An Introduction To The World-system Perspective

Second Edition

Thomas R Shannon

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429973789
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book takes into account the dramatic changes associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and significant developments in the semi-periphery and periphery. It addresses some of the issues that have come to prominence in the world-system literature since 1989.

1

The Origins of World-System Theory

C. Wright Mills (1961) once described sociology as the attempt to link history to individual biography. This book examines one recent attempt in sociology to make sense of the social, economic, and political history of the modern societies—world-system theory. Like its theoretical predecessors, world-system theory adopts a particular approach to history. Theorists of this school claim that out of the welter of events contained in the historical record, certain general trends and historical patterns can be identified and shown to be causally related. According to this view, history is a relatively orderly general process in which certain events make others possible or likely.

World-system theory is a continuation of the central concerns of such early social theorists as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. They maintained that a fundamentally new kind of society had emerged in Western Europe in the centuries after 1500 (the modern era). They sought to identify the nature of this new society, explain its origins, and explore the consequences of its emergence.

World-system theory is also part of a general theoretical development in sociology that began in the 1970s. During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s structural-functionalism was the dominant approach in U.S. sociology. This theoretical perspective provided a general model of the nature and operation of all societies and constituted the conceptual underpinnings for an explanation of the evolution of contemporary societies called modernization theory. In the late 1960s both structural-functionalism and modernization theory were the objects of increasingly harsh criticism. Much of this criticism came from a growing group of sociologists who sought to replace these theories with a revised and updated Marxist sociology. World-system theory emerged in the 1970s as part of this Marxist intellectual revival. The theory's specific role was to provide an alternative to modernization theory's interpretation of social change in the modern era.

This chapter will trace the origins of world-system theory, beginning with a consideration of structural-functionalism and modernization theory. The chapter will then examine how world-system theorists have drawn upon a number of previous models in the Marxist tradition to create an alternative to modernization theory. World-system theory represents an explicit effort to extend, modify, and synthesize these earlier efforts.

Structural-Functionalism and Modernization Theory

World-system theorists reject the structural-functionalist theory of modernization, which considered societies relatively stable systems of interrelated parts. Each part, such as the kinship system, did something necessary (had a “function” or social consequence) for the other parts and for the system as a whole. Each part was related to and dependent upon the others. Social change was therefore the process by which the social system gradually adapted to a changing environment. Because of the system's in-terrelatedness, if once one element of the system changed, the others had to change (Parsons, 1951, 1966; Moore, 1974: 72-93; Applebaum, 1970: 67-70).

Modernization theorists attempted to apply this basic view of society to an understanding of changes in the modern era. To formulate a general model of the emergence of contemporary societies, theorists focused on explaining the process of industrialization in Europe. One of the best known practitioners of this approach, Wilbert E. Moore, characterized the process of modernization as the

“total” transformation of a traditional or premodern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the “advanced,” economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the Western world…. It is … a general transformation of the conditions of life and the way life is socially organized (1974: 94).

At the most general level, these theorists described modernization as a process of “differentiation.” In this view, the social structures of “traditional” societies were relatively simple, or “undifferentiated.” In an undifferentiated social structure most of the key activities necessary for societal survival were concentrated in a limited number of institutions, especially the family and kinship systems. The roles within each institution were also limited in number and performed several different functions. Hence, modernization entailed the creation of more numerous, specialized (differentiated) institutions and roles (Parsons, 1966; Smelser, 1973).

Modernization theorists attempted to identify certain key social, cultural, economic, and political changes that they felt were central to the emergence of contemporary societies in the West. Most theorists did so by constructing an “ideal type” (generalized, abstract model) of the process. In the model, premodern societies were characterized by certain general features that were typical of all traditional societies. As a result of industrialization and social change, a new societal type with different features emerged—the “modern” or “industrial” society. Table 1.1 summarizes one view of these societal types.

These theorists also attempted to specify the preconditions for these changes and the events that typified the process of modernization itself (see Table 1.2). Modernization theorists believed that they had identified the common elements of an essentially universal process of change about which it was possible to make meaningful general theoretical statements. (Harrison, 1988: 1-32; Abraham, 1980:1-29). Alvin So (1990:33-35) has summarized the general claims of modernization theory:

1. Modernization takes place in a series of phases or stages through which all societies go.
2. Modernization produces convergence toward a g;eneral type ofsociety similar to those that already exist in Western Europe and North America.
3. Western Europe and North America represent models of successful modern societies that developing societies should aspire to emulate.
4. Modernization, once begun, is an irreversible process that creates popular expectations for a better life that must be satisfied.
5. Modernization is a socially “progressive” process that creates a liberating, socially desirable outcome.
6. Modernization is a long-term, evolutionary (rather than an abrupt, revolutionary) process.
7. Modernization proceeds systematically, in that one change requires and implies that other, consistent, related changes occur.
8. Modernization thoroughly transforms a society, completely replacing traditional values with modern ones.
9. Modernization, once begun, unfolds according to its own logic as part of a process of change that is primarily generated by internal mechanisms.

TABLE 1.1 Levy's Comparison of Relatively Nonmodernized and Relatively Modernized Societies

TABLE 1.2 Moore's “Sequential” Model of Modernization

Application to the Third World

Modernization theorists interpreted the problems and events in Third World countries in light of this presumed universality. (World-system theorists classify such countries among the so-called peripheral and semi-peripheral societies. We will follow that usage here.) These societies were viewed as typical traditional societies just beginning the process of modernization. Their difficulties in achieving the conditions existing in the already industrialized societies were simply the result of “historical backwardness.” According to this view, such Third World societies needed to overcome the “traditionalism” of their social structures, cutural values, and political institutions (that is, the characteristics that marked all societies prior to modernization). Then these societies would be in a position to take advantage of transfers of industrial technology from the West and to begin improving their economies. If local political elites were appropriately educated and socialized, they could speed up the process by first changing the political system to Western political structures and then using it to foster economic and social change. The advanced societies of the West (”core” societies in world-system usage) could also help by advising the local political elites on how to reform the political system; providing technical training and expertise; donating some of the capital and industrial equipment to start industrialization; investing in the local economy; providing the assistance to create a more efficient service infrastructure (roads, schools, airports, electrical grids); and so on.

Apart from altruism, it was in the interest of the industrialized societies to provide such assistance in order to counteract the decreased social equilibrium brought about by the process of modernization. If modernization was not encouraged and shaped by Western efforts, the breakdown of traditional value systems and institutions and increased expectations among the impoverished masses could lead to rising discontent, which in turn could provide support for Communist-inspired revolutions and the creation of totalitarian dictatorships hostile to the West (Chirot, 1977: 2-4; Abraham, 1980; 1-29; Sanderson, 1988: 168).

Criticisms of Structural Functionalism and Modernization Theory

By the late 1960s both the general model of structural-functionalism and the specific claims of modernization theory were encountering a number of criticisms in U.S. sociology. (World-system theorists generally agree with these criticisms and have attempted to avoid making the same mistakes in formulating their own theory.) The general model was faulted for overemphasizing the degree of orderliness, cooperation, and stability in society. Critics pointed to the frequency of very abrupt social changes and open conflict in history. Other critics added that the apparent preference for stability and order in structural-functionalist theory led its practitioners to view conflict and rapid change as inherently dangerous and abnormal. Behind this failure, said the critics, was a failure to recognize the importance of vast differences among various groups and social strata in terms of power and the benefits received from society. These differences in fact guaranteed a high level of group conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959; Buckley, 1967; Coser, 1956).

Structural-functionalists were also criticized for their general analytic approach, which was characterized by theoretical statements that were no more than complex, abstract statements of the obvious and sterile systems of categories. In particular, critics castigated structural-functionalists for their lack of a sense of history and of the uniqueness of particular societies and time periods (Mills, 1961).

Of most relevance to world-system theory, however, were the criticisms of modernization theory. The central complaint was that it attributed the conditions and problems of peripheral societies to factors internal to them (their traditionalism). Critics charged that such a view ignored several centuries of cultural contact, trade, colonization, and political-military intervention by Europe and (later) by the United States. Hence, said the critics, these countries had stopped being true traditional societies well before the twentieth century. Rather, they had been changed into new kinds of societies that fit neither the traditional nor modern categories of modernization theory (Chirot, 1977: 3-6; Wolf, 1982: 386-391; Sanderson, 1988: 140).

Emerging out of this central criticism of modernization theory were a number of other, related ones, particularly that structural-functionalists had assumed that the Western process of industrialization (especially that of Great Britain) was the pattern all other societies had to, would, and should follow. This assertion, critics charged, ignored a number of factors. First, Britain had developed without competition or intervention from other, more technologically advanced societies, whereas peripheral societies were attempting to industrialize and compete with wealthy, technologically advanced, and militarily powerful countries. Second, the social, economic, and political conditions that existed in Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not exist in the periphery in the twentieth century. Third, peripheral countries differed considerably among themselves; they had unique historical heritages that created special problems for their modernization efforts. Fourth, modernization theorists implicitly assumed that the results of Western industrialization (individualism and materialism, for example) were inherently desirable. In fact, such results were not necessarily compatible with the cultural values of many people in the periphery (Abraham, 1980:176-204).

Critics of modernization theory also rejected its attribution of a benign role to the core countries as the supposed purveyors of modernity. That view, critics charged, ignored the centuries of abuse and exploitation by the core of the periphery and also failed to explain why core governments had so frequently supported corrupt and exploitative authoritarian regimes on the periphery. Hence, these critics claimed, many of the problems of the periphery were the result not of historical backwardness but of the “imposed backwardness” caused by core exploitation and repression (Burns, 1980; Magdoff, 1969; Sanderson, 1988:159-185; Frank, 1966).

Implications for World-System Theory.

These criticisms of structural-functionalism and modernization theory became part of the initial agenda of those who were to develop world-system theory. Specifically, these criticisms suggested that an adequate alternative approach should (1) be grounded in the historical experiences of the societies in the periphery; (2) consider the differences between present-day conditions and those that existed when the core industrialized; (3) explicitly address the role of relationships among societies in explaining change within them (such as the role of the already industrialized countries in creating conditions in the periphery); and (4) take into account the role of power, exploitation, and conflict in the relationships both within and among societies. In their search for such an approach sociologists in the late 1960s and early 1970s began to reexamine a number of previous theoretical efforts, beginning with the work of Marx.

Classical Marxism

Marx's basic model of society emphasized the role of power in social relationships, the exploitation by one social class of the rest of society, and the constant conflict generated by that exploitation. For Marx, the basic nature of society was shaped by the “mode of production”—the type of technology and organization of labor used in economic production (the “productive forces”) and the set of rules governing who controlled and benefited from that production (the “social relations of production”). In turn, the relations of production determined the nature of the social class system in society. In Marxian sociology a “social class” was defined in terms of its relationship to the means of production. Those who controlled the productive process, economic decision making, and the distribution of the goods produced constituted the “ruling class” of society. This class concentrated the benefits of economic production in its hands and did so by “exploiting” the labor power of workers (who, depending on the type of society, were peasants, serfs, slaves, or paid employees). By exploitation Marx meant that the ruling class kept the bulk of the wealth created by the workers’ labor because of its control over the means of production (Marger, 1987: 33-34; Ritzer, 1983: 80-91; Freedman, 1961; Szymanski, 1983).

To continue this process of exploitation the ruling class had to have effective control over society. In part, the ruling class's direct supervision of the process of production provided it with day-to-day control over the workers. The ruling class also used its economic resources to shape the basic institutions and culture of society (the “superstructure”). Hence, religion, family relationships, the laws, the policies of government, education, and cultural beliefs and values all reflected the interests of the ruling class. As a consequence, the superstructure functioned to shape the behavior and beliefs of the exploited members of society so as to encourage their acceptance of the economic system and the power and privileges of the ruling class. The most critical institution in the superstructure was the state, which promulgated and enforced laws benefiting the ruling class (Marger, 1987: 35-36; Ritzer, 1983: 80-91; Giddens, 1971: 35-60).

Yet, for all the power of the ruling class, its control of society was not stable or permanent. Productive forces continually evolved. Marx identified several basic stages in this evolution; as the productive forces moved from one stage to another the relations of production also changed. (There was a best or most appropriate set of relations of production for each general stage in the development of the productive forces.) But change in the relations of production would undermine the position of the ruling class—whose power ultimately rested on a particular set of relations of production. Hence, the ruling class resisted changing these relations. Eventually, that resistance proved futile because a new class, associated with the new productive forces, emerged and began to challenge the power of the ruling class. This new class stood to benefit by a change in the relations of production. Because of its association with the newer, more effective productive forces, this class gradually became larger and more economically important in society, more aware of its true class interests (to change the relations of production), and thus more politically organized. Finally, it became po...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Tables and Illustrations
• Preface to the Second Edition
• Preface to the First Edition
• Acknowledgemnts for the Second Edition
• Acknowledgemnts for the First Edition
• 1 The Origins of World-System Theory
• 2 World-System Structure
• 3 World-System Structure: The Early Centuries
• 4 The Contemporary World-System
• 5 World-System Dynamics
• 6 Criticisms of the Theory
• 7 New Directions in World-System Analysis
• 8 An Assessment of World-System Theory
• Index