Analyticity

Cory Juhl, Eric Loomis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781135278403
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Analyticity, or the 'analytic/synthetic' distinction is one of the most important and controversial problems in contemporary philosophy. It is also essential to understanding many developments in logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. In this outstanding introduction to analyticity Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis cover the following key topics:

• The origins of analyticity in the philosophy of Hume and Kant
• Carnap's arguments concerning analyticity in the early twentieth century
• Quine's famous objections to analyticity in his classic 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' essay
• The relationship between analyticity and central issues in metaphysics, such as ontology
• The relationship between analyticity and epistemology
• Analyticity in the context of the current debates in philosophy, including mathematics and ontology

Throughout the book the authors show how many philosophical controversies hinge on the problem of analyticity. Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms making the book ideal to those coming to the problem for the first time.

1
CONCEPTIONS OF ANALYTIC TRUTH

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter we survey the emergence of the analytic–synthetic distinction. The notion of analytic truth has played an important role in many central philosophical projects of the late modern and contemporary period, including the work of Immanuel Kant, Bernard Bolzano, Gottlob Frege, the Vienna Circle, and Rudolf Carnap. Philosophers have taken analytic truths as paradigms of necessary truths, of truths knowable a priori, or of truths knowable with absolute certainty. As a result, philosophers skeptical of the existence of such properties as necessary truth or a priori knowledge have frequently bolstered their skepticism with an attack on analyticity.

Our purpose in this chapter is to develop the history of the notion of analyticity and the correlative distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, with an emphasis on showing how the notion shaped individual philosophers’ conceptions of what philosophy is, and on how those conceptions informed subsequent developments of the notion. Our investigation of the philosophical controversy surrounding analytic truth begins with the work of Scottish philosopher David Hume.

1.2 Hume’s Fork

David Hume (1711–76) formulated an important prototype of the analytic– synthetic distinction. Many of the ideas that guided the main figures in this book, Rudolf Carnap and Willard V. Quine, received their earliest articulation in the work of Hume. Hume found much of the philosophical tradition of metaphysical speculation that preceded him to be ‘not only painful and fatiguing’ but also ‘the inevitable source of uncertainty and error’ (1988, 11). This complaint would be echoed by Carnap and Quine over two centuries later. Like them, Hume saw the reason for this perceived failure of metaphysics in the fact that metaphysics was not conducted as a science, for it had substituted abstract speculation for close analysis of ‘the operations of the mind’ (13). Hume saw philosophy’s proper role as that of knowing ‘the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads’ (13). To do this, Hume adopted an empiricist theory of knowledge, dividing all the ‘perceptions of the mind’ into the more lively ‘impressions,’ as ‘when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will,’ and the less lively ‘ideas’ formed as copies from the impressions (18–19). All thinking, and all ideas, originated in their corresponding impressions, Hume argued. Attempts by abstract thought to go beyond impressions, as prior metaphysics had done, involved going beyond the very things that gave our thoughts content. The antidote to such metaphysics was, Hume argued, to introduce a ‘greater clearness and precision into philosophical reasonings’ by analyzing the definitions of disputed or obscure concepts in terms of their component impressions:

Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what recourse are we then possessed of? … Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. (1988, 62)

Hume used this method to investigate a variety of traditional metaphysical concepts, most famously including the ideas of causation, cases of seemingly necessary connections among ideas, and freedom of the will (cf. 1988 40–55, 60–79, 80–103). The verdict of Hume’s investigation into these concepts was invariably a ‘skeptical’ one. He could not find a corresponding impression for them that was strong and sensible, and so argued that our belief that these concepts corresponded to something real (an impression) rested instead on the ‘custom or habit of the mind’ (43). Insofar as traditional metaphysics rested on the claim that these concepts did correspond to some real object, it was mistaken.

Nonetheless, Hume granted a distinction that would anticipate the later analytic–synthetic distinction. The distinction, known as ‘Hume’s Fork,’ divided all objects of human reasoning into ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’:

Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain … That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more a contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. (1988, 25–6)

As Hume used the terms, our reasoning concerning relations of ideas and matters of fact must involve judgments or statements, for they concern things that are knowable, affirmable, or deniable, and have implications. Relations of ideas are knowable through intuition or demonstration, independent of what exists, and the denial of the consequences of demonstrably certain reasoning implies a contradiction and cannot be distinctly conceived (26). Matters of fact are knowable only through evidence such as ‘the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory,’ or from causal inferences drawn from these things (26). Their denials are ‘intelligible’ and (or because) they imply no contradiction.¹

Hume’s real interest lay with ‘matters of fact,’ and he apparently believed that if metaphysical concepts like causation and necessary connection were to have any content, it would be because they concerned matters of fact. Relations of ideas received no further attention from Hume. Yet their introduction by him raises a variety of interesting questions, most prominently why he found it necessary to acknowledge them. Was Hume granting that some knowledge could be had a priori, contrary to what is suggested by his theory that all ideas originate in impressions? If so, could metaphysics take root here, in this realm of relations independent of matters of fact? Although Hume did not further develop the distinction, we can nonetheless surmise that his likely answer to these questions would have been negative. Certainly the fact that he thought that his empirical approach to the analysis of philosophical concepts would fix the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism ‘beyond controversy’ (6) strongly indicates that he regarded further inquiry into the relations of ideas to be of limited philosophical interest. Our next philosopher, Immanuel Kant, would see things very differently.

1.3.1 Kant and the Analytic–Synthetic Distinction

The contemporary distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments traces its roots most directly to Kant (1724–1804). It was Kant who first articulated the notion in something close to its current usage. Kant introduced the notion as a part of his larger philosophical theory, one aimed, in part, at rebutting Hume’s ‘skeptical’ conclusions. His response to Hume was to argue that Hume had tried to find in the realm of our experience the conditions which make that experience possible (Kant 1965, sections A760/ B788). But this, Kant thought, was mistaken, for we should not expect to find the conditions which make experience possible in that very experience. Rather, we should search outside of experience in the realm of a priori knowledge in order to find the conditions of experience (cf. 1965, B1–9). Kant believed that philosophy could discover substantive, informative truths that were nevertheless knowable a priori, what he called ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge.

What led Kant to believe in the synthetic a priori? Kant thought that the modality of a judgment, that is, its being contingent or necessary, was tied in an important way to the manner in which that judgment was known.² More specifically, he thought that all necessary judgments were in principle knowable a priori, and conversely, that all judgments knowable a priori were necessary (A7/B12, A595/B623). To see why he linked a priori knowledge and necessary truth, consider the judgment that 7 + 5 = 12. This judgment is true, and more importantly it is true in a way that seems to place it beyond falsification by any experience. We can motivate this idea with a simple thought experiment. Suppose that we wish to ‘test’ the truth of the judgment that 7 + 5 = 12 by applying it to empirical objects. Perhaps we start with drops of a colored liquid. Using a dropper, we drop seven drops of the liquid into a beaker, followed by five more drops, and count the result, whereupon we find only one big ‘drop’ – not twelve. Why haven’t we just empirically ‘refuted’ the judgment that 7 + 5 = 12? Most of us likely feel certain that we haven’t, but what explains our certainty here?

Kant had a sophisticated, although somewhat obscure, answer to this question. His answer rested on two important moves. First, he regarded every judgment that seemed to be immune to any empirical refutation as knowable independently of experience. The a priori knowability of immune judgments was, Kant reasoned, the most plausible account of how such judgments were known. Second, Kant accounted for the seeming immunity of some statements to empirical evidence in terms of their distinctive modal status as necessary truths. Let’s look at these two moves in turn.

Kant thought that the immunity of some judgments, like 7 + 5 = 12, to any experimental refutation (or, in the case of some false judgments like 7 + 6 = 12, to any experimental confirmation), was evidence of their being knowable a priori, as well as for their necessity. But how is it that we can know something a priori? Kant’s answer varied with the type of judgment at issue. In some cases, Kant thought that our a priori knowledge came from a special, non-sensory intuition. An intuition, in Kant’s terms, can be thought of as a kind of direct acquaintance to the mind of something. Kant believed that space and time were intuitions, but not sensory intuitions, in part because he believed that space and time are a precondition of sensory experience. Arithmetical judgments, Kant argued, are themselves only possible in time. A number series, for instance, is only possible as the successive iteration of an operation in time. Arithmetical judgments thus derived from our a priori intuition of time, for Kant. Similarly, Kant thought that geometrical judgments, such as that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is 180°, derive from a priori intuitions of space. He also believed that geometrical judgments are immune to empirical refutation. While a priori intuitions of space and time were thought by Kant to be the source of much of our a priori knowledge, he believed that there were other sources as well. One such source was a priori concepts, concepts which ‘spring, pure and unmixed, out of the understanding’ (A67/B92). Another source of a priori knowledge is our knowledge of rules through which empirical experience becomes possible (A177/B218f.).

Kant’s second move was to tie the a priori knowability of certain judgments with their having a distinctive modal status, that is, with their being necessary truths or necessary falsehoods. Kant believed that a judgment is knowable a priori if, and only if, it is necessary (cf. A7/B12, A595/B623). Again, consideration of the 7 + 5 = 12 example above might offer some support for this idea. For one explanation of why this judgment cannot be falsified by empirical observations is that it cannot possibly be falsified at all, that it is a necessary truth.

The Kantian picture raises another question. What is it that makes a statement necessary, and how is the truth of necessary judgments knowable a priori? This is where Kant introduced a distinction between two different types of judgments, analytic judgments and synthetic judgments. The explanation of what makes a statement necessary, as well as knowable a priori, differs for the two types of judgment.

Kant’s various attempts to draw the distinction between analytic and synthetic were at times unclear, and some have charged that they are equivocal (a charge that is also leveled against subsequent attempts to draw the distinction, as we will see). We will begin with Kant’s most famous characterization of the distinction, the ‘containment characterization,’ which occurs at the start of his Critique of Pure Reason:

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought … this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. (Kant 1965, B11)

Kant’s own example of an analytic judgment is ‘All bodies are extended.’ Here Kant conceived of extension as the ‘predicate’ of the subject ‘body.’ In this judgment, Kant said, ‘I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with “body” in order to find extension bound up with it’ (ibid.). By contrast, Kant thought that ‘when I say, “All bodies are heavy”, the predicate is something quite distinct from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general, and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment’ (ibid.).

Two features of this way of drawing the analytic–synthetic distinction are worth remarking upon. The first is that the containment criterion applies only to statements that have a subject–predicate form. But what are we to make of judgments that don’t, or don’t obviously, have such a form, such as disjunctive statements like ‘It’s raining or it’s snowing,’ conditional statements like ...

Table of contents

• New Problems of Philosophy Series
• CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• 1 CONCEPTIONS OF ANALYTIC TRUTH
• 2 CARNAP AND QUINE
• 3 ANALYTICITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
• 4 ANALYTICITY AND ONTOLOGY
• 5 ANALYTICITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
• 6 ANALYTICITY REPOSITIONED
• GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX