Social Power in International Politics

Peter van Ham

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781135159993
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Social power, defined as "the ability to set standards, create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment", is a central part of contemporary international politics.

This text introduces and defines the concept of social power and considers how it works in international politics. It demonstrates how social power is a complex phenomenon that manifests itself in a wide variety of ways and circumstances, particularly in culture, institutions, law, and the media. Providing a global perspective on the role of social power from the EU, the US, the Middle East, and China, this book:

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• Focuses on the key aspects of social power: centrality, complexity, and comprehensiveness.
• Examines the complex relationship between soft and hard power, the role of the media, and new communications technologies.

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• Explores the interplay between state and non-state actors in framing the public discourse, setting the agenda, molding identities, and ultimately determining the outcome of policy processes.
• Features a broad range of international case studies and addresses issues including: culture and pop culture, media, public diplomacy, and branding.

With particular focus on the social power of non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, the media, and consumers, Social Power in International Politics offers a thought-provoking new perspective on how power is exercised in the complex reality of the contemporary world. It will be of particular interest to students and scholars of international relations, political science, and media and communications studies.

1
Social power defined

1.1 INTRODUCTION

When W.B. Yeats wrote his famous poem The Second Coming, in the revolutionary aftermath of World War I, it was generally assumed that the established rules and mores had been overtaken by events, and were ready for a major and radical overhaul. Indeed, anarchy was looming, things seemed to be falling apart, and traditional institutions of authority were no longer able to keep the center together. Although today’s political tableau is less ominous and does not foreshadow a looming anarchy, it seems clear that we are equally witnessing a major reshuffling of economic, political, and social cards on the global stage. As Richard Haass has argued, the world is entering a new era “dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power.”¹

Although still dominant, the United States is no longer the unquestioned hegemon, setting and maintaining the guidelines of the world economy, international politics, and law.² Rising powers like China and India claim their rightful place in world politics, and want to get their voices heard and respected. Russia, which had its wings clipped after the end of the Cold War, is re-emerging, using military bullying and its abundant energy supplies as tools of statecraft.³ On the other hand, globalization and the ongoing revolution in information technology (IT) continue to level the playing field between industrial and developing countries, making the world “flat”, in Thomas L. Friedman’s well-known phrase.⁴ New Internet-based media are changing the global information environment, making it hard for classical gatekeepers (like the state) to control information, and easier for a multitude of social actors (especially firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) to influence political agendas and priorities. This makes it questionable “whether any country can any longer consistently wield ‘super’ or even ‘great’ power, given the sheer pace and complexity of systemic changes, a global crisis of political authority, and the influence of so many polities of different types on a host of crucial issues.”⁵ The 2008 meltdown of the global financial system has further undermined the self-confidence of Western powers, whose role has been reduced to “impotent commentators.”⁶

The sheer complexity and dynamics of global economic and political change requires a thorough reconsideration of one of the most fundamental concepts of the social sciences: power. The debate about power is ongoing, and remains central to the study of international politics.⁷ The godfathers of the discipline of international relations (IR), like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Karl W. Deutsch, were all primarily concerned with the working and distribution of power in the international system. Going further back in time, the philosophical roots of IR can be found in the classical works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, whose tracts on war and conflict tried to answer the key questions: what is power and how can, or should it be used? Today, the debate about power is predicated on the understanding that the character of international politics is changing, and that we are moving away from classical state-based authority towards “global governance.”⁸ As David Held has it, “we must recognize that political power is being repositioned, recontextualized, and, to a degree, transformed by the growing importance of other less territorially based power systems.”⁹

But radical change is not limited to the sphere of international politics. Social scientists remind us that power is all around us. No one can escape power relationships, since we all influence each other and are in turn influenced by others. Since the most common definition of power is the sense of someone getting someone else to do something they would otherwise not do, we are confronted with power within the family, as consumers, voters, lovers, and in all other social relationships.¹⁰ Why we buy a certain product, support a certain presidential candidate, or accept a foreign country’s political leadership, all boils down to the power of branding, spin-doctoring, or loyalty. As a result, power becomes ubiquitous, in the sense that it is in all arenas of social life, as well as complex, since it is often ambiguous who exercises power, and how.¹¹ Little surprise, therefore, that new facets and loci of authority, as well as new notions of power have come to the fore.¹²

This is reflected in today’s political debate, which suggests that power comes in all shapes and sizes, catering to all tastes. Idealists with sanguine views about human nature may champion the notion of soft, smart, or sticky power, convinced as they are that persuasion and benchmarking will get the best out of Man, as well as out of states.¹³ Skeptics and self-styled Realists who take anarchy for granted, continue to rely on hard, military power as the final judge of who is right, or at least who will get his right.¹⁴ Since the Realist notion of power is the “meaning-in-use” in both the public and academic discourse of international politics, newer notions of power challenge and destabilize the debate. They give rise to several fundamental questions: How should we study power? Is it based on, or embedded in, resources or in relationships? Should we examine structures or focus on agency? Is power a potentiality or an actuality? Which actors are the most salient, deserving our attention?

Depending on one’s theoretical and methodological choices, power is defined and measured differently. The study of power remains riddled with ontological dilemmas, turning it into an intellectual battleground whose outcome remains undecided.¹⁵ In particular, making comparable judgments on the extent of power remains an intractable source of controversy. Who affects whom, and who has more influence over matters of central importance, ultimately seems to boil down to a value judgment. In this context, Friedrich Kratochwil has big-heartedly made the case for pragmatism, calling upon scholars to continue their research despite uncertainties and unknowns, and in the absence of logically defensible warrants.¹⁶ It is with this encouragement in mind that this book studies a particular face of power, which I label “social power.” The term is not new, and has obviously been used more widely and more often in sociology than in the study of international relations.¹⁷ This introductory chapter defines social power, relating it to other relevant notions of power and legitimacy. Although this opening chapter will set the theoretical stage, subsequent chapters will further clarify the notion of social power, explain its relevance and limits, and make clear why it is a key concept to understanding contemporary international politics.

There are many different ways to get one’s arms around the concept of social power. To start with, the “social” in social power derives from the understanding that power is fluid and non-linear, and that it moves through relationships and communication. For example, merely looking at resources and objective capabilities is hardly useful without examining how they are used and perceived by other relevant actors. Realists generally examine power in terms of coercion, as something that is possessed and accumulated, measurable, visible, and working on the surface. The study of social power, however, takes a markedly different approach, looking for power beneath the surface, as permeating all social relationships, institutions, discourses, and media.¹⁸ The notion of social power aims to offer a necessary alternative conceptualization of power since it acknowledges that the exercise of power always takes place in a specific social situation and is therefore inherently contextual. Just as a gun secretly hidden in a closet without anyone knowing about it does not result in a credible threat of force, social power is contingent upon interaction, communication, relationships, and institutions. Or, as Yale H. Ferguson has argued: “[p]ower is not like money in the bank, [but] rather a relative matter. The effective exercise of potential power is dependent on the actors being targeted, the issue involved, and prevailing circumstances.”¹⁹

Power therefore comprises a dual ontology: one based on social interaction, and one as an essential condition and resource. This is obviously confusing. Social power’s ontology, however, is much clearer, since (as the concept itself indicates) it is predicated upon the notion that this face of power derives from communication, social knowledge, and economic and political interaction. This implies that social power only works in relationships and is ultimately dependent upon the perception of others. David A. Baldwin has already recognized power to be situationally specific, mainly because power is exercised in a reciprocal relationship between two or more actors.²⁰ And, as Alain Touraine has claimed, “all social relations include power relations. There is no purely horizontal social relation.”²¹ For social power to become part of a strategic doctrine, policymakers must think carefully about how to use power. Policymakers realize that they can never take social power for granted, although they generally remain confused about how to use it. Moreover, since continuing relations give rise to social learning, social power is inevitably a long-term process, and should be studied as such.

What counts as power and being powerful remains controversial. Steven Lukes suggests that the study of power is fraud with two basic mistakes: first, the so-called “exercise fallacy”, which assumes that “power can only mean the causing of an observable sequence of events”; and second, the “vehicle fallacy”, which “equates power with power resources.”²² Often, the exercise of power suggests activity and agency to bring about certain intended consequences, whereas passivity and non-action may at times demonstrate an actor’s power to resist change. More often than not, the assumption is made that power involves going against the interests of others, which excludes significant parts of the more novel (and as I will argue: more interesting) aspects of social power, which include agenda-setting, framing, public diplomacy, as well as (place) branding. Social power is often used to advance policy issues not against the interests of others, but by co-opting other actors, rather than coercing them. Whereas Realists generally look for power in situations characterized by conflict, social power is frequently (but not exclusively) found in cases which seem harmonious, at least on the surface.

R.P. Wolff’s well-known example illuminates the subtle difference between power based on pure, often physical coercion, and social power: If I am forced at gunpoint to hand over my money, I am subject to coercive power, but if I pay my taxes (although I may dislike it and even occasionally cheat), I recognize legitimate authority, acknowledging the social power of the state.²³ Most European states have gone through the historical phase when tribute was paid to kings, which over centuries was transformed into paying taxes to governments. In this case, the difference is made by the new element of legitimacy, which transforms theft into a civic duty. It is therefore important to recognize that legitimacy may confer power, but should not be confused with power itself. From this perspective, legitimacy is just one method to socialize power.²⁴

Social power is also at play when mothers are “not angry, but disappointed” by their children’s behavior, by shoppers who buy Nike in order to fit in with their peers, or by European Union (EU) member states who reluctantly comply with EU regulations due to a complex mix of international legal constraints, political factors, and normative pressure. Social power is at work when the United States tries to touch the “hearts and minds” of the men and women on the “Arab street”, trying to entice them to embark upon the thorny road towards liberal democracy. It is also at work when cities and states make efforts to lure tourists and students to spend time and money in their territory, or when US President George W. Bush takes tar and feathers to brand countries like Iran and North Korea as the Axis of Evil. In all these cases, power is embedded in complex, reciprocal relationships. At times it may not even be clear who has (let alone exercises) power. For example, it is uncertain whether social power is applied by consumers who buy Nike, or by Nike who gets consumers to buy their product. Generally, product branding suggests that Nike draws on social power. But when an organized consumer boycott pushes Nike to change social standards in Asian sweatshops, it is clearly the other way round.²⁵ Studying social power is therefore a highly contextual affair, which prohibits the drawing of general conclusions based on sweeping statements.

Admittedly, this complicates any study on the nature, locus, and scope of power in international politics, since it becomes problematical to distinguish between the hard power based on coercive measures (be they economic or military in nature), and the social power based on non-coercive mechanisms, structures, and processes. Whereas military power is visible and mediagenic (battleships are moved, and shots fired, oftentimes live on TV), social power generally lacks visibility and public attention. By their very nature, institutions and relationships are visually unappealing, and often elusive. The simplicity and straightforward quality of hard power stands in stark contrast to the complexity and ambiguity of social power.

Studying the Cold War’s dying years offers us some good insights into the complex interplay between hard and social power. Obviously, the West “won” this Cold War, since its own societal model has prevailed.²⁶ But how did the West “win”, and by which means? By outspending the Soviets through a military arms race? Or by the luring vistas of political and religious freedom, combined with affluence and consumerism? Soviet dictator Stalin famously asked: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” Stalin subscribed to an undiluted Realist worldview, seeing the globe like a chess game ultimately determined by sheer military force.²⁷ It was a twist of fate that the Polish Pope John Paul II may have been instrumental in undoing the Soviet “Evil Empire” not with military divisions, but by using the social power vested in his authority as leader of the Roman Catholic Church.²⁸ Others argue that it was globalization which gave the kiss of death to the Soviet system, since the image of an affluent Western society was just too enticing for ordinary people in Central and Eastern Europe to ignore.²⁹ As Benjamin Barber submits, the Communist revolutions of the late-1980s were less over the right to vote, than the right to shop.³⁰ This suggests that both explanations can hold true. Both the hard power of US President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or “Star Wars” as it was informally referred to), and the social power of a liberal democracy-cum-market economy have been at play.

But “the memory of the past is a prize worth struggling for”, as Tina Rosenberg has rightfully argued.³¹ By claiming that “NATO won the Cold War” under US leadership, the role of hard, military power has become privileged, offering American policymakers the discursive power to define economic, social, and political problems, and suggest policy solutions (viz. the 1999 Kosovo intervention, and the 2003 Iraq war). Those who argue that Western social power and globalization have been equally instrumental in undoing the Soviet system have a more complex story to tell since where hard power is visible, social power is intangible and versatile.³² Moreover, and as we will discuss later on in this chapter, social power cannot be wielded easily, or deliberately and persistently applied by policymakers. Quite...

Table of contents

• The New International Relations
• Contents
• Series editor’s preface
• Preface
• 1 Social power defined
• 2 Geopolitics and hegemony
• 3 Culture and constructivism
• 4 Institutions and law
• 5 Media and globalization
• 6 Public diplomacy
• 7 Place branding
• 8 Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index