The Rise and Fall of Classic Planning Theory
Planning theory was marked initially by a rationalistic model of decision making, crystalized, perhaps, in the writings of Simon (1957). Planning was viewed as a process whereby through use of proper rules of logic an optimal solution to a problem is determined. Persons were seen as utility-maximizing beings whose relations to others were defined in instrumental terms. Classic decision-making theory involved following a task-oriented set of basic steps, including ordinarily: setting a goal; identifying all the alternative means of attaining the goal; evaluating means in order to arrive at the single best solution; and implementing the decision. Hudson (1979) characterizes this approach in modern form as examining āproblems from a systems viewpoint, using conceptual or mathematical models relating ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints), with heavy reliance on numbers and quantitative analysis.ā This may entail use of forecasting and analysis techniques such as multiple regression analysis, Markov chains, econometric modeling, or Bayesian methods.
Historically, planning concentrated on physical land-use elements of the community, rather than stressing larger social concerns. This is related to the professionās association with the housing reform movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This movement was characterized by an environmental-deterministic philosophy, suggesting that social conditions could be altered by changing the situation of the urban poor through the manipulation of housing designs and thus improving the deteriorating physical environment found in crowded slums. Most of the early planners were architects and engineers by professional training and thus quite predictably focused on the physical and locational aspects of urban development.
Another major feature of traditional planning theory was the association of the planning field with that of the municipal reform movement. It was characterized by an emphasis on the service function of municipal governments over the political function, expressed in a distinct ideology of commitment to a public interest that should prevail over competing private interests. The belief in the existence of such a solitary public interest reflected a strong anti-political bias, neglecting to see the city as a pluralistic political entity. Suggestions for two major structural changes resulted, namely the replacement of the mayor-dominated city by a council-manager form of government and the substitution of non-partisan for partisan elections.
The concept of city government as a non-political body in pursuit of governmental efficiency was instrumental in shaping the traditional planning doctrine. It adopted the concept of a solitary public interest, providing planners with the legitimation based on their objectivity and technical expertise. They were to intervene as neutral judges in the private-market system by allocating land uses to benefit the public as a whole, mainly through the development of comprehensive master plans. As Altshuler (1965) points out, the assumption underlying the concept of master planning is that of a common interest of societyās members that constitutes an aggregate of all interests. Additionally, conflicts in society are illusory and about minor matters. They can be foreseen and resolved by just arbiters, planners who understand the total interests of all parties. This traditional planning outlook, imbued with a disdain of politics, was characterized also by elements of scientific management, expressed in the suggested role of the rationalistic, presumably value-free technician.
Despite or perhaps because of its elegance and simplicity, the rationalistic, comprehensive concept has been subjected to criticism from various quarters. A variety of limitations have been attributed to the model, including limits to rationality, limits to analytic methodology, limits to environmental control, limits to professional expertise, and limits of value uniformity. (See Rothman and Zald, in press.)
This classical model of planning apparently no longer commands consensus within the planning profession. In the early sixties, various issues were raised about the viability of the comprehensive planning model, given the characteristics of local political systems. Among the most influential was Banfieldās (1967) critique in which he questioned many of the essential assumptions of this planning ideal, suggesting that the decentralized nature of American community politics mitigates against the ideal of comprehensiveness, and pointing to the enormous complexity in predicting change in the environment.
The contradictions between decision-making styles and the time frames of politics versus the development of comprehensive plans have been extensively discussed by both Altshuler (1965) and Lowi (1969). Lindblomās (1969) critique of planning as a rational approach to societal guidance focused on the inability of decision-makers to truly consider all values because of incomplete information and the dynamic of the political system, reflecting a continuous adjustment process. Davidoff (1965), one of the major proponents of advocacy planning, rejects outright the existence of a solitary public interest in which all societal groups share equally. He questioned the notion that planners can resolve conflicts among different competing goals in expert fashion. Unlike traditional planning theory, advocacy planning is explicitly partisan, suggesting that there are no neutral, value-free criteria for evaluating plans, thus rejecting the role of the neutral expert-technician planner. Catanese (1974) notes that there will always be a need for planners to fulfill the requirements of an apolitical, technical-expert role, but that this role should not be confused with additional roles necessary for meeting the greater potential of professional planning, which he sees in a planning approach committed to social change.
Rather than a single model of planning and community intervention with its precise set of roles and attitudes, planning has increasingly been defined in multi-model terms (Friedmann and Hudson 1974; Hudson, 1979; Rothman, 1974).
A Kuhnian Analysis
The breakdown of the rationalistic, comprehensive decision-making model in mainstream planning theory can be understood in part through the work of Kuhn (1970) on the structure of scientific revolutions. Kuhn rejects the conventional notion that scientific breakthroughs occur through the orderly, progressive aggregation of knowledge by means of a linear chain of related studies. Rather, he posits random activities and contributions as the pattern associated with significant scientific leaps. This process is blurred, he states, by textbooks which attempt to depict a more orderly, cumulative process than actually takes place. Critical changes in scientific thought, according to Kuhn, come about when established paradigms no longer work and are not capable of explaining anomalies that present themselves within the scientific community. These anomalies are the driving force for radical departures in thinking.
In a useful discussion, Galloway and Mahayni (1977) apply the Kuhnian framework to analyze changes that have taken place with respect to developments in the urban planning field. Although Kuhn applied his theory to the sciences, especially natural science, one can use it heuristically to explore changes in other fields of thought. The authors use the five-phase process formulation of Kuhn as a basic framework, illustrating each step with relevant developments in planning.
Preparadigm Period. In this period there is no consensus concerning a basic paradigm. Competing schools of thought vie with one another for legitimacy and dominance. Taking as a starting point the turn of the century and going up to the early 1920s, the authors illustrate a variety of different urban planning developments: city beautiful, master planning, the park movement, housing reform, social reform-settlement houses, and municipal reform. Diversity and ferment characterize the preparadigm state.
Paradigm Development. A formalized community of adherents appears. This period extends roughly from the 1920s through the mid-1940s. Consensus forms regarding a particular orientation. In urban planning the comprehensive land-use concept took hold. Planning and zoning power were established and land-use planning became legitimized as a function of local government.
Paradigm Articulation. Problem-solving research and theory development are stimulated and guided by the paradigm. The paradigm is extended during this time. This period covers the mid-1940s through the 1950s. The rationalist theory is better articulated by Simon, Lindblom and others. Social scientists contribute to developments.
Paradigm Anomaly. In this period, one is faced with paradoxical phenomena. The paradigm falters as anomalies appear. Here we are talking of the 1960s and the early 1970s. There is inability to predict or successfully address critical social and racial problems and inability to deal with the political environment. Widespread criticism of planning activities is expressed. Social action and advocacy formulations employing conflict tactics begin to appear.
Paradigm Crisis. Attempts are made to resolve anomalies within existing paradigms as well as to formulate alternative ones. Again, there is the emergence of competing schools of thought. This period involves the late 1970s and 1980s. Fragmentation is extensive. Different constituencies form within the profession. Professional boundaries become less clear. Notions of endemic turbulence guide and disturb theory formulation. Concepts of societal planning come to the fore through the policy analysis school.
The development described here, however, is not unique to the planning field. The rationalistic planning model was influenced by the classical scientific method based on the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm which has inspired the natural sciences and was adopted by the social sciences and related professional disciplines. The essence of this world view was the definition of the universe as a mechanical system composed of elementary building blocks which, taken apart, could be analyzed in order to find cause-effect relationships, reflecting the fundamental laws of interaction. This reductionist model of static structures was translated to theories of social phenomena, suggesting that there were laws of nature governing society similar to those determining the physical universe. Planning then, similar to other professions in the field of applied social science (i.e., clinical psychology, social work, etc.) attempted to gain acceptance and legitimacy through the application of strategies and techniques closely modeled after the traditional scientific method of inquiry, i.e., increased use of modeling, forecasting, and other quantitative techniques of various kinds.
The appropriateness of the mechanistic world view has been questioned increasingly in recent years, initiating a process of reflection affecting many disciplines. For Capra (1982) this is the expression of a broad paradigm shift, initiated by developments in physics, such as quantum theory, which has made it impossible to continue to analyze the world into independently existing separate parts which are connected by causal laws. Rather, it must be recognized that there are no static structures in nature but only patterns of dynamic balance with all parts being interdependent and interrelated. The inability to successfully address large-scale societal problems such as air pollution, poverty, hunger, disease, economic instability, etc., has led to growing criticism of reductionist approaches in other academic disciplines. An example is the biomedical model in health care which has created exorbitant costs to society without being able to address the major diseases of our time. The emphasis on scientific rigor in economics, to take another exampleā where cost/benefit analyses convert social and moral choices into pseudo-technical onesāis a reflection of the widespread belief that all problems have technical solutions. Kenneth Boulding has called this issue of unstated values āa monumentally unsuccessful exercise ā¦ which has preoccupied a whole generation of economists (indeed, several generations) with a dead end, to the almost total neglect of the major problems of our ageā (quoted by Myrdal, 1973, p. 149).
Based on this discussion, the analysis by Galloway and Mahay ni, and the previously mentioned criticism of the limitations of the classical planning model, we would expect that planners reflect divergent roles and attitudes concerning the theory and practice of planning. The field may be characterized as centrifugal rather than centripetal in its value stance. In order to assess this assumption from an empirical standpoint, we engaged in a comprehensive retrieval and synthesis of research studies concerning the roles and attitudes of planners. Hence, in this further discussion, we will restrict our conclusions to derivations from empirical research findings on the subject, drawing specifically on eighteen data-based studies that we have been able to locate in the literature (Appendix B). Utilizing a research and development methodology formulated by one of the authors (Rothman, 1980), studies were systematically evaluated and synthesized. When a set of studies yielded consensus findings which converged on a given topic, these are presented in italicized form in the text as generalizations. The implications of findings for professional planning policy are given prominence and treated at appropriate points throughout the analysis.