NeuroAnalysis

Bridging the Gap between Neuroscience, Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry

Avi Peled

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9781134057788
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Psychiatry & Mental Health

NeuroAnalysis investigates using the neural network and neural computation models to bridge the divide between psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience when diagnosing mental health disorders and prescribing treatment.

Avi Peled builds on Freud's early attempts to explain the neural basis of mental health by introducing neural computation as a bridging science to explain psychiatric disorders. Peled describes the brain as a complex system of interconnected units and goes on to suggest that conscious experience, feelings, and mood are emergent properties arising from these complex organisations. This model describes mental health disorders in terms of perturbation to the optimal brain organisation, and demonstrates how particular disorders can be identified through a specific breakdown pattern of the brain's organisation.

This fresh approach to the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders will interest students, professors, and researchers of psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and their related fields.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Author’s introduction

At the annual meeting of the Rapaport-Klein study group held at Austen Riggs Center in 2006, David D. Olds presented a paper on “Interdisciplinary studies and our practice.” In his presentation he discussed the influence of neighboring disciplines on psychoanalysis.

Among other topics, he discussed “bridging theories” which may be traced back to the biological theories of Freud’s Project (Freud 1953 [1900]: 536). He argued that the purpose of these theories was to provide a scientific basis for psychoanalysis. In today’s era of “evidence-based treatments” this foundation could be relevant to measures of efficacy and thus may extend the cultural foundation for psychoanalysis. In my mind, most importantly, bridging psychoanalysis and neuroscience opens up each discipline to the fruitful advances of the other, substantially increasing our understanding of the human experience.

Even though they did not use the language of biology, psychoanalysts have developed a true understanding of the workings of the psychological brain. Recently, neuroscience, with the advancement of systems theories, is beginning to present evidence that may validate many psychoanalytic intuitions. Bringing these disciplines together may have a phase-transition effect on our understanding of the brain, which could potentially advance psychiatry towards the goal of finding effective cures.

It has been stated that we are at the phase in psychiatry where “astronomy was before Copernicus and biology before Darwin” (Kendell and Jablensky 2003). Combining psychoanalysis and computational neuroscience may lead to the “Copernicus Darwin effect” of phase transition we are waiting for. To date, any attempt to link brain neural activity and psychodynamic concepts requires a tremendous conceptual leap, which would be facilitated by developing a common language between brain and mind (Peled 2004). This monograph takes that leap.

Although we are dealing with an extremely complex field of research, due to the interdisciplinary character of the content, this monograph is intentionally written in terms comprehensible to the layperson. The neuroscientist may be a layperson in psychoanalysis, and vice versa. In addition, since a combined psychoanalysis-computational-neuroscience discipline is inevitably a discipline of the future, this monograph is also addressed to future generations.

I do not aspire to present a comprehensive review of computational neuroscience or psychoanalysis, but rather the bare basics of each discipline, hoping that this text will stimulate the reader to seek further information. For more extensive and in-depth information the reader is referred to the vast literature of each field.

General introduction

Freud and his successors (in developing psychology) have left us the unfinished task of relating their work to the functions of the brain. This is evident in Freud’s writings. Freud was aware that some day a neurophysiological basis would be established for his psychological insights (Freud 1953 [1900]: 536).

In 1895, before he developed psychoanalysis, Freud attempted to explain the neural basis of psychological phenomena and disorders. This effort was formulated in a series of letters he wrote to his Berlin friend, Wilhelm Fliess. Freud soon abandoned his attempt to find an explicit neurological framework for his theories, probably realizing he was ahead of his time regarding neuroscience. Turning to develop psychoanalysis, as we know it today, he wrote:

I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain on psychological ground.

(Freud 1953 [1900]: 536)

What are the biological (neuroscientific) roots of psychoanalysis? To answer this question we need to go back to some of Freud’s teachers who influenced the science of his era and thus the basis for psychoanalysis. We will refer to Ernest Brücke (1810–1892) and Theodor Meynert (1833–1892).

In a time when mental phenomena were treated in philosophical and religious domains Ernest Brücke stated that no other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. Thus psychic phenomena should be studied with physical mathematical methods. This trivial understanding of modern science had to be formulated back then in order to annex the study of the psyche to science. With this notion in mind Freud would later write to Fliess: “the intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate stages of specifiable material particles” (Freud 1966:295).

Brücke discussed a putative existence of an as yet undiscovered mechanism in the nervous system whose function is to “summate” excitation. Brücke suggested that excitation from the stimulus enters the nervous system via a receptor (meaning sensory organ), and then accumulates in a nervous center until a certain threshold is reached. Only then does the center initiate the reflex by discharging its accumulated excitation into the motor nerves.

Brücke’s influence is reflected in Freud’s letters to Fliess formulating a “Q” quantity. Neurons are conceptualized as receptacles that can be filled up, or cathected by varying amounts of Q. In this sense “catharsis” originated for describing what would today be called “action potential” of the neuron.

According to Meynert the cortex is the anatomical substrate of the mind with certain cells in the sensory and motor areas representing specific ideas and memories. The cells are potentially interconnected in a vast network by means of “association fibres,” the bulk of whose substance lies in the frontal lobes. After two cells have been simultaneously excited (equivalent to simultaneous arousal or two ideas), an association fibre opens up between them. Meynert believed that a “train of thought” is simply the consequence of excitation flowing through a series of cortical cells that have been associated due to previous simultaneous excitations.

Each individual has a unique pattern of experience and so develops a unique pattern of cortical associations that represent his memories. These associations are the anatomical substrate of a person’s “individuality,” and Meynert referred to them collectively as the ego (German Ich). If the ego has not had time to develop, as in an infant, thought processes tend to be random or determined largely by any pattern of stimulation that happens to be effectual at a given moment.

Meynert also believed that the associations of an adult ego could be temporarily or permanently weakened, with a similar result of random or confused thought processes. The sleep state brings on temporary ego weakness, for example, with the consequent bizarre mentation that characterizes dreams. Toxic conditions in the brain can produce a more permanent ego weakness, resulting in psychotic states.

Thus it is evident that the term “ego” was pre-Freud and that Freud also shared the idea that activations of groups of neurons may represent psychological phenomena such as ideas and thoughts. In this regard Freud wrote that certain cortical neurons are the anatomical equivalents of ideas and memories. He called these neurons, collectively, the Psi system and formulated some sketch drawings showing possible “Q” energy flow from neurons representing “food in the kitchen” trying to draw the network representing the thought of going to the kitchen to have a meal.

Based on these early writings, one may assume that if Freud were living today he would be astute in modern neuroscience and might formulate psychoanalytic theories in terms of neuronal organizations of the brain, and perhaps even coin the term “neuroanalysis.”

Today we can attempt to achieve Freud’s initial goals by bridging the gap between his psychoanalytic intuitions and today’s current advances in neuroscience. We can attempt to describe psychological psychodynamic formulations using insights from neuroscience and neural computation systems theories of the brain. To achieve that goal, a review of basic neuroscience and neural computation theories followed by the application of these insights to psychological formulations used in psychotherapy is in order.

This is not an easy task. While neuroscience and neural computation progress as scientific disciplines through the orderly evolution of empirically tested hypotheses and scientific experiments, psychoanalysis is a collection of suppositions based on clinical experience. It developed by refining and reframing the initial ideas of Freud and his early followers; thus it results in overlapping frames of reference that lack a universal orderly schema. To complicate the task, various psychoanalytic theorists use the same vocabulary but ascribe very different meanings to the terms, based on their unique orientations.

Although a comprehensive review of psychoanalysis and neural computation will not be presented given the multifaceted aspects of psychoanalysis, a reduction to presumably the most common conceptualizations in the field is called for in order to provide an adequate basis to pursue the goals of this project. The relevant points in each discipline will be discussed solely in the context of linking psychology and neuroscience. For more extensive and indepth discussions of the disciplines, the reader is referred to the vast literature of each field.

Emergent properties

Prior to embarking on the daunting task of relating psychology to the functions of the brain, a fundamental “psycho-physic” problem must be addressed. How can psychological phenomena be explained via physical biological events? The “materialistic” approach of “emergent properties” is suggested.

Emergent properties relate to synergism, “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Simply put, the characteristics of the system as a whole are not explainable based on the characteristics of its isolated parts. For example, in reference to our interest in mental functions as emergent properties of brain organization, in 1962 Rosenblat stated: “neurons have never been demonstrated to possess psychological functions (e.g., mood, awareness, intelligence). Such properties presumably emerge from the nervous system as a whole” (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). It is evident from brain research that microcircuits of neurons possess more properties than those that may be deduced from our understanding of the single neuron (King 1991). Similarly, the properties of activated brain regions are greater than the properties of microcircuits of neurons.

Emergent properties originate from nonlinear systems. Nonlinear systems are those systems that have no one-to-one relation between input and output. In linear systems, the whole may be described as the sum of all its parts. A change in the total system obeys an equation of the same form as the equation for the change in its elements. Thus, linear systems cannot demonstrate more properties than those of their components. Nonlinear systems may result in responses (or properties) that are higher than predicted compared to linear estimations, thus achieving emergent properties.

In this work normal (healthy) mental functions are conceptualized as emergent properties of brain organization, and mental disorders presumably emerge from perturbed and disturbed brain organizations.

Chapter 2
Some psychoanalytic formulations

Ego, id, and superego

When Freud set out to develop a theory for motivation that would help explain human behavior and the formative elements that shape personality, he was largely influenced by his professional background and the science of his time. The laws of physics and thermodynamics were then developed, and Freud’s biological and medical background (which included the teachings of Ernest Brücke) induced him to consider drives of biological energy that underlay mental phenomena. This biological physical notion asserts that each drive has four components: aim, source, impetus, and object. The aim is satisfaction and discharge of the instinct (eating for hunger); the source is a bodily need (i.e., physiological condition); impetus is the force of the drive, and object is the entity or condition that will satisfy the drive (Freud 1915a: 122–123).

Drives represent internal biological influences on human behavior. They are energy-driven sources of behavior; however, they are also conceptualized by Freud as ideas and thoughts. This additional conceptualization is probably the combined influence of Meynert’s and Brücke’s teachings. According to Brücke the neurons act according to energy forces and, according to Meynert, neuronal activations represent ideas and thought.

Working with hypnosis Freud realized that ideations and thought content can be unconscious. This is typically characteristic of post-hypnotic commands. Under hypnotic states subjects can be instructed to perform tasks once they are awakened from their hypnotic trance. The task is then performed but the subject cannot explain the reason for his actions. Such phenomena point to unconscious commands that are reflected in post-hypnotic behavior. Freud realized that conscious, unconscious, and subconscious events comprise components of our psychic (mental) system and may determine our behavior and thoughts (Freud 1915c).

With that realization the transformation of unconscious ideas and drives to conscious ideas and vice versa interested Freud, especially the manner in which unconscious motives influence thoughts and attitudes (Freud 1915b). Initially Freud placed more emphasis on bodily biological needs, instincts, and drives. Later on Freud also realized the importance of external influences (i.e., interaction with the environment). The need to mediate between the drives, their satisfaction, and the demands of the environment led to the conceptualization of the ego. The ego acts as a mediator between the needs from the environment and uncontrolled biological drives. The id represents the source for the drive energy. The id is unorganized where conflicting impulse and ideations coexist unconstrained by any organizing force.

Freud viewed the newborn infant as chiefly representing the id’s masses of drives and impulses without an organizing pattern of activity and thus also without consciousness. The interactions and contact with the real world gradually organize portions of the id forming the beginning organizations which allow for consciousness to surface as the ego slowly emerges from these portions of organized activity. However, the ego is not synonymous with consciousness. Only a small portion of the ego is conscious at any given time. A great part of the ego is outside of awareness but can be readily called into awareness. This is called preconsciousness; however, other parts of the ego remain unconscious and not readily convertible into preconsciousness or consciousness.

The disorganized activity of the id cannot directly become conscious; however, from time to time portions of the id can be expressed in the ego by becoming connected with memory traces of repressed experiences and thus participate in the formation of symptoms. Presumably, disorganized expressions within the ego underlie mental disturbances such as loosening of ideations and associations, inducing disorganized distorted experiences. Thus the expression of the id’s unorganized and disordered activity underlies symptom formations and can be pre-detected via slips of the tongue, and in dreams when the id’s content is more manifest.

Developmentally the id is present at birth and functions before the ego mediates the apparatus of the psyche. As the ego emerges, it faces the task of controlling or transforming the impulses of the id. The ego makes use of various psychological mechanisms, especially repression, in the process of controlling instincts. Repression keeps unwanted impulses of the id from consciousness, and this fosters the ego’s growth. In mediating between environmental experience and drives from the id the ego “protects” our conscious awareness from unwanted unpleasant contents neutralizing non-adaptive (with regard to environmental demands) drives, not allowing them to interfere with our adaptive experience.

The conception of the id and ego forms the “structural” model of the psyche; they are hypothetical constructs. We can refer to them when observing behavior, as they serve to explain actions and attitudes. This is also relevant to all other psychological formulations.

The ego develops gradually as the infant grows to adulthood. The development of the ego reflects the maturation of the mental psyche apparatus as it manifests in a more organized fashion. Through parental training and early childhood education, as the ego develops it incorporates cultural and social norms as parent images within the ego, which Freud called the superego.

The superego has a censoring and criticizing power. It incorporates the norms and standards of society, and also includes parental attitudes as well as the ideals and self-expectations of the person. Because it was created in early childhood and infancy the superego is mostly unconscious and thus unavailable for reality testing. Irrational self-blame and excessive harshness with one’s own feelings and behavior is partly explained by the powers of the superego.

Freud viewed the ego as the great mediator. In an executive manner the ego acts to reconcile the id, the superego, and the outside world of events. The ego must allow the id to discharge energy but not to the extent that it damages the organization of the ego. In particular, the ego needs to mediate the conflicting forces of the id and the superego. A balance between appropriate interaction with the dynamic outer world should be maintained; thus the individual’s attitudes and reactions will remain adaptable and reconciled with the external environment.

Neurologically the id is first expressed in infancy. The id is initially disorganized, as the extra-pyramidal motor system is undeveloped. Sensory experience has not been integrated and the infant, who is initially blind; and may initially not associate various experiences, when he begins to see objects. For example, the infant may see his own hand touching an object but may not yet experience the hand as being his own hand. Thus psychologically the infant experiences the world as chaotic, uncontrolled, and disorganized. As connections are made between and within neuronal systems, both experiences become organized and associated and the motor response gradually coordinates to become goal directed and response related.

Psychologically the character structure, according to Freud, results from sublimation and reaction formation. These are unconscious processes that bind the forces of the id in such a way that the ego accepts them, without jeopardizing relations with the outside world. The concept of “multiple constraints satisfactions,” and the manner in which biological neuronal ensembles within the brain can achieve Freud’s descriptions, will be explained later.

This description of character formation shifted the attention of many therapists from the drives and impulses as the causes of character disturbances, toward the more subtle complex interrelation of id, ego, superego, and environments which may generate character and problematic behavioral reactions.

In instinctual terms Freud described how the “libido” (sex drive) manifests in increasingly more organized ways. Freud named each developmental phase by the zone in the body where libidinal energy becomes manifest, and defined the “oral,” “anal,” “phallic,” “latency,” and “genital” phases. This reflects sexual maturity from a general pleasure of the autoerotic infant to focused object-directed sexual feelings.

Interestingly the infant’s social connection with the environment centers on the mouth. Having not developed control over movements and sensations, crying is the only action and eating is the only pleasure the infant experiences. Thus it is biologically suitable to see the oral phase as neurologically guiding the psychological experience of the infant. This is a very passive psychological experience that explains why “oral” traits in descriptions of personality relate to th...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Some psychoanalytic formulations
• 3 Some ideas from computational neuroscience
• 4 Attempting the conceptual leap
• 5 Implications for diagnosis of mental disorders
• 6 Implications for future directions and therapy
• 7 Implications of NeuroAnalysis in clinical settings: case reports
• References