Science and Technology Ethics

Raymond E. E.Spier

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781134753727
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Science and Technology Ethics re-examines the ethics by which we live and asks the question: do we have in place the ethical guidelines through which we can incorporate these developments with the minimum of disruption and disaffection? It assesses the ethical systems in place and proposes new approaches to our scientific and engineering processes and products, our social contacts, biology and informatics, the military industry and our environmental responsibilities. The volume is multidisciplinary and reflects the aim of the book to promote a state of the art assessment of these issues. Science and Technology Ethics is a much-needed discussion of the scientific developments that have major effects on the way we live. It will be of interest to all students of science and technology and all professionals involved with administrating laws in these fields.

1

SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING ETHICS

Overview

Raymond E. Spier

Introduction

New knowledge about our world and the way it works is accumulating at an ever-increasing pace. Along with this is a burgeoning of engineering activities leading to new, improved and life-changing products. These two activities feed off one another so that we may expect the rate of change in both these areas to either maintain present levels or increase.

For example, our increasing knowledge of the way we work as human beings has spawned a profusion of guidelines as to what we should eat, how we should exercise and how we should refrain from exposing ourselves to toxic materials which could lead to heart disease, cancer or liver failure. In another area the insinuation of massively increasing computer power into the domestic environment has connected people to an abundance of information whose magnitude is almost beyond comprehension. This, and the advent of satellite and cable television, has provided individuals with an exposure to worldwide events and cultures. A consequence is that we are beginning to change the way we think about our own upbringing, traditions and way of life. Global attitudes and considerations are now on most agendas.

The ubiquity of the private car has led to enormous changes in how we behave and how we build and use our towns and cities, just as the prevalence of relatively inexpensive air travel has led to an apparent shrinking of our globe by many orders of magnitude. And the new technologies that are in the realm of our ‘defence’ sectors have radically changed the way we think about defending our territorial possessions. This has led to international collaborations which would have been unthinkable some fifty years ago.

But to cap all the above, our modern answers to questions about origins (energy/matter, universe, Earth, life, humans) mean that we are beginning to see ourselves in a different light. We do not need to invoke an involvement of supernatural elements in these areas. This in turn may have a profound influence on our ethics and the way we relate to one another.

For these reasons it is timely to review our position with regard to the nature of our science and engineering activities and to reexamine and consider in greater depth the way these powerful influences are actually affecting our lives. We might also ask whether the present ethical systems are sufficiently well honed to allow such behavioural changes. Indeed, while we may learn from our past and immediate present, we have also to consider the near, medium and long-term future positions. Here we must again ask the question, have we the most appropriate ethics for the careering progress evidenced by the continuing advances in science and engineering?

The range and scope of science and engineering

Science

For various reasons, culminating in C.P. Snow’s declaration of the ‘two cultures’ in 1959,¹ science seems to have been relegated to those activities effected by the white-coated personnel frequenting forbidding fortresses called laboratories. This dichotomous treatment of how we acquire and process knowledge has created unnecessary boundaries between areas of investigative activities effected in all subject areas by people trained in a variety of disciplines. If we are to resolve this issue, it would be appropriate to revert to the original meaning of the word ‘science’ (Latin scientia) which, in translation, is simply ‘knowledge’. This latter word leads us to consider the thoughts, impressions, ideas, beliefs, concepts, abstractions, images and models we hold in our conscious and unconscious brains as representations of the world (which would include ourselves and the seat of such thinking and ideation). We acquire this knowledge via a process known as the ‘scientific method’. This involves observing one or several states of nature (or the same state a number of times) and then making a hypothesis (or guess) as to what it is that is being observed, or any relationship which may pertain between the different things observed. Such a hypothesis is then tested by experiments or examinations to determine the level of confidence we may place in the original guess or hypothesis. At one time it was thought that it was possible to ‘prove’ the ‘veracity’ or ‘truth’ of a hypothesis by virtue of a sophisticated series of unequivocally determinative experiments. However, K. Popper² cast serious doubt on this: ‘Theories are not verifiable, but they can be corroborated . . . we should try to assess how far it has been able to prove its fitness to survive by standing up to tests. In brief, we should try to assess how far it has been “corroborated”.’³ Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the same arguments, which eliminated the possibility of proving the truth of a hypothesis, may be applied to showing that it is impossible to disprove a hypothesis. So the ‘product’ of the application of the scientific method is not the proof of a hypothesis nor yet its disproof, but rather a change in the level of confidence with which we may hold and use that hypothesis. It follows that if the hypothesis passes stringent and difficult tests then we may have more confidence in the hypothesis than if a weak or uncritical test was effected with a similar pass result. A consequence of such an increase in confidence is that we may use the hypothesis with greater assurance and reliability to generate new hypotheses or guesses to explain different phenomena. When our hypotheses have been so well tested that we hold them with virtually complete assurance, we refer to them as knowledge.

Some people write about ‘knowledge’ which is ‘unscientific’ or ‘non-scientific’. Although at first examination this implies a contradiction of terms (science is a word which translates directly to knowledge) it actually denotes a kind of knowledge which has not been tested by methods of sufficient stringency to ascertain with any significant reliability the degree of confidence which can be placed in that ‘non-scientific’ knowledge.

But this testing-of-guesses procedure is not an activity unique to people who wear white coats. People who work in libraries and test their hypotheses by using the published literature are no less scientific than those who have to make convoluted tubes of glass act as condensers and connectors. The former might be called ‘library scientists’ as opposed to the latter who might be termed ‘laboratory scientists’. (It should be noted that the laboratory scientists do not have to work in closed buildings for such a designation. Rather such individuals might be characterized as doing experiments with appropriate controls in the wider context of the social, biological and geophysical worlds to name but three such extramural environments.) Moreover, science can also be effected ‘on the street corner’. When we question other people about our thoughts and ideas we are using the scientific method by testing our version or concept of the world against the version which may be held by a respected colleague or neighbour. I would designate such science ‘street science’. We may also test ideas within the confines of our own minds, in which case we may consider applying to such an activity the denotation ‘conscious science’. It is even possible to ‘do science’ subconsciously, hence ‘subconscious science’.

A simple introspection of the way we work will reveal that we have done many things without thinking consciously about them. In typing or playing an instrument we do not consciously tell each finger what to do, yet our bodies must sense where each finger is and by activating the appropriate muscles achieve an effect which has a broader intention than the mere moving of a particular digit. That the intended effect is achieved is a test of the hypothesis that the finger in question is doing the correct thing at the correct time. Additional examples of having effected subconscious science may be realized by considering what we were thinking about when driving a car between an origin and a destination, or hitting a ball with a squash racquet or just walking along a road. In each case our thoughts may be elsewhere than with the activity in hand. The need to use knowledge of our position in relation to external physical objects has been taken care of by our subconscious acquiring ‘knowledge’ of the external world, testing that knowledge and using the result to control the workings of our muscles to achieve our predetermined ends.

Thus science is not just for the physicists, chemists and biologists among us. We have to recognize the work of the sociologists, historians, psychologists, theologians, economists, musicologists and a myriad of other -ologists, not excluding those who research literature and politics, and include them in the realms of scientific investigation. We may, therefore, choose to describe those who call themselves ‘scientists’ as people who, for material or immaterial reward, research those areas of nature which are difficult to penetrate without the use of refined and generally unavailable instruments or difficult and elaborate techniques. (This differs from the original definition of Whewell who, in 1840,⁴ considered scientists as those who use the scientific method and tested guesses; as we all test guesses to obtain a new purchase on our knowledge, this definition becomes less than adequate.)

As the product of science is an emotive sensation of confidence or assurance rather than a ‘truth’ or ‘proof’, science may be said to lack ‘objectivity’. This does not automatically mean that because science is subjective it lacks reliability. As expressed above, the more stringent the experiments we use to determine the confidence we may have in our hypotheses, the more assurance we can have in the closeness of the relationship of such hypotheses to something in the world outside ourselves. So as our knowledge is not absolute it has to be relative. Indeed it relates to how we ‘feel’ about the observations and tests we effect. This in turn is informed by our previous experiences and the way in which we hold ideas and concepts in our minds. It has therefore been influenced by our exposure to whatever social conditioning has prevailed during our mental development. While such preconditioning may be held to pervert the appropriate level of confidence we attribute to a tested guess, this process cannot get too far out of line with the state of the world outside the individual. Because, were the distorting effects of preconditioning too severe, a model of the external world would be conveyed which would put the individual at a disadvantage in activities relative to his or her survival. It is therefore pragmatism (learning about the world outside ourselves by our actions and the consequences of those actions) which prevents us from straying too far from concepts of the actual world outside; nevertheless we cannot discount the occasional perversion of our concepts by such preconditioning. However, having recognized this possibility our students and citizens need to be prepared so that they may avoid those influences which prevent them from arriving at a perception of reality which will serve them with the greatest reliability.

While the examination of hypotheses leads to a level of confidence which is also influenced by previous conditioning, the areas of interest which are examined by scientists and others are determined in part by the prevailing state of society and the social ‘agenda’. For example, at this state of our being we are obsessed with issues which relate to our health. But we can easily imagine that we will soon conquer infectious disease and learn to implement ways of eating and exercising that considerably decrease the risk of heart disease and cancer. So the focus for our questioning may shift to environmental issues or even to ways we might colonize other planets in our solar system or other planetary systems. That society can prioritize the questions for which it requires answers is not a reprehensible state; after all, most scientific (laboratory and library) investigation is supported by money provided through the tax system and, thereby, provided by the citizens. In a system which is solely dependent on the state of energy and matter in the universe, scientific questions do not arise de novo. Likewise curiosity is not sui generis. Rather, those who accept public funding to pursue investigations or test hypotheses need to recognize that there is an implicit (covert) or explicit (overt) social contract to which they commit themselves.

Engineering

The word ‘science’ is often inappropriately applied to engineering. Scientists are held to be fully responsible for nuclear reactors, aeroplanes and communication systems. Such notions must be challenged. As has been described above, scientists are responsible for developing and testing the knowledge base. Some of such knowledge is incorporated into engineering activity and indeed many engineers contribute to the extension of the knowledge base as the questions asked by scientists do not necessarily generate the knowledge required to build bridges, design a printer or enhance the energy of a laser.

In addition to using and extending the knowledge base, engineers are distinguished from scientists in that the product of their activities is generally a material entity. (In this context a new system, organization, work of ‘art’ or law may be regarded as ‘material’ products.) These products are characterized by having two additional features. In the first place they provide benefit to society, while in the second they express inventiveness or the ‘genius’ of the word engineering. To cover the issue of the generation of social benefit most engineers enter into a social contract (see Andrew Reeve, this volume, chapter 6) via their commitment to a code of conduct or practice as administered by their representative institute or body. Although this is one way of recognizing the requirement for the engineer to progress social benefit, it is not always clear as to what constitutes such benefit. To some, a healthy armaments industry is an unalloyed social benefit while to others this self-same industry is an anathema (see Michael Atiyah, this volume, chapter 10). Such disputes need to be resolved and Brad Hooker (see this volume, chapter 5) has indicated how such resolutions might be achieved.

When considering the issue of inventiveness we may augment the term by the use of an extended expression such as the introduction of significant novelty into a product. Again we might look to the experience generated and reported by patent examiners who make a first assessment as to whether a proposed patent has within it something which is inventive, or something which would surprise a worker who is already ‘gifted in the art’. If the latter conditions are fulfilled a patent may be issued. Engineers may not always be engaged in writing patents. But I would suggest that the thrust of their day-to-day activities is to arrive at something that is patentable; they work with the intent of eventually generating something which has significant novelty. Those whose daily work does not have the commitment to arriving at this degree of novelty might be termed ‘technicians’. Even though each decision they make might require them to do something different, these differences do not constitute the kind of novelty which is required for the issue of a patent. To meet the innovation provision for the award of a patent, the inventor has to produce something which would be a surprise to someone working in the same area and gifted in the existing arts.

While this definition of engineering requires a certain, and assessed, level of knowledge, skill and experience along with the commitment to social benefit and inventiveness, it is yet possible to satisfy the criteria by application to an engineering institute. In place of the assessed formal qualifications, one would be allowed to substitute an appropriate suite of experiences acquired over a significant period. Indeed many inventors may qualify for ‘engineer’ status as a result of the uptake and use of their inventions via the patent system.

It is not possible to examine the nature of the engineering activity without addressing the issue of the nature and role of ‘design’ in engineering. Some might regard this as the essential and creative proces...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contributors
• 1. Science and Engineering Ethics: Overview
• 2. The Processes of Science
• 3. Ethics and the Products of Science
• 4. Engineering Ethics
• 5. Ethics In Conflict
• 6. A Social Contract?
• 7. Biology, Engineering and Ethics
• 8. Computers and Society
• 9. Ethical Issues Engendered By Engineering With Atomic Nuclei
• 10. Science and the Military
• 11. Engineering, Ethics and the Environment