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Why have people from different cultures and eras formulated myths and stories with similar structures? What does this similarity tell us about the mind, morality, and structure of the world itself? From the author of 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos comes a provocative hypothesis that explores the connection between what modern neuropsychology tells us about the brain and what rituals, myths, and religious stories have long narrated. A cutting-edge work that brings together neuropsychology, cognitive science, and Freudian and Jungian approaches to mythology and narrative, Maps of Meaning presents a rich theory that makes the wisdom and meaning of myth accessible to the critical modern mind.
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Yes, you can access Maps of Meaning by Jordan B. Peterson in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Psychology & Psychotherapy. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.
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1
MAPS OF EXPERIENCE
MAPS OF EXPERIENCE
Object and Meaning
The world can be validly construed as forum for action, or as place of things.The former manner of interpretation-more primordial, and less clearly understood-finds its expression in the arts or humanities, in ritual, drama, literature and mythology. The world as forum for action is a place of value, a place where all things have meaning. This meaning, which is shaped as a consequence of social interaction, is implication for action, or at a higher level of analysisimplication for the configuration of the interpretive schema that produces or guides action.The latter manner of interpretation-the world as place of things-finds its formal expression in the methods and theories of science. Science allows for increasingly precise determination of the consensually validatable properties of things, and for efficient utilization of precisely determined things as tools (once the direction such use is to take has been determined, through application of more fundamental narrative processes).No complete world-picture can be generated without use of both modes of construal. The fact that one mode is generally set at odds with the other means only that the nature of their respective domains remains insufficiently discriminated. Adherents of the mythological worldview tend to regard the statements of their creeds as indistinguishable from empirical âfact,â even though such statements were generally formulated long before the notion of objective reality emerged. Those who, by contrast, accept the scientific perspectiveâwho assume that it is, or might become, complete-forget that an impassable gulf currently divides what is from what should be.We need to know four things:what there is,what to do about what there is,that there is a difference between knowing what there is, and knowing what to do about what there isand what that difference is.
To explore something, to âdiscover what it isââthat means most importantly to discover its significance for motor output, within a particular social context, and only more particularly to determine its precise objective sensory or material nature. This is knowledge in the most basic of sensesâand often constitutes sufficient knowledge.
Imagine that a baby girl, toddling around in the course of her initial tentative investigations, reaches up onto a countertop to touch a fragile and expensive glass sculpture. She observes its color, sees its shine, feels that it is smooth and cold and heavy to the touch. Suddenly her mother interferes, grasps her hand, tells her not to ever touch that object. The child has just learned a number of specifically consequential things about the sculptureâhas identified its sensory properties, certainly. More importantly, however, she has determined that approached in the wrong manner, the sculpture is dangerous (at least in the presence of mother); has discovered as well that the sculpture is regarded more highly, in its present unaltered configuration, than the exploratory tendencyâat least (once again) by mother. The baby girl has simultaneously encountered an object, from the empirical perspective, and its socioculturally determined status. The empirical object might be regarded as those sensory properties âintrinsicâ to the object. The status of the object, by contrast, consists of its meaningâconsists of its implication for behavior. Everything a child encounters has this dual nature, experienced by the child as part of a unified totality. Everything is something, and means somethingâand the distinction between essence and significance is not necessarily drawn.
The significance of somethingâspecified in actuality as a consequence of exploratory activity undertaken in its vicinityâtends ânaturallyâ to become assimilated to the object itself. The object, after all, is the proximal cause or the stimulus that âgives riseâ to action conducted in its presence. For people operating naturally, like the child, what something signifies is more or less inextricably part of the thing, part of its magic. The magic is of course due to apprehension of the specific cultural and intrapsychic significance of the thing, and not to its objectively determinable sensory qualities. Everyone understands the child who says, for example, âI saw a scary manâ; the childâs description is immediate and concrete, even though he or she has attributed to the object of perception a quality that is in fact context-dependent and subjective. It is difficult, after all, to realize the subjective nature of fear, and not to feel threat as part of the ârealâ world.
The automatic attribution of meaning to thingsâor the failure to distinguish between them initiallyâis a characteristic of narrative, of myth, not of scientific thought. Narrative accurately captures the nature of raw experience. Things are scary, people are irritating, events are promising, food is satisfyingâat least in terms of our basic experience. The modern mind, which regards itself as having transcended the domain of the magical, is nonetheless still endlessly capable of âirrationalâ (read motivated) reactions. We fall under the spell of experience whenever we attribute our frustration, aggression, devotion or lust to the person or situation that exists as the proximal âcauseâ of such agitation. We are not yet âobjective,â even in our most clear-headed moments (and thank God for that). We become immediately immersed in a motion picture or a novel, and willingly suspend disbelief. We become impressed or terrified, despite ourselves, in the presence of a sufficiently powerful cultural figurehead (an intellectual idol, a sports superstar, a movie actor, a political leader, the pope, a famous beauty, even our superior at work)âin the presence, that is, of anyone who sufficiently embodies the oft-implicit values and ideals that protect us from disorder and lead us on. Like the medieval individual, we do not even need the person to generate such affect. The icon will suffice. We will pay vast sums of money for articles of clothing worn or personal items used or created by the famous and infamous of our time.9
The ânatural,â pre-experimental, or mythical mind is in fact primarily concerned with meaningâwhich is essentially implication for actionâand not with âobjectiveâ nature. The formal object, as conceptualized by modern scientifically oriented consciousness, might appear to those still possessed by the mythic imaginationâif they could âseeâ it at allâas an irrelevant shell, as all that was left after everything intrinsically intriguing had been stripped away. For the pre-experimentalist, the thing is most truly the significance of its sensory properties, as they are experienced in subjective experienceâin affect, or emotion. And, in truthâin real lifeâto know what something is still means to know two things about it: its motivational relevance, and the specific nature of its sensory qualities. The two forms of knowing are not identical; furthermore, experience and registration of the former necessarily precedes development of the latter. Something must have emotional impact before it will attract enough attention to be explored and mapped in accordance with its sensory properties. Those sensory propertiesâof prime import to the experimentalist or empiricistâare meaningful only insofar as they serve as cues for determining specific affective relevance or behavioral significance. We need to know what things are not to know what they are but to keep track of what they meanâto understand what they signify for our behavior.
It has taken centuries of firm discipline and intellectual training, religious, protoscientific and scientific, to produce a mind capable of concentrating on phenomena that are not yet or are no longer immediately intrinsically grippingâto produce a mind that regards real as something separable from relevant. Alternatively, it might be suggested that all the myth has not yet vanished from science, devoted as it is to human progress, and that it is this nontrivial remainder that enables the scientist to retain undimmed enthusiasm while endlessly studying his fruitflies.
How, precisely, did people think, not so very long ago, before they were experimentalists? What were things before they were objective things? These are very difficult questions. The âthingsâ that existed prior to the development of experimental science do not appear valid either as things or as the meaning of things to the modern mind. The question of the nature of the substance of solâthe sunâ(to take a single example) occupied the minds of those who practiced the pre-experimental âscienceâ of alchemy for many hundreds of years. We would no longer presume even that the sun has a uniform substance, unique to it, and would certainly take exception to the properties attributed to this hypothetical element by the medieval alchemist, if we allowed its existence. Carl Jung, who spent much of the latter part of his life studying medieval thought patterns, characterized sol:
The sun signifies first of all gold, whose [alchemical] sign it shares. But just as the âphilosophicalâ gold is not the âcommonâ gold, so the sun is neither just the metallic gold nor the heavenly orb. Sometimes the sun is an active substance hidden in the gold and is extracted [alchemically] as the tinctura rubea (red tincture). Sometimes, as the heavenly body, it is the possessor of magically effective and transformative rays. As gold and a heavenly body it contains an active sulphur of a red colour, hot and dry. Because of this red sulphur the alchemical sun, like the corresponding gold, is red. As every alchemist knew, gold owes its red color to the admixture of Cu (copper), which he interpreted as Kypris (the Cyprian, Venus), mentioned in Greek alchemy as the transformative substance. Redness, heat, and dryness are the classical qualities of the Egyptian Set (Greek Typhon), the evil principle which, like the alchemical sulphur, is closely connected with the devil. And just as Typhon has his kingdom in the forbidden sea, so the sun, as sol centralis, has its sea, its âcrude perceptible water,â and as sol coelestis its âsubtle imperceptible water.â This sea water (aqua pontica) is extracted from sun and moonâŚ.The active sun-substance also has favourable effects. As the so-called âbalsamâ it drips from the sun and produces lemons, oranges, wine, and, in the mineral kingdom, gold.10
We can barely understand such a description, contaminated as it is by imaginative and mythological associations peculiar to the medieval mind. It is precisely this fantastical contamination, however, that renders the alchemical description worth examiningânot from the perspective of the history of science, concerned with the examination of outdated objective ideas, but from the perspective of psychology, focused on the interpretation of subjective frames of reference.
âIn it [the âIndian Ocean,â in this example] are images of heaven and earth, of summer, autumn, winter, and spring, male and female. If thou callest this spiritual, what thou doest is probable; if corporeal, thou sayest the truth; if heavenly, thou liest not; if earthly, thou hast well spoken.â11 The alchemist could not separate his subjective ideas about the nature of thingsâthat is, his hypothesesâfrom the things themselves. His hypotheses, in turnâproducts of his imaginationâwere derived from the unquestioned and unrecognized âexplanatoryâ presuppositions that made up his culture. The medieval man lived, for example, in a universe that was moralâwhere everything, even ores and metals, strived above all for perfection.12 Things, for the alchemical mind, were therefore characterized in large part by their moral natureâby their impact on what we would describe as affect, emotion or motivation; were therefore characterized by their relevance or value (which is impact on affect). Description of this relevance took narrative form, mythic formâas in the example drawn from Jung, where the sulphuric aspect of the sunâs substance is attributed negative, demonic characteristics. It was the great feat of science to strip affect from perception, so to speak, and to allow for the description of experiences purely in terms of their consensually apprehensible features. However, it is the case that the affects generated by experiences are real, as well. The alchemists, whose conceptualizations intermingled affect with sense, dealt with affect as a matter of course (although they did not âknowâ itânot explicitly). We have removed the affect from the thing, and can therefore brilliantly manipulate the thing. We are still victims, however, of the uncomprehended emotions generated byâwe would say, in the presence ofâthe thing. We have lost the mythic universe of the pre-experimental mind, or have at least ceased to further its development. That loss has left our increased technological power ever more dangerously at the mercy of our still unconscious systems of valuation.
Prior to the time of Descartes, Bacon and Newton, man lived in an animated, spiritual world, saturated with meaning, imbued with moral purpose. The nature of this purpose was revealed in the stories people told each otherâstories about the structure of the cosmos and the place of man. But now we think empirically (at least we think we think empirically), and the spirits that once inhabited the universe have vanished. The forces released by the advent of the experiment have wreaked havoc within the mythic world. Jung states:
How totally different did the world appear to medieval man! For him the earth was eternally fixed and at rest in the center of the universe, encircled by the course of a sun that solicitously bestowed its warmth. Men were all children of God under the loving care of the Most High, who prepared them for eternal blessedness; and all knew exactly what they should do and how they should conduct themselves in order to rise from a corruptible world to an incorruptible and joyous existence. Such a life no longer seems real to us, even in our dreams. Natural science has long ago torn this lovely veil to shreds.13
Even if the medieval individual was not in all cases tenderly and completely enraptured by his religious beliefs (he was a great believer in hell, for example), he was certainly not plagued by the plethora of rational doubts and moral uncertainties that beset his modern counterpart. Religion for the pre-experimental mind was not so much a matter of faith as a matter of factâwhich means that the prevailing religious viewpoint was not merely one compelling theory among many.
The capacity to maintain explicit belief in religious âfact,â however, has been severely undermined in the last few centuriesâfirst in the West, and then everywhere else. A succession of great scientists and iconoclasts has demonstrated that the universe does not revolve around man, that our notion of separate status from and âsuperiorityâ to the animal has no empirical basis, and that there is no God in heaven (nor even a heaven, as far as the eye can see). In consequence, we no longer belie...
Table of contents
- Cover
- Half Title
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Table of Contents
- PREFACE Descensus ad Inferos
- 1 Maps of Experience: Object and Meaning
- 2 Maps of Meaning: Three Levels of Analysis
- 3 Apprenticeship and Enculturation: Adoption of a Shared Map
- 4 The Appearance of Anomaly: Challenge to the Shared Map
- 5 The Hostile Brothers: Archetypes of Response to the Unknown
- Notes
- References
- Permissions
- Index