The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority

Bruce Cronin, Ian Hurd

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9781135973575
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Observes how the growth of the political authority of the Council challenges the basic idea that states have legal autonomy over their domestic affairs. The individual essays survey the implications that flow from these developments in the crucial policy areas of: terrorism; economic sanctions; the prosecution of war crimes; human rights; humanitarian intervention; and the use of force. In each of these areas, the evidence shows a complex and fluid relation between state sovereignty, the power of the United Nations, and the politics of international legitimation. Demonstrating how world politics has come to accommodate the contradictory institutions of international authority and international anarchy, this book makes an important contribution to how we understand and study international organizations and international law. Written by leading experts in the field, this volume will be of strong interest to students and scholars of international relations, international organizations, international law and global governance.

Part I
Concepts

1 Introduction

Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd

The United Nations Security Council is the most powerful international institution in the history of the nation-state system. As a body comprising the world’s most dominant and influential states—as well as representatives from each of the world’s regions—it has the means to establish and implement a wide range of policies regarding international peace and security broadly defined. When its members pool their military and economic resources, it represents the strongest combination of states in modern times. Yet it is not the mobilization of military or economic power alone that makes the Security Council such a formidable body. Despite their overwhelming resources, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) often cannot enforce their resolutions without cooperation from the less powerful states. Thus, for example, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, peacekeeping operations, nation-building, the prosecution of war criminals, and the resolution of civil wars require widespread support from even small states that may otherwise not be considered major players in international affairs. As recent events suggest, even a powerful “coalition of the willing” cannot impose stability in a chaotic region without the active participation of less-powerful countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and India. These events also indicate that such cooperation can no longer be obtained entirely through coercion or diplomatic inducements; it often requires a widespread acceptance by governments and their populations of the Security Council’s legitimate authority to act.

The United Nations Charter invests considerable political and legal authority in the Security Council, and the requirements of UN membership imposes a substantial level of obligation on the states to follow Security Council mandates. In practice, the success of the Security Council often depends less on its capacity to employ its collective military or economic strength than on its ability to gain recognition as the body with the legitimate authority to take a particular action on a particular matter. It is this authority that enables the Security Council to act on behalf of the international community, rather than simply the self-interest of its members.¹ The Council is therefore qualitatively different from previous associations of powerful states such as the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe (which was self-appointed), the League of Nations Council (which lacked credibility) or alliances such as NATO (which represent only a self-selected faction of states).

This volume seeks to explain the sources, effects, and implications of the international authority vested in the Security Council. This approach represents a shift from the traditional ways most scholars in the field have conceptualized international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular. The idea that an intergovernmental body like the Security Council could represent a form of centralized authority challenges our notions of how global governance operates within an anarchical system. Indeed it raises significant theoretical questions about the state of scholarship in the field, and more importantly, about the nature of international relations itself. While the contributors to this volume disagree with each other over whether a radical transformation of the international system is underway, they present important evidence that at least in some areas of international politics, international authority and international anarchy do coexist.

This suggestion requires the support of a volume-sized study. The dominant paradigms in contemporary International Relations (IR) theory either rule out or deny the possibility that any form of centralized authority could exist in an anarchical international system. In fact the very concept of anarchy as commonly understood in the field precludes this possibility by definition. For all the recent talk of “global governance,” the serious study of the institutionalization of global authority has not yet begun. Rather, most approaches to this question view global governance as the management and/or coordination of various aspects of global politics, economics, and environmental policy by international and regional organizations (Held and McGrew 2002; Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Vayrynen 1999; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). If authority implies a right to decide and an obligation to follow, then the concept has been effectively marginalized in mainstream international relations theory. Instead, realists see a system governed by the drive for hegemony and material power (Gruber 2000; Gilpin 1981); institutionalists by cooperation and collaboration under anarchy (Keohane 2002); English school theorists by commonly accepted regulatory rules (Bull 1977; Hurrell 1993; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993); and constructivists by constitutive rules (Wendt 1992). Despite wide differences concerning the implications of international anarchy cooperation, stability, and security, most theorists agree that in an anarchic system based on the principle of sovereignty, authority rests exclusively within the nation-state itself.

At the same time, a number of scholars have recently challenged the notion that the international system is an “authority-free zone,” opening important empirical and conceptual spaces for new research. Some critics, for example, charge that the absence of authority from the international system is, for most IR theorists, a matter of assumption rather than one of empirical proof (Milner 1991). IR theorists have been content to assume that it does not exist and then work out the logical implications of that absence. Theorists representing different paradigms may come to different conclusions concerning these implications, but most readily accept Kenneth Waltz’s distinction between international anarchy and domestic authority/hierarchy. At no point is that fundamental distinction put to the empirical test.

While direct tests have not been done, there is a growing literature on substantive problems in IR that uses the language of authority to resolve empirical puzzles. It is now increasingly common for scholars to refer to the authority of the United Nations (Russett and Oneal 2001), of international firms (Sinclair 1994; Hall and Biersteker 2002), of international law (Franck 2003), and of international institutions in general (Buchanan 2003). In particular, the literature on global governance paints a picture of a world that is increasingly organized and coordinated by a complex set of institutions, rules, and norms. Yet with all of this research, the concept of authority is rarely developed theoretically, and its relationship to power politics, state sovereignty, and international law remains unexplored.² For this reason, we believe that many studies of the Security Council have drifted away from the theoretical moorings.

This volume aims to connect and extend the literatures on Security Council power and on authority, in the belief that this enriches both. Many students of the Council claim that its authority has been increasing in recent years (Malone 2004). Yet there has been little research examining precisely what this means for the organization of international relations and its relation to the political structure of the international system. The Council appears as an anomaly in the theory of international politics. It does not easily fit our conventional models of an international institution; it is more than a security regime but less than a world governing body. It is comprised of delegates representing the interests of their governments, yet it also acts on behalf of the world association of states. It simultaneously reflects both the principles of intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993: 481) and global governance (Wilkinson 2005; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). The unwillingness of most scholars to conceptualize the Council beyond traditional notions of a sovereign–state association has led them to define it primarily in terms of their preconceived paradigms. Thus, for example, realists tend to view the Council as a forum for the great powers to act out their competition and conflicts, institutionalists as a mechanism for these powers to collectively manage an increasingly complex and interdependent system, and international law scholars as a legally constituted decision-making body designed to enforce the rules of the United Nations.

This book tries to expand these notions by examining—from a theoretical perspective—the degree to which the Security Council may be evolving into a loosely centralized international authority with the legitimate power to act on behalf of the international community on a wide range of global issues. It does so by placing the examination of the Council’s role in international affairs within the broader theoretical context of global governance and the nature of “international authority.” It builds upon theoretical advances in understanding political authority and international legitimacy, and employs legal, constructivist, and rationalist approaches to explain the evolution of Council authority. In this sense, The book seeks to contribute to a growing debate within the field of International Relations about the nature of international authority, the power of legitimacy, and the role of international organizations in world politics by examining the most visible and contested source of international authority in the modern world, the UN Security Council.

In a broader sense, we also raise questions concerning what, if anything, an increase in the Council’s authority implies about the power of nationstates. If there is a zero-sum relationship between the authority of governments and that of international organizations, then there is a tension between the authority of the Council and the power of states. This would suggest that we may need to rethink our common understanding of the institution of sovereignty. On the other hand, it may be that the trade-off model might not be the most appropriate way to conceive of the relationship: in some cases, power and authority at the Council may enhance state power, as when a peace-building mission rebuilds central governments in post-civil-war societies or when the Council endorses a member’s “coalition of the willing.”

Legitimacy, power, and authority

We must be clear what we mean when we speak of the “authority” of the Council. We define authority as a relation among actors within a hierarchy in which one group is recognized as having both the right and the competence to make binding decisions for the rest of the community (this is articulated in detail in Chapter 2). Authority is therefore a form of power, but a special case of the more general phenomenon. As Hall and Biersteker argue, what differentiates authority from power is the place of legitimacy in establishing claims of authority (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 4). Authority is legitimized power, or as John Ruggie puts it, authority is “a fusion of power and legitimate social purpose” (Ruggie 1983: 198). It is this social purpose (as opposed to purely private gain) that facilitates recognition and legitimacy by the members of a community.

Wayne Sandholtz describes this in Chapter 6 as the “purposive” legitimacy of an organization, a concept similar to one employed by Barnett and Finnemore (1999). Legitimation is possible when an organization is identified with purposes and goals that are consistent with the broader norms and values of its society—some consistency between the organization and social values is essential for legitimation. When this exists, there are at least three mechanisms by which the behavior and practices of the organization might contribute to its legitimation (or delegitimation). These are deliberation, proceduralism, and effectiveness. We discuss these next in order to show some of the complexity in the sources of legitimation. Our discussion draws on the categorizations provided by psychologists and sociologists, and in IR settings by Zelditch (2001), Tyler (2001), Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 5), Sandholtz (Chapter 7, this volume), and others.³ The first mechanism refers to the legitimating effect of deliberation within an organization. As Johnstone shows in Chapter 5, legitimacy can be established through the use of argumentation, justification, and appeals to reasons that reach beyond narrow self-interest in the course of making decisions. The second suggests a type of legitimation that flows from following the correct procedures of the organization—in particular, the terms by which the organization was vested with authority. The third corresponds with “performance” legitimation as described in Chapter 7 by Sandholtz. This envisions legitimacy based on positive results, in particular, the accomplishment of the organization’s goals. Given a socially sanctioned social purpose for the organization, these practices can contribute to the belief in the audience in its legitimacy and therefore transform its influence into authority.

It is widely observed that the opportunity for deliberation in an institution increases its legitimacy by encouraging group affinity among the participants (Gambetta 1998). The legitimating effect of deliberation appears to exist even when the outcome of the deliberative process goes against the individual’s interests, and it also appears to exist if the individual declines to exercise the right of deliberation. It appears to be the case that the opportunity to deliberate, separate from the act of participating in deliberation or the outcome, is legitimating in itself (Tyler 2001).

Jon Elster and others who theorize about deliberation suggest that it is important because it can change the positions that people take and so may change the outcome of decisions. In his defense of UN “gabfests” Shashi Tharoor (2003) says “talk is the necessary precursor for action. Nothing can change unless the world agrees, through talk, upon change.” For Tharoor, deliberation matters because it can lead to different (and presumably better) outcomes from decisions. We could add as well the possibility that deliberation might matter even where it is unlikely to affect the present decision—it might also be significant to the extent that it can alter outcomes or perceptions for the future.

There is disagreement regarding how and why deliberation affects decision-making. For some, deliberation is important because it increases the amount of information available to those making decisions. It helps to equalize asymmetries of information and to reveal the preferences of others. New information revealed through deliberation feeds into the decision calculus of players and causes them to strategize differently than they otherwise would (Fearon 1998). For others such as Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas, deliberation matters because the act of participating in deliberation changes the actors themselves. It can alter the preferences of players by changing their identities and therefore their perceptions of their interests. Deliberation requires a vocabulary of shared meaning and values—without these discussion is impossible—and this common vocabulary produces a sense of community. According to Charles Taylor (1979, cited in Adler and Barnett 1998: 31), such “intersubjective meaning gives people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms.” Similarly, Chong (2000: 78) suggests that “Group membership leads to identifying with the group and to developing attitudes, traits, and skills that serve the individual in that environment.” Once the deliberators have created these common meanings, they are then able to talk to each other in substantive terms that all will understand. However, at the same time, they have themselves been changed by participating in this process. Says Taylor (1979), “common meanings are the basis of community” and the new sense of community shifts the terms of the negotiation (Albin 2001). Deliberation might bring a community into being among participants and thus legitimize to themselves their collective endeavors. This logic is at the heart of the new “security communities” project in International Relations (Adler and Barnett 1998).

For our purposes here we do not need to resolve the differences between deliberative theories, and can conclude simply that deliberation—understood as the opportunity for participation and voice according to known procedures—legitimizes outcomes.⁴ Being allowed to participate in a procedure of collective decision-making increases the likelihood that one will accept the outcome as legitimate. Deliberation, however, must take place within the context of established procedures, and these rules can have a powerful impact on outcomes. Proceduralism, or procedural correctness, is a further important mechanism in institutional legitimation.

The Council’s legitimacy is therefore in part a function of it following the internal procedures of the United Nations itself. One could argue that in signing the UN Charter, states have not only accepted a set of legally binding principles; they have also recognized the legitimacy of a legally binding political process. The Council is primarily a deliberative body that not only vests the power to decide in the great powers—the P5—but also representatives elected from each region in the world—commonly called the E10.⁵ In this sense the Council’s authority is of the “rational-legal” type described by Max Weber. That is, its foundation is anchored in impersonal rules that have been legally enacted and contractually established by the UN membership. Thus, the expansion of the “breach of the peace” clause to encompass areas that were never envisioned by the framers (such as nation-building and humanitarian intervention) may have been possible because it was done according to the accepted procedures of the Council understood as an international authority with broad powers for international peace and security (see Chapter 4). Through ongoing and often contentious efforts to deal with discrete problems, the Council has been able to expand its authority on a case-by-case basis precisely because the UN membership believed that it was following proper procedures in making these decisions.

Actors strive to legitimize their behavior by showing that it conforms to important rules, norms, or laws accepted as appropriate (Hurd 2005). Unlike a pure power relationship—in which coercion or the threat of coercion is the resource that induces compliance—authority is a relationship which is based on rules. These rules may be procedural or substantive, and they may favor one group over another, but in order for them to be authoritative in our sense they require recognition and legitimation by the broader political community.⁶ For example, even though the former Soviet Union had the military resources to impose control over the foreign policies of its border states in Eastern Europe, it still sought the legal sanction of the Warsaw Treaty in order to legitimize its domination.⁷ Rule-following (i.e. proceduralism) is an important legitimating force.

According to the proceduralist view of legitimation, the procedures the organization follows need not be fair or just in themselves, but they must be applied fairly and consistently for maximum legitimation effect. Procedural correctness means fairly following the known rules, not fair procedures as such. (This distinction accounts for avoiding the more familiar terms of “procedural fairness” and “procedural justice.”) For the Security Council, this means adhering to the procedures set out in the Charter and in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Council (S/96/Rev.7 and Bailey and Daws 1998). For other international bodies and conferences there also exist formalized rules of procedure and protocol (for instance, Sabel 1997). The level of detail and specificity in these documents is revealing of the importance placed on procedures: they are explicit precisely because it is important that the rules for deliberation be known to all from the start.

The rules of procedure are defined by the organization and its setting. This means that what counts as “correct procedure” will vary among organizations, and also that the procedural rules of any organization can (and probably will) be biased by the power of strong members in the organization in their favor. This creates a significant opening for the operation of power in the manipulation of procedures and thus in the process of legitimation. Strong actors can alter the procedures in such a way that outcomes are biased in their favor. But the proceduralist hypothesis is that legitimation depends more on perceptions of following correct procedures than on self-interested outcomes, and so bias in outcomes is not antithetical to legitimation (Tyler 2001). What matters most is that the procedures for deliberation were followed correctly, even in the presence of hidden structures of power in the procedures themselves. In fact, many have noted the potentially troubling facts that proper procedures are often used to legitimize what objectively look like unjust or even offensive outcomes, and that, once created, legitimacy might sustain highly unequal outcomes. There is much to worry about in the fact that “people who on some objective grounds ‘ought’ to view the system as unfair often accept social justifications [legitimation] for the system and feel an obligation to accept its rules an...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• PART I Concepts
• PART II Sources of Council authority
• PART III The exercise of Council authority
• PART IV Conclusion
• References and interviews