Critical Realist Applications in Organisation and Management Studies

Stephen Ackroyd, Steve Fleetwood

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781134283675
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Critical realism has become increasingly important in the way organization and management is studied. This innovative book argues for an alternative to the prevailing ontology, and shows how positivism and its empirical realist ontology can be abandoned without having to accept strong social constructionism. Critical Realist Applications in Organisation and Management Studies applies critical realism in four ways. First, in the removal of meta-theoretical obstacles that hinder the development of fruitful theoretical and empirical work. Second and third, as a meta-theoretical tool with which to develop appropriate methodological and theoretical frameworks which can then be used to inform appropriate empirical work, and finally, all of this is applied across a broad range of subject areas including critical management studies, accountancy, marketing, health care management, operations research, the nature of work, human resource management, labour process theory, regional analysis, and work and labour market studies.

Ideal for postgraduates and professionals, this key book will be a valuable resource across a wide range of subjects.

Part I Meta-theory: Critique and development

Of the three areas of into which we have classified recent contributions by critical realists in this volume, this one, which is concerned with meta-theory, could pose problems for some readers. It is widely understood that realists place special emphasis on the importance of developing theory, and suggest that much depends on developing adequate concepts and building theories. The generative mechanisms that are so important to the critical realist view of effective explanation are primarily grasped by formulating theoretical accounts of these mechanisms. Hence, there is a special approach to theory proposed by realists and, because of this, extended discussion of the nature of theory and how it should be used is only to be expected in a book of this kind. Consistent with this, concern for theory and the importance of its role is a recurrent theme in this book. As has been suggested in the Foreword to this volume by Andrew Sayer, for example, critical realist philosophy provides guidelines about the necessary form of theory. But, in this section, a more general concern than with theory is indicated: here is a suggestion that critical realists are concerned about something called meta-theory. But what is meta-theory and why should it be regarded as important?

In a nutshell, meta-theory designates any ideas or areas of general thought or argument that are beyond or outside of theory. Unfortunately, there is not an agreed terminology with which to discuss such matters, and this is a potential source of problems. Different disciplines tend to approach this area with their own special categories and assumptions. Philosophers use the category metaphysics and propose specialised subject areas within this: among these the more important are ontology, epistemology and ethics. By contrast, political scientists tend to conceptualise what lies outside of theory as ideology or diffirent kinds of political ideas, while anthropologists propose and use the notion of culture. In general then, the idea of meta-theory is handy as a non-disciplinary category that refers to everything in the realm of thought outside theory and empirical work. Nevertheless, in general terms, meta-theory is important because realists tend to think their way through whatever is outside theory in particular ways, and tend to disagree acutely and systematically with other writers on O&MS (particularly those postmodernists and post-structuralists who presuppose a strong social constructionist ontology) on the way to understand the relationship of theory to other elements of thinking.

One of the issues that divides other thinkers from realists is the kind of assumptions they bring to the conception of the relationship between theory and other kinds of concepts. For many non-realists, the embedding of theoretical ideas in a broader matrix of culture and politics is a basic problem. It is usually true that a notion that becomes an element of theory was once part of common understanding before it was taken up, reformulated and used in conjunction with other ideas; that is, before it was made into theory. Certainly, a theory does not pop up, fully formed, out of nowhere, and theory is likely to be have been shaped by the context in which it was formed. The embedded quality of ideas in cultures and ideologies is clearly important and requires careful consideration. Realists respond by differentiating ideas, distinguishing the qualities of theories from other general ideas. For realists the embeddedness of ideas merely gives rise to what are sometimes called ‘demarcation problems’, in which there is difficulty in designating the extent of theoretical ideas. But, for the realist, these demarcation problems are not insoluble and must be dealt with if our ability to understand and explain is to be improved. To be able to differentiate the boundaries of theoretical ideas is clearly important, especially if there is some commitment to testing (which for realists involves far more than simply empirically testing hypotheses) theories for their adequacy. If it is not clear where the theory begins or ends, testing it is relatively more difficult.

Thus realists do not succumb to the relativism which afflicts many postmodernists and post-structuralists, which involves some basic differences in the implications of the embedding of ideas in meta-theory. For the latter the connections and linkages between general ideas in culture and ideology and more specific theoretical ideas will be impossible to disentangle; and this is one reason why, for them, objective knowledge is impossible in principle. For realists, however, the philosophy of realism is important in helping to separate theory from other things. Realism helps to reveal the reasons why theory works (when it does) and how it can be used to produce sound explanations. The main point here is that realist inspired theory is effective because it is formulated in terms of propositions concerning the way the world actually is, rather than solely in terms of the way it may be understood or interpreted. In the language of philosophy, realism is effective because it gives priority to questions of ontology rather than questions of epistemology. Many postmodernists and post-structuralists reverse this order of priority and end up reducing (ontological) questions about what exists to (epistemological) questions about how we might obtain knowledge of what exists—a move encouraged by the belief that what exists is constructed by the very processes involved with knowing. Whilst epistemological questions are, of course, perfectly legitimate, they are not the same as ontological questions and cannot be reduced to them. The upshot of reducing ontology into epistemology (termed by critical realists the epistemic fallacy) is that there can be no objective understanding and little point in trying to create such a thing.

In his contribution to this section, Steve Fleetwood argues for priority to be given to ontology. He introduces some analytical distinctions between kinds of concepts aimed at illuminating how it is possible to explain things independently of the beliefs or values of people. The chapter pays specific attention to what critical realists mean by the terms ‘real’ and ‘reality’. The author distinguishes between what he calls different ‘modes of reality’. Drawing a series of distinctions between what he calls the ideally real, the materially real, the artefactually real and the socially real, Fleetwood argues that it is important to recognise that although socially real phenomena are, in some senses, socially constructed (what else could the social world be?) in the first place, socially real phenomena exist independently of their knowledge or their identification by people and constrain and enable their behaviour. The main focus of the analysis is placed on what are termed ‘socially real entities’ such as class and gender relations which only exist in virtue of human activity. The key thing is to understand not only that socially real entities are activity-dependent but to clarify just which humans are and are not involved; which human activities are and are not involved; and when (i.e. the temporal location) these activities occur. From here the chapter shifts from social theory to slightly more concrete matters by considering a range of socially real entities (i.e. social structures, positioned practices, powers, mechanisms, configurations and tendencies) in the more familiar context of labour process theory. The aim of this chapter is primarily one of clarification, distinguishing what is being claimed by critical realists when they suggest accounts of the world are possible.

In the next chapter, not only does Paul Thompson resist the temptation to slip into the social constructionist ontology so fashionable within post-structuralism and postmodern circles, his chapter is devoted to highlighting the conceptual and practical confusion these perspectives have generated within the fashionable movement known as critical management studies (CMS). Thompson’s starting point lies in the commitment to a social world that can exist independently of our perceptions and investigations and, in virtue of this, he is also committed to an epistemology that retains the possibility of uncovering truth, or at least of making ‘reality claims’. The difficulties of establishing absolute certainty should not, he argues, be used to assert that we can make no reality claims. He then proceeds to demonstrate some of the problems facing the post-structuralist accounts of CMS such as the ‘bad practice’ often undertaken when faced with these problems, and the use of various ‘escape hatches’ that merely transpose the problem into another form. Although not the only tactic, he makes great use of showing how post-structuralists continually run into theory-practice inconsistencies; that is, they write theoretical cheques they cannot honour in practice.

Post-structuralism is also the subject of Peter Armstrong’s chapter. Whilst recognition of the role of language (and/or discourse and/or semiotics) in social life is a useful antidote to vulgar materialism perhaps, it licenses a degree of linguistic freedom that can easily be misused. The problem comes when a (correct) concern for language is coupled with an (incorrect) ontology constituted, and exhausted, by phenomena such as language, discourse, semiotics, concepts, ideas, beliefs, and so on. This combination leads to a variety of anti-realist ideas and ways of conducting social science. If the very idea of an extra-linguistic realm is rejected, neglected, or deemed irrelevant, then the pushes and pulls of phenomena operating in this realm cease to be of interest. There is, therefore, no sense whatsoever in considering an appeal to an extra-linguistic realm as a datum against which to compare theoretical statements in order to evaluate them. We can compare one theoretical statement to another theoretical statement; or we can take one theoretical statement and deconstruct it. Language has broken free of its extra-linguistic moorings. Now, one of the delights of imaginative writing is the freedom it allows for a parallel world to be created according to the wishes and purposes of the writer. Whilst this is appropriate for poets and writers of fiction, it is inappropriate for social scientists. In consequence it allows considerable freedom to manipulate the meanings which it draws from the ordinary language use of these terms. It is thus a medium well suited to the writing of ideology. An event of this kind happened a few years ago in the literature of critical accounting. Armstrong suggests that contemporary social scientists, especially those seduced by post-structuralism, would do well to pay attention to this event because it demonstrates what can happen when a (correct) concern for language is coupled with an (incorrect) ontology. He shows that the rhetorical devices used in this particular specimen of idealist writing represent not social science, but a work of imaginative fiction.

Jan Karlsson’s chapter has a diffirent emphasis, in that he uses meta-theory as a source for stimulating the development of theoretical ideas. Karlsson uses ideas drawn from the meta-theory of critical realist philosophy to illuminate and develop understanding of particular issues relating to the organisation of work. He uses two insights from the ontology developed within critical realism: that social phenomena are relational; and the necessity of avoiding the social constructivist notion that activities and relations are merely discourse. He then uses these ontological insights to resolve two sets of contradiction within the way work has been conceptualised. The first contradiction is between those definitions of work that emphasise the properties of actions and those that emphasise the properties of social relations. The second contradiction is between those definitions where work is treated as an empirical category (i.e. work is what can be observed) and those where it is treated as a ‘deep’ category (i.e. work is what we do in the sphere of necessity). He then attempts to transcend these contradictions in two steps. A fruitful definition of work, he argues, must start in ontology, specifically with what people have to do in order to gain their livelihood. But this is not enough. In a second step, he defines the internal social relations that structure the sphere of necessity in a specific society—what he calls work forms. When an activity is performed within a work form it is work; when the same activity is performed outside a work form, that is outside the sphere of necessity, it is non-work.

The final chapter in this section, by Denise Thursfield and John Hamblett, takes a similar line in using ideas drawn from the philosophy of realism to stimulate insights into the contemporary world of work. They employ a conceptual device that is prominent in the critical realist toolbox, the morphogenetic approach proposed by Margaret Archer. They use it as a basis for reconceptualising and gaining insight into the working of human resource management (HRM) in general, and the interest of HR managers in developing functional flexibility. They make use of the basic, but powerful, critical realist idea that the social world is stratified and transformational The orthodox, normative, developmental approach, they argue, is guilty of conflating complex elements of HRM into a flat, undifferentiated (empirical realist) ontology. It fails, therefore, to explain the disparate and multi-layered nature of what occurs in the workplace. A stratified realist ontology, by contrast, encourages a more lucid understanding of the way in which the emergent properties of structure, culture and agency generate the diverse practices and ideas immanent in HRM. They employ Archer’s morphogenetic approach to demonstrate how structural, cultural and agential emergent properties interject to generate a specific form of functional flexibility in a particular organisational context. Not only do they bring ontological sophistication to what is, all too often, a rather unsophisticated, positivist-orientated subject, they also provide a way of analysing HRM that avoids the temptation to slip into the social constructionist ontology so fashionable within post-structuralism and postmodern circles.

These chapters, then, demonstrate that critical realism generates a number of debates about contemporary scholarship. The particular importance attributed to theory and the understanding of its role in particular has allowed realists to re-engage with other intellectuals operating in O&MS and to take issue with their ideas in fundamental ways. There is clearly further to go: the strong social constructionist ontology presupposed by many postmodernists and post-structuralists has had such a corrosive effect on beliefs and practices in O&MS scholarship and research in the few years it has been influential As the work of Thompson and Armstrong suggests, there is a great deal of ground to recoup. In addition, as the chapters by Karlsson and Thursfield and Hamblett suggest, the relevance of critical realist philosophy to conceptualisation and theory construction can be surprisingly direct and deep, suggesting that the future for specifically realist O&MS is unexpectedly wide. These essays also demonstrate the extent of controversy that has been provoked by the collision between critical realism and currently fashionable ideas in O&MS, and indicate how effective critical realist ideas are as a viable alternative to much postmodernism and post-structuralism in this field.

1 An ontology for organisation and management studies

Steve Fleetwood

This collection is motivated by two beliefs: one positive and the other negative. The positive belief is that critical realism, and especially its ontology, has much to offer in the analysis of organisation and management. Evidence for this is provided not only in the following chapters where contributors have rooted their theoretical and empirical work in critical realism to good effect, but also in the growing number of critical realist-inspired articles found in the organisation and management studies literature.¹ The negative belief is that much current organisation and management study is committed to one of two mistaken ontological positions: the empirical realist ontology in which positivist-orientated analysis is rooted; and the social constructionist ontology in which postmodernist or post-structuralist-orientated analysis is rooted. Despite contributions that postmodernism and post-structuralism have to offer, the recoil from (correctly) abandoning positivism appears to have ‘catapulted’ postmodernists and post-structuralists into substituting one mistaken ontology for another. If unchecked, this could easily take organisation and management studies down an alley as blind as the positivist one from which it has struggled to escape. This would be tragic given that critical realism can provide a viable ontology of organisations and management, allowing positivism and its empirical realist ontology to be abandoned without having to accept a social constructionist ontology.²

This chapter opens with an attempt to clarify some of the ontological ideas, terms and concepts central to critical realism, whilst making it clear that critical realism is not positivism by another name. The second part of the chapter concretises the discussion a little by discussing social structures, positioned practices, powers, mechanisms, configurations and tendencies by exemplifying them via a brief discussion of labour process theory.

Clarification of terms and concepts

Over the past few years, when introducing critical realism to various audiences, similar comments and objections vis-à-vis ontology come up time after time. Many (although not all) of these comments and objections are based upon a misunderstanding of the ideas critical realists actually hold. The following section, therefore, engages with some of the more common comments and objections in an attempt to clarify them and remove as much misunderstanding as possible.

Ontology

The term ontology refers to the study or theory of being, not to being itself. To have an ontology is to have a theory of what exists. It is thus misleading to write things like: ‘entities that really exist are ontological, or have ontological status’, or some such. This is a subtle, but important point, so let us pur...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Critical realism: interventions
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Contributors
• Preface
• Editors’ introduction: Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies
• Foreword: Why critical realism?
• Part I Meta-theory: Critique and development
• Part II Methodology: Critique and development
• Part III Substantive contributions