Social Identities

Multidisciplinary Approaches

Steve Spencer, Gary Taylor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134269600
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Social Identities: Multidisciplinary Approaches attempts to make sense of the increasingly complex ways in which we define ourselves and others. It recognises that we are not simply individuals, or members of a certain class or a certain nationality. Rather, each of us comprises a rich blend of various identities.The book provides not only an eclectic spectrum of the forms of identity and influences through which identities are formed, but also critical treatment of the theoretical tools used to understand these phenomena.

1. Introduction

Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer

The question of ‘identity’ is being vigorously debated in social theory. In essence, the argument is that the old identities which stabilized the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the modern individual as a unified subject. This so-called ‘crisis of identity’ is seen as part of a wider process of change which is dislocating the central structures and processes of modern societies and undermining the frameworks which gave individuals stable anchorage in the social world. (Hall, 1992: 274)

Identity has a unique and contentious place in social and political theory. On the one hand it is a concept which embodies our sense of uniqueness as individual beings and as members of groups sharing values and beliefs. On the other it is an intensely political field in which the expansion of critical theory has allowed the emergence of competing voices demanding space for recognition of fragile and previously often fugitive and unspoken subjectivities. As the above quote suggests, challenges to the grand narratives of modernity have begun to detach identity from the moorings of a stable social consensus, drifting to new, ambiguous, and hybrid forms. Bauman quite rightly suggests that ‘identity’ is an uneasy concept, that we examine when confronted with uncertainty and that one ‘. . . thinks of identity when one is unsure where one belongs’ (Bauman, in Hall & Du Gay, 1996: 18). Recent interventions question the attempts of dominant groups in society to impose single definitions on such domains as sexuality, race, ethnicity, age, disability, and class. It could indeed be argued that to study identity is to recognise the troubled nature of the individual.

Understanding identity

In order to understand the nature of identity, a number of questions must be raised. Is there a single unitary self, or a collection of social selves? We each possess a number of social identities: father/mother, brother/sister, son/daughter, employee/employer, friend/lover, British citizen/Australian citizen, football team supporter and so on. Yet is there not simultaneously a self who oversees the faces we present and choreographs these different roles to portray a pattern of predictable reactions consistent with some core personality?

Craib argues that this is not necessarily an either/or question and that it is possible for us to be both the single unified self and plural selves simultaneously (Craib, 1998). Indeed the work of George Herbert Mead implicitly accepts this dichotomous nature. The division between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ recognises that people are ‘reflective, symbol-using beings’ and that:

We cannot realise ourselves except in so far as we can recognise the other in his relationship to us. It is as he takes the attitude of the other that the individual is able to realise himself as a self.
(Mead, 1934: 194)

There is a constant dialogue between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, a negotiation between the internal and the external worlds of the self, what Jenkins in his discussion of Goffman and others calls the ‘internal/external dialectic’ (Jenkins, 1996: 22). In any social situation we project an image, an identity to those around us and may face approval or disapproval, acceptance or rejection. We decide how these reactions should be assessed; we may choose to modify our future presentations to that group, ignore their response, or feel a positive affirmation of our identity. So we constantly monitor our self-presentations, and as a result individual and collective identity is open to continuous reassessment.

Ethnic identity is a case in point. Terms such as ‘black’, ‘brown’ or ‘white’ are political and social boundary markers rather than iconic signs representing actual categories, and function in an interlocking fashion to raise or lower boundaries, exclude or unite. In Brown Britain Pauline Black (a woman of mixed-race) commented on her self-designation as ‘black’:

I will still continue to define myself as black, until white people turn around to me and say, “Hey I’m mixed race as well.” You know – the Vikings came over one time, the French came over one time – and actually recognise that everybody on this planet is really a mixture. (Brown Britain: 2001)

This is a vivid example of the manner in which human identity is socially, historically and culturally constructed. While there is individual choice and freedom of movement, in practice this is circumscribed by shared conventions, codes, values, by what Pierre Bourdieu (1992: 66) calls ‘the feel for the game’ a second nature instilled from childhood. The structure Bourdieu terms ‘habitus’; an internalised grammar of practice developed through the lived experiences inscribes meanings onto the body and psyche of the individual. While there are differences in each individual’s habitus – unique individuals construct their own – the individual has also been steeped in the specific traditions of a group, embodying all its social codes. Therefore while the habitus has a potentially infinite capacity to produce differences, the actual behaviours brought into active practice are ‘constrained’:

...without violence, art or argument. The group habitus tends to exclude all ‘extravagances’ (‘not for the likes of us’), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively sanctioned because they are incompatible with the objective conditions. (Bourdieu, 1990: 56)

In fact the primary difference between ‘identity’ and ‘habitus’ seems to be that habitus denotes a less conscious level of collective awareness (see Mennell, 1994) whereas according to Goffman and others the presentation of self is much more intentionally stage-managed.

Ethnic identity then is a politically charged field. There is a danger of reification; dominant social codes construct ethnicity as ‘other’ not ‘us’. The fact that ‘white English’ is possibly an ethnic category may seem odd to a white English person who has come to see his/her identity as ‘natural’. Many westerners would see ‘Arabs’ as a relatively homogenous identity with common interests and broadly similar attributes – while it actually comprises dozens of distinct ethnic groups. Similarly white Australians typically do not differentiate between groups of indigenous ‘Aborigines’, but that term encompasses over 400 linguistically and culturally separate groups. This everyday essentialism allows for certain groups to be marginalised and made passive; there is no need to examine individual cases or social and historical forces which have shaped relations. This tendency to classify diverse groups of people as homogenous has troubling implications. Stuart Hall in a recent lecture points out the dangers of classification becoming a practice with distorting and belittling consequences:

. . . our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence. Often by the misrecognition of others. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm can be a form of oppression imprisoning someone in a false distorted and reduced mode of being. (Hall, 2000).

Unfortunately it is the distorting perceptions the ‘misrecognition’ which often seem to persist over generations in the form of stereotypes. Identity is in part a uniquely personal, internal sense of self, but at the same time it relates to that person’s place in society and how they are categorised, and the flow of dominant cultural meanings and the power relations contingent on these. Language and other cultural codes are central to our internal identity as well as to our sense of belonging or our collective identity. At a more implicit level, our language with all its cultural baggage has provided us very early in life with a field of restrained expressive possibilities. While there is some freedom of expression, it is constrained by ‘available discourses’ (Muecke, 1982). The meaning of discourse can be narrowed down to two very influential and particularly relevant aspects of language use. First, the centrality of language in the formation of individual identity; the fact that conversation is perhaps the best medium to express the dialectic between the external and internal worlds of the individual. Second at a more abstract level; social identity is directly related to discourses of power. The Foucauldian (and Lacanian) view that power has no unitary object but is constituted by the matrix of different social knowledge and practices, which have come to be known as discourses. The term ‘discourse’ has come to mean ‘a whole field or domain within which language is used in particular ways’ (Loomba, 1998: 38). Subjects are constructed through discourses of, for example, economics, anthropology, psychiatry, racism, literary genres, and the way these regimes of thought influence social reality, through their schemes of classification in different periods of time. As we will see political ideologies produce highly influential discourses which construct very different views of individual and collective identity.

Identity is a work in progress, a negotiated space between ourselves and others; constantly being re-appraised and very much linked to the circulation of cultural meanings in a society. Furthermore identity is intensely political. There are constant efforts to escape, fix or perpetuate images and meanings of others. These transformations are apparent in every domain, and the relationships between these constructions reflect and reinforce power relations. Groups that have suffered marginalisation become acutely politically aware of the politics of identity. Often there is a struggle to reclaim the very terms which had been used to ‘other’ such identities, for example ‘queer’, ‘wog’, ‘nigger’ are terms stemming from homophobia and racism and have to some extent been reclaimed, parodied and used to highlight awareness of the experience of being objectified and stereotyped.

By studying social identities, we gain insight into the complex range of factors influencing the way we see ourselves, the way we are seen by others and the pressures exerted on individuals to readjust or at least prioritise some social agendas over others. Investigations into social identity show that we have many dimensions. For example, a person is not simply working class. This person may also be defined in terms of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality and adherence to or rejection of particular religious or spiritual views. The social shaping of self-identity operates as a continuous process and will depend upon the specific dynamics of the social context. For example, while an Afro-Caribbean male has a highly complex matrix of identities which compose his habitus, at times certain features will be thrown more sharply into relief. As a single man amongst a large group of women his maleness may be emphasised. At other times his ethnic or religious or political identity may be fore-grounded. Although his other social identities still exist, they will probably have less influence on the way he interacts with the group. But social identity is not only important in understanding the complex nature of the individual. The assumptions made concerning social identity are of central importance in the way we think politically and in the organisation of the political system.

Identity, ideology and class

Politicians and political theorists make assumptions about the nature of the individual when devising their political programmes. It would make no sense to disband the army, reduce the powers of the police, relax censorship and liberalise the education system if you assume that individuals are primarily greedy and untrustworthy. Advocates of social freedom will tend to have faith in the potential of the individual to live a virtuous life. The virtues necessary to create a ‘good’ society are also often associated with a particular social class. The virtues displayed by the working class are often seen as quite different from those displayed by the aristocracy and by the middle class. A strong sense of class will have a significant impact upon the values we choose as our own from the vast array found within any nation.

Ideological discourse has traditionally revolved around the conflicting claims of different social classes. The modern ideologies that developed in Europe in the years following the French revolution consist in clusters of ideas and deal with fundamental questions about the relationship between individuals and the state. Ideologies contain both an examination of the present and views about possible futures for society. These ideologies are not, however, created in a social and political vacuum. Indeed, social and political theorists are usually driven by sectional interests and almost certainly hold views about the relative importance of various groups in society. They attack or defend divisions and inequalities and aim to establish a social matrix to give order to the social and political demands advanced by numerous social groups. The dominant ideologies in western society (liberalism, conservatism and socialism) contain class views of society.

It is often the case that liberals are viewed as the champions of middle class interests and values. Liberals argue that the individual must be given room to grow and not confined to the class position of his or her parents. Early liberals wrote in opposition to the entrenched class system of the Middle Ages and argued that the new capitalist system needed a more fluid social system. Hierarchies could be allowed to develop, but these should be based upon merit rather than upon the past glories or relative failures of families. The so-called classical liberals of the early nineteenth century believed that we should be seen as isolated individuals pursuing our own interests and that our freedoms depend upon placing limits upon the jurisdiction of the state. They felt that people are dwarfed by large organisations and that the state in particular poses a definite threat to personal freedom. They assume that the common good can be enhanced by allowing everybody the freedom to develop as individuals, to make of life what they will. This rests upon and reinforces the belief that individuals are primarily motivated by the desire for individual betterment and material gain and that we are capable of living according to the dictates of reason. This philosophy of life served the interests of the emerging capitalist class of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. It made virtues of self help, material acquisition and individualism (Eccleshall, 1994; Barry, 1990: 16–21).

Whereas liberals believe that individuals are capable of listening to reason and therefore have little need for the disciplinary functions of the state, conservatives argue that individuals are flawed, deficient in reason, driven by base motives and therefore need to be disciplined by the moral codes and sense of order enshrined in the modern state. It is argued that too much freedom undermines respect for authority and that the power of the church and the state are necessary to place limits upon the life of the individual. Attempts to break away from the established economic, social and moral order will almost inevitably lead to chaos, violence and social degeneration. From a traditional conservative perspective, we are not capable of controlling our own destinies. We are products of history, carrying per...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of Contributors
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Social Class
• 3. Gender
• 4. Sexuality
• 5. Racial Stereotypes
• 6. Mixed Race
• 7. English Character and Identity
• 8. European Identity
• 9. Paganism
• 10. Mass Media
• 11. Ethnic Communications
• 12. Music
• 13. Cyber Identity