1 Pan-Asianism in modern Japanese history
Overcoming the nation, creating a region, forging an empire
Sven Saaler1
Pan-Asianism between nationalism and regionalism
In studies of international relations in East Asia, the phenomenon of regionalism â i.e. regional cooperation and integration based on a shared perception of the regionâs present, past, and future â is receiving growing attention. Regional approaches in East Asia are still heavily burdened by the legacies of the past, as shown by the recent discussions about the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the territorial disputes between Japan and her neighbors. Another important and controversial aspect of these legacies is Pan-Asianism, an ideology that served not only as a basis for early efforts at regional integration in East Asia, but also as a cloak for expansionism and as a tool for legitimizing Japanese hegemony and colonial rule. The history of Pan-Asianism is therefore highly ambiguous, as previous research2 has demonstrated, and it is this ambiguity that still continues to pose a major obstacle for regional integration in contemporary East Asia.3 This volume aims at exploring the ideology and the movement of Pan-Asianism as a precursor of contemporary Asian regionalism, thereby bringing historical perspective to bear on recent approaches to regional cooperation and integration.
Regionalism, as Peter Katzenstein has argued, âoffers a stepping-stone for international cooperation between unsatisfactory national approaches on the one hand and unworkable universal schemes on the other.â4 Europe is widely seen as a pioneer in regional integration and in the quest to overcome the nation-state; while in Asia, regional approaches, although en vogue in journalism and academia, have yet to produce comparable institutional manifestations in international relations.5 However, recent initiatives such as ASEAN+36 and Free Trade Agreements between Asian countries illustrate the growing importance of regional cooperation and integration.7 In this context, references to historical precedent, i.e. nineteenth-century and prewar Pan-Asianism, are conspicuously avoided, made a taboo, or even taken as a ânegative model.â8 This approach stands in contrast to the ubiquity of historical pan-Asian discourse in prewar Japan and Asia, as the contributions in this volume demonstrate.
The concept of a âpanâ-movement originated within the framework of European history and international relations and thus, at first sight, may seem an inappropriate tool for analyzing Asian history. However, since the end of the nineteenth century, terms such as âAsian solidarityâ (Ajia rentai), âRaising Asiaâ (kĆ-A), âAsianismâ (Ajia-shigi or Ajia-shugi), âPan-Asianismâ (Han-Ajia-shugi or Zen-Ajia-shugi) and âAsian Monroe-ismâ (Ajia MonrĆ-shugi) have had a wide circulation in discussions of foreign policy-making as well as in the discourses leading to the construction of modern identities in East Asia. Pan-Asianism developed in the discursive space between national identities and possibilities for transnational cooperation. It appeared in a wide variety of forms, as the variety of terms in use demonstrates, and it was also used in different ways. In all its historical manifestations, Pan-Asianism emphasized the need for Asian unity, mostly vis-a-vis the encroachment of Western colonialism and imperialism, but also emphasizing indigenous traditions, as will be shown below. Over time, the content of pan-Asian thought, including even the definition of âAsia,â evolved as much as the consequences of its utilization in foreign policy. While Pan-Asianism was originally directed against Western influence and colonialism, it also functioned as a tool for legitimizing Japanâs claim for hegemony in East Asia and Japanese colonial rule, i.e. as a way for Japan to deal with the emerging nationalisms of other Asian nations.9
Indeed, as a result of its prewar history, the idea of Pan-Asianism, and therefore Asian regionalism, has been much discredited. However, pan-Asian rhetoric continued to be employed in the postwar period, most notably in the quest to define so-called âAsian valuesâ in response to the supposed universality of Western thought. Given the persistence of pan-Asian thought, and notwithstanding its problematic historical background, the phenomenon of Pan-Asianism obviously possesses a strong transnational character which appeals to intellectuals as well as politicians throughout Asia, notably at a time when economic bonds among Asian nations have reached high levels. When employed in efforts to establish a collective regional identity, pan-Asian thought has the capacity to cut across nation-state boundaries10 and appeal to certain cohesive factors, such as culture and religion, language and script, shared historical experience, geography, and race. By addressing these aspects of Pan-Asianism in Japan11 from the late nineteenth century until the postwar period, this volume aims at making both an empirical and a theoretical contribution to the study of Pan-Asianism and the historical background of regionalism as a factor in international relations.
The roots of Pan-Asianism
Pan-Asian ideology was an omnipresent force in modern Japanâs foreign policy as well as in the process of the creation of a âJapaneseâ identity. In the Meiji era (1868â1912), it evolved into an ideology that was the antithesis of the governmentâs ârealistâ foreign policy, which aimed at joining the club of âgreat powersâ (rekkyĆ). Early pan-Asianist writings, in a rather âromanticâ and âidealisticâ manner, emphasized Japanese commonalities with Asia and aimed at uniting Asian peoples and countries against Western encroachment. In the process of the construction of a modern regional identity, Asianism was part of the criticism of modernization, against which pan-Asian thinkers advocated a âreturn to Asiaâ (Ajia kaiki) â a return to Asian culture and values.12 Identification with Asia was not always an affirmative experience, as the quest for âcasting off Asiaâ in Fukuzawa Yukichiâs (1835â1901) famous âDatsu-A-ronâ suggests; but Asia, as the contribution by Oguma Eiji in this volume points out, always functioned as a mirror for Japanese efforts at defining Japanese identity. Asia was âthe spatial and temporal object through which Japanese defined themselves,â as Stefan Tanaka has put it.13 The resulting discussion about whether modern Japan was a part of the West, or rather of Asia, was central to modern Japanese discourse on national identity.14 During this discourse, âJapan vacillated between insisting on being not Asian at all, and declaring itself the epitome of Asianness.â15 With the passage of time, the growing power of the Japanese nation-state and growing Japanese self-confidence, emerging as a consequence of growing power, eventually militated against a return to Asia, but led instead to ever-strengthening Japanese claims of superiority over Asia and leadership in Asia culminating in the ânew orderâ of the 1930s and the âGreater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphereâ of the early 1940s.
The early roots of Pan-Asianism go back to the mid-nineteenth century, when China and Japan were forced to âopen upâ their long-isolated countries to foreign pressure and enter the system of international relations, dominated by the European imperialist powers. During that process, both China and Japan struggled to redefine their place in the new international order. Historically, a system of inter-state relations and tributary trade centered on China, also called the Sinocentric world system,16 had been the framework holding East Asia together as a region. Japan had long been part of this system through relations conducted with China over the RyĆ«kyĆ« Kingdom, controlled by the Japanese Satsuma domain, and through relations with Korea over Tsushima, as well as through its own tributary relations with China prior to the Tokugawa era.17 At the same time, Japanese scholars had long challenged the âcentralâ role of the âMiddle Kingdom,â China, in this system. Scholars of the kokugaku school such as Hirata Atsutane (1776â1843) had claimed that Japan was the âMiddle Kingdom,â since the unbroken imperial line of Japan (bansei ikkei) demonstrated that the island empire was the âLand of the Gods,â not China, where dynastic changes and âTartar ruleâ were frequent.18 In this theory of âJapan as the Middle Kingdomâ (Nihon chĆ«karon) lay the seeds of the Japanese claim of superiority over China and the Japanese claim to leadership in Asia (Nihon meishu-ron).19
Notwithstanding the collapse of the Sinocentric world order in the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan could not immediately replace the old order with a pan-Asian ânew orderâ under Japanese leadership. After the âopeningâ of the country in 1854 and the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan, above all, devoted her energy to securing national independence in view of the threat to it posed by Western imperialism. We can identify two approaches to dealing with the Western threat: aligning with other Asian nations to present a unified front, or joining the Western system of international relations and strengthening Japan economically and militarily in order to enable it to survive on its own. The Meiji government, faced with overwhelming Western military strength â which had been demonstrated on occasions such as the bombardment of the town of Kagoshima in 1863 or the fighting in the Shimonoseki Straits in 1864 â chose to adjust to the Western âLaw of Nationsâ and secure national independence through modernization and the creation of a strong economy and a strong military (fukoku kyĆhei). Only a few voices rejected this approach. Katsu KaishĆ« (1823â99), a Bakufu official who also worked for the Meiji government, advocated a JapaneseâChinese alliance (Nisshin teikei) as early as in the 1860s, an option taken up again by politician Sugita Teiichi (1851â1929), author of KĆa-saku (A Policy for Raising Asia), in the early Meiji era.20 Authors like Fukuzawa Yukichi, too, before embracing a policy of âcasting off Asiaâ argued for Japan becoming the leader (meishu) of a united Asia.21
During the Meiji era, a number of political associations were formed that fervently advocated the ideal of âsolidarity with Asiaâ (Ajia rentai) or the notion of âraising Asiaâ (kĆ-A) or âdeveloping Asiaâ (shin-A). These organized pan-Asianists criticized the governmentâs foreign policy of cooperating with the Western powers. In order to promote a pan-Asian foreign policy, independent of the government, they maintained close contacts with opposition groups in Korea and China. The most influential of these early pan-Asian organizations were the KĆa-kai (Society for Raising Asia, founded in 1880), its successor organization Ajia KyĆkai (Asia Association) and the TĆa DĆbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Association, founded in 1898).22 While these organizations were above all an instrument of the opposition to criticize the foreign policy of the government, some also received government funds to pursue their ideals. Societies such as the GenâyĆsha (Black Ocean Society, founded 1881) or the KokuryĆ«kai (Amur Society or Black Dragon Society, founded 1901) worked in close cooperation with the government.23 The KokuryĆ«kai under the leadership of Uchida RyĆhei (1874â1937) developed into the pan-Asian organization par excellence, lobbying intensively for a regionalist approach in foreign policy.24 But also the above-mentioned TĆa DĆbun-kai, headed by court noble (kuge) Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863â 1904), cooperated closely with the government, for example in 1900 when it founded the Institute of East Asian Common Culture (TĆa DĆbun Shoin) in Nanjing with government funding;25 throughout the following decades it produced China specialists who were frequently hired into government service. The first director of the TĆa DĆbun Shoin, Nezu Hajime (1860â1927), a former army officer, had founded another institute for the promotion of closer Sino-Japanese relations as early as 1890, the Research Institute for Sino-Japanese Trade (Nisshin BĆeki KenkyĆ«jo), together with Arao Sei (also Kiyoshi, 1859â96), another retired army officer.26
However, the early pan-Asian movement could not yet gain influence on foreign policy-making, because of the governmentâs realist course and its efforts at establishing a positive image of Japan in the West. Since the end of the nineteenth century, in Europe fears of a âYellow Peril,â the notion of a unified âyellow raceâ threatening European supremacy and European colonial control of parts of Asia, had gained prominence.27 The Japanese government made continuous efforts to avoid adding fuel to Yellow Peril fears. Therefore, it refrained from using pan-Asian rhetoric and, at times, suppressed the pan-Asian movement and jailed authors of pan-Asian writings. For example, Tarui TĆkichi (1850â1922), who in the 1880s had written an âArgument for a Union of the Great Eastâ (DaitĆ GappĆ-ron) in which he rejected the Western Law of Nations and argued for a union of Japan and Korea, was arrested for participating in the Oriental Socialist Party and his manuscript was lost. However, after his release he rewrote the tract and it was published in 1893, becoming of major importance in pan-Asian circles.28
While Tarui was subject to government suppression, other writers who are nowadays considered representative of pan-Asian thought, such as Okakura Tenshin (KakuzĆ), did not even make the effort to address their fellow countrymen. Okakura (1862â1913), who in 1903 coined the famous phrase âAsia is one,â29 did not write for a Japanese audience,30 but rather for an Indian one. Moreover, he could not have possibly promoted Asian unity against the West in Japan, since the government had just signed an alliance with Great Britain â the colonial master of India and other parts of Asia. Okakuraâs works, authored originally in English, were translated into Japanese only during the 1930s and his influence on earlier pan-Asian discourse must be considered marginal.31 The efforts of the government to prevent âYellow Perilâ fears were not limited to the national scene. Japan also developed an active âPR campaignâ abroad. In 1904, for example, when Japan set out to wage war on Czarist Russia, the Japanese government dispatched diplomats to Europe and the United States to head off the resurgence of âYellow Perilâ propaganda and influence public opinion in Japanâs favor.32 Suematsu KenchĆ (1855â1920), a diplomat who was dispatched to Europe, emphasized in a speech given to the Central Asian Society in London that nothing resembling a pan-Asianist ambition to unite Asia against the West existed in Japan:
Of late, there has been much talk about the Yellow Peril, or the possibility of a Pan-Asiatic combination; this appears to me . . . nothing more than a senseless and mischievous agitation. . . . Can anyone imagine that Japan would like to organize a ...