Warfare and Society in Imperial Rome, C. 31 BC-AD 280

Brian Campbell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134468614
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

This well-documented study of the Roman army provides a crucial aid to understanding the Roman Empire in economic, social and political terms. Employing numerous examples, Brian Campbell explores the development of the Roman army and the expansion of the Roman Empire from 31 BC-280 AD.When Augustus established a permanent, professional army, this i

1
THE ORIGINS OF WAR

Warfare in the ancient world was a personal business. Decisions were taken by an individual or by a few people and were carried out by soldiers fighting face to face.Wars differed in type and intensity; in the early period war was virtually a private affair, fought between individuals and their retinues, and could even be resolved by single combat. Later, war was waged by the state against external enemies, or involved civil conflict or rebellion against occupying forces, and was settled by full-scale battles, guerrilla campaigns and sieges. There were also naval engagements, though Rome fought no specifically naval wars. War was sometimes used as a political tool, to confirm a ruler in power, or as social cement, to bind a whole people together for purposes other than fighting in the war itself, or to establish the dominance of one group. Some fought to seek revenge or with that pretence, others as an expression of religious belief or ritual enactment. However, state-sponsored wars were usually fought for imperial and economic aggrandizement and territorial expansion, the acquisition of booty, and the achievement of honour and glory for the leaders (though this, too, could often have political significance).Wars fought against powerful neighbours to ensure survival might be described as defensive, however disingenuous that was, but wars begun ostensibly for defensive purposes might in time lead to further conquest. Of course many wars arose for complex reasons, or from accidents and misunderstandings, and indeed those instigating war may have had different, even inconsistent, motives.Therefore it is useful to start with a general definition, namely, that war occurs when ‘those who decide public and military policy believe that war is in their material self-interest, considered from the perspective of their position within social and economic organization’.¹

In the Roman imperial period it is of course notoriously difficult to discover why a particular war occurred, or what the people thought about the wars fought in their name. This is because we rely mainly on literary sources that are often incomplete and ill-informed, or prejudiced by preconceptions or dislike of individual emperors. In fact historians tend to be more interested in politics, government, and even civil wars than in foreign conflicts.² What we need is access to the diaries of emperors and their advisers, the records of meetings that normally took place behind closed doors, and the letters or memoirs of army commanders. In their absence it may be instructive to examine societies in other ages and common sociological features that can help explain the origin of war and illuminate the impact of warfare on society and political development.War seemingly has deep roots in human personality and the aggression of man living in society, whether that is instinctive or environmental.³ However,we must be cautious, since the application of over-schematic theoretical analysis based on inadequate knowledge of the ancient world may produce only superficial and ultimately misleading similarities.

The Roman Republic

One Roman historian believed that it was the number and valour of Rome’s soldiers and the skills of her generals that, with the help of fortune, had made Rome unconquerable.⁴ Now, the willingness of any state to go to war surely depends in part on the expectation of success, and past experience of war and its consequences. So, in developed societies, determination to fight will be centred on the nature of the army and its organization and command, which in turn depend on the nature of society and the political structure. Consequently war decisions were taken which embodied the motives of governments and assemblies, or groups or individuals within those bodies, and such decisions were closely linked to the success of government itself.Therefore Cicero could refer to ‘the institutions of our ancestors which experience and the long duration of our government vindicate’.⁵

In fact most wars in the Roman world depended on the decision of a relatively small number of important people, or, in the imperial period, of the emperor. In the early Republic the Roman army was effectively a peasant militia, in which Roman citizens took up their arms for the duration of a campaign.Warfare tended to follow a routine pattern, with mobilization in early spring for campaigns against neighbouring communities. At the end of the summer the soldiers were discharged. Citizens were habituated to warfare as an annual event and continued to be available for call-up while they were of military age. But there was also a property qualification; thus fighting for the state was a duty and responsibility, but also a kind of privilege associated with citizenship.⁶

The same citizens who took up arms for the state also constituted the people’s assembly, which controlled decisions about war and peace.⁷ Therefore, when proposals were put to the assembly, the leaders might need to take account of the feelings of the ordinary citizen-soldiers and their willingness to serve in person and go into battle. Many factors applied here: the soldiers’ confidence in their commander, their hope of booty and the profitable acquisition of land and slaves, and perhaps the prospect of an exciting change in the usual humdrum routine of peasant life. Doubtless patriotism also played a part, in that what they fought for could be represented as the defence of Rome. It is likely that at least down to the 150s BC Roman citizens were not reluctant to engage in regular warfare.⁸

Although popular opinion remained important, in that the people were theoretically sovereign, in my view the preponderant influence in deciding all questions of foreign policy lay with the senate, which under the guise of offering advice issued instructions to senatorial magistrates or army commanders. These officials, because of the difficulties of communicating quickly with Rome, often exercised considerable discretion and could significantly influence policy. Of course, army commanders also had to justify their conduct with reports or displays of military success. Therefore decisions were subject to the prevailing emotions and opinions of the upper classes, and the traditional structure of Roman society and government.⁹ Many of the aristocrats who sat in the senate were attuned to a militaristic outlook and experienced in military service, and had warfare firmly implanted in their mindset. Moreover, military success could be personally advantageous in bringing enrichment, prestige, and even political advancement. Collectively, senators might compete to vote for more wars to enhance their own glory and also to enrich the state by expanding the empire. Strategy and longterm planning may have taken second place to greed and imperialist aggrandizement. Of course they could readily convince themselves that what was in fact personal gain was to the advantage of the Roman state.¹⁰

There was also the effect of a gradual habituation to war and the possession of a successful army, and in particular the contribution from Rome’s Italian allies. Every year they were obliged by their treaties with Rome to contribute a considerable body of infantry and cavalry, in lieu of taxes.There may have been a perceived need to find something for them to do, to convince the allies of Rome’s worth and power.¹¹ It is also true that the Romans did not always win their battles and sometimes encountered a real threat to their success or even their existence, notably during the invasion of Hannibal. Fear that powerful neighbours might be able to do them serious damage could be a factor in decisions to go to war, even if this fear was often irrational. Finally, as an established state Rome doubtless found it relatively easy to wage war on less militarily developed communities.

However, even if the social and cultural context in the mid-Republic was conducive to the unrestrained waging of war, we may still exaggerate the single-mindedness of Rome’s devotion to war and her greed and imperialist aggression. Especially in the second century BC the level of warfare fluctuated and the momentum of Roman conquest was inconsistent as her military commitments changed. There were also constraining factors. For example, rivalry among the upper classes for military glory may have been two-edged, in that it could restrict war, as successful senators tried to prevent others from benefiting by denying opportunities for military command. Furthermore, for a time in the late second century there were increasing worries about the availability of sufficient manpower. Therefore it may be argued that the Roman senate was sometimes able to reach decisions on war and peace dispassionately, in the light of the general public good, although that of course was in line with entirely selfish Roman interests.¹²

The causes, character and intensity of Roman warfare changed throughout the first century BC, and by the late Republic the senate and upper classes were increasingly sidelined and decisions on war and peace were taken to satisfy the ambitions of a few great military commanders, who aimed for wealth and personal aggrandizement to secure their political dominance. Thus Marcus Crassus, who dragged Rome into a disastrous war against Parthia in the hope of winning military glory, said that no man could call himself rich unless he was able to support an army from his own pocket.¹³ Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul, in which he built up a deep personal rapport with his army, was partly motivated by a desire to win wealth, renown and political standing.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the underlying intention was to win glory by conquering through war and adding territory to the empire.¹⁵

The army, too, had changed. Men now joined up in the expectation of enrichment in the successful campaigns of a distinguished commander, served for longer (sometimes stationed in a permanent base), and looked forward to a satisfactory pay-off, usually in the form of land that would set them up for the rest of their life. Therefore a bond of personal loyalty was created with their commander rather than with the state.¹⁶ In the eighteen years after Caesar crossed the River Rubicon, invaded Italy and initiated civil war, Roman life and society were convulsed until the Republican establishment was finally overthrown with the emergence of Octavian as master of the Roman world in 31 BC.Taking the name Augustus in 27 BC, he established an autocracy that lasted until the fall of the city of Rome itself.

Augustus and warfare

Augustus reorganized the Roman army, and absorbed into himself the mechanisms for controlling the military and deciding questions of war and peace. Making use of earlier developments, he established a professional army, in which the soldiers were paid to spend their best working years (eventually twenty-five) as full-time soldiers; they could devote all their time to military duties, free from farming and commercial concerns or formal family responsibilities. Augustus intended that this standing army should be capable of meeting all the military requirements of the empire without the need to resort to disruptive special levies. This transformed war-making possibilities. The empire was virtually in a permanent state of war, in which year-round sustained campaigns could be fought where necessary. Augustus’ shrewd recruitment of non-citizen auxiliary troops from the less Romanized provinces or the periphery of the empire, and their eventual incorporation into the formal structure of the army, offered significant reserves of manpower.¹⁷

Strabo described Augustus as ‘Lord of war and peace’, and Dio speaks of the right of emperors ‘to declare war, make peace, and rule both foreigners and citizens in every place for all time’.¹⁸ The senate and people now counted for little, and if Augustus consulted them it was out of politeness. By the end of his reign most governors in charge of troops were directly under his control and incapable of taking any real initiative. So Augustus was not bound by the jealousies and prejudices of the aristocracy that had previously controlled senatorial debate and the appointment of governors, or by any high command of generals.¹⁹ All our literary sources, when describing Augustus’ military campaigns, indicate that he was effectively in charge. For instance, according to Florus’ history, the German wars resulted from a personal decision of Augustus.²⁰ Dio describes how Augustus intended to wage war on Britain, but then changed his mind during a visit to Gaul.²¹ This is also the story in Augustus’ autobiography, the Res Gestae, though he is normally at pains to conceal his political dominance. ‘At my command and under my auspices two armies were led almost simultaneously into Ethiopia and Arabia Felix.’²² Similarly, embassies from foreign peoples seeking to confirm or develop relations with Rome came to Augustus, wherever he was.²³ Eventually he appointed a committee of ex-consuls to hear embassies from peoples and kings, but only when he was too old to do so himself.²⁴

The emperor’s control of military affairs was limited only in so far as he chose voluntarily to consult more widely.²⁵ Here he could ask friends (amici) whose advice he trusted to attend his informal council, the consilium principis. He was not obliged to consult the council, or take its advice, and there was no formal membership or schedule of meetings. However, in the debate over the future of Judaea after the death of King Herod in 4 BC, we have a rare glimpse of the council’s involvement in the important question of whether peripheral lands in which Rome had an interest should be annexed or managed in some other way.²⁶

Augustus’ decisions on war and peace should therefore indicate precisely how he wanted to use the Roman army, but they cannot tell us why he went to war or if he had some kind of general strategy.We still need to deduce this from the nature of the campaigns he conducted and the political and cultural context.We can have little confidence in the (rare) attempts by ancient sources to explain the motives for the wars waged by Augustus. Florus implies that Augustus generally had personal motives, alleging that he embarked on the German wars because he sought to emulate the campaigns of Julius Caesa...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• EMPERORS FROM AUGUSTUS TO DIOCLETIAN
• 1: THE ORIGINS OF WAR
• 2: SOLDIERS AND WAR
• 3: THE NATURE OF WAR
• 4: WAR AND THE COMMUNITY
• 5: WAR AND POLITICS
• 6: WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION
• 7 EPILOGUE
• BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY