The Origins of the First World War

Ruth Henig

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781134506200
• Edition: 3
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

First published in 2003. There is an enormous literature on the origins of the First World War and this pamphlet focuses on the major issues involved in the topic and assesses the validity of the different interpretations. Beginning with the legacy of Bismarck's diplomacy between 1871 and 1890, Ruth Henig surveys the roots of the conflict and outlines the assassination crisis which led to war in August 1914, looking especially at the factors which influenced individual countries to mobilize their armed forces. She goes on to consider how the long-term factors leading up to the crisis of 1914 and the crisis itself have been interpreted by successive generations of historians since 1919, including the recent arguments concerning German responsibility for the outbreak of war.

1 The origins of war

Introduction

Europe, in the early months of 1914, seemed to be at peace. Sir Winston Churchill, writing in the 1920s, recalled that ‘the spring and summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional tranquility’. Anglo-German relations, after years of tense naval rivalry, seemed to be improving as the two powers negotiated amicably about the possible future disposition of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa. French bitterness towards Germany, centred on the lost provinces’ of Alsace and Lorraine, appeared to be abating. Austria-Hungary and Russia had refused to allow their Balkan ‘clients’ to draw them into war in 1912 and 1913.

But this picture of reduced tensions and of increasing stability amongst Europe’s great powers was illusory. It masked great underlying problems and increasing pessimism on the part of many European leaders about developments which they believed were undermining their countries’ position and great power status. Since 1900, Europe had been wracked by a series of crises, each of which had brought her great powers closer to war. These crises were provoked by a number of serious issues which were causing mounting friction amongst the powers and which, by 1914, in the opinion of many European statesmen, were becoming insoluble by means other than resort to war.

A number of historians have traced the roots of the conflicts and antagonisms of this period back through the previous forty years. The titles of recent books on the origins of the First World War, such as The Long Fuse by Lafore and The Collapse of the Concert of Europe by Langhorne emphasize the long-term factors which were slowly but inexorably undermining the foundations of European stability.

The outcome of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1 and the establishment of a new German Empire which included the two former French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine decisively altered the distribution of power in Europe. The enormous expansion of the German economy after unification and the accompanying growth of German political ambitions—particularly after the period of Bismarck’s chancellorship—caused considerable alarm to the other European powers. At the same time, rapid industrialization and urbanization were generating social and economic conflicts in most European countries and were widening the arena of political debate and participation. The spread of strong nationalist feelings, which had helped to bring about Italian and German unification and were now at work in eastern Europe and in the Balkans, made it more difficult for governments to compromise on their stated national objectives and to pursue flexible strategies of diplomacy. This was increasingly evident in the Near East and in the Balkans where the decline of the Ottoman Empire triggered off amongst the great powers a scramble for concessions and for influence made more dangerous and potentially explosive by the accompanying release of Balkan nationalism. While Russia sought to profit from Turkey’s weakness, Austria-Hungary tried to prevent the expansion of Russian power, and Germany, France and Britain attempted with varying degrees of success to bolster up Turkey, the ‘sick man of Europe’, and to contain Austro-Russian hostility.

The rise of German power after 1870, the corresponding relative decline of France particularly in terms of economic strength and size of population, the increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the unending conflicts between the two ramshackle empires of eastern Europe, Austria-Hungary and Russia, all contributed to a lengthy period of unsettled and at times stormy international diplomacy. Many European statesmen of the 1870s and 1880s expected a major war to break out in the near future; indeed, so concerned was Bismarck about this possibility that he concentrated a large part of his considerable abilities after 1871 on the establishment of a complicated diplomatic network of understandings which would secure European peace and stability. In the short term he was successful, but as we shall see, his policies had long-term repercussions which helped to undermine the post-1871 European settlement he had done so much to establish.

Bismarck’s legacy

The unification of Germany and establishment of the German Empire in 1871 clearly altered the distribution of power within Europe and ushered in a new international order. But what was most significant about the new German Empire was its internal power structure and the circumstances in which it was established. The federation of German states which made up the new united Germany was dominated by Prussia. The constitution was carefully drawn up to maximize Prussian power and Prussian interests. And within Prussia social control and political power had traditionally been exercised, and continued to be exercised, by the Junkers, a class of nobility who owned large landed estates and operated within a neo-feudal social structure. They owed military and political allegiance to the Prussian king—who became after 1871 the German Kaiser— and ruled autocratically over the classes beneath them. Bismarck himself came from a prominent Junker family, and according to A.J.P.Taylor his foreign policy was ‘always shaped by “Junker” needs’. One could indeed argue that Bismarck’s Junker background influenced all his policies, especially after he became Chancellor in the new united Germany in 1871. Bismarck sought to preserve the traditional Prussian social and political order and to enshrine it in the new German Empire. The forces released by industrialization and urbanization could not be allowed to undermine Junker power, and for nearly twenty years Bismarck struggled to keep liberalism, socialism and democracy at bay. Abroad Bismarck’s concern was also the preservation of order, but in this case a newly-established European order created after Prussia’s defeat of France.

Bismarck’s objective after 1871 was to stabilize Europe around the new German Empire. France’s inevitable desire for revenge and for the return of Alsace and Lorraine was to be countered by depriving her of European allies through skilful diplomacy, and by encouraging her to embark on colonial expansion in Africa and Asia which could have the added advantage of embroiling her in conflict with Great Britain. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary and Russia had to be brought together with Germany in some diplomatic alignment to preserve order in eastern Europe. Bismarck achieved this in 1872 through a meeting in Berlin of the emperors of the three monarchies, but it was in practice very difficult for the three rulers to reach agreement on anything very concrete. All the ‘League of the Three Emperors’ actually achieved was a ringing declaration against revolution in general and against the Marxist International in particular—an international movement of workers’ associations and socialist revolutionaries which was at the time more concerned with its own internal squabbles over ideological purity than with thrusting forward a significant revolutionary challenge. Through the isolation of France and the League of the Three Emperors, Bismarck hoped to be able to contain the new currents of nationalism and industrialism which were flowing so strongly through Europe from west to east. His chief difficulty, however, lay in keeping Russia and Austria-Hungary in harness, pulling alongside Germany. The two great east European empires had conflicting interests, particularly in the Balkans area where, as Turkey continued to decline in power, former Turkish provinces in south-east Europe struggled for national identity and for independence.

The problems in south-east Europe in the late 19th century

Some of these provinces contained sizeable communities of Slav people who appealed to the Russian Emperor on grounds of race and religion to assist them in their historic struggle against the Turks. Panslavism, a crusading movement of support for Slav ambitions in the Balkans and Near East, swept through Russia in the midnineteenth century and aroused such strong sentiments amongst the Orthodox Russian parts of the population that even in autocratic Russia no ruler could ignore their force. But while Russia was being pulled into the Balkans, the Austrians were determined to try to minimize Russian involvement, dampen down national and independence movements and shore up the Turkish Empire as far as possible. As the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Andrassy, presented the situation to the Habsburg Crown council in 1875.

Turkey possesses a utility almost providential for Austria-Hungary For Turkey maintains the status quo of the small Balkan states and impedes their aspirations. If it were not for Turkey, all these aspirations would fall down on our heads…if Bosnia-Hercegovina should go to Serbia or Montenegro, or if a new state should be formed there which we cannot prevent then we should be ruined and should ourselves assume the role of the ‘Sick Man’.

Russia and Austria-Hungary were therefore in headlong conflict over their policy in south-east Europe and this was clearly revealed in the period between 1875 and 1878, when a series of anti-Turkish revolts swept through the Balkans and threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was not possible for Bismarck to support both Russia and Austria-Hungary and when he could not force the two powers to work together or to reach a compromise over their differences he chose to work more closely with AustriaHungary since any drastic decline in her position, which could follow a Turkish collapse, would imperil Bismarck’s whole strategy of great power conservation. Russia, as the champion of the Balkan Slavs, was left to challenge Turkish power alone and was unable to win a decisive military victory. But the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 did have the result of further weakening Turkey’s hold on her European provinces in the Balkans, thereby making it even more difficult for Bismarck to try to maintain a stable balance between Austria-Hungary and Russia in south-east Europe. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 tried to demarcate Balkan spheres of interest, with Austria-Hungary in the west occupying Bosnia and Hercegovina and garrisoning a small strip of Turkish territory—the Sanjak of Novibazar—between the newly-created states of Serbia and Montenegro, and Russia in the east recovering a part of Bessarabia and gaining the port of Batum on the Black Sea. But Austro-Russian rivalry could not be contained for long by such means, and Bismarck was fearful that the Austrian government might seek French support to strengthen its diplomatic and military position.

The formation of the Triple Alliance 1879–1882

In 1879 he made the fateful decision to conclude a defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, in a move calculated to maintain French diplomatic isolation and to force Austrian co-operation with Russia. This second objective was underlined in 1881 when for the second time a League of the Three Emperors was constituted, this time an alliance to preserve the stability of the Near East and to pledge neutrality if one of the three empires came to be involved in war with a fourth power.

Having bound Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia together, Bismarck now drew in Italy. In 1882, a Triple Alliance was concluded between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy and the preamble of the treaty outlined its objective ‘to increase the guarantees of general peace, to strengthen the monarchical principle, and by that to assure the maintenance of social and political order in their respective states’. At the same time, France was encouraged to pursue her colonial ambitions in Africa. As a result of a serious nationalist uprising in Egypt which threatened the security of both European financial interests and the Suez Canal, Britain sought French assistance to establish a joint occupation of the country. When the French government failed to reply, British troops marched in alone and established a British protectorate in 1882. Bismarck capitalized on this situation by encouraging French claims for compensation elsewhere in Africa. He also ventured into the African arena himself over the next two years and laid claim on behalf of Germany to areas of land bordering on British spheres of influence and trade— South West Africa, Togoland and the Cameroons, and East Africa. This proved to be a very popular policy within Germany, but was undertaken by Bismarck for reasons of diplomatic gain rather than as a result of domestic or colonial pressures. Bismarck was not slow to see the advantages of constructing a colonial understanding between Germany and France at Britain’s expense which would make it easier for France to accept her loss of status in Europe as a result of the acquisition of a great colonial empire in Africa. But Bismarck’s interest in African conquest was fleeting; after 1885 it was not seriously pursued. As he commented, ‘my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here lies Russia and here lies France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa’. Bismarck was not interested in pursuing a world policy for Germany as a first priority. His concern was German security and dominance in Europe.

In 1887 his network of agreements was widened when Britain and Italy agreed to cooperate in maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean. In the same year, the Triple Alliance was renewed, Austria-Hungary and Germany made new separate treaties with Italy and Austria-Hungary associated herself with the Anglo-Italian agreement. In December 1887 there was a second ‘Mediterranean’ agreement between Britain, AustriaHungary and Italy in which the three powers undertook to maintain peace and the status quo in the Near East, the freedom of the Straits, Turkish authority in Asia Minor and Turkish suzerainty in Bulgaria. Moreover Germany and Russia had also signed an agreement in the same year, commonly referred to as the Reinsurance Treaty, defining the circumstances in which they would remain neutral in a conflict involving the other power.

The results of Bismarck’s diplomacy

By the time of his departure from office in 1890, Bismarck had secured his diplomatic objectives in Europe. France was still isolated, though in 1888, in a significant move, a Russian loan was floated on the French money markets and a year later the Russians placed a large order for French rifles. Agreements had been concluded with both AustriaHungary and Russia, and a Mediterranean compact covered Italy and Great Britain. These were great achievements on Bismarck’s part which ensured short-term European stability and have led many historians to conclude that Europe’s problems became acute only after Bismarck’s fall. However one can argue very strongly that both Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy between 1871 and 1890 and his tactics bequeathed serious long-term problems for his successors.

No network of diplomatic agreements, however elaborate, could extinguish France’s resentment over her defeat in war, her loss of territory, and the manner in which she had been outmanoeuvred by Bismarck both militarily and diplomatically. Bismarck was well aware after 1871 that French hostility towards the new German Empire would be enduring, and that French rulers would exploit any opportunity to try to overturn the new European power structure. At the same time, Bismarck’s alliance with Austria-Hungary inevitably alienated Russia and paved the way for a Franco-Russian understanding which could easily harden into an alliance. It is undoubtedly the case that Bismarck worked very hard to keep Russia aligned to Germany, but the very scale of his efforts indicates the difficulty he faced in trying to keep France and Russia apart, once he opted to conclude a binding agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1879. Furthermore, the protection of Junker agriculture in East Prussia by tariffs hit at Russian grain exports to Germany and increased the importance to Russia...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Foreword
• Introduction to the Third Edition
• Acknowledgements
• Timeline of Key Events
• 1. The Origins of War
• 2. The Historical Debate
• Annotated Select Bibliography