Chapter 1
Psychoanalysis and women from margin to center
A retrospect
For a volume of The Annual of Psychoanalysis on psychoanalysis and women, I was asked, along with several other contributors, to write an autobiographical essay on my own professional trajectory in relation to psychoanalysis and women. The chapter traces my writing from the beginning of second-wave feminism, in the late 1960s, through my analytic training and almost to the present, and it alludes to some personal biographical factors that may also have played a role in my intellectual development and the character of my thinking. I suggest that such multiple factors inform all psychoanalytic writings on sexuality and gender. 1
I, as a woman, ask in amazement, and what about motherhood?
Karen Horney (1926)
But, in contradistinction to Freud, we are assuming that the castration complex in female children is a secondary formation and that its precursor is the negative oedipal situation.
Jeanne Lampl-de Groot (1927)
The reader may ask how I define womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and âmasqueradeâ ⊠they are the same thing.
Joan Riviere (1929)
Psychoanalysts need (at least) two storiesâexternal and historical, internal and psychologicalâto understand our field, its practitioners, its history, its theoretical and clinical developments. We find this confluence first in Freud, excluded from the professoriate and research because of Jewishness, whose personal psychologyâespecially his driving ambition and willingness to engage in and reveal his own self-analysisâcombined with his work with patients, early collaboration with Breuer, and studies with Charcot and Bernheim, all these factors together enabling him to discover the methods and theories of psychoanalysis.
Among the classic 1920s and 1930s psychoanalytic contributors to the psychology of women, we find the same confluence. Deutsch, Horney, Bonaparte, Lampl-de Groot, Klein, and others, all these women spoke from within the field, from their unique individuality, and from their psychological response and position as insider-outsiders, at both center and margin: women practitioners in a field that was more welcoming than almost any other but that at the same time put at its core a masculine norm. We find Horneyâs autobiographical exclamation, Lampl-de Grootâs tentative disagreement with Freud (buried, I note, midparagraph 10 pages into her paradigm-shifting article), Riviereâs ironic musings. So, too, my own intellectual trajectory is situated in history, in my personal psychology, and in my self-location, historically created and driven from within, at both margin and center.
IDENTITY AND ORIGINS, MARGIN AND CENTER
In the spring of 1969, I went to my first conference on âwomenâs liberation.â I was 25 and a budding social scientist about to switch from anthropology to sociology, with an (already greatly overdetermined) interest in child development and the relations of psyche and culture. I had made it my business intuitively to choose an undergraduate fieldâanthropologyâ in which there had been an unusual number of prominent women and in which I could actually work with women professors. Influenced by and influencing psychoanalysis in the 1930s, psychological anthropology, my own subspecialty, had even investigated the psychology of gender in culture (Margaret Mead, for example, in the 1920s and 1930s, and my own teachers, Beatrice and John Whiting, in the 1940s and 1950s). However, with few exceptions neither psychoanalysis nor anthropology had in recent years focused on or problematized women or gender.
For me, as for numbers of women of my generation, the womenâs movement exhilarated and propelled us into awareness. When I entered a graduate program in sociology in the fall of 1969, I wrote what would become my first published essay, âBeing and Doing: A Cross-Cultural Examination of the Socialization of Males and Femalesâ (1971). At the time, American feminists had begun to conceptualize and document sexism in political, economic, and familial institutions in terms of menâs behavior toward women. Sexism was external, and although the personal was political, this meant that feelings and primary relationships were caused by external forces, not that we needed to investigate their internal constitution and creation.
By contrast to this trend, âBeing and Doingâ located the origins of male dominance not externally but internally, in menâs dread of women and fear of their own internal femininity, and it suggested that menâs and womenâs bisexual identifications were asymmetrical, the manâs more threatening. I contrast womenâs more easily attained feminine identity, based on âbeing,â with menâs constantly challenged masculine identity, based on âdoing,â and I describe a âself-perpetuating cycle of female deprecationâ (Chodorow, 1971, p. 41) in which mothers transmit to daughters their own anxieties and conflicts about femininity. The chapter cites only one psychoanalyst, Karen Horney, and its title, âBeing and Doing,â created in 1969, fortuitously anticipates terms found in Winnicott (1971), whom I had never heard of. I draw idiosyncratically upon a wide range of psychological anthropology, psychology research, and psychoanalytic sociology.
This first publication of mine inadvertently anticipates many of the themes found in subsequent psychoanalytic rethinkings of femininity, as well as constituting a protomodel of my own later work. My argument here, as in many later writingsâthe intuitively natural mode in which I think, but a mode that has been challenged by my more recent desire to write from within the clinical momentâbegins with a single, self-evident, taken-for-granted but previously unnoticed or unstudied feature of the psychic or cultural world and elaborates the consequences of this fact from within.2 In what would become characteristically Chodorovian fashion, I unabashedly invent theory, putting together observations from different studies and drawing upon evidence and (sometimes apparently contradictory) theories from a variety of fields.3
In âBeing and Doing,â the self-evident observation is that male dominance seems to be universal. I ask: How can we account for this? In my next publicationsââFamily Structure and Feminine Personalityâ (1974, written in dialogue and dividing the territory of psyche, culture, and society with Sherry Ortner (1974) who wrote on culture and Shelly Rosaldo (1974) who wrote on society), âOedipal Asymmetries and Heterosexual Knotsâ (1976), and The Reproduction of Mothering (1978)âI begin from the observation that women mother, a completely self-evident, taken-for-granted fact that at the same time had been hitherto almost theoretically and clinically unremarked (Stoller is the exception here). As is well known, following from this I develop claims that the mother-daughter relationship must be central to female psychology and that the fact that everyoneâs primary caregiver is a woman must be important to childrenâs gender development and to the relations between the sexes, creating, as I called them, oedipal asymmetries and heterosexual knots. In âHeterosexuality as a Compromise Formationâ (1992), I begin from further observations on heterosexuality, noting that it has been taken for granted as normative, not only culturally but within psychoanalysis, and that it has therefore not been studied. I ask: What if we treat heterosexuality as problematic, as we have done with homosexuality and the perversions?
In The Power of Feelings (1999b), I begin from clinical individualityâ the obvious fact that each person who walks into the analystâs consulting room is unique. In relation to psychoanalysis, I elaborate the claim that our universalistic developmental theories and theories about the content of unconscious fantasies of self and other, including those about gender and sexuality, do not take account of this clinical individuality. Also beginning from basic psychoanalytic principlesâthe demonstrated existence and effect of dynamically unconscious mental processes, thoughts, and feelings; the fact that meaning comes from within as much as from withoutâI argue against the taken-for-granted assumption, found in feminist poststructuralism, cultural studies, and social science, that people are shaped culturally and discursively rather than creating their own psyches from within.
Just as with the classical writings on female psychology, there is some implicit autobiographical input in my contributions. I do not think that without a personal analysis, a strong mother and maternal lineage, and early experiences of finding myself a cultural outsider,4 my writings would have the emotional and affective solidity and resonance that they possess. Yet, in spite of being of the feminist generation who believed that the personal was political and knowledge perspectival, and that the female scholarly âIâ should replace the male objectivist view from nowhere, my writings, at least until well into the 1990s, do not begin from a female experiential voice. My voice seems characterized by clarity and confidence, even by a certain courage: âThis is what I think, there is no other way I can think, all I can do is present it to you, as directly as possible.â When I first presented âFamily Structure and Feminine Personalityâ to a group of feminist English faculty in the Boston area in 1972, I was accused of being too confident and âwriting like a manâ: How could I begin so directly, âI propose here a model ⊠â (Chodorow, 1974, p. 45)? I was shocked, in 1978, upon first encountering lâĂ©criture feminine, to find that French feminists such as Irigaray and Cixous believed that traditional language and modes of argument were phallologocentric (Chodorow, 1979).
My voice echoes, perhaps, those no-nonsense, speak-your-mind, midwestern and western pioneer lineage women with whom I grew up, or my Jewish New Yorker mother and aunts, all of whom had been professionalsâteachers, librarians, scientists, social workers, musiciansâbefore marriage and some afterward, those women of that prefeminine mystique 1890â1920 birth cohort with higher education and professional participation than those who came before or after them. In my voice, there is also a paternal identificationâhence, writing like a man. My father, an eminent professor of physics and applied physics at Stanford and a Silicon Valley pioneer, once told me (at least, this is my screen memory) that while he was not a great theoretical physicist, he had an especial capacity to see linkages and structureâconnections among widely disparate scientific theories and discoveries, often heard of years apartâin ways that enabled him to conceptualize comprehensively, leaving nothing out, how these principles and discoveries might all be put together to work perfectly in a new instrument or process.
A traditional stance toward voice continues. In the present period, I find myself uncomfortable with and resistant toward the postmodern locutions and wordplay that became so prominent in academic feminism and the humanities more generally and that, in psychoanalysis, characterizes relational more than classical writing. Thus, although I have written (Chodorow, 1989b) that the great difference between women psychoanalysts of the second and third psychoanalytic generations and feminist psychoanalysts of my generation was that for us the theoretical was personalâthat we evaluated psychoanalytic theories of femininity against our personal experienceâit is not the case that I explicitly brought in my own personal experience, or shifted voice, in making my theoretical arguments. I begin from experience, from a freedom to challenge, and from a sense that knowledge is perspectival and derived from power, but I have found myself on the classical-modernist side (or somewhere in the middle; see Chapter 65), in psychoanalysis, as in feminism, of a divide about evidence and language (a place perhaps more characteristic of analysts who were trained in the âmainstreamâ institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association).
These qualities of invention, starting from the unremarked and taken-for-granted, synthesizing disparate or surprising theories and observations in a not theoretically monolithic, interdisciplinary, almost structural template, and using traditional approaches and language that are theoretically steeped but quite straightforward, characterize many of my writings.6 Yet these same qualities, which also gave my work a relative independenceâthat is, I respond to trends that seem relevant to my thinking and am careful to cite relevant work, but I do not fit easily into a school, probably by conscious and unconscious intentionâhave meant that my work has always received attention somewhere, but often belatedly, and not necessarily from its intended audience. The Reproduction of Mothering was immediately recognized and lauded within the feminist humanities, ambivalently accorded admiration but also widely criticized in my then-exclusive field, sociology, and only noticed within psychoanalysis many years later. Articles that became classics, widely reprinted and cited, were originally rejected by leading psychoanalytic journals for being ânot psychoanalysisâ (for example, âHeterosexuality as a Compromise Formationâ) or severely criticized by editorial readers for feminist journals for being intersubjective and reflexive rather than statistical (e.g., âSeventies Questions for Thirties Women,â 1989b).
I have not, it seems, wanted to be placed, and others have not wanted to place me. Even as I originated the idea that feminine personality is founded on relation and connection and named womenâs self in relationship, I am not a self-in-relation theorist, and I have been criticized by those who are for not understanding the mother-daughter relationship (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991). Although I was one of the first American psychoanalysts to make British object relations theory central to her or his theorizing (in 1974, I cite Alice Balint, Fairbairn, & Guntrip; in 1978 also Michael Balint & Winnicott) and have been recognized as a founding American relational thinker (Mitchell & Aron, 1999), I do not consider myself a relational psychoanalyst.
When I was honored by CORST (the Committee on Research and Special Training that enables academics to be trained in the American Psychoanalytic Association), I titled my talk, âWhy It Is Easy to Be a Psychoanalyst and a Feminist, But Not a Psychoanalyst and a Social Scientist,â and I joked that I had considered calling the talk âFrom Margin to Margin and Back Again.â There, I described the experience in 1979 of simultaneously receiving the Jessie Bernard Award for The Reproduction of Mothering from the American Sociological Association and being in a symposium on the book, later published in Signs (Lorber, Coser, Rossi, & Chodorow, 1981), in which Judith Lorber observed, âWhen I read The Reproduction of Mothering, I found to my disappointment that it is primarily an exegesis of psychoanalytic theory and therefore, in my eyes, a lesser contribution to the sociology of gender than Nancy Chodorowâs earlier, short piecesâ (p. 482), and Alice Rossi said, âI was not prepared for so extended an exegesis of psychoanalytic theory past and present ⊠what constitutes âevidenceâ in Chodorowâs book [?] ⊠does her central insight require the burden of so much psychoanalytic theory?â (p. 493). Only Rose Coser enthusiastically supported my use of psychoanalytic theory in the work.
At sociology meetings for years afterward, I would wander into session after session on gender, feminist theory, or mothering, only to hear someone saying, âWe can take seriously five different understandings of sexual inequality (or womenâs mothering), but Chodorowâs individualistic psychology is not one of them.â A former student, Michigan professor of sociology Karin Martin, remarked, when we were at the meetings of the University of California Interdisciplinary Psychoanalytic Consortium, that of the faculty present, all the feminists were in the humanities, except me, and all the social scientists, except me, were men.
My sociology colleagues were right to be uneasy. Even as I have drawn upon many theories, my âfieldâ has always been, basically, psychoanalysis. I have always been interested in the complexities of individuality and in studying people, and I think that the absence of serious attention to individuality as a field of study in its own right is a great lack in the academy. I have never studied groups, institutions, organizations, stratification, collective behavior, or any other typical sociological topic, and I do not do research. I came to feminism in the first place partly because it called for an understanding of the psyche.
Yet, even as sociological colleagues were excoriating my individualistic psychology, colleagues in the humanitiesâin literary criticism, philosophy, and political theoryâwere writing books and dissertations based on my work. My focus on the mother-daughter internal world and its sequelae opened new vistas for understanding women authors, women characters in womenâs novels, and imagery, metaphor, and characteristics found in womenâs writing. My characterization of the female psyche, in terms of relation and connection, and my noting the defensive denial of connection and dependency in men, served as a basis for thinking in moral philosophy and epistemology and for critiques of normal science, classical political theory, and so forth. For many practitioners of these literary and textual-theoretical academic feminisms (at least until the poststructural and L...