John Locke

En Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Focus

Gary Fuller, Robert Stecker, John P. Wright

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781134685936
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is among the most important books in philosophy ever written. It is also a difficult work dealing with many themes, including the origin of ideas; the extent and limits of human knowledge; the philosophy of perception; and religion and morality. This volume is original in that it focuses on the last two of these topics and provides a clear and insightful survey of these overlooked aspects of Locke's best known work. Four eminent Locke scholars present authoritative discussions of Locke's view on the ethics of belief, personal identity, free will and moral theory. Contributors include John Passmore (Australian National University), Harold Noonan (Birmingham University), Vere Chappell (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), and Daniel Flage (James Madison University).

SELECTIONS FROM JOHN LOCKE’S AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Epistle to the Reader

Book I: Of Innate Notions

Chapter I: Introduction

Chapter II: No innate Principles in the Mind

Chapter III: No innate practical Principles

Chapter IV: Other Considerations concerning innate Princiles, both speculative and practical

Book II: Of Ideas

Chapter I: Of Ideas in general, and their Original

Chapter II: Of simple Ideas

Chapter III: Of Ideas of one Sense

Chapter V: Of simple Ideas of divers Senses

Chapter VI: Of simple Ideas of Reflection

Chapter VII: Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection

Chapter XII: Of Complex Ideas

Chapter XX: Of Modes ofPleasure and Pain

Chapter XXI: Of Power

Chapter XXII: Of Mixed Modes

Chapter XXIII: Of out Complex Ideas of Substances

Chapter XXVII: Of Identity and Diversity

Chapter XXVIII: Of other Relations [Of Moral Relations]

Chapter XXX: Of Real and Fantastical Ideas

Chapter XXXI: Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas

Chapter XXXIII: Of the Association of Ideas

Book III: Of Words Or Language In General

Chapter III: Of General Term

Chapter V: Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations

Chapter VI: Of the names of Substances

Chapter IX: Of the Imperfection of Words

Chapter X: Of the Abuse of Words

Chapter XI: Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses

Book IV: Of Knowledge And Opinion

Chapter I: Of Knowledge in General

Chapter II: Of the Degrees of our Knowledge

Chapter III: Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge

Chapter IV: Of the Reality of our Knowledge

Chapter V: Of Truth in general

Chapter VI: Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty

Chapter IX: Of our Knowledge of Existence

Chapter X: Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD

Chapter XI: Of our Knoivledge of the Existence of other Things

Chapter XII: Of the Improvement of our Knowledge

Chapter XV: Of Probability

Chapter XVI: Of the Degrees of Assent

Chapter XVII: Of Reason

Chapter XVIII: Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces

Chapter XIX: Of Enthusiasm

Chapter XX: Of wrong Assent, or Errour

Chapter XXI: Of the Diviston of the Sciences

EPISTLE TO THE READER

This, Reader, is the Entertainment of those, who let loose their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; … they afford thee an Opportunity of the like Diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own Thoughts in reading. ’Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I referr my self: But if they are taken upon Trust from others, ’tis no great Matter what they are, they not following Truth, but some meaner Consideration…. There is nothing in this Treatise of the Truth whereof I am not fully persuaded; yet I consider my self as liable to Mistakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this Book must stand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those, that had already mastered this Subject, and made a through Acquaintance with their own Understandings; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry….

BOOK I: OF INNATE NOTIONS

Chapter I: Introduction

1. SINCE it is the Understanding that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties, that lie in the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the Dark to our selves; sure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds; all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant; but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the search of other Things.

2. This, therefore, being my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent; I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists…. It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ’d about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misimploy’d my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted some where or other with such Assurance, and Confidence, that he that shall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the same time, consider the Fondness, and Devotion wherewith they are embrac’d; the Resolution, and Eagerness, wherewith they are maintain’d, may perhaps have Reason to suspect, That either there is no such thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.

3. It is therefore worth while, to search out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Perswasions. In Order whereunto, I shall pursue this following Method.

First I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly I shall endeavour to shew, what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Faith, or Opinion: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of Assent.

8. … Before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking….

Chapter II: No innate Principles in the Mind

1. IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain innate Principles; some primary Notions …, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind….

2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both Speculative and Practical (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore they argue, must needs be the constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

3. This Argument, drawn from Universal Consent, has this Misfortune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fact, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may come to that Universal Agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent, which is made use of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a Demonstration that there are none such: Because there are none to which all Mankind give an Universal Assent. I shall begin with the Speculative, and instance in those magnified Principles of Demonstration, Whatsoever is, is; and ’Tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, which of all others I think have the most allow’d Title to innate. These have so setled a Reputation of Maxims universally received, that ’twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, That these Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent, that there are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

5. For, first ’tis evident, that all Children, and Ideots, have not the least Apprehension or Thought of them: and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal Assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate Truths: it seeming to me near a Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible…. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a Man may live long, and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles. For no Body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate Maxims? …

15. The Senses at first let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish’d with Ideas and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general Ideas, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together: yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that chews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about Ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In Ideas thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct Ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the use of Reason. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the Ideas ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Selections From John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
• Locke and the Ethics of Belief
• Locke on Personal Identity
• Locke on the Suspension of Desire
• Locke and Natural Law
• Select Bibliography
• Index