Hume's Philosophy Of The Self

Tony Pitson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781134537778
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First Published in 2002. Personal identity lies at the very heart of Hume's philosophy but has received surprisingly limited attention. Hume's Philosophy of the Self is the first book to go beyond the famous section of the Treatise, 'Of Personal Identity', and explore the fundamental concern with the Self that pervades all of Hume's work. A. E. Pitson argues innovatively that this concern rests on a crucial distinction between two aspects of personal identity: our thought and our passions. Hume's Philosophy of the Self addresses issues fundamental to the study of eighteenth-century thought, the Scottish Enlightenment and naturalism, and offers an essential new perspective on Hume's moral philosophy, epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Part I

THE MENTAL ASPECTS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

1

THE SELF AND HUMAN NATURE

I indicated in my introduction that Hume’s account of the self in ‘Of Personal Identity’ (Treatise 1.4.6) reflects remarks from earlier sections of the Treatise. We shall see that further light is shed on it by remarks elsewhere in the book as well as in other writings of Hume.

The self in Hume’s Treatise

One way in which we might emphasise the importance of Hume’s theory of the self in the context of the Treatise as a whole, is to point out that there is a sense, at least, in which the self provides the focus for the project which Hume undertakes in the Treatise. This project, which Hume outlines in the Introduction to his book, amounts to establishing a ‘science of man’ which will provide a foundation for the other sciences (T, Intro. 6). This, as we have seen, places Hume squarely within the approach to human nature associated with the Scottish Enlightenment. More especially, the science of man as a project in moral – as opposed to natural – philosophy, is concerned with the ultimate principles of the mind or soul.¹ It is more aptly described, therefore, as a ‘science of mind’: a ‘science’ to be conducted in accordance with the experimental method referred to in the sub-title to the Treatise.² Since Hume’s account of the mind in Book 1 is central to what he has to say about the self, while further aspects of the self emerge from the other two Books of the Treatise, we might say that the Treatise as a whole constitutes Hume’s theory of the self. Hume’s theory makes itself felt elsewhere in his philosophy, though we should note that there may be some dispute as to how far Hume retains the distinctive theory of the self to be found in the Treatise.³

I

THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE MIND

I turn now to the opening sections of the Treatise, and this for two reasons. First, we can understand the terms in which Hume’s theory of the self is couched only if we attend to the distinction with which Hume begins his book; and second, we shall find that these opening sections also point to the way in which the theory is developed in Book 1 of the Treatise. Hume begins, then, by suggesting that ‘the perceptions of the human mind’ are of two distinct kinds: impressions and ideas (T, 1.1.1.1). It becomes clear that Hume means to provide in this way a classification of all those states, activities, etc., that we associate with having a mind (sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, imaginings, and so on). A great deal has, of course, been written about Hume’s attempt to classify these various aspects of mind in terms of his distinction between impressions and ideas, but I am not directly concerned here with the merits of this classification, nor with the general validity of the distinction itself.⁴ We need to be aware, however, of certain general features of Hume’s division of the perceptions of the mind into impressions and ideas. First, impressions themselves are to be divided into two categories, impressions of sensation (comprising the experiences associated with perception, as well as bodily feelings of pleasure and pain), and impressions of reflection which are in general identified with what Hume calls the passions (including, for example, emotions like pride and humility).⁵ Second, ideas are described by Hume as the ‘images’ of the different kinds of impression which we thus experience, and we may for the moment think of them as constituting our thoughts about these experiences. In general terms, Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas amounts, as he himself puts it, to ‘the difference betwixt feeling and thinking’ (ibid.).

Simple and complex perceptions

Now there are certain aspects of this distinction of which we need to take note. To begin with, each of Hume’s two kinds of ‘perception’ may occur either as something simple or as a complex containing a number of such simples. This distinction, which Hume himself seems to take more or less for granted, is in fact problematic on a number of counts. It is far from clear what will count as a simple impression or idea, i.e. as one which is capable neither of ‘distinction nor separation’ (T, 1.1.1.2). And in so far as the distinction can be made, it seems doubtful whether it will work in the same way for both impressions and ideas, bearing in mind that while complex ideas consist in conjunctions of ideas, complex impressions may involve a mixture of the impressions (T, 2.2.6.1). Hume is rather coy about citing instances of impressions or ideas which he would count as simple, but it is nevertheless important for him that we should recognise this category of perceptions because he wishes to claim that every simple idea, when it first appears in the mind, is a copy of a corresponding impression (T, 1.1.1.7). If every idea is either a simple idea or a conjunction of such ideas, it follows that all ideas must be derived, ultimately at least, from experience in the form of impressions either of sensation or of reflection. And this, indeed, is the ‘first principle’ – one yielded by the impressions/ideas distinction – that Hume seeks to establish in his science of human nature (T, 1.1.1.12).⁶

Ideas

We may now look a little more closely at the category of ideas. Suppose I see something like an apple and thereby experience what is, presumably, a complex impression of colour, shape, etc. According to Hume, there will be a corresponding idea which will, at least to some extent, resemble that impression (the extent of the resemblance perhaps reflecting the complexity of the impression, cf. T, 1.1.1.4). But how, apart from the order in which they occur, are the impression and idea distinguished from each other? According to Hume, they will differ in their degree of force and vivacity, impressions generally being more lively than the corresponding ideas.⁷ But an idea may acquire some of the vivacity of the impression with which it is associated. As Hume goes on to say in the second Part of Book 1 of the Treatise, it is of the nature of belief that it consists in an idea enlivened in this way by a present impression (T, 1.3.7). The idea in my example amounts, then, to a perceptual belief and we may say, in general, that impressions of the senses are attended in this way with belief (cf. T, 1.3.5.7). Now I may, as Hume says, repeat the original impression in a subsequent idea which will be one of memory, when sufficient vivacity from the impression is retained for the idea still to be one of belief. On the other hand, I may form an idea – a complex idea – for which there is no directly corresponding impression, by transposing and changing ideas which have already been acquired from experience, thereby creating an idea of imagination (T, 1.1.3). In this case the idea is not enlivened by the impressions from which it ultimately derives,⁸ and consequently belief is not involved.

The association of ideas

There is one additional feature of Hume’s account of the perceptions of the mind – in particular, those which belong to the category of ideas – that I should mention here. In Treatise 1.1.4 he sets out the theory his use of which, he subsequently says, may entitle him ‘to so glorious a name as that of an inventor’ (Abs. 35). This is the theory of the connection or association of ideas. The gist of this principle of association is that there are various ‘qualities’ by which one idea may naturally introduce another: these consisting in resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect (T, 1.1.4.1). In the corresponding discussion in the first Enquiry (Section 3, ‘Of the Association of Ideas’), Hume gives examples to illustrate how each of these qualities may lead to a connection of one idea with another (EHU, 3.3). Since we will be concerned with two of them, in particular, later on I shall not pause to say more about them here. The fact that ideas are associated or connected in this way shows that the occurrence of ideas in imagination is not, after all, an entirely arbitrary process, but one that is guided by certain principles. These principles amount, Hume says, to ‘a kind of ATTRACTION’ (T, 1.1.4.6), which provides the counterpart in Hume’s science of mind to the Newtonian theory of gravity in natural science.

Relations and substance

Before I go on to consider this account of the perceptions of the mind, there are two other topics introduced in Treatise Book 1 Part 1 which should be mentioned. The first occurs in Section 5, ‘Of Relations’. Hume here suggests that the word ‘relation’ is commonly used in two different senses. One of these is reflected in Hume’s theory of the association of ideas. According to this theory, two ideas may be so connected in the imagination that ‘the one naturally introduces the other’ (T, 1.1.5.1). Accordingly Hume himself subsequently describes this kind of relation as a natural one. The other kind of relation obtains where it is possible to make some kind of comparison between objects or qualities, even if the corresponding ideas themselves have no natural relation to each other. Hume refers to relations of this kind – which include ones of particular concern to philosophy – as philosophical relations. We should note that all relations are philosophical in so far as they involve a ‘comparison of objects’; the point of Hume’s distinction is that some, but not all, of these relations are also natural ones.

The other topic occurs in Section 6, ‘Of Modes and Substances’, where Hume introduces a preliminary discussion of the idea of substance (we will be concerned later with his detailed treatment of this topic in Treatise Book 1 Part 4). If it is true that every idea originates in experience, then the idea of substance will be derived from impressions either of sensation or reflection. Now the impressions with which our senses provide us are those of colour, sound, taste, and so on, while substance itself is conventionally distinguished from such qualities. On the other hand, impressions of reflection comprise the passions and emotions, none of which, as Hume puts it, ‘can possibly represent a substance’ (T, 1.1.6.1). Hume thus reaches the important conclusion that ‘We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it’. This is not to say, however, that we think of substances in such terms. In fact, since the simple ideas associated with a substance exhibit the kind of natural relation referred to above – they are ‘united by the imagination’ – we may be led to form the ‘fiction’ of substance as an ‘unknown something’ in which particular qualities inhere. We will see the importance of this shortly.

Hume’s causal account of the perceptions of the mind

Let us now, then, consider Hume’s account of the perceptions of the mind as described above. Perhaps the most striking feature about it is that it not only represents these perceptions as standing in certain causal relations to each other, but that different kinds of perception are identified by their causes and effects. (It is true that Hume’s references to the vivacity of impressions, and also to the vivacity of certain ideas, seem concerned with internal, rather than relational, features of these perceptions: but it is arguable that in this case Hume is, after all, referring to the characteristic effects of the perceptions in question – cf. n7 above). Impressions of the senses, for example, are dependent on the organs through which they occur, so that someone born blind or deaf will be incapable of the relevant impressions of sensation (and also, therefore, of the corresponding ideas, T, 1.1.1.9). It is true that Hume as a moral – as opposed to natural – philosopher is not concerned with the nature of the causes of impressions of sensation (T, 1.1.2.1), and that he is agnostic as to their ultimate explanation (T, 1.3.5.2), but he clearly ascribes them immediately to physical or natural causes (T, 2.1.1.1). Such impressions also, as we have seen, have effects in the form of ideas which amount to beliefs. These ideas, in turn, also have their characteristic effects in the form of impressions of reflection, so that our beliefs may have emotional repercussions. The latter, as involving impressions, will give rise to further ideas (and, perhaps, beliefs), from which further impressions of reflection may result. Hume himself provides a summary of the way in which ‘perceptions’ thus arise in the mind:

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because deriv’d from it. These again are copy’d by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from them (T, 1.1.2.1).

What Hume says here suggests that perceptions typically occur in the following sequence: impressions of sensation → ideas → impressions of reflection → ideas, etc. But this is not invariably so, as Hume’s re-statement of the impressions/ideas distinction at the beginning of Book 2 of the Treatise illustrates. Hume here identifies the distinction between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection with the distinction between original and secondary impressions. Impressions of sensation are ‘original’ in the sense that they arise in the mind through physical or natural causes, independently of any other perceptions, while the secondary impressions of reflection proceed from these original impressions either immediately or through ideas derived from impressions of this latter kind (T, 2.1.1.1). This latter distinction within the category of impressions of reflection indicates that some ‘passions’ are direct, arising immediately from experiences of pain or pleasure, while others are indirect to the extent that they depend upon additional perceptions. Hume classifies as direct such ‘passions’ as desire and aversion, as well as emotions like hope and fear, and as indirect, emotions such as pride, humility, love and hatred (T, 2.1.1.4). We shall see later that the indirect passions in particular play an important part in Hume’s account of the self.

Now it is not too much to say that in these opening sections of the Treatise Hume has provided us with a picture of the mind itself. It is one which represents mental activity as consisting in the occurrence of different sorts of perception related to each other partly by resemblance (as in the case of complex ideas of memory which repeat the original impressions), and partly by causation (so that the perceptions of the mind occur in typical sequences). This suggests how Hume will carry out the task he describes in Section I of the first Enquiry as ‘mental geography’, or the ‘delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind’ (EHU, 1.13). As his preliminary remarks about memory and imagination indicate, it is a matter of locating the perceptions in the complex pattern of activity that makes up our mental life. An idea of memory is identified in part, for example, by its causal relation to the corresponding impressions. More generally, the ‘mapping’ of perceptions will reflect their function or role in the mind, in terms of their characteristic causes and effects. This does not, as such, amount to a theory of mind, for any such theory would require that something should be said about the relation of the mind to its perceptions. But while it may be true that Hume has not, at this stage, provided us with a positive account of the nature of the mind itself (Flage 1990: 253), we have identified here the essential ingredients of the account which Hume goes on to present in Treatise 1.4.6. For what could the relation of the mind to its perceptions be? There seem to be only two sorts of possibility, namely, that perceptions belong to the mind as something which is itself distinct from perceptions themselves, or that the mind just is the perceptions related to each other in the complex way described. But the former possibility seems to require that the mind itself should be some sort of thing or substance to which perceptions would belong as qualities, and Hume has indicated that this kind of supposition amounts to a fiction explained by the fact that natural relations among perceptions (including resemblance and causation) would lead us to refer them to the mind as an unknown ‘something’. We are at least prepared, therefore, for the explicit account of mind which we subsequently find in the Treatise, and to which I now turn.

II

TREATISE 1.4.6 ‘OF PERSONAL IDENTITY’

Apart from the opening sections of the Treatise to which I have referred above, it should be said that the section explicitly devoted to the topic of personal identity is preceded by others in which the ground is prepared for Hume’s treatment of this topic. For example, Hume’s account of the nature of the mind in T, 1.4.6 is anticipated in his earlier discussion of belief in the existence of body (T, 1.4.2.39), and his treatment of the view of the mind as a substance reflects the discussion of the Aristotelian and scholastic notion of substance in T, 1.4.3. Perhaps most importantly of all, Hume provides an extended treatment of the rationalistic conception of the mind as an immaterial substance in the immediately preceding section, ‘Of the Immortality of the Soul’ (T, 1.4.5). I shall reserve discussion of this section for the third chapter where I am concerned with its bearing on Hume’s view of the mind/body relation. So far as ‘Of Personal Identity’ is concerned, it scarcely needs to be said that Hume provides here one of the most significant, as well as controversial, treatments of this topic in the history of philosophy; and it is one...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Hume texts
• Introduction
• PART I The mental aspects of personal identity
• PART II The agency aspect of personal identity
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index