Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements

A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis

Karl-Dieter Opp

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781134014385
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Political protest and social movements are ubiquitous phenomena. This book focuses on the current theoretical approaches that aim at explaining them: the theory of collective action, the resource mobilization perspective, political opportunity structure theory, the identity approach, the framing perspective, and the dynamics of contention approach. The book has three objectives: (1) Many basic concepts like political opportunities or identity are not clearly defined. It is further often a matter of interpretation what factors are supposed to affect which phenomena. The first aim is therefore to provide a detailed introduction to and a clear restatement of the theories. Only then is it possible to assess and improve them. (2) For each theory the major strengths and weaknesses are discussed, and various modifications and extensions are suggested. (3) Building on these analyses, it is shown how the theories can be integrated into a single theoretical paradigm: the structural-cognitive model.

1
What kind of theory do we need and what is a good theory?

This chapter sets the stage for the substantive discussions in the following chapters. In order to understand what this chapter is about it is necessary to briefly sketch the research program suggested in this book. The starting point is that each theoretical perspective¹ in the social movement literature deals with micro-macro relationships.² This will be shown in detail in the following chapters. For example, in the literature on political opportunities an assumption is that changing opportunities (macro factors) affect certain individual incentives (micro factors). Furthermore, each theoretical perspective applies some general (social psychological) theory of individual behavior, i.e. a micro theory. For example, if it is assumed that political opportunities affect individual incentives to protest, it is implicitly held that incentives affect protest behavior. Otherwise, changing political opportunities would not change collective political action. The problem of the vast social movement literature is that this theoretical structure is never spelled out in detail: neither micro-macro relationships nor micro theories are clearly specified. The message of this book is that this is a failure and that a reorientation of theory and research to engage in such micro-macro modeling is necessary.³ The present chapter will discuss some components of this research program.

In regard to applying general theories about individual behavior (i.e. micro theories), several question arise: Which theories might be taken into consideration? How can these theories be applied to explain specific phenomena and what are these theories good for? Sections 1 to 3 address these questions.

Since micro-macro modeling is the exception rather than the rule in the social movement literature, the question arises as to what the arguments are for pursuing this explanatory strategy explicitly and systematically. Section 4 provides the major arguments. Section 5 discusses a possible alternative that is largely pursued in the literature: the procedure is just to combine the factors which the perspectives focus on as additive independent variables.

Sections 6 and 7 are concerned with issues of theory construction and concept formation.⁴ At first sight, this seems rather superfluous. Does not even an undergraduate student know what a good theory looks like? If this is true we would expect that theories in the social sciences and especially in the social movement literature are less often flawed, and we would not expect that even renowned scholars make simple methodological mistakes. For example, definitions and empirical hypotheses are often mixed up, and it seems unclear to some authors what a “tautology” is and what the difference between a tautology and circular reasoning is. Therefore, it seems advisable to provide a short discussion of issues of theory construction and in particular of the question of how to criticize a theory.

Similarly, there are misconceptions in regard to concept formation. For example, it is held that wide concepts are to be avoided. This and other issues of concept formation are discussed in section 8.

1. General social psychological theories for social movement research

Theories of protest and social movements are theories of the middle range.⁵ These are theories that explain specific kinds of phenomena such as protest participation, crime or divorce. If scholars want to explain specific phenomena, a common strategy is to search for conditions that are causes for these phenomena.

Another strategy is to apply a general theory that includes the phenomena to be explained as a specific class of explananda. For example, in order to explain protest behavior one might apply a general theory of action that comprises protest behavior as a special form of action. This strategy of applying a general theory is typically employed by advocates of the theory of collective action: the general theory is a theory of action and the phenomena to be explained are a specific kind of action, namely collective action.

It is very rare that a general theory is explicitly and systematically applied by the proponents of the other perspectives in the social movements literature. However, the analyses in this book clearly show that the proponents of these other perspectives implicitly apply a general theory of action. We will argue later in this chapter, that the application of general theories is to be strongly recommended. This raises the question of which general theories seem most appropriate to the field of social movements and protest. This section provides a brief outline of these theories.

The theory of rational action

The theory of collective action is one of the theoretical perspectives in the field of social movements and protest. It is based on Olson’s seminal work (Olson 1965) and will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this book. This perspective is the only one that uses explicitly rational choice theory (RCT) to generate hypotheses that explain specific social phenomena. In this subsection the basic propositions of this theory are presented – they will be called the “general model.” Next, two important versions of the theory are distinguished: the narrow and wide version. Finally we look at a widely accepted critique of the theory, namely the tautology charge.

The general model

The first proposition of RCT⁶ is that preferences (i.e. the goals or motives or desires) of individual actors are conditions for their behavior. In other words, individual behavior is goal-oriented or, put differently, an individual’s interests are a determinant of his or her behavior. The second proposition reads that behavior depends on the constraints or, equivalently, behavioral opportunities the individual is faced with. “Constraints” are any phenomena that impede the individual’s goal attainment, whereas “opportunities” are any phenomena that promote the individual’s goal attainment. For example, if individuals wish to express their discontent against a government, the expected negative sanctions would be a type of constraint (i.e. an event that impedes the realization of individual goals). The third proposition is that individuals choose between the behavioral alternatives open to them by maximizing their utility. In other words, individuals do what they think is best for them. Thus, RCT consists of the preference proposition, the constraints proposition and the utility-maximization proposition.

The narrow and the wide version

For the theoretical discussions in this book it is important that there are two versions of RCT. The version which social movement scholars usually have in mind and criticize is the narrow version that is mainly used in neo-classical economics.⁷ In addition to the propositions of the general model, assumptions are, e.g. that reality is perceived correctly, that only material incentives matter, that individuals explicitly calculate the costs and benefits of their action,⁸ that individuals are fully informed, and that individuals maximize their objective utility from the viewpoint of an observer. This narrow version is only a caricature of a wide version which assumes “bounded rationality.” The wide version is used by most sociologists of the rational choice tradition and is increasingly becoming accepted by economists as well.⁹ Basic assumptions of the wide model are that beliefs (which includes perceptions) and all sorts of costs and benefits (including soft incentives such as norms or informal sanctions) may be determinants of behavior. Another assumption is that persons “satisfice,” that is, do what they think is best for them and not what objectively (i.e. from the viewpoint of a third omniscient person) yields the highest possible benefits.

This wide version can be applied to explain various phenomena which social movement scholars are interested in. Examples are individual protest behavior, the decision to mobilize resources, and decisions of authorities about how to deal with protests.

Including non-economic incentives and beliefs (that may be at odds with reality) in an explanation of collective action and protest behavior has the consequence that RCT can be applied to a vast variety of situations. For example, the great number of spontaneous political protests during the East European revolutions cannot be explained by economic incentives alone. Empirical research suggests that perceptions of repression, social rewards and the belief that personal participation in collective action matters (i.e. that perceived personal influence is high) are important determinants of participation. There are many situations where it seems that individuals cooperate without any incentives (or, more precisely, without any palpable incentives). An example is contributing to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia or the Oxford English Dictionary, which seems to lack any external remuneration. Authors are not even mentioned. Experimental results in the dictator and ultimatum games are stunning as well. Assume a dictator disposes of a sum of, say, $100 and may offer you any percentage of this money. If you reject, nobody receives anything. If you agree, each gets the respective amount. Assume the dictator offers you one cent. Would you accept? One could argue that even with one cent you are better off than before and you will accept. But most subjects reject such an offer. In general, offers of about 50 percent are accepted. This is the ultimatum game. In the dictator game a person – the dictator – only decides what amount another person gets. Again, the dictators may keep all the money, but that does not happen: most dictators give substantial amounts.¹⁰ Why? It seems that a fairness norm works: one has a good conscience if one sticks to certain rules of distributing some assets. Thus, “soft” incentives and not material rewards are essential in these situations.

The tautology charge

Social movements scholars who criticize RCT most of the time attack the narrow version (see, e.g., Fireman and Gamson 1979; see also Koopmans 2005:20, 28). But often they reject a wide version as well. A major argument against the wide version – but also often against the narrow version – is that it is tautological or, equivalently, analytically true (see, e.g., Fireman and Gamson 1979:20; Ferree and Miller 1985:40; Ferree 1992:30 argues that the whole rational choice approach is tautological).¹¹ It is striking that the authors who raise this critique do not provide a detailed analysis of the theory showing why it is supposed to be tautological. In order to examine whether this charge is correct, it is first necessary to clarify what it means that a statement is tautological (or analytically true).

A sentence is “tautological” (or, more precisely, “analytically true”) if its truth can be determined by analyzing the meaning of its terms. For example, the sentence “all bachelors are unmarried” is in this sense tautological (or analytically true) because when we analyze the meaning of the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried” we find that a bachelor is, by definition, a person who is unmarried. The sentence thus says “unmarried persons are unmarried,” which is certainly a true sentence.¹² Thus, finding out whether a statement is tautological requires one to analyze the meaning of its terms. I...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 What kind of theory do we need and what is a good theory?
• 2 Protest, social movements, and collective action
• 3 Group size, selective incentives, and collective action
• 4 Protest and social movements as collective action
• 5 The resource mobilization perspective
• 6 Political opportunity structures, protest, and social movements
• 7 Collective identity and social movement activity
• 8 How framing influences mobilization and protest
• 9 Identity, framing, and cognitive balance
• 10 The dynamics of contention approach – retreat to history?
• 11 The structural-cognitive model
• 12 General discussion, conclusion, and an agenda for future research
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index