In a series of lectures at Yale University in 1979–80 on the relation between the institution of comparative literature and the modern regime of translation, Jacques Derrida prefaces his lecture with an expression of prudent reserve:
Nor is it in my intentions, in my taste {or within my means}, to organize a general and radical problematic (as my title could nonetheless lead one to believe) in order to begin with a tabula rasa and establish the basis of a new foundation, of another legitimacy.
(Derrida, 2008: 23)
Endowed with far fewer means than Mr Derrida, I will admit that I count myself as one of many devoted to nothing other than a yearning for a different taste, a new foundation for a different kind of comparativism.
The term taste comes to Derrida via René Étiemble. ‘I would like’, intones Étiemble in a key passage cited by Derrida, ‘our [ideal] comparativist to be equally a man of taste and of pleasure’ (Derrida, 2008: 48). Hence, the meaning of the ‘new foundation’ to which Derrida refers must be understood in the context of his reading of a crucial inaugural moment in the historical trajectory of comparative literature, specifically the praise lavished in 1958 on René Wellek by Étiemble (whose identical given name, René, highlights Derrida’s reflections via the proper noun on translation1). Étiemble’s devotion to aesthetic humanism and his juxtaposition with Wellek becomes the touchstone for Derrida’s critique of the essential ambivalence at the heart of the modern regime of translation and the institution of literature.
Ultimately indissociable from the rise of the modern bourgeoisie and its attempt to mediate the relation between capital and labour through the disciplines of national aesthetics, the category of taste is an invention of early modernity (Perullo, 2016: ix). Understood as the pinnacle of individualisation, taste is also, it must be remembered, a species-specific faculty. As a species faculty, it is subject to differences that go to the heart of subjectivity (a central concern for aesthetic humanism), not just in the sense of individualising experience, but also in the sense of specialisation and expertise—those elements that the bourgeoisie will utilise to legitimate new forms of class difference based on an emergent division of labour. For the modern era, the problem of subjectivity is always inextricably bound to the question of knowledge. Yet knowledge in the modern context is not associated only with the division of labour. It is also associated with the emerging discourse of species difference.
Hence, the transformation of a species trait, such as taste, into a distinguishing, or specialised, sign of intra-species difference, such as that between experts and laymen, brings us face-to-face with the two sides of the apparatus of anthropological difference. Externally, the face of this apparatus is characterised by the anthropological exception, the notion that homo sapiens is not only one species among many, but also an exceptional species able to intervene in its own speciation and that of other species through its unique command of tools and language. Internally, this apparatus appears under its other face, that of the colonial difference: the notion that certain populations or segments—or even gifted individuals—within the species approach more than others the heights of the anthropological exception by virtue of their superior knowledge of tools and language. These two faces of the apparatus of anthropological difference—which are fundamentally comparative—are invariably articulated to a nature that is supposed to be rooted in an area. Henceforth, area becomes the ground or basis of comparison. If the category of taste to which Étiemble refers is anthropological before being class-based, this is also a reflection of modern liberalism, which extrapolates from the apparatus of anthropological difference a series of anthropological invariants based on the bourgeoisie’s projection of its values into the beginning and end of history as the protagonist of evolution. Equal parts biological and cultural, the hero of the story of evolution will henceforth be known as human nature, a fiction that will increasingly come to be identified with homo economicus precisely through the active involvement of the colonial novel.
Étiemble’s pairing of pleasure with taste deepens the speciesist logic of imperial nationalist, class-based liberalism. Whereas taste is a species faculty appropriated by a class with universal pretensions, pleasure is a sign of the indifference of the individual to society, a proof of auto-affectivity. Adding the affect of pleasure to the sense of taste reminds us that liberalism wants us to understand homo naturans as a self-grounding, self-referential creation of homo faber. This dual aspect of man’s specificity is principally aesthetic.2 Literature, as the artistic form that corresponds most closely, particularly in the form of the modern novel, to the rise of the bourgeoisie and the creation of the modern nation-state, would thus be the art of self-referentiality (pleasure) that is devoted to giving the apparatus of anthropological difference (in its guise as an apparatus of taste) a human face. Behind the institution of literature thus lies the aesthetic articulation of capitalism, colonialism, and science in the form of an evolutionary narrative. Étiemble’s ideal comparativist, composed of equal parts taste and pleasure, is not just something that belongs to the realm of literature; rather, it is the figure of evolution par excellence. As such, it comprises an intrinsic element of comparison, in which comparison serves to identify superiority in a taxonomic sense. Let us call this the taste of anthropological superiority crystallised in the comparative aesthetics of national humanism, and realised in the figure of the literary comparativist.
Just as I share in Derrida’s rejection of this aesthetics, I also share what I discern to be Derrida’s complementary rejection of an outright disqualification of the aesthetic category of taste. Hence, I will take the risk of speaking of, or at least evoking, a different taste, even if I, far more than Derrida, lack the ‘means’ to explain it fully. This taste, which I will call definitively common (hence neither colonial nor capitalist), not exceptional but singular in each instance, cannot be contained in the schema of the One and the Many or the logic of genus and species. To explain it via Derrida in relation to comparative literature, we might say that this taste is neither that of the generalist, who ‘transcribes […] the very object’ into a scientific, ‘universal metalanguage’ (Derrida, 2008: 41; word order modified), thus reducing the multiplicity of tastes to the one taste, nor that of the specialist, whose obsession with a particular object, invariably anthropologically coded and stamped with a particular taste, is easily conflated with or appropriated by the conceit of nationalism. Nor is it the sexualised taste of the ‘polygamist’ (as opposed to that of the ‘monogamist’) championed by Étiemble’s Japanese admirer, Sukehiro Hirakawa (Hirakawa, 2002), only several years after the appearance, in English, of an attempt by his compatriot Takayuki Yokota-Murakami to rescue the possibility of ‘non-comparison’ from hegemonic aesthetic humanism (Yokota-Murakami, 1998: x). The alternative taste that I have in mind is one that does not correspond to an anthropologically coded object, but is to be found, rather, in the practice of translation as a practice of relation to non-relation. We will have more to say about this practice in a moment.
In short, the dark side of translation is a brilliant formula that simultaneously captures both the various different tropes that have dominated the modern regime of translation (bridge, filter, transfer, exchange and brokerage), as well as the problematic ambivalence of translation in relation to ‘Aesthetic Humanism’3 (Redfield, 2003). How might we go beyond this configuration?