1 Past and present
Looking back in time
A decade ago an eloquent Namibian intellectual called for more âAfricannessâ to be put back into Africa, with whatever consequence (Diescho 1995). But what is âAfricannessâ? Is there an African identity that transcends the differences which distinguish one African culture from another? Or are there no commonalities over and above those that have been imposed by one form of domination or another? In short, is there more that divides Africa than unites it? These are difficult questions and the possible answers rest upon particular perspectives and time-frames. Africaâs history as a whole is varied and stretches back through millennia. North Africa is awash with antiquity from ancient history and buildings and artefacts of that period appear in other countries. Pyramids and archaeological evidence are present in Sudan and would be sought out by tourists and travellers if the country were at peace with itself. Strong links existed between pre-colonial Africa and the Middle East, especially after the Arab empire extended its conquests in AD 656. Trade, intermarriage and conversion spread Islam across sub-Saharan Africa,1 and according to Jean-Francois Bayart, as a trans-regional religious movement, was a âpowerful means of social rapprochement.â In essence, a âprocess of assimilation between communities occurredâ (Bayart 1992: 177).
European expansion began with the explorations of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century but was to reach its zenith in the nineteenth and early to midtwentieth centuries. D.K.Fieldhouse (1973: 147) viewed the motivation for nineteenth-century colonial expansion as fiscal or political: âThe desire of existing colonies or trading bases to extend the limits of their customs collection to raise more revenues;âŚand in the special case of Senegal, fear of Islamic power inland,â together with a desire to increase colonial revenues. When the imperial powers agreed at the Berlin Conference of 1884 that no new annexations on the African coast were to be recognized as valid unless they were accompanied by effective occupation, it is generally acknowledged that the African continent was, as the phrase goes, âcarved upâ indiscriminately âwith casual disregard for the people whom they thus allocated into one or another colonyâ (Clapham 1985: 17). As Maps 1.1a, b and c indicate, the European colonial penetration of Africa was immense and arbitrary. It was both the scale and the territorial rearranging of the continent that separated tribal groupings. East Africa, for example, was partitioned into two areas, one initially under German control, Tanganyika, and the other land, which included part of Somalia and was later to become known as Kenya, under the British. However, colonial administrations, particularly the French and British, were aware of the powerful Islamic communities and cooperated with established leaders, for example the Fulani Emirs in the northern provinces of the Cameroons and Nigeria, and the Muslim brotherhoods of Senegal. Arabs and their African offspring occupied high government offices in Tanganyika and Kenya and it is alleged that in some cases Arab commercial activities were facilitated by the improved infrastructure and transport systems established under colonial rule (Haseeb 1985: 132).
Map 1.1 Historical maps of Africa, (a) 1885; (b) 1914; (c) 1939.
The cultural inheritance of Africans is important in assessing whether or not peoples have any commonalities. One analyst asserted âWhatever Africans share, we do not have a common traditional culture, common languages, a common religious or conceptual vocabularyâŚand we do not even belong to a common raceâ (Appiah 1992: 26). Religion has, of course, served to separate groups: âthe role of religion as a symbolic medium of contact and conflict is striking in the colonial history of Africaâ (Bayart 1993: 177). Bayart (1993: 190) maintains that the two monotheistic religions, that is Christianity and Islam, have both had âlong experience of accommodation with the State,â colonial and other. Certainly, privilege, power and status were accorded to some ethnic groups and this has led to discussion of how the âcarve-upâ of Africa affected relations between Africans and Arabs. Did, for example, Arabs, Africans of Arab descent and Africans of different tribal inheritances share common objectives or were their interests separate and possibly contradictory? One view supporting the first proposition suggests that âAt no point in the long history of Islamic power did a non-African Islamic ruler succeed in controlling African Muslims.â As such, Islam presented no threat to the interests of Africans as it âallowed for compromise and harmonious relations with the African way of life, traditions and customsâ (Yousuf 1986: 28). From such a perspective there can be no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim Africans. If some powerful Muslim African leaders cooperated with colonial powers in the administration of truncated territories, it should not imply a betrayal of the interests of other non-Muslim Africans but should be viewed as the only available option open to subjugated peoples. Colonial rule would be in the interests of neither native Africans nor those of Arab descent as it demarcated territory, imposed administrative structures and introduced a colonial economy which advantaged European powers through fiscal and trading procedures at the cost of the colony itself. For some, when the foundations of colonialism were laid down in East Africa, âArab political control was ended once and for allâ (Salim 1985: 130).
However, if it is possible to consider the interests of African Muslims as differing from those of other indigenous Africans an alternative picture emerges: one of complicity with the colonial power to the detriment of the native non-Muslim African population. The old colonial strategy of âdivide and ruleâ, that is the privileging of one community over another, would have little meaning in a society where interests were one and the same. Difference between sections of society were both perceived and acted upon by colonial authorities, who identified certain groups as tribes and were actually instrumental themselves in creating distinctions between peoples (Chazan et al. 1988: 103). Anthropologists have viewed African societies as consisting of âdescent groupsâ which define the norms and limits of behaviour and establish lines of authority. Sometimes these groups would be in competition and would fight each other but, interestingly, if attacked by a third party, would unite: âBrothers could be naturally opposed to one another, but if a more distantly related third party fought with one of the brothers, the two brothers would unite to form a single segment and fightâ (E.E.Evans-Pritchard cited in Grinker and Steiner 1997: 5. See also Falk Moore 1994). So, to put it another way, artificial unity could be achieved at intervals depending on the nature of the perceived threat, be it European colonisation, neo-imperialism or Western economic dominance.
Ali Mazrui acknowledges that the âinterplay of Africaâs indigenous cultures with Islam on the one side and Western civilisationâ on the other has had not only political/economic effects, but also âcultural and civilisationalâ influences. Culture he defines as a âsystem of inter-related values, active enough to influence and condition perception, judgement, communication and behaviour in a given societyâ, whereas civilization embraces a âculture which has endured, expanded, innovated and been elevated to new moral sensibilitiesâ (Mazrui 1986: 239). These are farreaching definitions which require detailed examination of every point. Mazrui believes the word civilization can be applied to the Western and Islamic as well as âindigenous legaciesâ but cautions that the term is âalways relative and somewhat hyperbolicâ. Exactly what constitutes a civilization may be debated, but cultures, when viewed as different systems of values, can often clash with each other, particularly if those values are in competition for authority and control. Ultimately, Mazrui asserts, one culture will establish a âclear ascendancyâ which essentially forces the âmore vulnerable culture to surrender.â Subsequently, cultural confusion emerges among the dominated culture leading to a process of first âcultural surrenderâ followed by âcultural alienationâ and then âcultural revivalâ, meaning a return to traditionalism. In essence, Africa has a âtriple heritage of indigenous, Islamic and Western forcesâfusing and recoiling, at once competitive and complementaryâ (ibid.: 239, 21).
During the latter years of the colonial period the intellectual political climate within nationalist movements in Africa was dominated by Marxism, variant forms of socialism and notions of self-determination.2 The path to the future was to be secular and independent. While some Pan-African Congress resolutions stressed the need for âfreedom, democracy and bettermentâ, others highlighted that Africa was prepared to fight for liberation: âIf the western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve Freedomâ (Mazrui and Tidy 1986: 22). Essentially, the African struggles against colonial rule were waged to end European dominance. Goran Hyden argues that African post-colonial leaders created an âinformal contextâ in which they could ignore formal rules by promoting the idea that the âessential experience during the colonial period was exploitation of the local peopleâ by outsiders. âFormal rulesâ would include the performance of certain basic tasks, such as promoting political freedoms and economic prosperity, but Africaâs new political elite managed to construct an overarching objective: ending colonial rule (Hyden 2006: 32). Since the perceived purpose of colonialism was to oppress politically and to exploit economically, it was expected that decolonization would bring freedom and prosperity to Africa. It certainly brought freedom of a kind but prosperity is still awaited by many Africans. Politically, for the masses it often brought military government, the one-party or no-party state, the dominant ruler and until quite recently the âpresident for life.â Table 1.1 outlines the political longevity of some African leaders.
The patriarchal political environment of many African states gave rise to ethnic clashes with rival groups fighting for control of government and access to resources. See Map 1.2 for an outline of some ethnic groups across the continent. The increasing lack of legitimacy and economic development has led to the politicization of ethnicity. As Patrick Chabal asserts, the incidence of violence in Africa is often attributable to âbad governmentâ (Chabal 1992: 34). The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its inception in 1963 asserted that its members are âDetermined to safeguard and consolidate the hard won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms.â However, by 1991 the OAU referred to the need for African states to democratize and take seriously âthe expansion of liberalismâ and the adoption of multi-party politics (Deegan 1996: 32). For Nelson Mandela, who addressed the OAU summit in 1994, Africa had to âput its house in orderâ: âWe must face the matter squarely that where there is something wrong in how we govern ourselves, it must be said that the fault is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are ill-governedâ (Deegan 2001: 56).
For Ali Mazrui (1986: 11â12), âAfrica is at war. It is a war of cultures. It is a war between indigenous Africa and the forces of Western civilisation. It takes the form of inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption and decay.â In fact, the whole process of attempted modernization is a form of âunnatural dis-Africanisationâ,which is effectively tearing Africa away from its indigenous roots. Yet can economic progress take place without a massive shift in societal values? And should improvements in welfare, education and literacy determine a new cultural enlightenment?
Table 1.1 Political longevity of selected African leaders
Map 1.2 A selection of ethnic groups.
Traditional theories of culture and development
For over a century the relationship between developmental and cultural change has been much debated. It was assumed that as countries developed there would be a shift towards the adoption of scientific knowledge, an evolution from subsistence farming towards commercial production of agricultural goods and a move towards industrialization. Yet such changes involved great social and cultural alteration. Hence, this process of structural differentiation marked a break in established norms of social and economic life. Consequently, during periods of development, familial, kinship, religious and cultural ties would be undermined and regarded as largely restrictive traditional forces (Smelser 1966: 29). For some political participation was seen as a key which opened the door to development, thus distinguishing the traditional society, which separated people âby kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a centreâ, from an advancing modernizing state (Lerner 1958: 48â50). Other analysts, however, believed that developing nations initially faced a âcruel choiceâ between rapid, self-sustained expansion and the introduction of democratic processes. As Western patterns of capital accumulation were seen as crucial for development, it was argued that authoritarian states would be more adept at extracting surpluses from their populations. Economic progress, then, would have to precede moves towards democratization: âdevelopment first, democracy laterâ was the theme (Bhagwati 1966: 53; see also revised version, Bhagwati 1995). S.M.Lipset (1960: 71) explained: âMen may question whether any aspect of this interrelated cluster of economic developmentâŚgradual political change, legitimacy and democracy is primary, but the fact remains that the cluster does hang together.â
Inevitably, attitudes towards social activities and societal change would vary between different cultures depending on their values and beliefs. Also, societies were composed of structures whose âcultural systemsâ exercised organized patterns of influence over the whole community, sometimes irrespective and independent of particular individuals (Billington et al. 1991: 4). In general, then, cultural factors serve an overall integrative function in society. Yet often a complex relationship exists between culture and a social structure. According to Emile Durkheim, societal values constituted the component which reached the highest level of generality, for they were âconceptions of the desirable society that are held in common by its membersâ (Wolff 1960: 122). Values and norms were specified within the cultural system and determined the manner in which âpeople behave as they are expected to in a given situationâ (Parsons 1968: 399). A âwell-defined system of values shared to some degree with other members of the communityâ is necessary (ibid.). Yet modernization as a complex process of social change has the capacity to dislodge previous cultural systems and value structures (Deutsch 1953: 35).
The straightforward division between agricultural/agrarian and industrial societies provides a clear illustration of the differences between these forms of states as seen in Table 1.2. The shift from what can be regarded as a semi-feudal society to one that is differentiated and essentially class-based suggests that a stage has been reached when common values are expressed in conformity with the universal principle that âeverybody be judged on the same fundamental basesâ (Sutton 1963: 67). But how is it possible to move from one typology to another? Certainly, several technical, economic and ecological processes that frequently accompany development can be isolated:
- in the realm of technology: the shift from simple and traditional techniques towards the application of scientific knowledge;
- in agriculture: the evolution from subsistence farming towards commercial production of agricultural goods, i.e. the introduction of cash crops, purchase of non-agricultural products and the introduction of wage-labour;
- in industry: the transition from the use of human/animal power toward industrialization/factory production led by the market mechanism;
- ecologically: the move from farm and village towards urban centres.
As development demanded urbanization, improved literacy rates, expanding economies and exposure to mass communications, it subjected the institutional framework of a society to continual challenges to adapt in the face of rapidly developing productive forces. Economic modernization, associated with ideals of progress and rationality, was intended to sweep away traditional beliefs, ways of life and patterns of authority. Obviously, the process presented difficulties, particularly in traditional societies where value systems tended to be âprescriptiveâ (Bellah 1966: 188). A prescriptive system was characterized by âthe comprehensiveness and specificity of its value commitments and by its consequent lack of flexibility. Motivation is frozenâŚthrough commitment to a vast range of relatively specific norms governing almost every situation in life.â Whereas in a modern society a degree of flexibility had to be introduced in economic, political and social spheres, in âprescriptiveâ societies a religious system would attempt to regulate all those areas. âThus changes in economic or political institutionsânot to speak of family and educationâin traditional societies tended to have ultimate religious implicationsâ (ibid.: 189). In fact, in certain societies, notably Muslim, it was believed that traditional culture was synonymous with religion and rested âeverywhere on an Islamic basisâ (Rustow 1970: 452). The relationship between religion, tradition and development becomes more complicated, especially so if culture has the capacity to inhibit modernization.
Table 1.2 Typologies of societies
R.B.Bellahâs research explored how the organizat...