Niklas Luhmann

Christian Borch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781134008292
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Niklas Luhmann offers an accessible introduction to one of the most important sociologists of our time. It presents the key concepts within Luhmann's multifaceted theory of modern society, and compares them with the work of other key social theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, and Zygmunt Bauman.

The book pays particular attention to introducing and discussing Luhmann's original sociological systems theory. It presents a thorough investigation into the different phases of his oeuvre, through which both the shifting emphases as well as the continuities in his thinking are shown. The primary focus of this text is Luhmann's theory of modern society as being differentiated into a plethora of 'function systems' – such as politics, law, and economy – which operate according to their own distinct logics and which cannot interfere with one another. For Luhmann, this functional differentiation works as a bulwark against totalitarian rule, and as such is a key foundation of modern democracy. Furthermore, the book critically examines the implications of this functional differentiation for inclusion and exclusion dynamics, as well as for the understanding of power and politics.

This is a key text for both undergraduate and postgraduate students of areas including contemporary social theory, political sociology, and sociology.

1

Introduction

A THEORY OF SOCIETY

Is it possible to grasp the complexity of the entire social world? How to account for phenomena ranging from the politics of climate change to the ways we address our beloved ones? Is it feasible within one single sociological framework to conceive of anything from modern science and economy to exclusion patterns in Brazilian favelas, and from legal decisions to the way artists communicate? While many would find such a challenge too big, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann did not find it insurmountable. He developed an exceptionally sophisticated theory of society which was based on a simple severance, namely the distinction between a system and its environment. On the basis of this fundamental separation he set out to seize the complexity of the world, a venture he pursued in around 75 books and 500 articles.

Luhmann worked as a sociologist at Bielefeld University, Germany, where he was appointed professor in 1969 when the university had just been established. With a population today of around 330,000 people and located some 400 kilometres west of Berlin, Bielefeld does not occupy a central place in the German social and political landscape. Yet ever since its inauguration the city’s university has created a very stimulating environment for sociological thought, which has attracted a number of prominent sociologists. For example, Nobert Elias was visiting professor at the university’s sociological faculty for several years. Likewise, Karin Knorr Cetina was professor at Bielefeld University for almost two decades. It was within this intellectually inspiring environment that Luhmann developed his grand sociological project.

In a retrospective comment Luhmann has remarked that, when he came to Bielefeld University in 1969, he was asked to assign a title to his research project. ‘My project was entitled, at that time and subsequently: theory of society; term: 30 years; costs: none’ (1997a: 11). For Luhmann, a theory of society refers to a sociological theory which is able to account for all societal phenomena. It was to this great task that de devoted his academic career. Luhmann’s emphasis on theory is not fortuitous, but rather an effect of the main problem he identified in the discipline of sociology. As he put it in a programmatic text,

Sociology is stuck in a theory crisis. Empirical research, though it has, on the whole, been successful in increasing knowledge, has not been able to produce a unified theory for the discipline. Being an empirical science, sociology cannot give up the claim that it checks its statements against data drawn from reality, no matter how old or new the bottles may be into which these data are poured. But it cannot use this principle of empirical scrutiny to account for the distinctiveness of its specific domain of research or its unity as a scientific discipline. Resignation about this is so widespread that no one even attempts such accounts any longer.

(Luhmann 1995g: xlv, italics added)

Luhmann could not accept this resignation. He therefore put all his energy into revitalising the idea of a universal sociological theory, i.e. a theory which would allow sociology to arrive at a more precise description of modern society in all its dimensions. Needless to say, creating such a unifying theory must be a highly abstract enterprise, and Luhmann made no pretentions that it would be an easy journey. Also, following the quote above, Luhmann professed that this journey would not be loaded with empirical data. Very appositely, he therefore used the metaphor of the pilot sitting in his or her cockpit to illustrate the venture:

Our flight must take place above the clouds, and we must reckon with a rather thick cloud cover. We must rely on our instruments. Occasionally, we may catch glimpses below of a land with roads, towns, rivers, and coastlines that remind us of something familiar, or glimpses of a larger stretch of landscape with the extinct volcanoes of Marxism. But no one should fall victim to the illusion that these few points of reference are sufficient to guide our flight.

(1995g: l)

This siding with abstract theorising gives a first indication of Luhmann’s distinctive position in social theory. He did not infuse himself in empirical work as did, for example, Michel Foucault who, rather than the pilot flying high in the sky, described his wok by way of the metaphor of the sperm whale that only surfaces occasionally (Foucault 2003: 4). To be sure, the strong belief in a unifying sociological theory is something that has been fiercely contested, from C. Wright Mills’ critique of Talcott Parsons to Bruno Latour’s critique of the canonised sociological tradition from Emile Durkheim to Pierre Bourdieu. Put differently, not only would many resign when confronted with the task of developing a universal theory; quite some sociologists would also deny its relevance. Luhmann disagreed with this and argued that sociology could only progress if provided with a new theoretical edifice.

One cannot expect a theory which claims to be able to understand all social phenomena to be easy to comprehend. The complexity of the social world will necessarily have to be mirrored in the theoretical corpus. This also applies to Luhmann’s sociology. Yet in Luhmann’s case, the complexity is not only a reflection of the variety of social phenomena he analysed (law, politics, science, art, love, economy, etc.). It is just as much a consequence of his specific approach. Thus, rather than merely reinterpreting classical sociological theories such as those put forward by Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Luhmann developed his theoretical framework on a multiplicity of resources from biology, philosophy, mathematics, cybernetics and so-called general systems theory. The interdisciplinary inclusion of this variety of inspirational sources, with which only few social scientists are familiar, has contributed to the highly difficult, if not outright inaccessible, character that many sociologists (rightly) think that Luhmann’s work has. However, it was also on the basis of this interdisciplinary approach that Luhmann arrived at some of his most thought-provoking ideas which sought to radically reformulate the foundation of modern sociology. For example, Luhmann entirely rejected the notion of subjects. Instead of operating with a basic distinction between subjects and objects, Luhmann suggested his separation between system and environment and argued that humans are not part of society, but belong instead to its environment. This idea is provocative in itself, but it appears even more astonishing when Luhmann at the same time centred his systems theory on the notion of communication and argued that it is not humans or subjects that communicate, but communication itself!

The present book is an attempt to unravel some of the complexity of Luhmann’s sociology. It aims to demonstrate that, even if Luhmann applied a vocabulary which at first sight appears rather foreign, one actually only needs to be acquainted with a few central notions in order to start seeing the social world in an entirely new way, namely the way it emerges when observed from the vantage point of sociological systems theory.

The book is structured as follows. In this introductory chapter I will begin with some brief biographical remarks on Luhmann, weaving into these biographical details some notes on his early theoretical work, and end with an overview of the various phases one can identify in his oeuvre. Chapter 2 deals with the fundamental architecture of Luhmann’s systems theory, including his notion of social systems, how they are conceived to be operationally closed and autopoietically organised and how social systems are distinguished from but nevertheless intimately related to psychic systems. Chapter 3 discusses Luhmann’s turn to so-called secondobservation and explores the epistemological consequences of his work. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 investigate different aspects of Luhmann’s general diagnosis of modernity, namely that modern society’s most significant trait is its functionally differentiated nature. First, Chapter 4 presents the key elements in this diagnosis: how functionally differentiated systems are organised. On this basis, Chapter 5 deals with the implications of functional differentiation. This discussion revolves around the de-centring of modern society that the diagnosis of functional differentiation entails, just as the consequences of this de-centring for society’s ability to handle ecological challenges and problems of risk are addressed. The chapter also discusses a possible new mode of societal differentiation that Luhmann identifies, namely that of inclusion/exclusion. Chapter 6 goes into detail with the political function system and also critically discusses Luhmann’s conception of power. Common to chapters 4, 5 and 6 is the attempt to make explicit the normative agenda underpinning Luhmann’s diagnosis of functional differentiation. I thus contend that, contrary to Luhmann’s self-proclaimed non-normativity, his discussions of functional differentiation bear witness to a clear normative defence of modernity. At times this normative defence is very explicit, at other times it appears in disguise. Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarise what I see as Luhmann’s main sociological achievements, as well as some of the main blind spots in his work.

I attempt in my approach to Luhmann to be loyal, but critical. Without being dogmatic, I will try to be faithful to Luhmann’s main ideas and flesh out some of the highly stimulating and thought-provoking suggestions that his systems theory offers. But I will also engage critically with his perspective and highlight what I consider controversial or problematic propositions. The critical reflections will appear throughout the book, but will be unfolded especially in the final chapters. In order to see the strengths and weaknesses of Luhmann’s theory, I will relate it throughout to the work of other key sociologists and social theorists.

SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

Niklas Luhmann was born in the German city of Lüneburg on 8 December 1927, thereby belonging to the same generation as other key modern sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) and Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). The most important biographical detail of Luhmann’s early life is that he was drafted for the German Luftwaffe at age 15, and against his will. Luhmann and his family were sternly opposed to the Nazi regime, and the experience with totalitarianism had a deep normative impact on Luhmann’s later theorising: although it was a virtue for Luhmann to be explicitly non-normative in his sociological work, he was always normatively in favour of modern society’s differentiation into autonomous function systems since this differentiation was society’s bulwark against collapsing into totalitarianism. Yet Luhmann suffered from no misconceptions; the differentiation of society did not entail any guarantees that no harms be done. He knew this from another formative experience from his youth. At the end of World War II Luhmann was captured by American forces and, what at first sight might have marked a welcome liberation from the Nazi regime, soon turned out to add to the negative experiences. Luhmann thus felt on his own body how the treatment of the prisoners of war violated international conventions (Luhmann in Horster 1997: 28). This taught him that notions such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ should only be used cautiously to assess political regimes (Luhmann 1987a: 129).

After the war Luhmann studied law and then worked for some years in the public administration. Alongside this work he pursued scholarly interests and published some articles on administration and organisations. The academic interest was further encouraged by a scholarship that Luhmann received and which allowed him to go to Talcott Parsons at Harvard University in 1960–1. Although Luhmann was familiar with sociological theory prior to his stay at Harvard, Parsons inspired him to cultivate the sociological interest – and to explore in detail the kind of functionalist approach that Parsons advocated. The result was not late in coming. Some of Luhmann’s first publications after he returned from the USA thus discussed the sociological advantages of functionalism (Luhmann 1962; 1964).

There are important differences between Luhmann’s and Parsons’ understandings of functionalism, however. Parsons developed a comprehensive structural-functionalist theory which argued that a social system is characterised by certain structures (a shared value system, as he called it), and that it can only be maintained if it fulfils specific functions. This focus on the maintenance of the system motivated the critique that Parsons’ sociological programme was inherently conservative; it did not adequately account for possible changes of the system. Contrary to Parsons Luhmann did not begin with structure. Rather his approach revolved around function, hence his argument that he enacted a transformation from (Parsonian) structural functionalism to a functionalist-structural systems theory (e.g. Luhmann 1967a). More specifically, Luhmann’s main point was to attribute a very different meaning to function than Parsons did. Thus, for Luhmann, functionalism refers to an essentially comparative approach which studies the possible relations between problems and solutions. That is, rather than operating with a strict causality between a given problem and its solution, Luhmann argued that sociology could use functionalism to look for functionally equivalent alternatives. If, for example, we are used to observing climate change as a problem that requires political solutions, Luhmann’s functionalist approach invites us to look for and compare alternative ways to solve this problem, be they of economic, scientific, legal, etc. form. In that sense the functional method seeks to provide new ways of conceiving the social world.

The fellowship at Harvard inspired Luhmann to pursue an academic career. He therefore left the administration to take up a position at the Academy for Administrative Sciences in Speyer, Germany, in 1962. Two years later he published his first major book, Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation (1964), through which Luhmann made his mark as a central organisation theorist in Germany. Luhmann’s intellectual capacities were easily seen, and it did not take long before one of Germany’s most influential sociologists at the time, Professor Helmut Schelsky, invited him to join him at Münster University and to be part of the Center for Social Research in Dortmund which Schelsky led from Münster. Besides being one of Germany’s most prominent sociologists, Schelsky was also deeply involved in instituting Bielefeld University. In particular, Schelsky played an important role in establishing in Bielefeld the first distinctive faculty of sociology in Germany. It was at this new faculty that Luhmann was appointed professor in 1969. He retired in 1993, but retained his affiliation with Bielefeld University till he died on 6 November 1998.

Shortly before moving to Bielefeld Luhmann held a programmatic inaugural lecture at Münster University. The title of the talk was ‘Sociological Enlightenment’ (1967b), indicating that Luhmann conceived of his own sociology as standing on the shoulders of the Enlightenment tradition. Yet, argued Luhmann, a contemporary conception of enlightenment would have to move significantly beyond the classical understandings of the term. In particular, he asserted, the complexity of society is now so great that recourse to reason, the most celebrated Enlightenment notion, can no longer serve as the ultimate solution to societal problems. As an alternative approach Luhmann suggested that sociology should operate, not as applied enlightenment, i.e. as promoting reason as the grand answer to every problem, but rather as a ‘serene enlightenment’ (abgeklärte Aufklärung) which would imply being aware of the limits to enlightenment (1967b: 98).

Not surprisingly, this refined notion of enlightenment referred to Luhmann’s own systems-theoretical programme. Specifically, he associated it with a formula which became almost synonymous with his early work, namely ‘reduction of complexity’. In what might be termed the cosmology underlying all of Luhmann’s work, he argued that the social world comprises enormous complexity which social systems, each in their own way, reduce. This was in effect the early definition of social systems he proposed: a system is something that reduces the complexity of its environment. This is why it makes sense to talk of the economy or science as social systems. Even if they are extremely complex in themselves, they nonetheless suggest ways in which the social complexity is radically reduced. Thus the economy proposes a view on the social world in which the latter’s complexity is reduced to matters of payments, interest rates, capital, etc. Likewise, the system of science suggests theories and methods with which to address (and reduce) the complexity of the world. It is important to stress that, for Luhmann, the reduction of complexity, and hence the formation of systems, is an indispensable and unavoidable occurrence. Since the complexity of the world is so overwhelming, we can only arrive at a meaningful way of living if we somehow reduce the complexity. Sociological systems theory shows not only that this is the case, but also how the reduction of complexity unfolds.

It was this idea of complexity reduction that Luhmann linked to his notion of enlightenment. Thus, in Luhmann’s interpretation, enlightenment is neither about collecting more knowledge, nor is it about promoting reason. In fact, Luhmann argued, such a classical understanding of enlightenment ignores that the mere accumulation of knowledge might increase complexity rather than reduce it. As an illustration of this limit to enlightenment, as Luhmann conceived it, one might refer to contemporary suggestions for how to live a healthy life. Evermore research produces still new recommendations for what (not) to eat, how (not) to behave, etc. While the stockpiling of all this information is consistent with Enlightenment ideals, the research findings often contradict one another (one day a particular kind of food is considered healthy, the next day it is not). This means that instead of offering guidelines for behaviour, the accumulation of knowledge actually increases complexity.

Luhmann believed his functionalist systems theory to be more apt. Rather than promoting knowledge and reason for their own sake, this theoretical apparatus claimed to understand how social systems may ‘increase their potential for grasping and reducing complexity’ (1967b: 123). Furthermore, since social systems reduce the complexity in different ways, this systemic perspective also implied taking seriously that no single Reason (with a capital R) exists. Rather, and this is another of Luhmann’s key mantras, the reduction of complexity is always characterised by contingency, i.e. by being ‘neither necessary nor impossible’, as Luhmann liked to put it (1998c: 45). It is always possible to think of different ways to understand and approach the world (and hence ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Social systems
• 3. Observing systems
• 4. The functional differentiation of modern society
• 5. Consequences of functional differentiation
• 6. Power and politics
• 7. Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index