Theodosius

The Empire at Bay

Gerard Friell, Stephen Williams

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781135782610
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

Emperor Theodosius (379-95) was the last Roman emperor to rule a unified empire of East and West and his reign represents a turning point in the policies and fortunes of the Late Roman Empire. In this imperial biography, Stephen Williams and Gerry Friell bring together literary, archaeological and numismatic evidence concerning this Roman emperor, studying his military and political struggles, which he fought heroically but ultimately in vain.
Summoned from retirement to the throne after the disastrous Roman defeat by the Goths at Adrianople, Theodosius was called on to rebuild the armies and put the shattered state back together. He instituted a new policy towards the barbarians, in which diplomacy played a larger role than military might, at a time of increasing frontier dangers and acute manpower shortage. He was also the founder of the established Apostolic Catholic Church. Unlike other Christian emperors, he suppressed both heresy and paganism and enforced orthodoxy by law.
The path was a diffucult one, but Theodosius (and his successor, Stilicho) had little choice. This new study convincingly demonstrates how a series of political misfortunes led to the separation of the Eastern and Western empires which meant that the overlordship of Rome in Europe dwindled into mere ceremonial. The authors examine the emperor and his character and the state of the Roman empire, putting his reign in the context of the troubled times.

PART I
THE CRUCIBLE

‘As for the Romans, after this defeat they gave up all hope of maintaining their supremacy over the Italians and began to fear for their own native soil and indeed, for their very existence, since they expected Hannibal to appear at any moment…Yet although without any doubt the Romans had been worsted in battle and their military reputation destroyed, because of the special virtues of their constitution and their ability to keep their heads, they eventually not only won back supremacy in Italy and later defeated the Carthaginians, but within a few years of this made themselves masters of the whole world.’

Polybius, Histories Bk III

1
ADRIANOPLE AND AFTER

The embassy which came to the Sacred Court of Valens Augustus, emperor of the East, at Antioch in Syria in the spring of 376 was certainly important, but on the surface at least its substance was not unusual. The Tervingian Goths (later known as Visigoths),¹ under their chieftains Alavivus² and Fritigern,³ were encamped en masse on the northern bank of the Danube, opposite the Roman diocese of Thrace (Bulgaria and European Turkey, map II), and respectfully begged the emperor to grant them lands to settle within the empire, on the customary conditions of submission to Roman rule and the supply of fighting men for the imperial armies.⁴ They explained that they had been driven from their homelands, after very fierce fighting, by new and savage invaders, the Huns. A fearsome, demonic picture was painted of these ugly nomad warriors who were so primitive they dressed in skins, had no houses nor land but seemed to live on horseback, and whose cavalry was irresistible.⁵ They had defeated the Alans,⁶ and in alliance with the survivors had overwhelmed the Greuthungian Goths,⁷ driving them from their fertile lands westwards to the river Dneister.⁸ The Huns and their Alan allies then attacked the Tervingi, who were unable to withstand this combined assault and were compelled to migrate.⁹

Valens and his ministers already knew something of these troubles, for they had been in continual contact, hostile and friendly, with Gothic tribes and their leaders for many years. Ten years earlier Valens had led his army against the Tervingi in a long, largely successful but inconclusive war, ending at last in a treaty with their leader Athanaric¹⁰ which was concluded on a boat in the middle of the Danube, representing neutral territory.¹¹ The situation had now altered. The impact of the Huns had disrupted all of the societies beyond the Danube, including that of the Tervingi.¹² Athanaric had advocated continued resistance, but had been deserted by most of his people, who instead followed Alavivus and Fritigern in seeking asylum in Roman territory.¹³ Athanaric, with the rump of his followers, had retreated into Transylvania,¹⁴ having earlier (sometime before AD 367) sworn a solemn oath by his gods that he would never set foot on Roman territory.¹⁵ He may also have feared a refusal by Valens to allow him to enter the empire following their long conflict in the 360s.¹⁶

Fritigern, by contrast, was more pro-Roman and prepared to compromise.¹⁷ He was a leader of his people but not a king in the monarchical sense.¹⁸ In common with nearly all other Germanic leaders he had no means of organised coercion and no state apparatus. His authority rested partly on his noble lineage, but more important was his prowess and success in war and peace.¹⁹ He could exhort, threaten, persuade, but he could not compel. If he failed to deliver they would abandon him as they had abandoned Athanaric.²⁰ He therefore had to anticipate and guide their wishes with some skill, particularly through the lesser nobles who had the loyalties of the clans and subgroups.²¹ The momentous decision to emigrate might have been suggested by him, but it required collective tribal agreement. Once taken, he could steer it but no longer prevent it.

The imperial policy of controlled barbarian immigration, receptio,²² was long established. Provided it was on Roman terms—as part of the treaty following a victory, for example—it offered a simple means of recultivating deserted lands, securing a source of recruits for the army, and creating a safety-valve for the pressures of the tribes beyond the frontiers.²³ In consequence, a growing number of the subjects of Gaul, Italy and the Danube provinces were of barbarian origin (mainly Germanic) and semi-Romanised, as were most of the regular soldiers and officers in the army.²⁴

Valens was uncertain what course to take. From his distant base at Antioch it was difficult to assess the scale of the problem. Tribal wars were always taking place in the remote steppe lands far beyond the Danube, of which the Romans had only a hazy knowledge. Sometimes, news of them only reached the civilised world long after they were over and the whole picture altered.²⁵

Still, there were enough separate reports and petitions to indicate that this time something on a larger scale than usual was going on. The plight of the Goths seemed genuine, but what were their real numbers, and what scale of military threat would they present if refused?²⁶

Although he had been emperor of the East for some twelve years Valens was neither a very astute nor a decisive ruler.²⁷ He owned his throne entirely to his elder brother, the great and warlike Valentinian, who had been elected emperor by the army and, against sincere advice, ²⁸ had chosen his brother to rule jointly with him in the collegial custom which the beleaguered empire had followed for nearly a century.²⁹ Valentinian had ruled the West vigorously, throwing the invading Alamanni back across the Rhine, rescuing Britain from barbarian invasions, and crushing a separatist revolt in Africa.³⁰ Valens in the East had been overshadowed and implicitly protected by the ferocious military prowess of his brother,³¹ but a year earlier Valentinian had died suddenly, of a stroke, while angrily haranguing some barbarian envoys.³² The Western throne had passed to his teenage son Gratian, who also lived in the shadow of the heroic dead emperor.

Valens had to depend more than ever on his ministers in the Consistory,³³ men such as the Praetorian Prefect Modestus,³⁴ and the two finance ministers Fortunatianus³⁵ and Tatianus.³⁶ They mostly favoured acceptance, arguing that this addition of Gothic manpower would greatly strengthen both Valens’ army and his treasury. The new supply of soldiers would relieve landowners of the duty to supply recruits, so that they could pay their taxes in gold instead.³⁷ This advice might be sound, but it may not have been disinterested. The new levies of gold would, of course, pass through the sticky fingers of these ministers and their clients all down the line. Barbarian tribal groups had been settled before, but rarely in such numbers.³⁸ The Tervingi promised ‘submission’ of course, but that was a diplomatic formula being used in the absence of any demonstration of Roman military superiority. How could they be controlled in practice? More reports were arriving of yet another Gothic people, the Greuthungi (later Ostrogoths),³⁹ having likewise migrated to the northern bank of the Danube. Would they too want admission?

Valens had little room to manoeuvre. The worst result would be a general Gothic invasion across the Danube, on a greater scale than anything for a century.⁴⁰ His armies along the Danubian frontier were hardly strong enough to repel such a threat, and he could not afford to transfer many troops from the East since a new war with Persia was looming.⁴¹ He therefore accepted his ministers’ advice and agreed to the immigration of the Tervingi across into Thrace. The Persian problem kept Valens at Antioch, so that he could not oversee this highly sensitive and important operation in person. Instead he sent instructions on conducting the immigration to his local officials.

Alavivus and Fritigern were informed of the decision. The great crossing was to be assisted with boats and rafts. Their people were to be given immediate provisions from state supplies, and later allotted suitable land to cultivate. In return, they promised peace with the empire and readiness to supply troops on request. As an earnest of the treaty⁴² the two chieftains agreed to give a large number of hostages to the empire, and they were questioned on their adherence to the religion of the emperor, which was Arian Christianity.⁴³ Valens and his officials expressed great satisfaction at the bargain. And so, ‘With such great eagerness on the part of these insistent men was the ruin of the Roman world brought in’, wrote a contemporary historian some ten years later, with bitter hindsight.⁴⁴

The Danube was swollen with rains. As the great host was ferried across in boats, on rafts or even hollowed tree-trunks, it quickly became clear that, with their families, wagons and livestock, their numbers were far greater than anticipated. Regulation proved virtually impossible. Some drowned in the crossing. Exactly how the warriors were to be disarmed is not clear, but the orders were either disregarded or impractical. The potential for exploitation of such a desperate mass was obviously recognised by many on the Roman side, and this was compounded by the huge logistical problem of feeding and supplying such vast numbers: a task which would have strained the most efficient and honest of administrators. Soon hunger and desperation were widespread amongst the immigrants.

The administrators in question, Count Lupicinus⁴⁵ and his colleague Maximus,⁴⁶ had their own priorities. Instead of organising rapid and judicious dispersal from the original great encampments, Lupicinus let hunger do its work until even dogmeat was being sold to the Visigoths⁴⁷ at extortionate prices, which sometimes included the enslavement of their children. Soon their indignation was close to exploding, and Lupicinus hastily mustered his troops and began the long overdue transfer to permanent and dispersed settlements further from the frontier. Revolt might have broken out then had not Fritigern, a shrewd strategist, disguised his anger at the treatment of his people and, presenting a reasonable face to the Romans, persuaded the Visigoths to bide their time.⁴⁸

By this time the Greuthungi, likewise fleeing from Hunnic pressure, had also petitioned Valens for land south of the Danube.⁴⁹ However, now realising the extent of the Visigothic immigration and its problems, Valens refused to admit the Greuthungi. While Lupicinus and his forces were escorting the Visigoths away from the frontier zone the usual defensive river patrols seem to have been neglected, and the leaders of the Greuthungi—Alatheus⁵⁰ and Saphrax⁵¹—seized the opportunity to cross the river in makeshift boats with as many warriors as possible, hoping to follow and link up with Fritigern.⁵²

Fritigern’s main body, still under arms, moved obediently towards the city of Marcianople, near modern Varna, where there were ample markets to supply them. Here Lupicinus seems to have tried a very clumsy stratagem to separate the warriors from their leaders. In a show of friendship Alavivus and Fritigern were invited, with their bodyguard, to a banquet in the city while their followers were kept outside the city walls by a strong body of troops. The Visigoths protested loudly, both to the troops and to the local inhabitants, at being denied access to the markets and cheated once again. This quickly turned into a riot, then a battle, in which Lupicinus’ troops were defeated. The news reached Lupicinus, who was apparently no longer sober, and he gave secret orders to cut down the Visigothic bodyguard and to hold Alavivus and Fritigern captive. However Fritigern had also heard the news, and with great presence of mind he calmed his host and explained that it was all a local commotion of no consequence; but, he pointed out, it might become dangerous if his people could not see their chieftain unharmed and be reassured by his presence. Lupicinus grasped the offer and Fritigern returned to his people, where he promptly signalled them to prepare for battle.⁵³

Lupicinus and his forces were routed with great loss; characteristically he fled the field and disappeared into political oblivion. The result was probably the worst possible outcome: Valens, through the venality and incompetence of his officials, now had to face a war with the Visigoths well inside Roman territory, which proved to be inconclusive and destructive to the frontier provinces. Fritigern’s horde moved through Thrace and Moesia, pillaging at will and drawing additional strength from Gothic and other barbarian slaves, earlier settlers from beyond the frontiers, miners fleeing harsh labour and peasants who revolted and joined the Visigoths. The Greuthungi⁵⁴ were now also established south of the Danube and added to the threat. Valens ordered more troops to the Danube area from the Armenian frontier, and appealed to Gratian in the West for assistance.⁵⁵ There were Roman successes in the following two years, but they did not achieve a decisive victory and the war could not be brought to a conclusion.⁵⁶ When Valens moved briefly to Constantinople the mob taunted him for his spinelessness and he quickly left the city again.⁵⁷

Gratian was preoccupied with the Rhine frontier, but eventually achieved a major victory over the Alamanni⁵⁸ and in 378 he marched eastwards with a large field army to assist his uncle. Valens seems to have been in two minds. He welcomed his nephew’s aid, but envied him his recent victory. Valens’ own general Sebastianus⁵⁹ had recently won a battle against the Goths in the region of Adrianople (Edirne in modern Turkey). Since the Goths had already been weakened by years of fighting and recent defeats, surely he could deliver the final crushing blow himself without waiting for Gratian to share in the victory?⁶⁰

By now Valens had assembled a considerable field army from all over the eastern empire, the largest concentration of force that had been seen for many years, commanded by men of a very different calibre from Lupicinus. The detailed preparations, false assumptions, blunders, opportunities and strokes of fortune that attend a defeat often seem indistinguishable from those of a victory. Perhaps all one can say is that Fritigern made mistakes, but Valens made more. The Roman army moved westwards, shadowing the Visigoths, and scouts reported—wrongly—that the enemy force was much smaller than their own. Fritigern, having been defeated by Sebastianus as a result of over-dispersal, concentrated his forces and sent urgent appeals to his Greuthungian allies to join him.⁶¹ In the meantime he did all he could to delay the onset of battle.

Outside the great walled city of Adrianople Valens built a fortified camp and held a council of war⁶² . Gratian’s advance guard had already arrived and their commander, Richomer,⁶³ urged Valens to stay on the defensive and to await the arrival of the main western army. Victor,⁶⁴ Valens’ Master of Cavalry (Magister Equitum), seconded this view. However, Sebastianus was all for launching an immediate attack, which was what...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• PLATES
• MAPS
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• PART I: THE CRUCIBLE
• PART II: THE CHANGED BACKGROUND
• PART III: CONFRONTATION
• PART IV: THE UNRAVELLING
• APPENDIX I: THE BATTLE OF ADRIANOPLE—ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
• APPENDIX II: THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE LATER FOURTH CENTURY—COMMAND STRUCTURES, COMPOSITION AND SIZE
• APPENDIX III: THE DYNASTIES OF VALENTINIAN AND THEODOSIUS
• APPENDIX IV: BARBARIAN SETTLEMENTS
• APPENDIX V: FOURTH-CENTURY BARBARIAN OFFICERS IN THE ROMAN ARMY
• REFERENCES AND NOTES
• SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY