Coalescent Argumentation

Michael A. Gilbert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136685231
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Communication Studies
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

Coalescent Argumentation is based on the concept that arguments can function from agreement, rather than disagreement. To prove this idea, Gilbert first discusses how several components--emotional, visceral (physical) and kisceral (intuitive) are utilized in an argumentative setting by people everyday. These components, also characterized as "modes, " are vital to argumentative communication because they affect both the argument and the resulting outcome. In addition to the components/modes, this book also stresses the goals in argumentation as a means for understanding one's own and one's opposer's positions. Gilbert argues that by viewing positions as complex human events involving a variety of communicative modes, we are better able to find commonalities across positions, and, therefore, move from conflict to resolution. By focusing on agreement and shared goals in all modes, arguers can coalesce diverse positions and more easily distinguish between minor or unrelated differences and core disagreements. This permits much greater latitude for locating shared beliefs, values, and attitudes that will lead to conflict resolution.

Part I

Argumentation Theory

1

The Recent History of Argumentation Theory

Although this chapter may be of interest to all readers, it is particularly intended to assist those who do not have a thorough familiarity with contemporary Argumentation Theory.

Philosophy has had an intimate connection to argument since ancient times. The philosopher, after all, rarely has recourse to the tools and experiments used in the physical and social sciences. One does not usually defend a particular philosophical theory or approach by empirical research, and use of the “actual” world is most often confined to gedanken experiments. Rather, philosophers use argument to determine if a position has flaws and weaknesses, and we expect that the loser in a philosophical argument will abandon his or her position or, (perhaps more realistically), withdraw from the field to effect repairs. Perhaps as a result of the reliance of philosophy on argumentation, philosophers have always had a tremendous respect for its importance as well as a strong sense of responsibility to both its formal and informal study and its pedagogical propagation.

There has been, since Aristotle’s time, two basic ways to study argumentation in the domain of philosophy. The first way is formal, and utilizes the models of deductive logic. The second way, which like the first can be traced back to Aristotle (and before), is practical and has come to be called ‘Informal Logic’ or ‘critical thinking’ or some similar rubric. In recent times, however, dramatic changes have taken place in the kind of work being done on argumentation, so that we can now say that a virtually new field has been created on the older foundations. Called Argumentation Theory, this new arena of scholarly pursuit has its contemporary roots back in the 1950s, but only recently has assumed a shape that is sufficiently definable so as to be considered a (relatively) independent sub-area of endeavor. In addition to formal deductive logic and critical thinking, Argumentation Theory draws upon formal dialogue theory, the philosophy of language (especially in the form of speech act theory), Communication Theory, Discourse Analysis, and several areas of Psychology. The hallmarks that set argumentation theory apart from its predecessors are two: The first is a strong emphasis on dialogical argumentation, i.e., two persons having an argument, rather than the traditional single person encountering a bit of text. The second is that argumentation theorists more and more view arguments as situated or taking place in a locatable context that itself is liable to have an impact on both the arguments and arguers.

The goal here is to describe the recent history of the field and lay out the several distinct approaches within philosophy and other disciplines that are tending more and more to intertwine and slowly evolve toward a more unified approach. These approaches include, among other things, an unusual degree of reliance on various branches of the Social Sciences as well as work in European philosophical circles. More emphasis, therefore, will be laid on scholars who are liable to be less familiar to the reader. I hope to demonstrate the renewed vitality of Argumentation Theory, and encourage other scholars to become aware of the connections their own work might have to this area.

While virtually all the roots of contemporary formal and informal logic go back to Aristotle, these will not be reviewed here. There is, however, one distinction he introduced that is crucial to this study, and that is the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric. The former seeks out truth by using logic and reasoning, whereas the latter uses persuasion and emotion to influence an audience’s mind. Aristotle did not actually see the differences as being very sharp, but he did separate the areas by creating different realms of study for each. This subsequently led other scholars to harden the distinction, very likely to a degree Aristotle would not have accepted. At all events, the distinction has had a profound impact on the history of logic and argumentation, and has undergirded what is sometimes called the convince/persuade dichotomy. According to this distinction, to convince is to use reason, dialectic and logic, while to persuade is to rely on emotion, prejudice, and language. This distinction has moral as well as logical implications insofar as “convincing” has been considered to be a superior method. “Persuading” appeals to the “baser” components of the human psyche, namely, the emotions, while ‘convincing’ speaks to the “higher” aspects, namely, reason. On this view, one who is persuaded may be so for reasons that have little to do with the value of the arguments or the truth of the premisses put forward.

Hand in hand with this distinction is the further subdivision of rhetoric by Aristotle into three separate areas: logos, ethos, and pathos. The result of Aristotle’s dividing rhetoric into these three aspects has been the assumption that the areas can be dealt with as separate fields, each of which concerns argumentation in a very different but unrelated way. As a result, three distinct areas developed in virtual independence of each other. Formal Logic (logos) focused on the structural aspects of arguments, and, in particular, on the articulation and (to some) excruciatingly exact amplification of the concept of formal validity. Ethos, insofar as it was accorded any concern at all by philosophers, became a part of Informal Logic found in such notions as the argumentums ad hominem, misericordiam, and vericundiam. Pathos, or emotionality, which Aristotle viewed as central to rhetoric, was given even less attention. Certainly, one has several fallacies that, like those linked to ethos, can be seen as somehow connected to pathos, but the stretch is even greater (see Walton, 1992, for discussions of this issue).

Not every discipline ignored the non-formal categories of ethos and pathos. Classical and modern rhetoric remained concerned with ethos and its impact on speechmaking. Pathos, on the other hand, was subsumed by psychology, and later taken up by communication theory. For philosophers, however, these two aspects of Aristotle’s work were primarily seen as not relevant to the construction of good, sound, convincing arguments. It was not that philosophers believed that ethos and pathos had no impact on the acceptance and rejection of arguments, but rather they seemed to believe that these factors ought not have an impact. In other words, one ought to accept and reject arguments on the basis of logos alone. It is important to note the implicit assumption that logos can exist alone, independently of ethos and pathos. This essentially undefended axiom is central to the traditional philosophical approach to informal logic, and it has stood, more or less unquestioned until the relatively recent times to which we now turn.¹

Perelman’s New Rhetoric

There are two scholars generally considered to be the founders of contemporary Argumentation Theory, especially as it is understood in North America. The first is the Belgian argumentation theorist and jurisprude, Chaim Perelman, the second is the English philosopher Stephen Toulmin. In an amazing example of synchronic- ity, both of their seminal works were originally published in almost the same year. Perelman first published The New Rhetoric, L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, in French in 1958 (see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969) as La Nouvelle Rhetorique, and Toulmin’s now classic The Uses of Argument (1959) was released by Cambridge University Press the very next year. As it was not until 1969 that the University of Notre Dame Press published John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver’s translation of The New Rhetoric, Toulmin’s work had a much greater immediate impact on the English speaking philosophical community. One further progenitor of the modern area who also had a marked influence in Europe, but only recently in the United States and Canada, is Arne Naess. His work was first produced in English in 1953 and is an important though often neglected contribution. These scholars are examined in turn with the emphasis placed on their particular contributions to the nature of Argumentation Theory, rather than their complete philosophical outlooks.

Perelman’s approach to argumentation rests on several key assumptions. The first is that the separation of argument into different categories, depending on whether it is classed as logic, dialectic or rhetoric, is unfounded. There simply is no way, outside of the mathematical sciences and formal logic, to use self-evident premisses in conjunction with logically guaranteed reasoning to secure conclusions. This follows from the denial in The New Rhetoric of the existence of the required self-evident starting points: “We do not believe in definitive, unalterable revelations, whatever their nature or origin. And we exclude from our philosophic arsenal all immediate, absolute data, be they termed sensations, rational self-evidence, or mystical intuitions” (1969, p. 510). So, first, every starting point in an argument can be challenged, and, therefore, the self-evident input required by the logical truth generating machine cannot get started. Secondly, all arguments based on purely formal models of argument (i.e., formal logic) are, at best, attempts to reduce and translate natural, inherently ambiguous language into formal terms. Such arguments are termed ‘quasi-logical’ as opposed to logical since there may always be debate concerning their proper form.

The single most significant feature of the program is the idea that the truth is not manifest. That is, there is no way we can point, in the course of an argument, to the truth itself: there is no “natural light” that shines forth from true statements and is lacking in false ones. Argument, therefore, is the only way we have of reaching non-formal truth in the first instance, and so truth itself cannot in turn be appealed to as a criterion for determining which arguments are best. The contrary view, the “Natural Light Theory” holds that when two views are pitted against each other, the true one will, by virtue of its truth come out the better. Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca explicitly reject such a view, and do not believe that convincing or persuading an audience in the course of an argument means that the view adopted must be the true one. Indeed, the very title of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work calls for a re-interpretation of the relationship between truth and rhetoric, i.e., argument. The kind of rhetoric under discussion is “new”: it does not emphasize myriad ways in which a speech can be made flowery, but focuses instead on the ways in which the adherence of a particular audience may be increased through reason and argument.

The abandonment of identifiably veridical theses as the goal of argumentation explains why the notion of ‘adherence’ is so central to Perelman’s work. He says in (the very accessible) The Realm of Rhetoric, that the purpose of argumentation is “ … to elicit or increase the adherence of the members of an audience to theses that are presented for their consent” (1982, p. 9). After all, if there are no self-evident truths we can only believe propositions more or less, and, when arguing, the arguer’s goal will be to increase the audience’s adherence to the particular proposition or position in question. The adherence should be sufficiently strong to warrant action as well as simple belief. Moreover, the concepts of ‘adherence’ and ‘audience’ go hand in hand. One does not argue in isolation. Arguments are about real things being presented to real people: “For argumentation to exist an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969, p. 15). That community is constructed by the speaker, and it is the adherence of that audience that the speaker seeks. Each audience has its accepted beliefs and will honor certain modes of proof and argument: “For since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced” (1969, p. 19). Thus, a persuasive argument aimed at two separate audiences with regard to the same theses might be constructed and presented in entirely different ways. It is the audience that provides one with the initial agreed upon presumptions required to begin the argument, as well as providing the frame for the substance and style of the argumentation.

Not all audiences are created equal; some are elite whereas some are common. Above them all is the universal audience, a construct that represents the widest and most discerning audience to which one might address an argument. Philosophy, science, and the “best” arguments generally have the universal audience as the constructed audience: “Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of. Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969, p. 33). And yet, the concept still maintains its force as a result of its construction. The individual arguer must construe her or his arguments as being acceptable to the widest possible group. This means that (barring bald self-deception) the psychological necessity of admitting objections from various audience members, actual or hypothetical, will act as a control on the nature of the argumentation, provided only that the arguer aims it at the universal audience.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide a thorough and useful taxonomy of arguments as used in practical discourse. Their emphasis is heavily on speeches addressed to an audience, and does not focus on dialogic argument as does more recent work. It is surprising that, as important as audience is to Perelman, he pays relatively little attention to dialogic argumentation. There is some mention made of it, but it is not at the core of the book except as an instance of one type of audience. Indeed, dialogic argumentation turns out to be an encounter that must mimic one with a larger audience: “The philosophic significance of the interlocutor’s adherence in dialogue is that the interlocutor is regarded as an incarnation of the universal audience” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969, p. 37). Perelman and 01- brechts-Tyteca acknowledge that pure “discussion,” which is heuristic, as opposed to “debate,” which is eristic, are extreme ends on a continuum. Most dialogues fall between the extremes and involve some aspects of both. But, in the end, dialogic argumentation is secondary and derivative to discourse before a larger audience.

Perelman’s work raised the flag of argumentation as that which we use to locate the truth, and waved it before the forces of formal logicians and classical rhetoricians. The former group had to begin to confront the truth that formalized argument was radically divorced from actual argumentation, and the latter had to begin the modernization away from the analysis of classical speeches and toward the “new” rhetoric that involved persuasion, adherence, and real audiences. By denying the separabilty of logic and rhetoric Perelman forced argumentation theorists to think along new, integrated lines.

One effect of The New Rhetoric and later works by Perelman alone was to emphasize the aridity and irrelevance of formal deductive logic to argumentation. In addition, the abandonment of non-mathematical absolute truth (or, at the very least, our ability to recognize it), the importance of the actual audience being addressed, and the notion of increased adherence as the goal of argumentation all aided in refocusing modern rhetorical studies. Perelman’s initial impact, however, was more in communication and rhetorical studies than in philosophy, especially in North America. Although he was certainly not unknown in philosophical circles (see Natanson & Johnstone, 1965), his work has only relatively recently come to the attention of many philosophy-based argumentation scholars.

Toulmin and the DWC Model

A lack of attention was certainly not the problem with the second of the ancestors. Stephen Toulmin’s (1969) book, The Uses of Argument, has received attention from philosophers, rhetoricians, and communication theorists. The book shares many prejudices with The New Republic, most notably the importance of audience (‘fields’ for Toulmin) and the belief in the irrelevance of formal logic to ordinary discourse. Indeed, a great deal of Toulmin’s book is a direct attack on the relevance of formal logic to anything aside from pure mathematics. Writing very much in the “ordinary language” tradition, Toulmin aimed to deflate the claims of those who saw formal logic as the proper arbiter of argumentative correctn...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Tables
• List of Examples
• Preface
• Part I Argumentation Theory
• Part II Multi-Modal Argumentation
• References
• Index