Faculty Diversity

Removing the Barriers

JoAnn Moody

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136647772
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Pedagogía
• Subtopic: Educación general

Why do we see so little progress in diversifying faculty at America's colleges, universities, and professional schools? This book explores this important question and provides steps for hastening faculty diversity. Drawing on her extensive consultant practice and expertise as well as research and scholarship from several fields, Dr. Moody provides practical and feasible ways to improve faculty recruitment, retention, and mentorship, especially of under-represented women in science-related fields and non-immigrant minorities in all fields. The second edition of Faculty Diversity offers new insights, strategies, and caveats to the current state of faculty diversity.

This revised edition includes:

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• New strategies to prevent unintended cognitive bias and errors that damage faculty recruitment and retention

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• Expanded discussion on the importance of different cultural contexts, political, and historical experiences inhabited and inherited by non-immigrant faculty and students

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• Increased testimonials and on-the-ground reflections from faculty, administrators, and leaders in higher education, with new attention to medical and other professional schools

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• Updated Appendix with Discussion Scenarios and Practice Exercises useful to search and evaluation committees, department chairs, deans, faculty senates, and diversity councils

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• Expanded chapter on mentoring that dispels myths about informal mentoring and underlines essential components for formal programs.

Moody provides an essential, reliable, and eye-opening guide for colleges, medical, and other professional schools that are frustrated in their efforts to diversify their faculty.

Part 1

THE BARRIERS TO
FACULTY DIVERSITY

1

COGNITIVE ERRORS THAT
CONTAMINATE ACADEMIC
EVALUATIONS AND BLOCK
FACULTY DIVERSITY

Regarding our job candidates, I just don't think Mercedes would be a good fit. Honestly, I can't see any of us having a beer with her at the corner pub. While it would be terrific to have a teacher and researcher who is Mexican American, we need to find someone who is a better fit.

(An anonymous member of a faculty search committee)

For the first four minutes of Todd's job talk, I noticed that he was shaking in his boots. We certainly don't need a high-maintenance, low-confidence kind of guy around here. No way.

(Another anonymous member of the committee)

The ideal … of the doctor as a dispassionate and rational actor is misguided. As … cognitive psychologists have shown, when people are confronted with uncertainty—the situation of every doctor attempting to diagnose a patient—they are susceptible to unconscious emotions and personal biases, and are more likely to make cognitive errors.

(Harvard Medical Professor Jerome Groopman, 2007b, p. 41)

Across the country, I am amazed to find that evaluation committees try very, very hard to read the minds of various candidates they are considering (for instance ‘I'm sure she won't accept our job offer because her partner is still in a post-doc in L.A. Have no doubt: she'll turn us down).

(Gilda Barabino, Georgia Tech and Emory University Biomedical
Engineering Professor and also Associate Chair for Graduate
Studies, conversation with Prof. Barabino, 2011)

Every day at colleges, universities, professional schools, research institutes, and government labs, we find evaluation and decision-making processes underway. Those doing the evaluations will usually be reaching important decisions about students, staff, colleagues and prospective colleagues, and others. Yet we are learning, from the research of cognitive scientists, that many of the selection and evaluation processes we undertake on a daily basis are alarmingly “contaminated,” despite our good intentions. The contaminants—generically termed “cognitive shortcuts and errors”—are present as we gather and sort through information, interpret it, and reach decisions about the following: candidates for jobs, tenure/promotion, and contract renewals; applications for grants; nominations for awards and leadership posts; and colleagues’ and students’ professional and academic performance, mastery of new concepts and skills, publications, exhibits, and other demonstrations of mastery and creativity.

During these cognitive processes, most of us unwittingly commit a variety of errors and automatically take shortcuts. A chronic one, regularly showing up in our personal and professional lives, is the confusion between causation and correlation. Who among us is immune from that error? Unfortunately, there are many more confusions and traps. If we are rushed and distracted, then cognitive errors and shortcuts demonstrably multiply. When those involved in evaluation and decision-making are not coached and not given opportunities to be thorough, deliberate, and self-correcting, then dysfunction results and unsound conclusions are reached about colleagues as well as prospective colleagues and potential award recipients.

Cognitive errors, intensified by organizational dysfunctions, can of course bring about the unfair measurement and evaluation of anyone included in the selection process. But I will suggest here and in other chapters that these errors have disproportionately damaging effects on under-represented women in predominantly male fields (whom I will abbreviate as URW) as well as especially damaging impacts on members of colonized, non-immigrant groups (NIs). The errors—usually made quickly and automatically—result in the under-valuing and frequent rejection of URW and NIs and therefore inadvertently block campuses’ and schools’ progress on diversifying their faculty ranks. A very serious roadblock needs to be removed.

Setting the Stage

Before continuing, it's important for the reader to know how I will be using the term non-immigrant (NI). I mean the term, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, to include five groups: African Americans, Mexican Americans, American Indians, Puerto Rican Americans, and Native Hawaiians. These non-immigrant groups were incorporated into this country through force (enslaving, conquering, possessing, dispossessing, denigrating). By contrast, immigrant groups were not subject to such force:they arrived through their own volition.

Who exactly are the fortunate immigrant groups who exercised the choice to settle here, despite encountering hardships and struggles? Immigrant groups include: the dominant European Americans; Asian Americans with their several subgroups, some of whom are now regarded in the United States as “honorary whites”; newcomers from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and so on; and recent and non-so-recent arrivals from South and Central America, some of whom are also regarded as “honorary whites” (Lopez, 2006a; Wu, 2002; and a dozen other scholars). Immigrant groups are motivated by choice and ambition. They are usually accompanied by and aided in establishing their new lives by other newcomers—newcomers who share some of their habits and values because they in fact have also come from the same village or area in the old world.

In this first chapter, I will focus on thirteen cognitive errors that show up repeatedly in academe. These have serious consequences for URW and NI groups. In Chapter 2, I will delve deeply into two additional and highly significant errors: negative bias/stereotyping and positive bias/stereotyping, which also have serious consequences for URW and NI groups. Further, in almost every chapter of this book including this first one, I will outline dysfunctional practices that exacerbate the frequency and severity of the fifteen cognitive errors (such as rushing and overloading evaluation and decision-making committees or failing to adequately prepare, assist, and then monitor those involved in the processes).

Finally, I will suggest ways to end these organizational bad practices as well as to reduce the cognitive errors and shortcuts committed by individuals, in usually innocent and unknowing ways. (For more on this subject see Moody, 2010, Rising Above Cognitive Errors.)

An Overview of Cognitive Errors

Consider diagnoses of medical disorders. In examining and interacting with patients and reviewing lab results, practitioners must be able to resist predictable and preventable errors, including first impressions; rushing to judgment; bias based on gender or group membership; and failing to factor in atypical symptoms and instead selectively choosing data that confirm one's original hunches (see Groopman, How Doctors Think, 2007; also Dawson and Arkes, 1987; Redelmeier, 2005; Bond,2004; Croskerry, 2003).

Likewise, behavioral economists and legal and cognitive experts (such as Sunstein, Thaler, Kahneman, Greenwald, Krieger) have identified shortcuts and biases that corrupt “rational” thinking, the estimate of probabilities, and sound decision-making and investing. Who is susceptible to these shortcuts and to what economists Robert Shiller and George Akerlof call “animal spirits” in their book by the same name (2009)? Lawyers, judges, juries, investors (big and small), professional financial managers, Federal Reserve Bank directors, philosophers, campus presidents, and, of course, the general public are susceptible. As one example, how one chooses to frame a problem can easily shut down open-minded exploration and foreclose certain solutions. Anchoring (i.e., fierce adherence to one's first impression) will corrupt deliberations as will a number of other predictable cognitive errors.

Recognizing the prevalence and danger of cognitive errors, several law and medical schools have begun coaching their students and residents to form self-correction habits and to routinely rely on safeguard protocols, reminders, and checklists (Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto, 2009). Likewise senior decision-makers at colleges, universities, and professional schools—as well as their gate-keeping bodies such as search committees—are receiving instruction in cognitive errors and in structural ways to minimize the errors and improve peer review. Such instruction of individuals and committees plus larger organizational changes are long overdue.

Thirteen Cognitive Errors

I will begin the discussion of cognitive errors by focusing first on the tendency to rely on first impressions. I will then examine in turn twelve other errors that evaluation and decision-making committees are capable of recognizing and rising above—when they are appropriately coached, assisted, and monitored.

1. First Impressions

Probably most of us are perennially reminding ourselves to stop judging a book by its cover. Unless we remain on guard, we will unfairly make conclusions about a candidate or applicant or new acquaintance in a matter of seconds, based on whether their dress or cologne or posture or laughter or something else pleases or displeases us. Our own personal values and preferences (and, of course, our learned stereotypes about certain groups, which I will consider in Chapter 2) can inordinately influence us to make fast and unexamined assumptions and even decisions about a person's worth or appeal.

For instance, you might hear a powerful gate-keeper observe: Well, that ponytail and those blue jeans clinched it for me, as soon as I saw him walk towards us. Clearly, that applicant is disrespecting us and still thinks he's in graduate school. Responding to the same candidate at the same moment in time, a second person might observe: I got a kick out of the ponytail and jeans. I bet he'd be a sharp person for our emergency-room team. Both of these rapid-fire assumptions could be fuel for sloppy decision-making about the applicant.

2. Elitism

This error involves feeling superior or wanting to feel superior. Elitism (commonly known as snobbery) could take the form of downgrading on the basis of the candidate's undergraduate or doctoral campus, regional accent, dress, jewelry, social class, ethnic background, and so on (Moody, Rising, 2010; Padilla and Chavez, 1995). A search committee member might complain: She's so very Southern— I'm not sure I can stand that syrupy accent. These folks always sound illiterate to me. Or conversely, giving extra points on the basis of the candidate's alma mater, accent, dress, or other items can be a manifestation of elitism. An evaluation committee member might observe about a candidate: Isn't it nice to hear his English accent? Always sounds classy. He would be a wonderful choice for our fellowship.

Other examples of elitism are easy to find: Fearing that a NI colleague from a stigmatized group will somehow lessen the quality and standing of the department, a committee member might say: Well, shouldn't we always ask if a particular hire like Dewayne is likely to bolster our place in the business school ratings wars? I think that's okay. I mean, Dewayne's scholarship is a bit out of the mainstream and could weaken us. Another similar example might be :Are we sure Ricardo will be productive enough to keep up with our publishing standards? I'm not so sure.

Elitism can, of course, prompt a committee member to feel validated because the candidate will bring some extra snob appeal. I think Les's doctorate from Princeton is just the kind of boost in prestige that we could use around here. I see no reason why we can't take that degree at face value and forego the so-called ‘weighing’ of what Les has done at Princeton with what the other candidates have accomplished at their hard-scrabble places. To me, that's an awful waste of our time.

3. Raising the Bar

This error involves raising requirements for a job or an award during the very process of evaluation. The raising is usually felt to be necessary because of the decision-maker's realization that the candidate is a member of a suspect group regarded as inferior (such as URW in science fields and NIs in almost every field). You may hear:

Say, don't we need more writing samples from Latorya? I know we asked for only three law review articles or other compositions from applicants. OK, hers are solid. But I'd feel better, to tell you the truth, if we had a few more in this particular case. I just want to be sure she's really qualified. I have to admit I'm uneasy for some reason.

A second instance: Another committee member agrees and says, Well, I wish Latorya had a doctorate from the Ivy League or maybe Berkeley. Can't we informally decide right now that Latorya and other candidates have to possess those credentials? I think we can.

My point is that “raising the bar” is unfair and yet unwittingly done in evaluations. Unfortunately, power-holders don't stop to ponder why they may be uncomfortable and why they desire both more evidence and more qualifications for one candidate but not for another. Perhaps group membership is implicated.

4. Premature Ranking/Digging In

All too often, evaluators at every kind of educational institution rush to give numerical preferences to the applicants they are considering. I often wonder if this haste-to-rank brings relief to evaluators and falsely assures them that they have now escaped both personal subjectivity and embarrassing vulnerability to cognitive errors. Perhaps they finally feel they have achieved objectivity and fairness. Ranking, after all, gets you “a number” and that guarantees objectivity, doesn't it? Embracing such false precision is unfortunately what many of us indulge in.

The superficial rush to rank candidates leads evaluators to prematurely state their position (he's clearly number one); close their minds to new evidence; and then defend their stated position to the death. Rather than developing a pool of acceptable and qualified candidates and then comparing, contrasting, and mulling over candidates’ different strengths with one's colleagues, some evaluators prefer to simplify their task and go for the simple numbers.

Here is one illustration of premature ranking and digging in: Well, I don't want to waste time here in summarizing each candidate's strengths and weaknesses, as the dean suggested. That seems to me just a useless writing exercise proposed by our dean, an overzealous former English professor. I've got enough evidence to make up my mind about who should be number one, number two, and number three. I just hope we can hire number one and not be stuck with the others.

Another illustration: Let's go through the categories we're using and assign points to each of the serious candidates for this job. I totally trust everyone here so you don't have to give me subtle and complicated reasons for your actions. With this straight-forward, no-nonsense approach, we can quickly add up the points and we've got a decision on our first choice—all in twenty-five minutes or less. I'm a big believer in mathematical, objective approaches to these decisions.

Rushing to rank is a mistake because it obviates engagement with colleagues in these cognitively beneficial tasks: higher-order thinking, sifting through and interpreting evidence, comparing and contrasting, and “weighing” the importance of different items of evidence on the table.Rushing to rank easily fades into rushing to judgment. Admittedly, this rushing to judgment could stand on its own as a cognitive error. But in this publication, I have not treated it this way.

5. The Longing to Clone

The longing to clone (reproduce yourself or your clan as nearly as you can) appears in the search process when committee members undervalue a candidate's educational credentials and career trajectory simply because they are not the same as most of those on the evaluation committee. You might hear a committee member ask: Hey, have we ever chosen anyone with a doctorate from the University of Southwestern Nevada? We don't know anything about that place. No one here ever went to that school, did they? No way. Or you might hear during tenure-review deliberations: I am dubious about this woman's seriousness as a researcher. Her dropping out for several years to raise little kids— this is not a confidence-builder in my book. Alarm bells are going off in my head. None of the rest of us ever had such leaves—it's a dangerous move, no matter what your gender.

In another instance of cloning, a committee member seeks candidates who resemble a colleague who has retired or died. You might hear: I can't believe that Tony has been gone for three years now. He was the perfect colleague and tax expert. Isn't it time we found someone just like him?

While the sentiment about missing Tony's presence is understandable, the danger comes when the committee constructs a very narrow net in order to find a Tony-like replacement and recreate the past. Casting a narrow net can do a disservice to the growth and evolution of the school and will shrink the number of qualified candidates who might be given serious consideration.

6. Good Fit/Bad Fit

Increasingly, gate-keeping individuals and committees ponder and worry whether a job candidate would be a “good fit” or “bad fit” for their department. It is, of course, necessary for a candidate to be able to meet the agreed-on needs of the department, the students, the institution, and perhaps the community. Further, candidates being serious...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• FACULTY DIVERSITY
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction and Organization of Faculty Diversity: Removing the Barriers, Second Edition
• PART 1 The Barriers to Faculty Diversity
• PART 2 Removing the Barriers to Faculty Diversity
• Conclusion and Next Steps
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• About the Author
• Index