Intelligence and Espionage: Secrets and Spies

Daniel Lomas, Christopher John Murphy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429664113
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

Intelligence and Espionage: Secrets and Spies provides a global introduction to the role of intelligence – a key, but sometimes controversial, aspect of ensuring national security. Separating fact from fiction, the book draws on past examples to explore the use and misuse of intelligence, examine why failures take place and address important ethical issues over its use.

Divided into two parts, the book adopts a thematic approach to the topic, guiding the reader through the collection and analysis of information and its use by policymakers, before looking at intelligence sharing. Lomas and Murphy also explore the important associated activities of counterintelligence and the use of covert action, to influence foreign countries and individuals. Topics covered include human and signals intelligence, the Cuban Missile Crisis, intelligence and Stalin, Trump and the US intelligence community, and the Soviet Bloc. This analysis is supplemented by a comprehensive documents section, containing newly released documents, including material from Edward Snowden's leaks of classified material.

Supported by images, a comprehensive chronology, glossary, and 'who's who' of key figures, Intelligence and Espionage is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the role of intelligence in policymaking, international relations and diplomacy, warfighting and politics to the present day.

Part I

Analysis

Introduction

What is ‘intelligence’? Theoretical approaches

Before we can begin our study, it is necessary to have some understanding of what is meant by the word ‘intelligence’. Despite the fact that it has been the subject of academic study for some 70 years, there continues to be debate and disagreement over what it means. As Warner (2002:n.p.) has observed, the word tends to be ‘defined anew by each author who addresses it, and these definitions rarely refer to one another or build off what has been written before’. Others question whether it is possible to pin down a precise definition, or whether this will remain elusive – ‘It is like the term “news”’, Kahn (2001:79) argues. ‘Though all but impossible to define, every journalist knows what it is: when something newsworthy is said in a court of a legislative hearing, all the reporters start taking notes’.

Perhaps the first thing many people will think of when it comes to intelligence is informed by popular culture; a secret agent, engaged in a battle with a (usually foreign) foe. The agent manages to defeat the enemy and thereby saves the world as we know it, perhaps enjoying a vodka martini or two along the way. Unfortunately, this is not a very useful starting point! Hollywood’s fictional spies tend to have a licence to kill, while real-life intelligence activity is primarily concerned with the acquisition of information – likely secret – without the knowledge of its owner. Who is responsible for collecting this information? Here again, the popular image of the secret agent falls short; for example, a Caucasian British agent, despatched from London to Beijing, is likely going to draw immediate attention to themselves simply on account of their physical appearance, even if they speak fluent Mandarin. In such cases it would be more useful to approach a commercial traveller who has legitimate business interests in China, and ask them to carry out the illicit information gathering alongside the main purpose of their visit. Yet even this would have its limitations; unless it concerned the company with which they were dealing, how would the traveller access the information, which is likely secret and held in a secure location? Ultimately, the most valuable secret agent, or spy, is a national of the country that is being targeted, who works in, or otherwise has access to, the organisation that holds the desired information, and who can be persuaded, through one or more of a variety of means, to betray the trust of that organisation – indeed, betray their own country – and to collect and pass on the desired information to an intelligence officer, likely working under diplomatic cover in the embassy of the country interested in collecting the information, or otherwise residing in the country covertly. Rather than a Walther PPK, as Herman has observed, ‘the most dangerous of an agent’s weapons is uncontrolled access to a Xerox copier’ (Herman, 1996:65), although it is hard to imagine a photocopier playing a starring role in a Hollywood spy blockbuster. Today, access to such machines has likely been supplanted by access to an organisation’s computer network, and the ability to extract information from this onto pen drives that are increasingly large in terms of memory yet increasingly small in terms of their physical size, and thereby easily secreted about one’s person.

Another challenge facing any definition of intelligence concerns the question of what sort of material needs to be collected in order to be considered intelligence: must it consist of secrets – that is, information that one country does not want another country to know – that have been collected secretly? Some would argue that intelligence has to be derived from secret sources, otherwise it isn’t really intelligence, but information. Where does that leave material that has been gathered from non-secret sources, known as OSINT (open source intelligence)? Further, is there any guarantee that secret information gathered by covert means will automatically be more reliable than that which can be found in the public domain? The fact that someone considers certain information worthy of protecting would suggest that this is likely to be the case, but is its accuracy always guaranteed? The danger, then, is that secret information collected secretly may end up being imbued with a credibility that may not, in fact, be justified. Johnson (2017) offers an answer to this conundrum by suggesting that intelligence is actually a mix of both open and secret information, in which the ‘secret component’ need not necessarily be particularly high. Somewhere in the region of 90 per cent of the intelligence reports provided to decision makers in the United States is actually based on non-secret material. However, the remaining 10 per cent – the secret ‘nugget’ – can be absolutely vital, providing a specific context within which the remaining non-secret information can be interpreted (Johnson, 2017:46–7).

As illustrated above, it is immediately apparent that intelligence activity involves a lot of people; those who want the information and those who are responsible for gathering it. As such, a useful definition of intelligence could be that which considers its ‘life cycle’; that is, the process whereby policymakers – intelligence ‘consumers’, or customers, ask for information (their ‘requirements’), which the intelligence agency then proceeds to collect through the most appropriate means, be that secret or open source. Once gathered, the information is then processed (it may need to be translated, for example) and analysed as quickly as possible, before being passed to the policymakers, as requested. Taken together, this series of actions is known as the Intelligence Cycle. Yet while such an overview of the process may appear to offer a reasonable definition of intelligence, when looked at in greater detail this is also problematic, its simplicity perhaps constituting its greatest weakness. For example, intelligence agencies collect a vast amount of information on a wide array of subjects, so they are unlikely to have to start from scratch every time they are asked for something new. In addition, some would question whether policymakers actually have a sufficiently good grasp of what intelligence agencies are capable of to make achievable requests in the first place!

For others, such as Arthur S. Hulnik, the Intelligence Cycle is problematic because it ignores both counterintelligence and covert action. This criticism takes us to another aspect of the definitional debate. Counterintelligence involves the specific targeting of enemy intelligence organisations, alongside preventative measures to stop such enemies from targeting one’s own organisation. Covert action, meanwhile, involves carrying out certain types of offensive secretly, thereby allowing those who ordered them to deny their involvement – that is, plausible deniability. Is it appropriate to describe such activities – for example, destabilising a country’s economy – as ‘intelligence’? For Herman, intelligence consists of ‘information and information gathering’ (Herman, 2004:342). As such, there is no place for them in his definition. Rather, he regards them as ‘associated activities’. In order to consider covert action and counterintelligence as part of intelligence, a definition must take a step back, and to consider intelligence as a set of interconnected ‘missions’, where they sit alongside the gathering and analysis of information. This helps us to understand why the world’s most well-known, fictional secret agent is considered to work in intelligence. James Bond clearly works for the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6; we know this because the real-life headquarters of the organisation are seen (being blown up, on one occasion) on screen. But would this be accurate in the real world? The answer to this question ultimately depends upon the definition of ‘intelligence’ adopted. If our definition of gathering intelligence involves working quietly and unobtrusively at a target organisation, copying secret documents with a digital camera or copying sensitive files onto a pen drive, then Bond doesn’t really fit the bill (it’s hard to imagine a film showing Bond engaged in such work for 90 minutes being a box office smash). He’s far more likely to be seen in some kind of physical altercation with an enemy thug, blowing up an enemy’s subterranean secret base or assassinating a target. These sorts of activities would place Bond more comfortably under the heading of covert action rather than intelligence. However, if covert action is itself considered as one of the intelligence ‘missions’, and conducted by an intelligence agency on account of their expertise in acting secretly, then while Bond may not be a spy his activities could indeed be considered to fall under the wider remit of intelligence.

There are a number of further issues that may be considered when trying to define intelligence. For example, is a globally accepted definition of intelligence actually possible, or is a nationally accepted definition the best that can be hoped for? Through a comparative study of how intelligence is perceived in the United Kingdom and the United States, Davies concluded that the different usage of the word in a UK as opposed to a US context was so great that ‘transatlantic dialogue on the subject … has tended to be conducted at cross-purposes’ (Davies, 2002:62). In the US, he notes that intelligence ‘tends to refer to “finished” intelligence’, while in the UK intelligence ‘tends to refer more narrowly to those kinds of information not available from the “normal product” of departmental activity’. As such, he suggests that we should ask ‘How do different countries and institutions define intelligence?’

A definition of intelligence also needs to take into account the nature of the political regime under which it functions. As Andrew (2004:176) has observed, it is important to differentiate ‘between the roles of intelligence communities in authoritarian and democratic regimes’, arguing that during the Cold War ‘there was a fundamental asymmetry between intelligence operations in East and West. Similarities in intelligence vocabulary disguised basic differences of function’. Intelligence agencies operating under authoritarian rule tend to serve as a means of upholding the regime, acting as an instrument of repression that will engage in surveillance of members of the general public who are considered a threat. In addition to playing this role, such intelligence agencies will also participate in ‘reinforcing the regime’s misconceptions of the outside world’: few members of authoritarian intelligence communities would be so bold as to challenge the views of their political leadership, regardless of their own intelligence assessments – to do so could cost them their lives (Andrew, 2004:177).

Finally, does intelligence have to be a state-backed activity, focussed upon issues of national security, and securing national advantage? Recently, greater attention has turned to the use of intelligence by non-state actors, including terrorist groups and the corporate world of big business. It is certainly possible for non-state actors to replicate, in many respects, the intelligence process as seen in the Intelligence Cycle, but ultimately they are limited to open source material that has not been acquired through covert means; only state intelligence agencies are able to ‘legally’ break the law; should a big business engage in similar tactics, then it could be argued that, rather than ‘doing’ intelligence, what they are actually doing is breaking the law. Luca De Pra, a coach from Genoa FC, found himself suspended from his job in September 2013 when he was caught spying on a rival football team, in full Rambo gear, in the run up to a derby match (Observer, 2013:n.p.). In 2001, Proctor and Gamble agreed to pay its rival Unilever somewhere in the region of $10 million in order to settle a case of corporate espionage (Barnes, 2001:n.p.) which had seen Unilever’s rubbish stolen in the hope of discovering details of a new brand of shampoo (Hulnick, 2002:566).

Having begun with a very narrow definition of intelligence as the gathering of information, our discussion has continued to become increasingly broad, first considering a larger process within which such collection sits (the Intelligence Cycle), then expanding to an even wider definition around a series of activities that are linked by their secretive, covert nature, which sees counterintelligence and covert action placed alongside the collection and analysis of information. Complicating matters further are the questions of whether the information gathered needs to be ‘secret’ in order to constitute intelligence, how intelligence is defined at a national level, itself likely influenced by the political regime of the country concerned, and finally whether intelligence has to be a state-based activity, or whether it can be conducted by non-state actors. Ultimately, perhaps it is best to suggest, as Gill and Phythian do, that intelligence is ‘an umbrella term’ (2006:19) that can encompass all of the above, which ‘renders precise definition problematic’ – if not indeed impossible.

Global intelligence: a brief history

There is nothing remotely new about the concept of gathering information on an enemy or rival. ‘The spy’, Phillip Knightley (1986:3) writes, ‘is as old as history’. Indeed, Khan goes so far as to argue that intelligence is intrinsically biological:

Every animal, even a protozoan, must have a mechanism to perceive stimuli, such as noxious chemicals, and to judge whether they are good or bad for it. At that level intelligence is like breathing: essential to survival, but not to dominance.

(Kahn, 2001:79–80)

As such, it is unsurprising that activity that would today be classed as intelligence has been in evidence in recorded human history for thousands of years. Even when found in what we know of ancient civilisations, such information gathering can be broadly divided into serving one of two main functions: the pursuit of knowledge about things ‘external’, particularly foreign enemies, their military strength and plans; and things ‘internal’, such as dissidence and dissatisfaction of citizens at home, which could challenge the stability of the regime.

The Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses II, who fought numerous battles and oversaw the successful expansion of the Egyptian empire, used prisoners of war to provide intelligence, beating them to reveal details of their military strength (Kahn, 2001:80). The sixth-century BC military tactician Sun Tzu pointed to the value of spies and the information they could provide. In The Art of War, he wrote: ‘the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy wherever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge’ (Kahn, 2001:80). The Vedic literature of ancient India illustrates the use of intelligence as a means of supporting state security (Schaffer, 2018:598–610) Intelligence for internal security was also practised by the ancient Greeks, through the sycophants, while intelligence from abroad was gathered by ambassadors (Smith, 2004:35).

Spying can be found in evidence in the Old Testament of the Bible, in the book of Numbers, where the Lord instructed Moses to send his men ‘on a mission to the land of the Canaan’ (Knightley, 1986:3). Intelligence activity also played an important role during the early years of Islam, being used by the Prophet Muhammad (570–632 AD) to ensure the survival of the movement. He developed ‘a network of informers, whereby he could cross-check and compare the bits and pieces of information in order to construct a larger picture’. In this way, the Prophet was able to keep appraised of both external developments and keep a watch of members of the group, fulfilling the dual role ‘of head of intelligence and internal security in seeking to ensure that all his plans and activities were kept in absolute secrecy’ (Suwaed and Kahana, 2018:180–1).

The Romans benefitted from intelligence in the form of intercepted communications prior to the Battle of the Metaurus River in Italy in 207BC; ‘having intercepted a Cathaginian message’, they ‘were able to concentrate their forces, defeat Hasdrubal before his brother Hannibal could reinforce him, and become the chief power of the Western world’ (Kahn, 2001:80). Later, ‘Caesar’s legions scouted their barbarian foes’ (Kahn, 2001:80). The Romans also utilised intelligence in order to monitor dissent at home. As Smith notes, this task was originally the responsibility of the fire brigade (the speculators) before later passing to the corn merchants (the frumentarii), who ‘were considered to have their ears close to the ground in the markets’ (Smith, 2004:35–6).

British interest in intelligence activity can be seen from the turn of the fourteenth century, at which point King Edward II ordered ‘the seizure of “all letters coming from or going to ports beyond the seas”’ (Smith, 2004:36). It was not until the reign of Queen Elizabeth I that Britain developed what Smith describes as its ‘first really effective intelligence service’ under Sir Francis Walsingham, ‘a man widely recognised as the father of the British secret services’ (Smith, 2004:37). Walsingham’s work was instrumental in foiling numerous conspiracies against Elizabeth, including the Babington plot. He also established networks to collect intelligence from Spain, which proved valuable in the defeat of the Armada.

Elsewhere, the practice of using spies to monitor the population continued.

In Sixteenth Century India, the Great Mogul Akbar’s security service comprised an army of 4,000 scavengers, pedlars and merchants. Their reports were relayed to the Mogul via a central council of advisers and analysts, which presented him with a daily intelligence summary.

(Smith, 2004:36)

Meanwhile, spying was rife throughout renaissance Europe. As Stephen Alford has observed, ‘Espionage was a thriving trade in the sixteenth century. In war-torn Europe spies did a healthy business of selling news and intelligence mostly for money, sometimes out of religious conviction, but often for both’ (Alford, 2012:14). Indeed, in the monarchies of Italy and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we can see the prototypes of formalised intelligence activity. As Laurent (2013:301) notes, ‘In the Serenissima Venice in the sixteenth century a modern intelligence service appeared’, while in the early years of the seventeenth century ‘an Espio mayor working directly for the Council of State was created to centralize all of the activities from Spanish spies and spy-rings’. Back in England, following the end of the Civil War Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell was ‘kept well informed about royalist plots by a network of agents run by his secretary John Thurloe’ – who, following the Restoration, ‘offered his services to Charles II’ (Andrew, 1985:1).

During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Britain’s Duke of Wellington mastered the use of intelligence during his campaigns against the French on the Iberian Peninsula. Wellington’s staff included George Scovell, an expert linguist and codebreaker responsible for running agents...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• Chronology
• Who’s who
• Part I: Analysis
• Assessment
• Part II: Documents
• References
• Glossary
• Further reading
• Index