Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy

A Paradoxical Legacy

Clair Apodaca

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135448196
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides a comprehensive historical overview and analysis of the complex and often vexing problem of understanding the formation of US human rights policy over the past thirty-five years, a period during which concern for human rights became a major factor in foreign policy decision-making.

Clair Apodaca demonstrates that the history of American human rights policy is a series of different paradoxes that change depending on the presidential administration, showing that far from immobilizing the progression of a genuine and functioning human rights policy, these paradoxes have actually helped to improve the human rights protections over the years. Readers will find in a single volume a historically informed, argument driven account of the erratic evolution of US human rights policy since the Nixon administration. Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy will be an essential supplement in courses on human rights, foreign policy analysis and decision-making, and the history of US foreign policy.

CHAPTER 1

The U.S. System of Foreign Policy Making

The struggle between Congress and the president over foreign policy will continue so long as the Constitution lasts.

Stephen Ambrose (1991)

The United States’ foreign policy can be defined as the United States’ behavior with regard to other states in the international arena to achieve its goals. The United States’ approach to foreign policy is an unusual combination of realism, idealism, and a unique sense of destiny. Consequently, America’s style of foreign policy is based on the tension between idealism’s moral principles and the realist balance of power. Many Americans believe that the United States has a divine mission to spread liberty, democracy, and freedom across the globe. Because of the superiority of American culture and values, many Americans think, the United States is unparalleled among the world’s nations. During the United States’ isolationist periods, its Manifest Destiny was to lead by example. By establishing a democratic and just system, the United States would serve as a model to the rest of the world. During an era of active and energetic international engagement, the United States would lead through intervention, exerting, by force if necessary, its benign and benevolent influence on other nations. Woodrow Wilson summed up America’s foreign policy spirit when he said, “God created the United States to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty” (as quoted in Murchland 2002). But, not satisfied to demonstrate by example, President Wilson sent American troops to occupy Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1916, and Mexico periodically from 1914 to 1917.

THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Often in foreign policy, particularly foreign policy relating to human rights, political ideology seems to be a compelling determinant of government behavior. As stated earlier, the American style of foreign policy incorporates a curious mixture of realism and idealism. American cultural values shape United States’ political institutions that ultimately influence foreign policy behavior. This is not simply a matter of ideological dispute between the American Left and the American Right. Obviously, the idealist segment of the United States has always been concerned with the moral content of U.S. foreign policy. For these people, the rationale of foreign policy ought not to be one of power and dominance, but rather of peace and cooperation. Interestingly, the religious right, or neoconservatives, are also concerned with balancing power politics with moral issues. For these right-wing conservatives, communism posed the greatest of evils and stood in direct contrast to America’s moral values of democracy and liberty. Thus, the United States had a moral duty to combat Soviet communist expansion.

Idealism and Foreign Policy

Idealism is a theoretical perspective that assumes that states are capable of mutual aid and collaboration. Self-determination and democratic governments would assure international peace, social justice, and human rights. All people, idealists argue, hold a common interest in these values, and their representative governments will reflect these principles. By submitting states to the power of an international organization and the prudence of public will, security could be ensured, war averted, and a moral rational order would prevail. Foreign policy, for idealists, is generally one of cooperation and humanitarian concern. Morality and human rights according to idealist foreign policy are important not only because they represent the right thing to do, but also because these values reflect the true character of the nation and its people. From this theoretical perspective, foreign policy, in the case of the United States, must mirror the moral principles enshrined in the nation’s political institutions and culture: freedom, justice, liberty, and equality.

From the beginning of the American Republic, the new nation believed that America had a special destiny; since it was the first democracy, America was morally superior to other nations. Therefore, the United States had a responsibility, perhaps a divine mission, to lead the world by example and inspiration toward freedom, liberty, and justice. Thomas Jefferson described this noble inspiration of the United States for the world in the following words:

[T]he solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights … the sole depositary of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions shall ever become susceptible of its benign influence. (As quoted in Tucker and Hendrickson 1990, 136)

The United States was to be a living ideal, the “shining city on the hill,” “holding the beacon of liberty” to cheer the hearts of the downtrodden and repressed all over the world. When the country was young, this sense of destiny and American exceptionalism initially manifested itself in the rejection of the dirty politics and secret diplomatic maneuvers of the European powers. If the United States was to be the shining city on the hill holding up the torch of liberty, it would have to remain isolated from the affairs of Europe. Although the United States sought commercial exchange with Europe, the United States refused to become embroiled in the politics and conflicts of the old continent. Indeed, the United States’ desire for isolationism would impede the impulse to become involved in world conflict. However, this desire for isolationism would later evolve into a perceived duty to provide global leadership. The United States, true to its idealistic character, would also feel the need to emancipate the weak and oppressed from tyranny. In periods of active and energetic international engagement, and given the United States’ sense of destiny, U.S. foreign policy has often run the risk of becoming an ideological crusade between good versus evil, right versus wrong, freedom versus repression, and liberty versus subjugation. The idealist foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter, for example, attempted to incorporate moral principles, ethics, and human rights into U.S. foreign policy. These values, in the opinion of Carter, reflected the true character of the United States and the American people. Carter promised to return America’s foreign policy to the path of righteousness, vowing never to do anything that would dishonor America’s moral nature and Wilsonian past. President Bill Clinton, a liberal internationalist, moved the ethereal principles of idealism into a more tangible paradigm of democratic enlargement and open markets through the use of international institutions and multilateral action.

Another idealist legacy of foreign policy is the idea of foreign aid. From an idealist perspective, the granting of foreign aid serves basic humanitarian purposes: to eradicate poverty and hunger, to save the lives of children, and to improve the health of the poor. In idealist terms, foreign aid is not only the right thing to do but also our moral obligation. When President John F. Kennedy signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, he declared,

The answer is that there is no escaping our obligations: our moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations—our economic obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people, as a nation no longer dependent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own economy—and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom. (Kennedy 1961)

Despite these altruistic motivations, idealists, like their realist counterparts, rely on the concept of self-interest when tying human rights to foreign policy. William Schulz (2001) argues that it is in the United States’ own best interest to support and defend human rights around the world. Human rights are the foundation of not only economic prosperity but also true democracy and world peace. The statistical evidence on this issue is clear. Countries that respect human rights and protect democratic freedoms are less likely to become embroiled in violent civil conflict. They also tend to be more economically viable and politically stable, the very characteristics needed to attract direct foreign investment and trade (Apodaca 2001).

A moral foreign policy can prevent the United States from becoming allied with repressive governments that, in the long run, are unstable and dangerous because of their lack of popular support. President Kennedy was well aware of the fact that foreign assistance was in the best interest of the United States when he signed the FAA into law. Kennedy further stated,

To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in the long run, more expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures, which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperiled. A program of assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the Nation’s interest and the cause of political freedom require it. (1961)

Previous studies have supported this view that idealists represent a mixture of humanitarian concerns and self-interest in their beliefs about foreign policy issues. David Lumsdaine (1993), for example, found that humanitarian concerns were a primary motivation in the allocation of multilateral foreign aid. But the United States’ rationale for contributing aid was a mix of humanitarian and strategic concerns.

Realism and Realpolitik

Although the United States’ sense of destiny has held a sacrosanct position in international affairs since the birth of the nation, the Founding Fathers also understood the role of power politics and need for self-interest in foreign policy behavior.¹ Realism is a dominant theory of foreign policy. The principal assumption of realism is that the international system is characterized by anarchy. Because there is an absence of a strong governmental authority to maintain international order, a state must rely on its own resources and power to promote and protect its national interests. International relations is a struggle for power. The acquisition of power means the survival of the state. Self-interest, defined as power, must be a state’s main goal. Nothing else, and particularly not morality, should stand in the way of power. Thus, universal moral principles cannot and must not guide state behavior (instead, power guides state behavior).

Often, though, the state may act morally, but only if it is in its national interest to do so. Sometimes, selfish acts may have moral implications too. Nevertheless, states are not moral agents. When states do claim to be acting on behalf of universal moral principles—human rights, democracy, and equality—they are in reality projecting their particular cultural views and codes on the rest of the world (Morgenthau 1949). Foreign policy is based on power and national interests, not on ideological or moral crusades. Morality, if it is to exist in foreign policy, is the product of power (Carr 1939). What is right, what is wrong, what is just, and what is unjust are determined by the values, beliefs, and, more importantly, the interests of the powerful. Common notions of justice and morality cannot be applied to states and their foreign relations. Therefore, leaders are permitted to undertake illegal or immoral acts if such acts enhance the power of the state.

George Kennan clearly believed, “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience” (1985/1986, 206). Standards of moral conduct for the state at the international level are substantially different from those of an individual in society. Any attempt to formulate a foreign policy based on abstract principles of morality, human rights, and global justice is not simply misguided but also downright dangerous. Consequently, for the realist, foreign policy is the state’s international struggle for power among states.

Within the Cold War scenario, there were two extreme realist positions in U.S. foreign policy: a traditional realist approach, and a conservative realist attitude. A traditional realist viewed the Soviet Union as a threat but one that could be contained with time-honored power politics, such as deterrence, the balance of power, and patient containment. During the Nixon Administration, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brought the assumptions of realism into diplomatic relations. In what is referred to as “realpolitik,” based on practical politics and expediency in addition to the realist sense of power politics, Kissinger forged a foreign policy devoid of any moral or ideological component. The United States, under Kissinger, sought to contain communism, not because it is an evil ideology that needs to be crushed (the conservative realist view), but because it was a direct threat to U.S. economic and strategic interests (the traditional realist perspective). Thus, détente was merely a strategy used to secure U.S. interests at lower costs and with a lower level of tension. Interests remained constant, and alliances were transitory and used for purposes of expediency.

On the other hand, a Reaganite conservative espoused a conservative realist attitude and viewed the Soviet Union as a malicious menace (or, as President Ronald Reagan would say, an evil empire) and the source of all international threats. A conservative realist believed that any attempt to cooperate or collaborate with the USSR was a dangerous and immoral miscalculation. The Soviet Union only understood military might and confrontation. America’s moral duty, according to the Reagan-styled conservatives, was to conquer communism for the benefit of humanity. A middle position between the extremes of realist thought is the pragmatic realism, or pragmatic conservatism, of President George Bush Sr. President Bush Sr.’s foreign policy style is characterized by the practical utility of what works, a no-nonsense approach to problem solving that rejects ideological crusades for power politics.

Under the theory of realism, foreign aid is to be used for geopolitical and strategic purposes—the furtherance of U.S. national security interests. During the Cold War, foreign aid was a tool used to contain the spread of communism and to keep the power of the Soviet Union in check. In the post-Cold War era, foreign assistance is now viewed as an important instrument in preventing terrorist attacks. Foreign aid is an additional mechanism to further U.S. national interests. First, foreign aid can be used to maintain nations as U.S. allies. By economically or militarily supporting a pro-American foreign government, the United States can prevent the recipient state from falling into the enemy’s camp. Second, foreign assistance may be granted in an attempt to gain foreign allies. Many countries that are ideologically neutral can be brought into the United States’ sphere of influence with promises of economic aid or military equipment. Finally, by building an economically strong and dependent state, the United States can ensure its trade advantage. The United States is not motivated to help foreign states develop because of humanitarian concerns, but rather is interested in guaranteeing future customers for its goods and services. By gaining or maintaining allies, the United States strengthens its international security, while development aid reinforces its economic hegemony.

FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS

The creation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy involves many different participants, each with their own interests, values, and perspectives. The four key actors in the making of U.S. foreign policy are the president and his advisors, the U.S. Congress, the bureaucracy (notably, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) representing the organized interests of the American public. The Founding Fathers created a foreign policy system based on shared responsibility. Their recent experience with King George III emphasized the need to control executive power. Yet, international events often require quick, decisive, or even clandestine decisions. A president who is hampered by the need to consult Congress during a crisis, an invasion, or an assault against U.S. personnel cannot act in the best interest of the country. On the other hand, a strong congressional role is basic to democratic government. Only an active and assertive Congress can hold the Executive accountable and ensure that policy is subject to evaluation and review. Therefore, the U.S. Constitution grants shared and overlapping powers between Congress and the Executive. This seemingly rational delegation of power hides the struggle that actually takes place between the executive and the legislative branches of the U.S government in the making of foreign policy. The sharing of power and responsibility in foreign policy making, built into the U.S. Constitution, requires a delicate balancing act between Congress and the president. When the executive role in foreign policy expands, the congressional role tends to contract, and vice versa. The separate and overlapping powers of the Executive-Congress relationship have been called “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy” (Corwin 1957, 171). This constitutionally imposed mêlée in foreign policy making is further complicated by the prominent roles played by other vested interests, such as the governmental bureaucracy, and the organized interests of the American public as advocated by NGOs.

The Supremacy of the President

Most presidential scholars hold the view that the president is the primary actor in U.S. foreign policy. According to Phillip Trimble, “The president dominates American foreign policy and is the principal force shaping the constitutional law governing foreign relations” (2002, 10). The presidency’s dominance is guaranteed by constitutional grants of power, the need for a strong centralized authority in times of crisis, and the expectations of the general public. The Constitution specifies the powers of the Executive to make foreign policy. The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He has the power to negotiate treaties as the chief executive of the diplomatic and policy bureaucracies. He is the head of state and can nominate and remove officeholders. Additionally, the president has the power to veto congressional legislation.

Trimble (2002) believes that the expansive power of the president in the realm of foreign policy and foreign aid allocations, which has evolved and expanded over time, is not found in the text of the Constitution but in the Vesting Clause (Article II), which states that “the Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.” The Vesting Clause is quite broad and undefined, and, therefore, any power not specifically granted to the other branches of government in conducting foreign relations has been claimed by the president. The president’s increasing dominance in the foreign policy realm is largely due to an increase of the president’s “inherent or recognized” powers. The recognized powers of the president are those powers assumed but ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: The Paradoxes of U.S. Human Rights Policy
• CHAPTER 1 The U.S. System of Foreign Policy Making
• CHAPTER 2 A Matter of Unintended Consequences: The Nixon and Ford Administrations
• CHAPTER 3 U.S. Human Rights Policy, the Unintended Victim: The Carter Administration
• CHAPTER 4 The Contradictions of U.S. Human Rights Policy: The Reagan Administration
• CHAPTER 5 Human Rights in the New World Order: The George H. W. Bush Administration
• CHAPTER 6 Selling Off Human Rights: The Clinton Administration
• CHAPTER 7 U.S. Human Rights Policy, the Calculated Victim: The George W. Bush Administration
• CHAPTER 8 Conclusion: Paradox Lost?
• Notes
• References
• Index