debate and self-criticism, women's insistence on standards of reason should be one way to combat the dogmatism that fuels patriarchy. If we reject the value of rational reflection and reasoned discussion, then what acceptable methods are left to criticize entrenched positions and to mediate between conflicting points of view? How are we to construct and evaluate our own feminist positions? Even if there are flaws in traditional accounts of reason, must we conclude that they are hopelessly flawed?⁵

This brief glance at some of the issues that arise in considering the claim that reason is gendered shows that we face two huge stumbling blocks: the first is the concept of reason, the second is the concept of gender. Both are highly contested concepts: attempts at their analysis spark profound disagreement. Often it is unclear in the context of debate what account of reason or gender is under discussion, making it unclear who is speaking to whom, where there is disagreement and where there is not. Given the vast amount of interdisciplinary literature on the issue, literature drawing from different traditions and speaking to different audiences, the task of sorting through the discussion seems intractable.

In what follows I will pursue the following strategy. In the first part of the essay, I consider what it is for a concept or a point of view to be "gendered." Drawing on the idea that gender should be defined in terms of social relations, I begin with the idea that concepts or attributes are gendered insofar as they function as appropriate norms or ideals for those who stand in these social relations. After modifying and elaborating this idea, I turn to ask whether and to what extent the norms of rationality are specifically appropriate to the role defining the social category of men. To make progress in answering this question, we need at least a working definition of gender.

In the second part of: the essay, I begin by considering Catharine MacKinnon's proposal tor defining the social relations that constitute gender. On her view, gender is defined in terms of sexual objectification: roughly, women as a class are those individuals who are viewed and treated as objects for the satisfaction of men's desire. In short, women are the sexually objectified, men the objectifiers. She argues, moreover, that rationality, construed as a stance of objectivity, is an ideal that sustains the inequality of power on which sexual objectification depends. MacKinnon's account of gender has often been criticized for focusing too narrowly on a specific form of gender oppression. But even allowing that there are a plurality of different relations which constitute gender, MacKinnon's work still provides a compelling analysis of one of them. Moreover, working with MacKinnon's concrete analysis of gender enables us to explore in some detail the connections between objectification and objectivity.

Drawing on MacKinnon's critique of objectivity, I undertake to explicate a set of epistemic and practical norms that would, under conditions of social hierarchy, legitimize and sustain objectification. I argue that there is an ideal recommending "neutrality" and "aperspectivity" whose satisfaction both contributes to success in the role of objectifier and is sufficient for functioning as a collaborator in objectification. However, I argue against MacKinnon's stronger claim that satisfaction of this ideal is sufficient for functioning in the social role of a man. I conclude that the ideal is contextually "gendered" and so a proper target for feminist concern, though it is not in the strong sense "masculine."

Before continuing, let me emphasize that tor the bulk of the essay I will try to remain as neutral as possible on the issue of what counts as reason or rationality. My strategy here is to approach the question of whether reason is gendered by way of a better understanding of gender. If there are some epistemic or practical ideals that are gendered, we should determine what they are; whether these ideals are "really" what has traditionally been meant by 'rationality', or whether they are currently what we mean by 'rationality', is an important question but not my immediate concern.

I should also note that to my mind, there is something peculiar about engaging in discussion and reasoned debate over the value, or legitimacy, or reality, of reason and rationality. If there is something wrong with our commitments to reason, I doubt we'll find it this way (and I don't know what we could do about it if we did). But this is just to say that in this essay, I will be assuming that at least some minimal conception of reasoning and some minimal norms of rationality are not at stake in the discussion.

2. Gender and Social Construction

In order to understand the charge that reason is "masculine" or "gendered," it is important to sketch some of the background work that has been done on gender.⁶ It is no easy task, since there are deep disagreements among theorists about what specific account we should give of gender or whether we should seek to give an account at all. Some of the concerns have even prompted the suggestion that the concept of gender is no longer a useful theoretical tool, and this in turn has raised the specter of "post-feminism.^"7 The project of this essay is (thankfully) a few steps back from that cutting edge, for the charge that reason is "gendered" or "masculine" arises from feminist views which allow that the notion of gender is at least dialectically appropriate. So I will begin by working briefly through some of the distinctions and themes that the critique of reason draws upon in order to situate the more detailed discussion that will follow.

Sex and Gender

For the time being, let us restrict ourselves to speaking of human beings. Let us use the terms 'male' and 'female' to indicate a classification of individual human beings on the basis of anatomical difference. For our purposes it is not important to specify exactly what anatomical differences count, though primary sex characteristics are a place to start. Let us allow that the distinction between males and females is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and that the terms may be vague—that is, given that human beings display a range of anatomical diversity, we can allow that there are individuals who do not fall neatly within either class and that there are others who fall within both. Further, let us leave it open whether such an anatomical classification is "natural" or "social," "real" or "nominal." And let us say that two individuals are of different sex just in case each falls within one and only one of the two classes, and they don't fall within the same class.⁸

It is commonplace in feminist research that we must distinguish sex from gender.⁹ In keeping with this research, let us use the terms 'man' and 'woman' to indicate gender difference (allowing that boys may fall within the gender man and girls within the gender woman. Although it might be that the distinctions of sex and gender are extensionally equivalent—that is that all and only females are women and all and only males are men—the basis for the gender classification is not anatomical; rather, its basis lies in social relations.

To see the general point, it is useful to consider other straightforward examples of distinctions based in social relations. Consider a scapegoat. An individual is a scapegoat not by virtue of their intrinsic features but by virtue of their relations to others: anyone, regardless of their bodily features, character, and so on can function as a scapegoat in the right circumstances. What makes you a scapegoat is the role you play in a social group. Consider a landlord. One is a landlord by virtue of one's role in a broad system of social and economic relations which includes tenants, property, and the like. Even if it turned out as a matter of fact that all and only landlords had a closed loop in the center of their right thumbprint, the basis for being counted a landlord is different from the basis for being counted as having such a thumbprint. Likewise for gender, one is a woman, not by virtue of one's intrinsic features (for example, body type), but by virtue of one's part in a system of social relations which includes, among other things, men.¹⁰ Gender is a relational or extrinsic property of individuals, and the relations in question are social.¹¹ If gender rests in this way upon the organization of social life, we should at least entertain the possibility that just as a change in social relations could have the result that there are no landlords and tenants, a change in social relations could have the result that there are no men and women, even if there continue to be males and females.

It is natural to ask next: What are the social relations that constitute gender? Here things become theoretically difficult, for although it seems plausible that gender difference appears cross-culturally and trans-historically, we must at the very least allow that the specific social relations constituting gender differ from culture to culture. But the recognition of broad social differences raises the question whether gender can be understood as a unitary phenomenon at all.¹² Moreover, there is a theme among feminists that the social relations that give rise to gender distinctions are relations of domination; in particular, they are oppressive to women.¹³ However, gender oppression does not typically occur in isolation from other forms of oppression; the social relations that constitute gender will be part of a system of social relations, and such systems also serve to ground other distinctions such as race and class. What distinguishes those social relations that constitute gender? On what basis (if any) can we meaningfully isolate gender from other hierarchical social distinctions, and gender oppression from other forms of oppression? Are anatomical facts concerning sex and reproduction important for distinguishing gender from other social categories, and gender oppression from other oppressions?¹⁴

Gender-Norms

There are several strategies for addressing the questions just raised which have been proposed and criticized in the feminist literature. Before I return to the issue of specifying what relations constitute gender, we need to consider a related distinction between "gender-norms": masculinity and femininity. Gender-norms are clusters of characteristics and abilities that function as a standard by which individuals are judged to be "good" instances of their gender; they are the "virtues" appropriate to the gender.

Because the notion of a "norm" is used in different ways, an example will help illustrate the notion I am relying on. Consider a paring knife. Something counts as a paring knife only if it has features that enable it to perform a certain function: it must be easily usable by humans to cut and peel fruits and vegetables. We can distinguish, however, between something's marginally performing that function and something's performing the function excellently. A good paring knife has a sharp hard blade with a comfortable handle; a poor paring knife might be one that is so blunt that it crushes rather than cuts a piece of fruit, it might be too large to handle easily, and so on. Those features that enable a paring knife to be excellent at its job, are the "virtues" of a paring knife. (Something that functions as a good paring knife may function as a poor screwdriver and, when nothing else is available, a good screwdriver may function as a poor paring knife. Although having a sharp pointed blade is a virtue...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface to the Second Edition
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
• EPISTEMOLOGY
• METAPHYSICS
• SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
• About the Editors and Contributors
• Index