Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation

Andrew J. Elliot

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135703653
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Of the many conceptual distinctions present in psychology today, the approach-avoidance distinction stands out as one of, if not the, most fundamental and basic. The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation has a venerable history, not only within but beyond scientific psychology, and the deep utility of this distinction is clearly evident across theoretical traditions, disciplines, and content areas. This volume is designed to illustrate and highlight the central importance of this distinction, to serve as a one-stop resource for scholars working in this area, and to facilitate integration among researchers and theorists with an explicit or implicit interest in approach and avoidance motivation.

The main body of this volume is organized according to seven broad sections that represent core areas of interest in the study of approach and avoidance motivation, including neurophysiology and neurobiology, and evaluative processes. Each section contains a minimum of four chapters that cover a specific aspect of approach and avoidance motivation. The broad applicability of the approach-avoidance distinction makes this Handbook an essential resource for researchers, theorists, and students of social psychology and related disciplines.

Part I
IntroductionIntroduction and Overview

1 Approach and Avoidance Motivation

Andrew J. Elliot

Contents

History

Fundamental Role of Approach and Avoidance Motivation

Definition and Conceptualization

Terminological Considerations

Overview of the Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation

Acknowledgments

References

The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation has a long and rich history in intellectual thought in general, and scientific psychology in particular. In accord with Lewin (1935), approach motivation may be defined as the energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior toward, positive stimuli (objects, events, possibilities), whereas avoidance motivation may be defined as the energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior away from, negative stimuli (objects, events, possibilities). Approach and avoidance concepts and constructs have been utilized across a diversity of scholarly disciplines, theoretical traditions, and empirical content areas.

Attention to the approach—avoidance motivational distinction has not been constant over the years, but may be seen as waxing and waning at different periods. At present, there appears to be substantial interest in approach and avoidance motivation, but it is also the case that motivationally relevant theories, models, variables, and hypotheses continue to be espoused with little or no consideration of this fundamental distinction. In addition, when the approach—avoidance distinction is utilized in the contemporary literature it is rarely explicitly defined, and approach and avoidance motivation are often described and discussed using diverse terminology that tends to obfuscate links between findings and frameworks.

Accordingly, the broad aims of the Handbook of Approach and Avoidance Motivation are threefold. First, the handbook is designed to illustrate the importance and broad utility of the approach–avoidance motivational distinction. Second, it is designed to provide a ready resource for scholars interested in theoretical and empirical work in this area. Third, it is designed to reveal conceptual and empirical links and convergences across disciplines, research traditions, and levels of analysis that will, it is hoped, facilitate cross talk and cross-fertilization among researchers and theorists.

In this introductory chapter, I begin by overviewing the history of the approach–avoidance distinction. I then proceed to explicate the fundamental role of approach and avoidance motivation in the functioning of organisms across the phylogenetic spectrum. Next, I return to the definition of approach and avoidance motivation offered above, and elaborate on several conceptual considerations inherent within this definition. I continue by discussing terminological issues pertaining to the approach–avoidance distinction, and then I close with a brief overview of the various sections that comprise the contents of the handbook.

History

Distinguishing approach motivation from avoidance motivation may be considered one of the oldest ideas in the history of thought about the behavior of organisms. Scholars have made use of the approach–avoidance distinction for well over 2000 years. It first appeared in the writing of the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus of Abdera (460–370 B.C.E.). Democritus articulated an ethical hedonism in which the immediate pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain were prescribed as the guide for human action: “The best thing for man is to pass his life so to have as much joy and as little trouble as may be” (fragment 189, see Copleston, 1946, p. 125; see also Aristippus [435–356 B.C.E.] and Epicurus [342–270 B.C.E.]). Plato (427–327 B.C.E.) had Socrates (470–399 B.C.E.) espouse various hedonic notions in Protagoras and Phaedo, although it is unclear whether such positions should be attributed to Socrates or Plato himself.

The eighteenth century British philosopher Jeremy Bentham was the first to clearly postulate a psychological hedonism, in addition to an ethical hedonism; this form of hedonism moved beyond a prescription of how we ought to behave to a proto-scientific description of how we actually do behave. This principle is directly stated at the beginning of Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham, 1779/1879, p. 1).

Within the field of scientific psychology per se, the approach–avoidance distinction was attended to from the beginning. Wundt (1887), for example, in his monumental Principles of Physiological Psychology (Vol. 3), conceptualized pleasure and pain as unique psychic elements brought into consciousness by sensation, emotion, and cognition (Marshall, 1889). In his classic Principles of Psychology (Vol. 2), James (1890) portrayed pleasure and pain as “springs of action,” noting that pleasure is a “tremendous reinforcer” of behavior and pain a “tremendous inhibitor” of behavior (pp. 549–559). James even provided speculation on the neural mechanisms underlying “impulsive” and “inhibitory tendencies” (p. 550). Freud (1915) construed the procurement of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (i.e., unpleasure) as the basic motivational impetus underlying psychodynamic activity, and divided the superego into two parts—the ego ideal, representing what the person should do, and the conscience, representing what the person should not do (Freud, 1923). Thus, James and Freud moved beyond a general focus on pleasure and pain per se to a focus on the specific ways that approach and avoidance behavior are produced and regulated.

In addition to these early pioneers, many prominent psychological theorists over the years have made use of the approach–avoidance distinction in their work. Thorndike (1911), in his “law of effect,” described how responses followed by satisfaction are more likely to recur and responses followed by discomfort are less likely to recur. Jung (1921) posited that a fundamental difference between extroverts and introverts is that extroverts exhibit an interest in moving toward social objects, whereas introverts exhibit an interest in moving away from social objects. Tolman (1925) contended that a complete description of behavior must include reference to the end (i.e., goal) toward which or away from which the organism is moving. Pavlov (1927) identified two types of reflexive responses to stimuli, an orienting response toward the stimulus and a defensive response away from the stimulus. Lewin (1935) posited that goal objects in the life space have positive valences that attract and negative valences that repel. Horney (1937) discussed different strategies that individuals use to cope with their basic anxiety, including “moving toward” and “moving away.” Skinner (1938, 1953) distinguished between reinforcers that strengthen responses and punishing stimuli that weaken responses, and differentiated positive reinforcement (the provision of a positive) from negative reinforcement (the removal of a negative).

Murray (1938) distinguished between two types of psychological needs, “adient” (positive) needs that impel the organism toward other objects, and “abient” (negative) needs that impel the organism away from other objects. Hull (1943) proposed two classes of acquired drives, conditioned appetitive drives (e.g., involving food) and conditioned aversive drives (e.g., involving pain avoidance), and his mathematical theory of instrumental behavior included parameters representing the tendency to respond (reaction potential) and inhibit responding (inhibitory potential). Miller (1944) detailed various dynamic conflicts that can result from incompatible valences (e.g., being attracted to and repelled by the same goal object). Hebb (1949) posited that stimulation below a certain threshold leads to pleasure and approach behavior, whereas stimulation above the threshold leads to pain and avoidance behavior. Sullivan (1953) introduced the notion of self-personifications, including the good me and the bad me. Rotter (1954) proposed that individuals’ expectancies and values are largely a function of their experiences with prior rewards and punishments.

Maslow (1955) asserted that human beings have two basic sets of needs, deficit needs (e.g., safety) that involve striving to eliminate a negative-life situation and growth needs (i.e., self-actualization) that involve striving to attain a more positive-life situation. Cattell (1957) distinguished between the innate motives (ergs) of exploration (an appetitive motive) and escape to security (an aversive motive). Heider (1958) summarized the difference between “can” and “may” by stating that the former implies that if a person tries, he or she will succeed, whereas the latter implies that if a person tries he or she will not be punished. Mowrer (1960) differentiated between hoped for and feared states, and linked the presence and absence of these states to distinct emotions. Rogers (1961) stated that personal goals may either represent moving toward something positive or moving away from something negative. Erickson (1963) distinguished between basic trust and mistrust in articulating the crisis of the first psychosocial stage of development. Eysenck (1967) posited that introverts are “stimulus shy” due to high baseline levels of cortical arousal, whereas extraverts are “stimulus hungry” due to low baselines levels of cortical arousal. Bowlby (1969) proposed two distinct types of attachments, secure attachment that promotes challenge seeking and exploration, and insecure attachment that leads to caution and a preoccupation with safety and protection.

The aforementioned is but a sampling of the prominent psychological theorists who have implemented approach–avoidance concepts or constructs in their work. This listing emphatically documents the historical significance of the approach–avoidance distinction; it not only shows that the distinction has a long history, but also that it has a broad history. Indeed, the approach–avoidance distinction has been utilized in all of the major theoretical approaches that have been employed to scientifically explain behavior, regardless of how these approaches might be characterized: psychodynamic (e.g., Freud), behaviorist (e.g., Skinner), and humanistic (e.g., Maslow); dispositional (e.g., Murray) and situational (e.g., Thorndike); biological (e.g., Eysenck), af fective (e.g., Mowrer), cognitive (e.g., Heider), and social cognitive (e.g., Rotter).

During the 1970s through the 1980s, many cognitive and social-cognitive theorists pitted cognitive against affective and motivational accounts of behavior. In this context, the approach–avoidance distinction was stil utilized in theorizi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Editor
• Part 1 Introduction
• Introduction and Overview
• Part II Neurophysiology and Neurobiology
• Brain Systems and Mechanisms 2 Emotional Processing and Motivation: In Search of Brain Mechanisms
• Cortical Asymmetry
• Cortex-Reflex Connections
• Subcortical Processes
• Neurotransmitters
• Hormones
• Olfaction
• Part III Basic Dispositions, Goals, and States
• Basic Personality Dispositions
• Basic Dispositions in Nonhuman Animals
• Behavioral Genetics
• Social Motives and Goals
• Achievement Motives and Goals
• Motivational States
• Part IV Evaluative Processes
• Evolution of Evaluative Processes I
• Evolution of Evaluative Processes II
• Immediacy and Automaticity of Evaluation
• Structure of Evaluation
• Evaluation Asymmetry
• Part V Emotion and Well-Being
• Structure of Emotions
• Function of Emotions
• Distinct Emotional Experience
• Anger
• Well-Being
• Part VI Cognition
• Challenge and Threat Appraisal
• Mental Control
• Orienting and Attentional Processes
• Framing
• Part VII The Self
• Self-Regulation
• Self-Esteem and Self-Concept
• Self-Knowledge
• Self-Access
• Part VIII Social Context
• Culture
• Stereotyping
• Social Comparison
• Social Exclusion
• Sexual Behavior
• Author Index
• Subject Index