Representation

Theory and Practice in Britain

David Judge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781134891696
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides an excellent insight into the theory and practice of political representation, a concept that is central to the understanding of modern British politics. The book explores the key elements of representation and the inextricable connections between theory and the unique British representative tradition. Using extensive contemporary examples and key theorists, this book will be essential reading for students of British politics.

1
Representation, representative democracy and representative government

There is by now a well established formula in the writing of books on representation whereby, in rapid succession, introductory sentences point to the longevity of the concept, differences in meaning of the word, and the inherent contestability of the idea of representation itself. Thereafter it is customary to pay homage to Hanna Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation (1967) to establish one’s seriousness as a writer on representation, and to engage in a debate about whether Pitkin is correct in her belief that there is a discernible single meaning that has not changed much over the past three hundred years (1967:8). Certainly this debate indicates the centrality of the concept in political theory throughout these centuries—but, equally, the very intensity and abstruseness of the debate is likely to discourage many students.

At the risk of disappointing those readers who expect such a familiar and well-worn linguistic approach, this book focuses instead upon the political dimensions of representation and the interconnections of the theory and practice of political representation in Britain. However, in preface, we do need, of course, some indication of what representation means. We need some etymological certainty in the conceptual uncertainty to follow. Here, indeed, the work of Hanna Pitkin is invaluable in providing the clue that ‘representation, taken generally, means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact’ (1967: 8– 9). In saying this Pitkin recognises that there is a paradox here and that ‘a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning of representation’ (1967: 9). This simple paradox will guide most of the discussion in this book, but it is also linked to a wider, more complex paradox, that:

Political representation is primarily a public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people. It is representation if the people (or a constituency) are present in governmental action, even though they do not literally act for themselves.

(Pitkin 1967:222)

In other words, we should examine the systemic nature of political representation—over time and as a system of government. In doing so, our attention is immediately drawn to the wider concepts of representative democracy and representative government. Both of which have inherent within them the initial ‘present/absent’ paradox noted above, where the people (however conceived and constituted) are held to be present through their representatives (however conceived and constituted) in the making of political decisions—yet are not literally present at the point of decision. They are, therefore, simultaneously included and excluded from the process of decision. Exactly where the emphasis is placed—upon inclusion/ participation, or exclusion/non-participation—depends upon one’s ideological predilections and one’s conception of democracy.

From starting with a simple etymological statement about the meaning of representation we have immediately become immersed in the exceedingly deep and complex conceptual waters of ‘democracy’. In fact we cannot avoid being embroiled in these waters, as one variant of democracy has at its very core—as one of its ‘indispensable components’— the notion of representation and a representative assembly. This variant— liberal democracy—justifies representation through an elected assembly ‘as the most effective device for reconciling the requirements of popular control and political equality with the exigencies of time and the conditions of the modern territorial state’ (Beetham 1992a:41). Exactly what these requirements and exigencies are we will return to shortly—but first we need to examine the democratic claims made on behalf of representation in the term ‘representative democracy’.

Democracy

Democracy, as Bernard Crick observed ‘is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs’ (1964:56). Indeed, the various usages of the word, both throughout history and in the modern world, have led some commentators to maintain that there is little in common between these variants of democracy other than the word itself (see Parry and Moran 1993:3). Indeed, the problem starts with the word itself, for although deceptively simple in its Greek origin demokratia—drawn from demos (people) and Kratos (rule)—their combination, in ‘people rule’, raises all sorts of questions about ‘who’ the people are and ‘how’ they rule? One perfectly defensible answer to these questions is to argue that democracy is an ideal, that it does not exist in practice (see Burnheim 1985:1). However, such a simple answer generates its own complexity and results in a new conceptual language of, for example, ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl 1989) or ‘demarchy’ (Hayek 1982:39–40; Burnheim 1985:9), designed to differentiate practical political systems, from the ideal. What both of these concepts have in common is the starting premise that ‘democracy’—defined as rule by the people—is impractical in the modern nation-state. At its simplest there are limits, both theoretical and practical, as to how far political participation (if this is how rule by the people is to be conceived) can be effective in a diverse and large mass public. Or as Dahl puts it: ‘The theoretical limit of effective political participation, even with modern electronic means of communication, rapidly diminishes with scale’ (1989: 217). A fully participatory political system, where all citizens participate directly in collective decisions, is thus seen to be an ideal. What is required is some practical institutional structure which will promote the ‘democratisation’ of decision making in order to ensure ‘the highest feasible attainment of the democratic process in the government of a country’ (Dahl 1989:222). It should be noted, however, that the claim is not that this is democracy itself, but that polyarchy is a process as close as can be achieved in a large scale polity. Similarly with ‘demarchy’, we do not need to understand the complexities of this system other than to understand that it is not a system of direct and universal participation in collective decision making. It is not, therefore, ‘democratic’ in the ideal sense, but is an attempt to ‘democratise’ the procedures of decision making in a large scale society/polity.

Direct democracy

The position we have arrived at from these negative postulates is that ‘democracy’ does not exist. A conception of fully participatory politics, with all of the necessary social, economic and political rights required to sustain such activity (see Parry and Moran 1993:4–5) is thus either an ideal, and unattainable, or is an aspiration, something to be striven for. A fully participatory process of decision making would entail each and every individual in the making of each and every decision. Even if the scope of decision is limited merely to participation on each and every decision which affects the individual, or is believed by the individual to affect him or her directly, this still imposes a significant time burden upon the individual. Moreover, it also assumes that individuals are equally capable of making consensual decisions in terms of knowledge, interest and resources —and that they are free and willing to do so in the absence of social, economic or political impediments. Direct democracy may thus conceivably require: a ‘democratic citizen’ who is capable of participation when given the opportunity to do so; a ‘democratic society’ which institutionalises the values of equality and liberty, and; a society sustained by a ‘democratic culture’ which actively encourages informed deliberation and the dissemination of information among the citizenry. These requirements are drawn from different models of direct democracy but they emphasise the inherent and inextricable interlinkage of social, economic and political factors in an adequate conceptualisation of democracy.

Athenian democracy

This interlinkage was apparent in Athenian democracy. In ancient Athens, between 461 BC and 322 BC, citizens (a small proportion of the total population, given that only male, non-slaves over twenty years old were eligible for citizenship) constituted ‘the people’. Formally, citizens faced no obstacles to involvement in public affairs—indeed the concept of citizenship itself entailed taking a share in legislative and judicial activity. In other words, there was an expectation that ‘the people’ would participate directly in the affairs of the polis. The political culture was thus one of ‘a general commitment to the principle of civic virtue: dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good’ (Held 1987:17). The institutional features of Athenian democracy reflected this political culture. As Aristotle noted:

From these fundamentals [liberty and equality], and in particular from the principles of ruling and being ruled, are derived the following features of democracy: (1) Elections: all citizens eligible for all offices; (2) rule: all over each and each in turn over all; (3) offices filled by lot, either all or at any rate those not calling for experience or training; (4) no tenure of office dependent on the possession of a property qualification, or only on a very low level; (5) the same man not to hold the same office twice or only rarely…; (6) short term of office for all offices or for as many as possible; (7) jury-courts all chosen from all the citizens and adjudicating on all or most matters…; (8)…the Assembly is the sovereign authority in everything, officials having no sovereign power over anything except quite minor matters….

(Aristotle [c.335–322 BC] 1962:237)

Hence, the Assembly, as the meeting of eligible citizens, institutionalised the concept of popular sovereignty. All major issues came before the Assembly for deliberation and decision. Unanimity was normally expected in reaching decisions, but on exceptional, intractable issues decisions could be reached by a formal majority vote. The Assembly in turn was ‘assisted’ by a Council of 500 members whose composition was determined by lot and whose function was to organise the agenda of the Assembly. Even in ancient Greece, therefore, the notion of direct democracy was not taken literally—with the whole people deciding unanimously on each and every issue freely and equally. Instead, there was provision for majority decision and for institutionalised leadership in the Council. As Manin notes: ‘In the Athenian democracy, then, the populace itself did not wield all power; certain important powers and even a portion of the decisive power belonged to institutions that were in fact, and were perceived to be, other than the demos’ (1997:25). What was important was that members of these other institutions were mainly appointed by lot. The use of lots to assign political power serves to differentiate direct democracy in Athens from later representative variants of democracy. Hence, in Manin’s (1997:41) view, what makes a system representative is not the fact that a few govern in the place of the people, but that they are selected by election only. Nonetheless, ‘the democracy of antiquity was undoubtedly the closest possible approximation to a literal democracy in which governors and governed stood side by side and dealt with each other face to face’ (Sartori 1987:280).

Marx: the ‘end of politics’ and direct democracy

Since ancient times there has been a protracted, heated and inconclusive discussion as to whether such direct self-government can be recreated. Throughout the ages alternative schemes for direct participatory democracy have been articulated—with Marx providing one particularly influential model. Starting from the belief that ‘democracy’ was impossible in capitalist society, in view of the fact that its political institutions systematically and exclusively served the interests of a dominant economic class (for reasons see Miliband 1977:17–42; Femia 1993:11–67), Marx maintained that both civil society and the state would have to be replaced by a higher unity where neither would be distinct from the other. ‘Civil society as a differentiated arena of private interest would therefore vanish. In the political realm, class or rank would no longer stand between the person and the universality of the body politic’ (Femia 1993:71). In these circumstances, with what Held refers to as ‘the end of politics’ (1987:123), public business would become the activity of ordinary citizens, with political deliberation and decisions being the concern of everyone. ‘What makes democracy “true” is not the equal opportunity of every citizen to devote himself to public life as something special, but the “immediate participation of all in deliberating and deciding” on political matters. There should be no professional bureaucrats, no professional politicians’ (Femia 1993: 72). ‘Rule of the people’ would thus entail equal opportunities for all to participate in decision making in all aspects of daily life (Parry and Moran 1993:4). The full complexity of this argument and its intellectual challenge to liberal democracy need not detain us here (see Held 1987: 105– 39; Femia 1993; Judge 1993:55–67), all that we need to note at this stage is that Marx’s argument echoes the radical tradition of direct democracy in ancient Greece (see Held 1987:130–1; Sartori 1987:476).

The new technologies and direct democracy

For different reasons the societal models, of direct democracy in ancient Greece and those contained within Marxist analysis, have proved inappropriate in the late-twentieth century—the conditions for direct citizen participation have long since passed, as in ancient Greece, or have not yet arrived, as in Marx’s communist society. Thus, for Held, ‘the classical participatory model cannot easily be adapted to stretch across space and time’ (1993:23). On the one hand, the social exclusivity and the small-scale of the city-state contrasts sharply with the size and organisational complexity of modern mass industrial societies; on the other, Marxian notions of ‘true’ participatory democracy remain untested without the overthrow of the capitalist state.

If direct democracy is equated solely with mass participation in public decision making bodies then it becomes a small step in logic, but a quantum leap in principle, to argue that ‘direct democracy is impracticable in the modern state. And this must surely be the correct view’ (Holden 1974:28). Yet, from what we know already, the concept of democracy is inherently contestable. Not surprisingly, therefore, some modern political scientists vigorously advance the counter view that direct democracy is now practicable in the modern state (see McLean 1989; Budge 1996). Their basic contention is that the technology for extending popular participation in decision making has been available for a long time and that the union of computers with telephone and television, and the universal access to this technology, now allows for the institutionalisation of direct democracy in modern form (Budge 1996:27). In which case, the argument against the practical feasibility of direct democracy is, in Budge’s view, ‘totally invalid’ as electronic media now provide the means for direct popular participation in decision making via debate and voting, and also reduce, if not eliminate, the costs associated with such participation (Budge 1996:28).

Indirect democracy

However, even allowing for the technical advances in recent years which facilitate direct participation, there are still those willing to argue in defence of the ‘inevitability’ of indirect forms of democracy in the modern state. Bealey (1988:36), for instance, advances the commonly held view that there are compelling practical reasons for the ubiquity of indirect democracy. First, total participation in decision making is impossible, given the vast numbers of people in the modern nation-state. Second, in handing decision making over to others, this form of democracy allows the citizenry to pursue other necessary daily activities. Underpinning such statements is a conception of a political division of labour where citizens limit their political activity essentially to voting, and so leave a small number of representatives to concentrate their attention on decision making. Indeed, it is the overriding practical consideration of time that leads David Beetham to conclude that: ‘any society with similar requirements to our own in terms of production and reproduction (including the work of domestic care) could only afford to have a relatively small number devoted to full time [deliberation and legislative decision making]’ (1992a:47).

With such considerations in mind, Lijphart argues that there is thus one major amendment that needs to be made to the literal meaning of democracy as ‘government by the people’:

that the acts of government are usually performed not directly by citizens but indirectly by representatives whom they elect on a free and equal basis. Although elements of direct democracy can be found even in some large democratic states, democracy is usually representative democracy: government by freely elected representatives of the people.

(Lijphart 1984:1)

Representative democracy

If indirect democracy is taken essentially as a synonym for representative democracy (Holden 1974:29...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Representation, Representative Democracy and Representative Government
• 2. Microcosmic Representation
• 3. Trustee Theory and Practice
• 4. Party Representation
• 5. Representation of Interests In Westminster
• 6. Representation and ‘Post-Parliamentary’ Governance
• 7. Territory and Levels of Representation
• 8. Representation In the Twenty-First Century
• References