Comparative Planning Cultures

Sanyal Bishwapriya

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781136794575
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Architecture
• Subtopic: Urban Planning & Landscaping

Bringing together leading planning and urban scholars, and including fascinating international case studies, this unique book investigates urban planning across the world and in different cultures.

PART I

OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 1

HYBRID PLANNING CULTURES: THE SEARCH FOR THE GLOBAL CULTURAL COMMONS

BISHWAPRIYA SANYAL

INTRODUCTION

Are there significant variations in the ways planners in different nations have influenced urban, regional, and national development? Do such variations arise from differences in planning cultures, meaning the collective ethos and dominant attitude of professional planners in different nations toward the appropriate roles of the state, market forces, and civil society in urban, regional, and national development? How are such professional cultures formed? Are they indigenous and immutable, or do they evolve with social, political, and economic changes both within and outside the national territory? Particularly relevant for our times is the intensification of global interconnection in trade, capital flows, labor migration, and technological connectivity and its effect on national planning cultures. Are there signs that previously dominant planning cultures are being challenged as a result of such interconnection? And, if so, are such challenges leading to the formation of new, radically different planning cultures?

The contributors to this volume address these and related questions, drawing on planning experience in ten nations and at different territorial levels, ranging from the local to national level. The nations vary by degrees of urbanization and industrialization. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia are relatively more industrialized and urbanized than China, India, Indonesia, Iran, and Mexico, which are industrializing countries. The nations also vary in terms of their established political systems. On one end are the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands, with long political traditions of democracy; on the other end is China, ruled by a communist party, albeit with an administrative structure that has been decentralized recently. In between are India, democratic and with a federal structure of government; Australia, founded in the early part of the twentieth century, also with a federated governance structure; Mexico, democratic since the revolution in 1910 but led by one centralized political party until only recently; Iran, struggling with a unique blend of theocracy and democracy in a relatively centralized governance structure; and Indonesia, which until recently was ruled by an autocratic leader supported by the army. This complex political scenario makes the discussion of planning cultures difficult but also intriguing.

As a general background to the discussion of specific planning cultures in each nation, this volume contains two theoretical papers, from John Friedmann and from Manuel Castells, that attempt to capture broad global trends at the end of the twentieth century. Castells highlights the impact of technological changes—particularly in information and communication—and how such changes have radically altered the material basis for urbanism. Castells is arguing, implicitly, that contemporary planning practice in all nations must acknowledge and meet the challenges posed by the new technological dynamics influencing urbanism. Friedmann differentiates this global scenario into three different parts, highlighting the sharply varying quality of urban lives in industrialized nations, industrializing nations, and “transitional” nations attempting to transform their previously socialist economies to fully industrialized, market-driven economies anchored in private ownership of the productive forces. This differentiation suggests that global interconnections—of trade, investment, flows of labor, cultural symbols, and other ideas, which are grouped together all too often under the term globalization—are not leading toward a homogenization of planning cultures across the globe. The sharp differences in the levels of industrialization among the three groups of nations and the particularly different ways each group is linked to the global economy seem to be the crucial variables influencing different planning practices in the three sets of nations.

PLANNING CULTURE: THE GOLDEN YEARS

Why focus on the planning culture of a city, region, or nation if, indeed, its political economy is what ultimately shapes the particular characteristics of its planning endeavors? In this chapter we probe this question through a brief historical analysis of how and why the notion of planning cultures emerged from the discussion of planning practices in industrialized as well as industrializing countries. Such an analysis logically begins with the years immediately after World War II, when planning flourished in both industrialized and industrializing countries, so much so that Peter Hall described them as “the golden years of planning.”¹ There was no discussion of planning cultures, however, during this period. What made it “golden” was the optimism among planners—urban, regional, as well as national—that planning efforts did not have to be based on the intuitive and aesthetic sensibilities of architects and urban designers of the past. In contrast, planning culture could be scientific and rational, based on accurate observations of statistically valid samples of reality, followed by dispassionate and value-neutral analysis of socioeconomic trends. Such analyses would lead to professionally crafted recommendations formulated through rigorous and objective assessment methodologies, such as cost-benefit analysis, planning-programming and budgeting systems, that had proven useful in conducting World War II.

The rational comprehensive model (RCM) of planning, about which much has already been written, reflected the aspirations of the postwar period.² It was backed intellectually by theories of location of firms, initially developed in Germany in the early part of the twentieth century and later introduced in the United States and elsewhere.³ Earlier location theories took on a new intellectual power and persuasiveness when combined with analytical studies of transportation—in particular, the automobile and its impact on location of not only firms but also households. The result was a rapid growth in land use and transportation modeling that reinforced the role of planners as professionals with the necessary knowledge and expertise to shape the future in a scientific way.⁴

In industrializing countries emerging from colonial rule, the dominant planning culture was equally optimistic and technocratic and more centralized than in industrialized countries. Many industrializing countries drew their inspiration from the planning experience of the former Soviet Union.⁵ Economists and statisticians dominated the planning process, which was conceived as a scientific and rational process requiring expert and technical knowledge. The topic of national culture was rarely, if ever, discussed. This was because, in part, the goal of planning was to change the national culture so as to rapidly modernize, both economically and politically. Though issues of national sovereignty, cultural autonomy, and economic self-sufficiency⁶ were discussed regularly by political leaders in many newly decolonized nations, planners, on the whole, rarely incorporated particular cultural attributes in formulating plans. The only visible difference in planning cultures after World War II was between ex-British colonies and ex-French colonies—particularly in Africa. The French model of colonial governance had been more centralized than the British style of administration, and some differences lingered on even after the colonies were independent. Both types of ex-colonies, however, pursued the same technocratic and export-driven approach to planning, with one clearly defined objective—to estimate the need for bilateral and multinational aid to support the annual growth rate of their national economies.⁷

At the city level, planners pursued the Western style of comprehensive planning by creating new master plans that embodied the vision of modern cities with distinctly separated land uses connected by transportation arteries. Much has been already written about this effort.⁸ One issue relevant for our purpose is that the actual culture of planning as practiced on a day-to-day basis was not as the planning documents described it.⁹ Most city planning offices were poorly staffed, with limited resources. Usually there was not even the rudimentary infrastructure necessary for serious technocratic planning, which required large amounts of data, technological capabilities, and a cadre of well-qualified and well-paid staff. Nevertheless, the inspiration for modernization was so strong that some national governments invested large sums from export earnings and international aid to create new capital cities. Planning for many of these capital cities was led by foreign architects with little knowledge of local planning culture.¹⁰ This lack of knowledge was not considered a drawback; on the contrary, since the goal was to interject a culture of modernization both in the physical form of the city and in its planning process, the lack of local knowledge was considered an asset, particularly because external experts who were to help modernize these cities were expected to be autonomous of traditional loyalties and local corruption.¹¹

PARADIGM SHIFT IN PLANNING CULTURES

The golden years of planning lasted for almost two decades, if one acknowledges 1968 as the turning point when prevailing notions of planning came under attack in both industrialized and industrializing countries. Though this transition is well documented,¹² it is worth reminding ourselves that what came under attack were not only the results of planning but also the culture of planning practice. The criticism came from many quarters, including planners themselves—particularly those based in academia.¹³ Attributes of planning that had been viewed as strengths during the golden years were now seen as major drawbacks. Planning was now considered too technocratic, elitist, centralized, bureaucratic, pseudoscientific, hegemonic, and so on.¹⁴ In industrializing countries the criticism of planning went even further. The critics argued that, rather than serving as a positive force for social change and modernization, planning had been the major hindrance to such change.¹⁵ Drawing on criticisms of planning from both the right and left of the ideological spectrum, an eclectic argument was made that top-down, state-centered planning was inflexible, unresponsive to the needs of the people, and alien to local culture.¹⁶

There was much discussion in both industrialized and industrializing countries about the need for a paradigm shift in planning practice. According to the new paradigm, planning practice was to be “bottom-up” and “people-centered,” relying no longer on economists, engineers, and statisticians, but on anthropologists, sociologists, scholars of cultural studies, and grassroots activists, who were closer to the people.¹⁷ Institutionally, the focus was to shift from state agencies to nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations, which were considered more efficient, equitable, flexible, and accountable.¹⁸ In this new mode planning was to become more participatory, culturally sensitive, politically more explicit in advocating the needs of disadvantaged groups, and, overall, less technocratic and less reliant on modern technology, such as computers, for problem solving.¹⁹ This paradigm shift in what was considered effective planning was more pronounced among academic planners than among practitioners, who could not change their style of practice as quickly as the academic discourse was changing. Nevertheless, with time, planning practice did change, producing a mixed outcome.²⁰

On the positive side, planners became more concerned about environmental issues, sexism, and the impact of racism on urban form and planning practice. The civil rights movement had coincided with the paradigm shift in planning practice and raised the general awareness of planners regarding the multicultural composition of urban populations.²¹ In general, the planning process became more open to public participation. In newly industrializing countries, the shift in planning practice was most noticeable in discussions of development. Until then, development had been equated with economic growth only. The new paradigm of planning from below stressed issues of income redistribution, poverty alleviation, and the critical roles of housing and the urban informal economy in meeting the basic needs of the urban poor.²² This led to the recognition that the planning problems of industrializing countries were starkly different from those of industrialized countries. Hence, the old paradigm of modernization built on the experience of industrialized countries was not appropriate for the newly industrializing countries. Planning in industrializing countries required sensitivity to their cultural, economic, political, and institutional particularities.²³

On the negative side, the shift in the dominant planning paradigm also created some problems. As traditional planning institutions came under attack, they lost not only legitimacy but also resources, weakening their power to intervene decisively in the socioeconomic and political processes influencing the urban built environment.²⁴ Though some alternative planning institutions did emerge in the process, they were not empowered to pursue a comprehensive approach to urban problems.²⁵ These new planning institutions focused on one or two problems of specific constituencies and were usually too small to address large-scale problems. Also, contrary to popular perception, they were not necessarily more efficient or accountable than traditional planning institutions.²⁶ True, the new paradigm opened up the planning process to public scrutiny. However, in some countries, this occurred to such an extent that the process of decision making became contentious. This forced planners to become negotiators, learning these skills on the job, through trial and error. In the process, planner-mediators often withheld their professional views to keep from “biasing” the deliberative process and, instead, searched for the common ground among contesting views, sometimes arriving at solutions that embraced the lowest common denominator.²⁷ This kind of planning process did not strengthen the claim that professional planners had valuable knowledge and training that others lacked.²⁸ Disagreements among planners themselves only deepened the ambivalence about what professional planners could contribute to decision making, which was reflected in growing disagreement among the planning theorists.²⁹ Lacking a professional consensus about how to plan well, professional planners reacted to planning problems with little certainty about their own effectiveness. This professional anxiety, combined with the threat of declining resources, led some to declare that the profession was in a state of crisis.³⁰

PLANNING UNDER ATTACK

The 1980s interjected two new elements into the culture of planning practice. First, as globalization of industrial production became increasingly widespread, manufacturing industries were moving out of old industrial cities. The outflow of capital left behind cities with high unemployment, housing foreclosures, and an underutilized infrastructure that could not be maintained on sharply declining revenues. Urban planners in the United States and other industrialized nations realized that the economic ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• Part I Overview
• Part II Two Theoretical Propositions
• Part III The Traffic of Planning Ideas in Industrializing Nations
• Part IV Planning Cultures and Social Change: The Experience of Industrialized Nations
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index