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INTRODUCTION
Ideological Fantasy in Reverse Projection
The cultural elites respect neither tradition nor standards. They believe that moral truths are relative and all lifestyles are equal. They seem to think the family is an arbitrary arrangement of people who decide to live under the same roof, that fathers are disposable and that parents need not be married or even of opposite sexes.
(Dan Quayle)
We work within the realm of fantasy, and in that realm there are a number of things we can do against the grain of stereotypical representations and discourses.
(Isaac Julien)
Imagine a script for a horror movie about a fragile, American urban environment teetering on the brink of collapse. The film centers on a slice of time from life in an urban park in which conflicting cultures have learned to maintain a fragile coexistence in semi-indifference to one another. Modeled after Washington Square Park, the cultural center of Greenwich Village, this multiblock square is portrayed as the gathering-place of homeless families, gay parents, senior citizens, drug dealers, students, musicians, political activists, and the multicultural peoples who now constitute the lifeblood of Americaās cities. A large crowdās celebration of the first warm day of spring is disrupted by the sudden appearance of a gray, 1987 Delta 88. No, it does not bring Dan Quayle to attack the cultural elite. Instead, it jumps the curb and careers out of control through a crowded end of the park. Sounding like an exploding bomb, the car slams through the Parkās gates and heads right toward the audience from the upper left of the screen. The spectators are confronted by a wave of terror as park benches topple and screaming pedestrians fly through the air. Once the battered Olds comes to a rest, the camera pans its flat tires and shattered windshield. The film then cuts to a tight shot of two spring jackets lying on the bloodied pavement next to the car. Next, the camera zooms in even closer to catch sight of an open textbook crumpled under the right front tire. Finally, the spectator views an eery shot of freshly splattered blood dripping slowly from the hood. All of this is followed by a contrasting sequence in which onlookers pull a 71-year-old woman from the car as people explode in rage, yelling and cursing at the dazed driver. They violently accuse her of driving the Olds in excess of sixty miles an hour straight into the crowd, killing three people instantly and critically injuring many more. She looks confused by the spectacle of the man next to her, who moans while bleeding profusely from the head.
But rather than a horror film, Crash in Washington Square: A Scene of Death and Chaos would be advertised as a docudrama of an event that shocked New York City on the first warm day of spring, April 23, 1992.1 This was an event tailor-made for Hollywood with ironic urban subplots and sinister connotations. As Javier Ipurralde recounts his sunny afternoon stroll with his injured friend, 21-year-old Nadine Hachuel, āI was looking at her and we were talking, believe it or not, about the apocalypse, because New York seems very apocalyptic right now. The car went under my friend and my friend was gone. She was first picked up by the fender and bounced several times on the windshield, and the last time she flew and ended up in front of the carā (Kleinfeld 1992: B2). Stressing the paradox of this tragedy, a reporter from the New York Times suggests that the arbitrary event similarly brought the apocalypse now to the shocked and bewildered driver, āher life irrevocably changed in one horrible instantā (Schemo 1992: B2).
I open this collection of essays on film, photography, and art with this gruesome scenario to provide a cinematic introduction to the concept of ideological fantasy that holds these chapters together. The imaginary film script of this traumatic accident could easily serve as a blueprint for what Christian Metz terms the (ideological) āproblems of denotation in the fiction filmā (Metz 1986). Such a script exemplifies the crucial semiological aspects of docudramaās analogical realism. On one level, it capitalizes on Metzās notion of the analogical motivation of cinematic denotation. The fictional adaptation of an historical event depends first on filmās technical ability to portray a literal sense based upon perception. In āProblems of denotation in the fiction filmā, Metz clarifies how the medium of film is motivated by the partial equations of visual and auditory analogy, by the perceptual similarity of signifiers and signifieds. That is, the ghoulish nightmare of a stroll through the Park here would be matched by the apocalyptical likeness of one horrible instant of film. On another, more complex level, Metz stresses how the symbolic nature of cinematic connotation overtakes perceptual analogy as the latter accrues value through the additional meaning it receives from sociocultural codes. Connotating the ideological fantasy of the apocalyptic future of urban culture, Crash in Washington Square Park reveals, for instance, the brutal irony of the death of a brave elderly woman who had survived the daily onslaughts of New Yorkās downtown drug culture: āEsther Rintel, a seventy-one-year-old lifelong resident of the area, had narrowly missed death. A park acquaintance who had been sitting near her, however, was hit. āMy poor Ruthie is goneā, Ms Rintel said sadly, āSheās goneāā (Kleinfeld 1992: B2). A further ironic analogy could be said to deepen the specifically cinematographic codification of this scene (the meaning of each visual element taken separately). For Ruthie met death arbitrarily at the hands of a respected Yonkers senior citizen who was āactive in church functions, charities and the anti-abortion movementā (Schemo 1992: B2). One might also acknowledge Hollywoodās tendency to overaccentuate sociocultural analogies by imagining the tragic twist of an additional subplot about a young woman shown to have been lobbying in the Park for āFreedom of Choiceā just prior to her untimely death at the hands of an elderly āRight to Liferā.
But what fascinates me more is that the scenario of Crash in Washington Square Park exemplifies how cinematographic analogy is itself a mixture of two important signifying organizations: what Metz calls āspecialized codesā and ācultural codesā. Specialized codes are said to be purely cinematographic signifying features: āmontages, camera movements, optical effects, ārhetoric of the screenā, interaction of auditory and visual elements, and so onā (Metz 1986:38). Cultural codes constitute the iconographical, perceptual, and other codes of given social groups. These cultural codes are āso ubiquitous and well āassimilatedā that the viewers generally consider them to be ānaturalāā (ibid.: 38). Of particular importance to me is not so much the distinction between these codes as the implications of the āmodulationā of the two analogical systems. For Metzās distinction seems open to the possibility that the specialized codes of cinema can themselves become, or always already are, ānaturalizedā or āculturalā.2 In this sense, they āreturnā to cinema not as āspecializedā but as cultural codes that function for the most part āwithin photographic and phonographic analogyā (ibid.: 38ā9). These would be the sorts of cinematic codes that āintrude to the film by means of perceptual analogy each time an object or an ordering of objects (visual or auditory) āsymbolizesā within the film what it would have symbolized outside of the filmāthat is to say, within cultureā (ibid.: 39). To emphasize such a modulating relation in which the specialized discourse of film is folded back upon itself as ānaturalizedā, I would like to introduce this book with one more suggestive detail from the script of Crash in Washington Square Park. It takes place within a sequence following the crash that depicts the feeble efforts of news reporters to assemble the facts of a story which are available, as Brecht might say, only through the impressions of benumbed witnesses. At the heart of this segment would be the account of Evie Hantzopoulos, an NYU graduate student who described the scene to the New York Times: āIt was like a surreal experience. We couldnāt believe what was happening. It was like a movieā (Baquet 1992: B2).
āLike a movieā, ālike a filmā. This collection dwells on the various ways the cinematic experience has pervaded contemporary cultural production only to return to itself āim-segnoā. This is the concept coined by Pasolini to suggest how diff ferent basic elements of filmic discourse ācarry with them, before even ācinematographic languageā can intervene, a great deal more than their simple identityā (Metz 1986:39). Like a Film reflects on the broad impact of the cinematic apparatus on interdisciplinary experimentations in the arts (Rainer, Jarman, the Harrisons), on social and political narratives (the discourses of feminism, homosexuality, race, and ecology), on representational and visual theory (Barthes, Lyotard, Silverman, Torok, and Laplanche), on perceptions and articulations of history (from the Renaissance of Shakespeare and Caravaggio to the modernity of military cartography and global rings of fire) and, ultimately, on the subsequent return of the procedures and results of interdisciplinary experimentation itself to the cinema and its language. A startling example of the complexity of such a composite return occurs at the end of Yvonne Rainerās film Journeys from Berlin/1971 (1979), a film I discuss in Chapter 2.Converted video footage portrays Rainer herself (see figure 2.8) performing a tearful monologue, āDear Mamaā, which recounts her viewing of a film, Morgen Beginnt das Leben, directed by Werner Hochbaum in Berlin in 1933. āShe describes the gasps and murmurs she heard as young members of the audience identified the street signs of neighborhoods that were otherwise unrecognizable. The film is their link to pre-war Berlin, a city āthat is no moreāā (Rainer 1989:168). Here the video-montaged ending of Rainerās experimental, feminist film is enveloped in an uncanny acknowledgement of contemporary cinemaās traumatic debts to its cinematic and/or phantasmatic precursors. What is more, this example suggests the degree to which the traumas of historical fantasy are enveloped in film and the sites of its projections.
IDEOLOGICAL FANTASIES/CINEMATIC DIFFERENDS
This book reflects my ongoing interest in how differing cultural milieux are caught up, bound up, with the schemata of visual theory and artistic practice. I reflect, to borrow a notion from Jean Laplanche, on how the theoretical enterprises of philosophy and psychoanalysis āinvadeā the cultural ānot only as a form of thought or a doctrine, but as a mode of beingā (Laplanche 1989:12). From this perspective, theories of sexuality and trauma, such as the Oedipus and the castration complexes, would be seen as āpossible variations on culturally determined scenariosā (ibid.: 163).3 Conversely, Like a Film reflects on how the cinematic apparatus itself has invaded the theory of culture as a mode of weaving together the disparate
āpsychopoliticalā fabrics of cultural production, psycho-analysis, and politically marked subject positions.
The reporting of Crash in Washington Square Park makes especially apparent how the analogical relation inscribed in the formula ālike a filmā can now be said to constitute the foundational fabric of cultural narrative, rather than being a mere fictional by-product of filmās distanced depictions of urban ecology and its tragedies. For what makes Crash in Washington Square Park describable, if not also comprehensible, to the readers of the New York Times is its almost necessary translation into the surreal experience of cultural fantasy, ālike a movieā. Suggested by Evie Hantzopoulos is the complex way that āwhat is happeningā in culture remains inscribed in the denial of its belief or, similarly, in the analogical modulation of belief and fantasy: āWe couldnāt believe what was happening. It was like a movie/Otherwise put, the cinematic āhappeningsā of cultureāof identity, identification, and politicsāare often believable precisely because they are structured so much like film. They are virtual constructs related to the plane, screen, or mirror of their personal and communal projections.
To explain this relation, I turn to my bookās subtitle and the concept of āideological fantasyā. I loosely appropriate this notion from Slavoj Žižekās The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989a) where it signifies the belief supporting the fantasy that regulates social reality.4 With this term, Žižek turns his attention away from the received notion of ideology as āfalse consciousnessā to the complex strata of fantasy-construction itself:
ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape the insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ārealityā itself: an āillusionā which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel (conceptualized by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as āantagonismā: a traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized). The function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel (Žižek 1989a: 45).5
What appeals to me is Žižekās reconfiguration of ideology as a doubled phantasmatic screen of the pleasure of illusions and the fetishistic preservation of the residues of trauma. For Žižek, a key feature of this function is that the social realities of late capitalismāthe social ārelations between things, between commoditiesāinstead of immediate relations between peopleā (ibid.: 33)āthemselves believe for the subject, act on its behalf. Countering the commonplace that belief is something interior and knowledge something exterior, Žižek adopts the Lacanian proposition that
āthe most intimate beliefs, even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerityā (Žižek 1989:34). He explains such a claim analogically by citing the example of televisionās ācanned laughterā, which relieves fatigued viewers of what he calls the āduty to laughā:
So even if, tired from a hard dayās stupid work, all evening we did nothing but gaze drowsily into the television screen, we can say afterwards that objectively, through the medium of the other, we had a really good timeā¦. The lesson to be drawn from this concerning the social field is above all that belief, far from being an āintimateā, purely mental state, is always materialized in our effective social activity: belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality.
(ibid.: 35ā6).
But the fact that this example of ācanned laughterā could appear trivial or insignificant to many readers suggests that Žižekās notion of āmaterialized belief need remain somewhat more open to the shifting transferential nature of āgood timesā and āeffective social activityā. Does not the mixed appeal of television itself contest any universal response to its effectiveness as a thing, a commodity, an āapparatusā? Just such an emphasis on how subjects are often positioned differently, and also position themselves (for what is āperniciousā to some is empowering to others), in relation to the lure of āappealā motivates my analyses of film, art, photography, and theory. For it is the very āappealingā nature of the phantasmatic relation, the polymorphous web of interpellation, which I think contests any trust in, say, a universal response to the media, on the one hand, or a blurred, but still distinct āinsideā and āoutsideā of representation, on the other. Following Žižekās own lead, might not we say that more emphasis on what Laclau and Mouffe call the ācontingencyā of interpellation itself will work to cloud the distinction between āimmediate relations between peopleā and āsocial relations between thingsā? Why not claim that relations between people can only ever have been as immediate and universal as they have appeared on the screen? Universality and immediacy, that is, can be structured only like a filmāas materializations of the many contingencies of enunciation and its social conditions.
The consequences of filmic contingency are brought home by the example of another horror show from American popular culture. I am thinking of the Associated Press report of the sensational White Plains, NY, trial of Carolyn Warmus for the murder of Betty Jean Solomon. When asked by a reporter what it was like to sit through the trial, Joyce Green, the sister of the victim, replied: āit doesnāt seem real. You can detach yourself.ā¦ Itās like being in a movie or some horrible book. You donāt think it will ever happen to youā (Ithaca Journal, April 22, 1991). Greenās filmic analogy refers less to what she believes is (not) happening āto herā, being in a movie, than to what the prosecution maintains happened to Carolyn Warmus, who wa...